In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: erofs: fix runtime warning on truncate_folio_batch_exceptionals() Commit 0e2f80afcfa6("fs/dax: ensure all pages are idle prior to filesystem unmount") introduced the WARN_ON_ONCE to capture whether the filesystem has removed all DAX entries or not and applied the fix to xfs and ext4. Apply the missed fix on erofs to fix the runtime warning: [ 5.266254] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 5.266274] WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 3109 at mm/truncate.c:89 truncate_folio_batch_exceptionals+0xff/0x260 [ 5.266294] Modules linked in: [ 5.266999] CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 3109 Comm: umount Tainted: G S 6.16.0+ #6 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 5.267012] Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC [ 5.267017] Hardware name: Dell Inc. OptiPlex 5000/05WXFV, BIOS 1.5.1 08/24/2022 [ 5.267024] RIP: 0010:truncate_folio_batch_exceptionals+0xff/0x260 [ 5.267076] Code: 00 00 41 39 df 7f 11 eb 78 83 c3 01 49 83 c4 08 41 39 df 74 6c 48 63 f3 48 83 fe 1f 0f 83 3c 01 00 00 43 f6 44 26 08 01 74 df <0f> 0b 4a 8b 34 22 4c 89 ef 48 89 55 90 e8 ff 54 1f 00 48 8b 55 90 [ 5.267083] RSP: 0018:ffffc900013f36c8 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 5.267095] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 5.267101] RDX: ffffc900013f3790 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8882a1407898 [ 5.267108] RBP: ffffc900013f3740 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 5.267113] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 5.267119] R13: ffff8882a1407ab8 R14: ffffc900013f3888 R15: 0000000000000001 [ 5.267125] FS: 00007aaa8b437800(0000) GS:ffff88850025b000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 5.267132] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 5.267138] CR2: 00007aaa8b3aac10 CR3: 000000024f764000 CR4: 0000000000f52ef0 [ 5.267144] PKRU: 55555554 [ 5.267150] Call Trace: [ 5.267154] <TASK> [ 5.267181] truncate_inode_pages_range+0x118/0x5e0 [ 5.267193] ? save_trace+0x54/0x390 [ 5.267296] truncate_inode_pages_final+0x43/0x60 [ 5.267309] evict+0x2a4/0x2c0 [ 5.267339] dispose_list+0x39/0x80 [ 5.267352] evict_inodes+0x150/0x1b0 [ 5.267376] generic_shutdown_super+0x41/0x180 [ 5.267390] kill_block_super+0x1b/0x50 [ 5.267402] erofs_kill_sb+0x81/0x90 [erofs] [ 5.267436] deactivate_locked_super+0x32/0xb0 [ 5.267450] deactivate_super+0x46/0x60 [ 5.267460] cleanup_mnt+0xc3/0x170 [ 5.267475] __cleanup_mnt+0x12/0x20 [ 5.267485] task_work_run+0x5d/0xb0 [ 5.267499] exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x144/0x170 [ 5.267512] do_syscall_64+0x2b9/0x7c0 [ 5.267523] ? __lock_acquire+0x665/0x2ce0 [ 5.267535] ? __lock_acquire+0x665/0x2ce0 [ 5.267560] ? lock_acquire+0xcd/0x300 [ 5.267573] ? find_held_lock+0x31/0x90 [ 5.267582] ? mntput_no_expire+0x97/0x4e0 [ 5.267606] ? mntput_no_expire+0xa1/0x4e0 [ 5.267625] ? mntput+0x24/0x50 [ 5.267634] ? path_put+0x1e/0x30 [ 5.267647] ? do_faccessat+0x120/0x2f0 [ 5.267677] ? do_syscall_64+0x1a2/0x7c0 [ 5.267686] ? from_kgid_munged+0x17/0x30 [ 5.267703] ? from_kuid_munged+0x13/0x30 [ 5.267711] ? __do_sys_getuid+0x3d/0x50 [ 5.267724] ? do_syscall_64+0x1a2/0x7c0 [ 5.267732] ? irqentry_exit+0x77/0xb0 [ 5.267743] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 [ 5.267752] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 [ 5.267765] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 5.267772] RIP: 0033:0x7aaa8b32a9fb [ 5.267781] Code: c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 f3 0f 1e fa 31 f6 e9 05 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8 a6 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 05 c3 0f 1f 40 00 48 8b 15 e9 83 0d 00 f7 d8 [ 5.267787] RSP: 002b:00007ffd7c4c9468 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6 [ 5.267796] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00005a61592a8b00 RCX: 00007aaa8b32a9fb [ 5.267802] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00005a61592b2080 [ 5.267806] RBP: 00007ffd7c4c9540 R08: 00007aaa8b403b20 R09: 0000000000000020 [ 5.267812] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005a61592a8c00 [ 5.267817] R13: 00000000 ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: rc: fix races with imon_disconnect() Syzbot reports a KASAN issue as below: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __create_pipe include/linux/usb.h:1945 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in send_packet+0xa2d/0xbc0 drivers/media/rc/imon.c:627 Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880256fb000 by task syz-executor314/4465 CPU: 2 PID: 4465 Comm: syz-executor314 Not tainted 6.0.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:317 [inline] print_report.cold+0x2ba/0x6e9 mm/kasan/report.c:433 kasan_report+0xb1/0x1e0 mm/kasan/report.c:495 __create_pipe include/linux/usb.h:1945 [inline] send_packet+0xa2d/0xbc0 drivers/media/rc/imon.c:627 vfd_write+0x2d9/0x550 drivers/media/rc/imon.c:991 vfs_write+0x2d7/0xdd0 fs/read_write.c:576 ksys_write+0x127/0x250 fs/read_write.c:631 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd The iMON driver improperly releases the usb_device reference in imon_disconnect without coordinating with active users of the device. Specifically, the fields usbdev_intf0 and usbdev_intf1 are not protected by the users counter (ictx->users). During probe, imon_init_intf0 or imon_init_intf1 increments the usb_device reference count depending on the interface. However, during disconnect, usb_put_dev is called unconditionally, regardless of actual usage. As a result, if vfd_write or other operations are still in progress after disconnect, this can lead to a use-after-free of the usb_device pointer. Thread 1 vfd_write Thread 2 imon_disconnect ... if usb_put_dev(ictx->usbdev_intf0) else usb_put_dev(ictx->usbdev_intf1) ... while send_packet if pipe = usb_sndintpipe( ictx->usbdev_intf0) UAF else pipe = usb_sndctrlpipe( ictx->usbdev_intf0, 0) UAF Guard access to usbdev_intf0 and usbdev_intf1 after disconnect by checking ictx->disconnected in all writer paths. Add early return with -ENODEV in send_packet(), vfd_write(), lcd_write() and display_open() if the device is no longer present. Set and read ictx->disconnected under ictx->lock to ensure memory synchronization. Acquire the lock in imon_disconnect() before setting the flag to synchronize with any ongoing operations. Ensure writers exit early and safely after disconnect before the USB core proceeds with cleanup. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: sun4i_can: populate ndo_change_mtu() to prevent buffer overflow Sending an PF_PACKET allows to bypass the CAN framework logic and to directly reach the xmit() function of a CAN driver. The only check which is performed by the PF_PACKET framework is to make sure that skb->len fits the interface's MTU. Unfortunately, because the sun4i_can driver does not populate its net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu(), it is possible for an attacker to configure an invalid MTU by doing, for example: $ ip link set can0 mtu 9999 After doing so, the attacker could open a PF_PACKET socket using the ETH_P_CANXL protocol: socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_CANXL)) to inject a malicious CAN XL frames. For example: struct canxl_frame frame = { .flags = 0xff, .len = 2048, }; The CAN drivers' xmit() function are calling can_dev_dropped_skb() to check that the skb is valid, unfortunately under above conditions, the malicious packet is able to go through can_dev_dropped_skb() checks: 1. the skb->protocol is set to ETH_P_CANXL which is valid (the function does not check the actual device capabilities). 2. the length is a valid CAN XL length. And so, sun4ican_start_xmit() receives a CAN XL frame which it is not able to correctly handle and will thus misinterpret it as a CAN frame. This can result in a buffer overflow. The driver will consume cf->len as-is with no further checks on this line: dlc = cf->len; Here, cf->len corresponds to the flags field of the CAN XL frame. In our previous example, we set canxl_frame->flags to 0xff. Because the maximum expected length is 8, a buffer overflow of 247 bytes occurs a couple line below when doing: for (i = 0; i < dlc; i++) writel(cf->data[i], priv->base + (dreg + i * 4)); Populate net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu() to ensure that the interface's MTU can not be set to anything bigger than CAN_MTU. By fixing the root cause, this prevents the buffer overflow.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: state: initialize state_ptrs earlier in xfrm_state_find In case of preemption, xfrm_state_look_at will find a different pcpu_id and look up states for that other CPU. If we matched a state for CPU2 in the state_cache while the lookup started on CPU1, we will jump to "found", but the "best" state that we got will be ignored and we will enter the "acquire" block. This block uses state_ptrs, which isn't initialized at this point. Let's initialize state_ptrs just after taking rcu_read_lock. This will also prevent a possible misuse in the future, if someone adjusts this function.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv, bpf: Sign extend struct ops return values properly The ns_bpf_qdisc selftest triggers a kernel panic: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffffffa38dbf58 Current test_progs pgtable: 4K pagesize, 57-bit VAs, pgdp=0x00000001109cc000 [ffffffffa38dbf58] pgd=000000011fffd801, p4d=000000011fffd401, pud=000000011fffd001, pmd=0000000000000000 Oops [#1] Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(OE) xt_conntrack nls_iso8859_1 [...] [last unloaded: bpf_testmod(OE)] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 23584 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G W OE 6.17.0-rc1-g2465bb83e0b4 #1 NONE Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: Unknown Unknown Product/Unknown Product, BIOS 2024.01+dfsg-1ubuntu5.1 01/01/2024 epc : __qdisc_run+0x82/0x6f0 ra : __qdisc_run+0x6e/0x6f0 epc : ffffffff80bd5c7a ra : ffffffff80bd5c66 sp : ff2000000eecb550 gp : ffffffff82472098 tp : ff60000096895940 t0 : ffffffff8001f180 t1 : ffffffff801e1664 t2 : 0000000000000000 s0 : ff2000000eecb5d0 s1 : ff60000093a6a600 a0 : ffffffffa38dbee8 a1 : 0000000000000001 a2 : ff2000000eecb510 a3 : 0000000000000001 a4 : 0000000000000000 a5 : 0000000000000010 a6 : 0000000000000000 a7 : 0000000000735049 s2 : ffffffffa38dbee8 s3 : 0000000000000040 s4 : ff6000008bcda000 s5 : 0000000000000008 s6 : ff60000093a6a680 s7 : ff60000093a6a6f0 s8 : ff60000093a6a6ac s9 : ff60000093140000 s10: 0000000000000000 s11: ff2000000eecb9d0 t3 : 0000000000000000 t4 : 0000000000ff0000 t5 : 0000000000000000 t6 : ff60000093a6a8b6 status: 0000000200000120 badaddr: ffffffffa38dbf58 cause: 000000000000000d [<ffffffff80bd5c7a>] __qdisc_run+0x82/0x6f0 [<ffffffff80b6fe58>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x4c0/0x1128 [<ffffffff80b80ae0>] neigh_resolve_output+0xd0/0x170 [<ffffffff80d2daf6>] ip6_finish_output2+0x226/0x6c8 [<ffffffff80d31254>] ip6_finish_output+0x10c/0x2a0 [<ffffffff80d31446>] ip6_output+0x5e/0x178 [<ffffffff80d2e232>] ip6_xmit+0x29a/0x608 [<ffffffff80d6f4c6>] inet6_csk_xmit+0xe6/0x140 [<ffffffff80c985e4>] __tcp_transmit_skb+0x45c/0xaa8 [<ffffffff80c995fe>] tcp_connect+0x9ce/0xd10 [<ffffffff80d66524>] tcp_v6_connect+0x4ac/0x5e8 [<ffffffff80cc19b8>] __inet_stream_connect+0xd8/0x318 [<ffffffff80cc1c36>] inet_stream_connect+0x3e/0x68 [<ffffffff80b42b20>] __sys_connect_file+0x50/0x88 [<ffffffff80b42bee>] __sys_connect+0x96/0xc8 [<ffffffff80b42c40>] __riscv_sys_connect+0x20/0x30 [<ffffffff80e5bcae>] do_trap_ecall_u+0x256/0x378 [<ffffffff80e69af2>] handle_exception+0x14a/0x156 Code: 892a 0363 1205 489c 8bc1 c7e5 2d03 084a 2703 080a (2783) 0709 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- The bpf_fifo_dequeue prog returns a skb which is a pointer. The pointer is treated as a 32bit value and sign extend to 64bit in epilogue. This behavior is right for most bpf prog types but wrong for struct ops which requires RISC-V ABI. So let's sign extend struct ops return values according to the function model and RISC-V ABI([0]). [0]: https://riscv.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/riscv-calling.pdf

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: lib/crypto: arm64/poly1305: Fix register corruption in no-SIMD contexts Restore the SIMD usability check that was removed by commit a59e5468a921 ("crypto: arm64/poly1305 - Add block-only interface"). This safety check is cheap and is well worth eliminating a footgun. While the Poly1305 functions should not be called when SIMD registers are unusable, if they are anyway, they should just do the right thing instead of corrupting random tasks' registers and/or computing incorrect MACs. Fixing this is also needed for poly1305_kunit to pass. Just use may_use_simd() instead of the original crypto_simd_usable(), since poly1305_kunit won't rely on crypto_simd_disabled_for_test.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64/entry: Mask DAIF in cpu_switch_to(), call_on_irq_stack() `cpu_switch_to()` and `call_on_irq_stack()` manipulate SP to change to different stacks along with the Shadow Call Stack if it is enabled. Those two stack changes cannot be done atomically and both functions can be interrupted by SErrors or Debug Exceptions which, though unlikely, is very much broken : if interrupted, we can end up with mismatched stacks and Shadow Call Stack leading to clobbered stacks. In `cpu_switch_to()`, it can happen when SP_EL0 points to the new task, but x18 stills points to the old task's SCS. When the interrupt handler tries to save the task's SCS pointer, it will save the old task SCS pointer (x18) into the new task struct (pointed to by SP_EL0), clobbering it. In `call_on_irq_stack()`, it can happen when switching from the task stack to the IRQ stack and when switching back. In both cases, we can be interrupted when the SCS pointer points to the IRQ SCS, but SP points to the task stack. The nested interrupt handler pushes its return addresses on the IRQ SCS. It then detects that SP points to the task stack, calls `call_on_irq_stack()` and clobbers the task SCS pointer with the IRQ SCS pointer, which it will also use ! This leads to tasks returning to addresses on the wrong SCS, or even on the IRQ SCS, triggering kernel panics via CONFIG_VMAP_STACK or FPAC if enabled. This is possible on a default config, but unlikely. However, when enabling CONFIG_ARM64_PSEUDO_NMI, DAIF is unmasked and instead the GIC is responsible for filtering what interrupts the CPU should receive based on priority. Given the goal of emulating NMIs, pseudo-NMIs can be received by the CPU even in `cpu_switch_to()` and `call_on_irq_stack()`, possibly *very* frequently depending on the system configuration and workload, leading to unpredictable kernel panics. Completely mask DAIF in `cpu_switch_to()` and restore it when returning. Do the same in `call_on_irq_stack()`, but restore and mask around the branch. Mask DAIF even if CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK is not enabled for consistency of behaviour between all configurations. Introduce and use an assembly macro for saving and masking DAIF, as the existing one saves but only masks IF.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/amd: Avoid stack buffer overflow from kernel cmdline While the kernel command line is considered trusted in most environments, avoid writing 1 byte past the end of "acpiid" if the "str" argument is maximum length.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: atm: atmtcp: Prevent arbitrary write in atmtcp_recv_control(). syzbot reported the splat below. [0] When atmtcp_v_open() or atmtcp_v_close() is called via connect() or close(), atmtcp_send_control() is called to send an in-kernel special message. The message has ATMTCP_HDR_MAGIC in atmtcp_control.hdr.length. Also, a pointer of struct atm_vcc is set to atmtcp_control.vcc. The notable thing is struct atmtcp_control is uAPI but has a space for an in-kernel pointer. struct atmtcp_control { struct atmtcp_hdr hdr; /* must be first */ ... atm_kptr_t vcc; /* both directions */ ... } __ATM_API_ALIGN; typedef struct { unsigned char _[8]; } __ATM_API_ALIGN atm_kptr_t; The special message is processed in atmtcp_recv_control() called from atmtcp_c_send(). atmtcp_c_send() is vcc->dev->ops->send() and called from 2 paths: 1. .ndo_start_xmit() (vcc->send() == atm_send_aal0()) 2. vcc_sendmsg() The problem is sendmsg() does not validate the message length and userspace can abuse atmtcp_recv_control() to overwrite any kptr by atmtcp_control. Let's add a new ->pre_send() hook to validate messages from sendmsg(). [0]: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00200000ab: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000000100000558-0x000000010000055f] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5865 Comm: syz-executor331 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1-syzkaller-00215-gbab3ce404553 #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/12/2025 RIP: 0010:atmtcp_recv_control drivers/atm/atmtcp.c:93 [inline] RIP: 0010:atmtcp_c_send+0x1da/0x950 drivers/atm/atmtcp.c:297 Code: 4d 8d 75 1a 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 42 0f b6 04 20 84 c0 0f 85 15 06 00 00 41 0f b7 1e 4d 8d b7 60 05 00 00 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 20 84 c0 0f 85 13 06 00 00 66 41 89 1e 4d 8d 75 1c 4c RSP: 0018:ffffc90003f5f810 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: 00000000200000ab RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88802a510000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: ffff888030a6068c RBP: ffff88802699fb40 R08: ffff888030a606eb R09: 1ffff1100614c0dd R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff8718fc40 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffff888030a60680 R14: 000000010000055f R15: 00000000ffffffff FS: 00007f8d7e9236c0(0000) GS:ffff888125c1c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000045ad50 CR3: 0000000075bde000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 Call Trace: <TASK> vcc_sendmsg+0xa10/0xc60 net/atm/common.c:645 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x219/0x270 net/socket.c:729 ____sys_sendmsg+0x505/0x830 net/socket.c:2614 ___sys_sendmsg+0x21f/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2668 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2700 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2705 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2703 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x19b/0x260 net/socket.c:2703 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f8d7e96a4a9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 51 18 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f8d7e923198 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f8d7e9f4308 RCX: 00007f8d7e96a4a9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000200000000240 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007f8d7e9f4300 R08: 65732f636f72702f R09: 65732f636f72702f R10: 65732f636f72702f R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f8d7e9c10ac R13: 00007f8d7e9231a0 R14: 0000200000000200 R15: 0000200000000250 </TASK> Modules linked in:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hfs: fix slab-out-of-bounds in hfs_bnode_read() This patch introduces is_bnode_offset_valid() method that checks the requested offset value. Also, it introduces check_and_correct_requested_length() method that checks and correct the requested length (if it is necessary). These methods are used in hfs_bnode_read(), hfs_bnode_write(), hfs_bnode_clear(), hfs_bnode_copy(), and hfs_bnode_move() with the goal to prevent the access out of allocated memory and triggering the crash.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFS: Fix a race when updating an existing write After nfs_lock_and_join_requests() tests for whether the request is still attached to the mapping, nothing prevents a call to nfs_inode_remove_request() from succeeding until we actually lock the page group. The reason is that whoever called nfs_inode_remove_request() doesn't necessarily have a lock on the page group head. So in order to avoid races, let's take the page group lock earlier in nfs_lock_and_join_requests(), and hold it across the removal of the request in nfs_inode_remove_request().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe: Make dma-fences compliant with the safe access rules Xe can free some of the data pointed to by the dma-fences it exports. Most notably the timeline name can get freed if userspace closes the associated submit queue. At the same time the fence could have been exported to a third party (for example a sync_fence fd) which will then cause an use- after-free on subsequent access. To make this safe we need to make the driver compliant with the newly documented dma-fence rules. Driver has to ensure a RCU grace period between signalling a fence and freeing any data pointed to by said fence. For the timeline name we simply make the queue be freed via kfree_rcu and for the shared lock associated with multiple queues we add a RCU grace period before freeing the per GT structure holding the lock.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: Add sanity check for file name The length of the file name should be smaller than the directory entry size.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: efi: stmm: Fix incorrect buffer allocation method The communication buffer allocated by setup_mm_hdr() is later on passed to tee_shm_register_kernel_buf(). The latter expects those buffers to be contiguous pages, but setup_mm_hdr() just uses kmalloc(). That can cause various corruptions or BUGs, specifically since commit 9aec2fb0fd5e ("slab: allocate frozen pages"), though it was broken before as well. Fix this by using alloc_pages_exact() instead of kmalloc().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RISC-V: KVM: fix stack overrun when loading vlenb The userspace load can put up to 2048 bits into an xlen bit stack buffer. We want only xlen bits, so check the size beforehand.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: venus: Add a check for packet size after reading from shared memory Add a check to ensure that the packet size does not exceed the number of available words after reading the packet header from shared memory. This ensures that the size provided by the firmware is safe to process and prevent potential out-of-bounds memory access.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sparc: fix accurate exception reporting in copy_{from_to}_user for Niagara The referenced commit introduced exception handlers on user-space memory references in copy_from_user and copy_to_user. These handlers return from the respective function and calculate the remaining bytes left to copy using the current register contents. This commit fixes a couple of bad calculations and a broken epilogue in the exception handlers. This will prevent crashes and ensure correct return values of copy_from_user and copy_to_user in the faulting case. The behaviour of memcpy stays unchanged.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: increase scan_ies_len for S1G Currently the S1G capability element is not taken into account for the scan_ies_len, which leads to a buffer length validation failure in ieee80211_prep_hw_scan() and subsequent WARN in __ieee80211_start_scan(). This prevents hw scanning from functioning. To fix ensure we accommodate for the S1G capability length.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/msm: Fix obj leak in VM_BIND error path If we fail a handle-lookup part way thru, we need to drop the already obtained obj references. Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/669784/

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: light: Add check for array bounds in veml6075_read_int_time_ms The array contains only 5 elements, but the index calculated by veml6075_read_int_time_index can range from 0 to 7, which could lead to out-of-bounds access. The check prevents this issue. Coverity Issue CID 1574309: (#1 of 1): Out-of-bounds read (OVERRUN) overrun-local: Overrunning array veml6075_it_ms of 5 4-byte elements at element index 7 (byte offset 31) using index int_index (which evaluates to 7) This is hardening against potentially broken hardware. Good to have but not necessary to backport.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: fix potential out-of-bound write The buffer is set to 20 characters. If a caller write more characters, count is truncated to the max available space in "simple_write_to_buffer". To protect from OoB access, check that the input size fit into buffer and add a zero terminator after copy to the end of the copied data.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: proc: use the same treatment to check proc_lseek as ones for proc_read_iter et.al Check pde->proc_ops->proc_lseek directly may cause UAF in rmmod scenario. It's a gap in proc_reg_open() after commit 654b33ada4ab("proc: fix UAF in proc_get_inode()"). Followed by AI Viro's suggestion, fix it in same manner.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: soc: qcom: mdt_loader: Ensure we don't read past the ELF header When the MDT loader is used in remoteproc, the ELF header is sanitized beforehand, but that's not necessary the case for other clients. Validate the size of the firmware buffer to ensure that we don't read past the end as we iterate over the header. e_phentsize and e_shentsize are validated as well, to ensure that the assumptions about step size in the traversal are valid.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sparc: fix accurate exception reporting in copy_{from_to}_user for UltraSPARC III Anthony Yznaga tracked down that a BUG_ON in ext4 code with large folios enabled resulted from copy_from_user() returning impossibly large values greater than the size to be copied. This lead to __copy_from_iter() returning impossible values instead of the actual number of bytes it was able to copy. The BUG_ON has been reported in https://lore.kernel.org/r/b14f55642207e63e907965e209f6323a0df6dcee.camel@physik.fu-berlin.de The referenced commit introduced exception handlers on user-space memory references in copy_from_user and copy_to_user. These handlers return from the respective function and calculate the remaining bytes left to copy using the current register contents. The exception handlers expect that %o2 has already been masked during the bulk copy loop, but the masking was performed after that loop. This will fix the return value of copy_from_user and copy_to_user in the faulting case. The behaviour of memcpy stays unchanged.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: kcm: Fix race condition in kcm_unattach() syzbot found a race condition when kcm_unattach(psock) and kcm_release(kcm) are executed at the same time. kcm_unattach() is missing a check of the flag kcm->tx_stopped before calling queue_work(). If the kcm has a reserved psock, kcm_unattach() might get executed between cancel_work_sync() and unreserve_psock() in kcm_release(), requeuing kcm->tx_work right before kcm gets freed in kcm_done(). Remove kcm->tx_stopped and replace it by the less error-prone disable_work_sync().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/ksm: fix flag-dropping behavior in ksm_madvise syzkaller discovered the following crash: (kernel BUG) [ 44.607039] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 44.607422] kernel BUG at mm/userfaultfd.c:2067! [ 44.608148] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI [ 44.608814] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2475 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 6.16.0-rc6 #1 PREEMPT(none) [ 44.609635] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 44.610695] RIP: 0010:userfaultfd_release_all+0x3a8/0x460 <snip other registers, drop unreliable trace> [ 44.617726] Call Trace: [ 44.617926] <TASK> [ 44.619284] userfaultfd_release+0xef/0x1b0 [ 44.620976] __fput+0x3f9/0xb60 [ 44.621240] fput_close_sync+0x110/0x210 [ 44.622222] __x64_sys_close+0x8f/0x120 [ 44.622530] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x2f0 [ 44.622840] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 44.623244] RIP: 0033:0x7f365bb3f227 Kernel panics because it detects UFFD inconsistency during userfaultfd_release_all(). Specifically, a VMA which has a valid pointer to vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx, but no UFFD flags in vma->vm_flags. The inconsistency is caused in ksm_madvise(): when user calls madvise() with MADV_UNMEARGEABLE on a VMA that is registered for UFFD in MINOR mode, it accidentally clears all flags stored in the upper 32 bits of vma->vm_flags. Assuming x86_64 kernel build, unsigned long is 64-bit and unsigned int and int are 32-bit wide. This setup causes the following mishap during the &= ~VM_MERGEABLE assignment. VM_MERGEABLE is a 32-bit constant of type unsigned int, 0x8000'0000. After ~ is applied, it becomes 0x7fff'ffff unsigned int, which is then promoted to unsigned long before the & operation. This promotion fills upper 32 bits with leading 0s, as we're doing unsigned conversion (and even for a signed conversion, this wouldn't help as the leading bit is 0). & operation thus ends up AND-ing vm_flags with 0x0000'0000'7fff'ffff instead of intended 0xffff'ffff'7fff'ffff and hence accidentally clears the upper 32-bits of its value. Fix it by changing `VM_MERGEABLE` constant to unsigned long, using the BIT() macro. Note: other VM_* flags are not affected: This only happens to the VM_MERGEABLE flag, as the other VM_* flags are all constants of type int and after ~ operation, they end up with leading 1 and are thus converted to unsigned long with leading 1s. Note 2: After commit 31defc3b01d9 ("userfaultfd: remove (VM_)BUG_ON()s"), this is no longer a kernel BUG, but a WARNING at the same place: [ 45.595973] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2474 at mm/userfaultfd.c:2067 but the root-cause (flag-drop) remains the same. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: rust bindgen wasn't able to handle BIT(), from Miguel]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: usb-audio: Validate UAC3 power domain descriptors, too UAC3 power domain descriptors need to be verified with its variable bLength for avoiding the unexpected OOB accesses by malicious firmware, too.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/vmwgfx: Fix Use-after-free in validation Nodes stored in the validation duplicates hashtable come from an arena allocator that is cleared at the end of vmw_execbuf_process. All nodes are expected to be cleared in vmw_validation_drop_ht but this node escaped because its resource was destroyed prematurely.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: ufs: exynos: Fix programming of HCI_UTRL_NEXUS_TYPE On Google gs101, the number of UTP transfer request slots (nutrs) is 32, and in this case the driver ends up programming the UTRL_NEXUS_TYPE incorrectly as 0. This is because the left hand side of the shift is 1, which is of type int, i.e. 31 bits wide. Shifting by more than that width results in undefined behaviour. Fix this by switching to the BIT() macro, which applies correct type casting as required. This ensures the correct value is written to UTRL_NEXUS_TYPE (0xffffffff on gs101), and it also fixes a UBSAN shift warning: UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in drivers/ufs/host/ufs-exynos.c:1113:21 shift exponent 32 is too large for 32-bit type 'int' For consistency, apply the same change to the nutmrs / UTMRL_NEXUS_TYPE write.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: zram: fix slot write race condition Parallel concurrent writes to the same zram index result in leaked zsmalloc handles. Schematically we can have something like this: CPU0 CPU1 zram_slot_lock() zs_free(handle) zram_slot_lock() zram_slot_lock() zs_free(handle) zram_slot_lock() compress compress handle = zs_malloc() handle = zs_malloc() zram_slot_lock zram_set_handle(handle) zram_slot_lock zram_slot_lock zram_set_handle(handle) zram_slot_lock Either CPU0 or CPU1 zsmalloc handle will leak because zs_free() is done too early. In fact, we need to reset zram entry right before we set its new handle, all under the same slot lock scope.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drbd: add missing kref_get in handle_write_conflicts With `two-primaries` enabled, DRBD tries to detect "concurrent" writes and handle write conflicts, so that even if you write to the same sector simultaneously on both nodes, they end up with the identical data once the writes are completed. In handling "superseeded" writes, we forgot a kref_get, resulting in a premature drbd_destroy_device and use after free, and further to kernel crashes with symptoms. Relevance: No one should use DRBD as a random data generator, and apparently all users of "two-primaries" handle concurrent writes correctly on layer up. That is cluster file systems use some distributed lock manager, and live migration in virtualization environments stops writes on one node before starting writes on the other node. Which means that other than for "test cases", this code path is never taken in real life. FYI, in DRBD 9, things are handled differently nowadays. We still detect "write conflicts", but no longer try to be smart about them. We decided to disconnect hard instead: upper layers must not submit concurrent writes. If they do, that's their fault.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/waitid: always prune wait queue entry in io_waitid_wait() For a successful return, always remove our entry from the wait queue entry list. Previously this was skipped if a cancelation was in progress, but this can race with another invocation of the wait queue entry callback.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: dev_ioctl: take ops lock in hwtstamp lower paths ndo hwtstamp callbacks are expected to run under the per-device ops lock. Make the lower get/set paths consistent with the rest of ndo invocations. Kernel log: WARNING: CPU: 13 PID: 51364 at ./include/net/netdev_lock.h:70 __netdev_update_features+0x4bd/0xe60 ... RIP: 0010:__netdev_update_features+0x4bd/0xe60 ... Call Trace: <TASK> netdev_update_features+0x1f/0x60 mlx5_hwtstamp_set+0x181/0x290 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_hwtstamp_set+0x19/0x30 [mlx5_core] dev_set_hwtstamp_phylib+0x9f/0x220 dev_set_hwtstamp_phylib+0x9f/0x220 dev_set_hwtstamp+0x13d/0x240 dev_ioctl+0x12f/0x4b0 sock_ioctl+0x171/0x370 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x3f7/0x900 ? __sys_setsockopt+0x69/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x6f/0x2e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 ... </TASK> .... ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Note that the mlx5_hwtstamp_set and mlx5e_hwtstamp_set functions shown in the trace come from an in progress patch converting the legacy ioctl to ndo_hwtstamp_get/set and are not present in mainline.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Enforce expected_attach_type for tailcall compatibility Yinhao et al. recently reported: Our fuzzer tool discovered an uninitialized pointer issue in the bpf_prog_test_run_xdp() function within the Linux kernel's BPF subsystem. This leads to a NULL pointer dereference when a BPF program attempts to deference the txq member of struct xdp_buff object. The test initializes two programs of BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP: progA acts as the entry point for bpf_prog_test_run_xdp() and its expected_attach_type can neither be of be BPF_XDP_DEVMAP nor BPF_XDP_CPUMAP. progA calls into a slot of a tailcall map it owns. progB's expected_attach_type must be BPF_XDP_DEVMAP to pass xdp_is_valid_access() validation. The program returns struct xdp_md's egress_ifindex, and the latter is only allowed to be accessed under mentioned expected_attach_type. progB is then inserted into the tailcall which progA calls. The underlying issue goes beyond XDP though. Another example are programs of type BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR. sock_addr_is_valid_access() as well as sock_addr_func_proto() have different logic depending on the programs' expected_attach_type. Similarly, a program attached to BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETPEERNAME should not be allowed doing a tailcall into a program which calls bpf_bind() out of BPF which is only enabled for BPF_CGROUP_INET4_CONNECT. In short, specifying expected_attach_type allows to open up additional functionality or restrictions beyond what the basic bpf_prog_type enables. The use of tailcalls must not violate these constraints. Fix it by enforcing expected_attach_type in __bpf_prog_map_compatible(). Note that we only enforce this for tailcall maps, but not for BPF devmaps or cpumaps: There, the programs are invoked through dev_map_bpf_prog_run*() and cpu_map_bpf_prog_run*() which set up a new environment / context and therefore these situations are not prone to this issue.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: lib/crypto: arm/poly1305: Fix register corruption in no-SIMD contexts Restore the SIMD usability check that was removed by commit 773426f4771b ("crypto: arm/poly1305 - Add block-only interface"). This safety check is cheap and is well worth eliminating a footgun. While the Poly1305 functions should not be called when SIMD registers are unusable, if they are anyway, they should just do the right thing instead of corrupting random tasks' registers and/or computing incorrect MACs. Fixing this is also needed for poly1305_kunit to pass. Just use may_use_simd() instead of the original crypto_simd_usable(), since poly1305_kunit won't rely on crypto_simd_disabled_for_test.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: Block access to folio overlimit syz reported a slab-out-of-bounds Write in fuse_dev_do_write. When the number of bytes to be retrieved is truncated to the upper limit by fc->max_pages and there is an offset, the oob is triggered. Add a loop termination condition to prevent overruns.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbcon: fix integer overflow in fbcon_do_set_font Fix integer overflow vulnerabilities in fbcon_do_set_font() where font size calculations could overflow when handling user-controlled font parameters. The vulnerabilities occur when: 1. CALC_FONTSZ(h, pitch, charcount) performs h * pith * charcount multiplication with user-controlled values that can overflow. 2. FONT_EXTRA_WORDS * sizeof(int) + size addition can also overflow 3. This results in smaller allocations than expected, leading to buffer overflows during font data copying. Add explicit overflow checking using check_mul_overflow() and check_add_overflow() kernel helpers to safety validate all size calculations before allocation.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: um: virtio_uml: Fix use-after-free after put_device in probe When register_virtio_device() fails in virtio_uml_probe(), the code sets vu_dev->registered = 1 even though the device was not successfully registered. This can lead to use-after-free or other issues.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hfsplus: fix slab-out-of-bounds in hfsplus_bnode_read() The hfsplus_bnode_read() method can trigger the issue: [ 174.852007][ T9784] ================================================================== [ 174.852709][ T9784] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hfsplus_bnode_read+0x2f4/0x360 [ 174.853412][ T9784] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810b5fc6c0 by task repro/9784 [ 174.854059][ T9784] [ 174.854272][ T9784] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 9784 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3 #7 PREEMPT(full) [ 174.854281][ T9784] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 174.854286][ T9784] Call Trace: [ 174.854289][ T9784] <TASK> [ 174.854292][ T9784] dump_stack_lvl+0x10e/0x1f0 [ 174.854305][ T9784] print_report+0xd0/0x660 [ 174.854315][ T9784] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x81/0x610 [ 174.854323][ T9784] ? __phys_addr+0xe8/0x180 [ 174.854330][ T9784] ? hfsplus_bnode_read+0x2f4/0x360 [ 174.854337][ T9784] kasan_report+0xc6/0x100 [ 174.854346][ T9784] ? hfsplus_bnode_read+0x2f4/0x360 [ 174.854354][ T9784] hfsplus_bnode_read+0x2f4/0x360 [ 174.854362][ T9784] hfsplus_bnode_dump+0x2ec/0x380 [ 174.854370][ T9784] ? __pfx_hfsplus_bnode_dump+0x10/0x10 [ 174.854377][ T9784] ? hfsplus_bnode_write_u16+0x83/0xb0 [ 174.854385][ T9784] ? srcu_gp_start+0xd0/0x310 [ 174.854393][ T9784] ? __mark_inode_dirty+0x29e/0xe40 [ 174.854402][ T9784] hfsplus_brec_remove+0x3d2/0x4e0 [ 174.854411][ T9784] __hfsplus_delete_attr+0x290/0x3a0 [ 174.854419][ T9784] ? __pfx_hfs_find_1st_rec_by_cnid+0x10/0x10 [ 174.854427][ T9784] ? __pfx___hfsplus_delete_attr+0x10/0x10 [ 174.854436][ T9784] ? __asan_memset+0x23/0x50 [ 174.854450][ T9784] hfsplus_delete_all_attrs+0x262/0x320 [ 174.854459][ T9784] ? __pfx_hfsplus_delete_all_attrs+0x10/0x10 [ 174.854469][ T9784] ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xc0 [ 174.854476][ T9784] ? __mark_inode_dirty+0x29e/0xe40 [ 174.854483][ T9784] hfsplus_delete_cat+0x845/0xde0 [ 174.854493][ T9784] ? __pfx_hfsplus_delete_cat+0x10/0x10 [ 174.854507][ T9784] hfsplus_unlink+0x1ca/0x7c0 [ 174.854516][ T9784] ? __pfx_hfsplus_unlink+0x10/0x10 [ 174.854525][ T9784] ? down_write+0x148/0x200 [ 174.854532][ T9784] ? __pfx_down_write+0x10/0x10 [ 174.854540][ T9784] vfs_unlink+0x2fe/0x9b0 [ 174.854549][ T9784] do_unlinkat+0x490/0x670 [ 174.854557][ T9784] ? __pfx_do_unlinkat+0x10/0x10 [ 174.854565][ T9784] ? __might_fault+0xbc/0x130 [ 174.854576][ T9784] ? getname_flags.part.0+0x1c5/0x550 [ 174.854584][ T9784] __x64_sys_unlink+0xc5/0x110 [ 174.854592][ T9784] do_syscall_64+0xc9/0x480 [ 174.854600][ T9784] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 174.854608][ T9784] RIP: 0033:0x7f6fdf4c3167 [ 174.854614][ T9784] Code: f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 26 0d 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 08 [ 174.854622][ T9784] RSP: 002b:00007ffcb948bca8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000057 [ 174.854630][ T9784] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f6fdf4c3167 [ 174.854636][ T9784] RDX: 00007ffcb948bcc0 RSI: 00007ffcb948bcc0 RDI: 00007ffcb948bd50 [ 174.854641][ T9784] RBP: 00007ffcb948cd90 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffcb948bb40 [ 174.854645][ T9784] R10: 00007f6fdf564fc0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000561e1bc9c2d0 [ 174.854650][ T9784] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 174.854658][ T9784] </TASK> [ 174.854661][ T9784] [ 174.879281][ T9784] Allocated by task 9784: [ 174.879664][ T9784] kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 [ 174.880082][ T9784] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 174.880500][ T9784] __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 [ 174.880908][ T9784] __kmalloc_noprof+0x205/0x550 [ 174.881337][ T9784] __hfs_bnode_create+0x107/0x890 [ 174.881779][ T9784] hfsplus_bnode_find+0x2d0/0xd10 [ 174.882222][ T9784] hfsplus_brec_find+0x2b0/0x520 [ 174.882659][ T9784] hfsplus_delete_all_attrs+0x23b/0x3 ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse-uring: Avoid use-after-free in fuse_uring_async_stop_queues fuse_uring_async_stop_queues() might run when the last reference on ring->queue_refs was already dropped. In order to avoid an early destruction a reference on struct fuse_conn is now taken before starting fuse_uring_async_stop_queues() and that reference is only released when that delayed work queue terminates.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: idxd: Fix double free in idxd_setup_wqs() The clean up in idxd_setup_wqs() has had a couple bugs because the error handling is a bit subtle. It's simpler to just re-write it in a cleaner way. The issues here are: 1) If "idxd->max_wqs" is <= 0 then we call put_device(conf_dev) when "conf_dev" hasn't been initialized. 2) If kzalloc_node() fails then again "conf_dev" is invalid. It's either uninitialized or it points to the "conf_dev" from the previous iteration so it leads to a double free. It's better to free partial loop iterations within the loop and then the unwinding at the end can handle whole loop iterations. I also renamed the labels to describe what the goto does and not where the goto was located.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf: arm_spe: Prevent overflow in PERF_IDX2OFF() Cast nr_pages to unsigned long to avoid overflow when handling large AUX buffer sizes (>= 2 GiB).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_tables: reject duplicate device on updates A chain/flowtable update with duplicated devices in the same batch is possible. Unfortunately, netdev event path only removes the first device that is found, leaving unregistered the hook of the duplicated device. Check if a duplicated device exists in the transaction batch, bail out with EEXIST in such case. WARNING is hit when unregistering the hook: [49042.221275] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 8425 at net/netfilter/core.c:340 nf_hook_entry_head+0xaa/0x150 [49042.221375] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 8425 Comm: nft Tainted: G S 6.16.0+ #170 PREEMPT(full) [...] [49042.221382] RIP: 0010:nf_hook_entry_head+0xaa/0x150

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: jfs: truncate good inode pages when hard link is 0 The fileset value of the inode copy from the disk by the reproducer is AGGR_RESERVED_I. When executing evict, its hard link number is 0, so its inode pages are not truncated. This causes the bugon to be triggered when executing clear_inode() because nrpages is greater than 0.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_rndis: Refactor bind path to use __free() After an bind/unbind cycle, the rndis->notify_req is left stale. If a subsequent bind fails, the unified error label attempts to free this stale request, leading to a NULL pointer dereference when accessing ep->ops->free_request. Refactor the error handling in the bind path to use the __free() automatic cleanup mechanism.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: fix race condition validating r_parent before applying state Add validation to ensure the cached parent directory inode matches the directory info in MDS replies. This prevents client-side race conditions where concurrent operations (e.g. rename) cause r_parent to become stale between request initiation and reply processing, which could lead to applying state changes to incorrect directory inodes. [ idryomov: folded a kerneldoc fixup and a follow-up fix from Alex to move CEPH_CAP_PIN reference when r_parent is updated: When the parent directory lock is not held, req->r_parent can become stale and is updated to point to the correct inode. However, the associated CEPH_CAP_PIN reference was not being adjusted. The CEPH_CAP_PIN is a reference on an inode that is tracked for accounting purposes. Moving this pin is important to keep the accounting balanced. When the pin was not moved from the old parent to the new one, it created two problems: The reference on the old, stale parent was never released, causing a reference leak. A reference for the new parent was never acquired, creating the risk of a reference underflow later in ceph_mdsc_release_request(). This patch corrects the logic by releasing the pin from the old parent and acquiring it for the new parent when r_parent is switched. This ensures reference accounting stays balanced. ]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/hisilicon/hibmc: fix irq_request()'s irq name variable is local The local variable is passed in request_irq (), and there will be use after free problem, which will make request_irq failed. Using the global irq name instead of it to fix.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smc: Use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu() in in smc_clc_prfx_set(). smc_clc_prfx_set() is called during connect() and not under RCU nor RTNL. Using sk_dst_get(sk)->dev could trigger UAF. Let's use __sk_dst_get() and dev_dst_rcu() under rcu_read_lock() after kernel_getsockname(). Note that the returned value of smc_clc_prfx_set() is not used in the caller. While at it, we change the 1st arg of smc_clc_prfx_set[46]_rcu() not to touch dst there.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/mediatek: fix potential OF node use-after-free The for_each_child_of_node() helper drops the reference it takes to each node as it iterates over children and an explicit of_node_put() is only needed when exiting the loop early. Drop the recently introduced bogus additional reference count decrement at each iteration that could potentially lead to a use-after-free.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath11k: fix sleeping-in-atomic in ath11k_mac_op_set_bitrate_mask() ath11k_mac_disable_peer_fixed_rate() is passed as the iterator to ieee80211_iterate_stations_atomic(). Note in this case the iterator is required to be atomic, however ath11k_mac_disable_peer_fixed_rate() does not follow it as it might sleep. Consequently below warning is seen: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at wmi.c:304 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl __might_resched.cold ath11k_wmi_cmd_send ath11k_wmi_set_peer_param ath11k_mac_disable_peer_fixed_rate ieee80211_iterate_stations_atomic ath11k_mac_op_set_bitrate_mask.cold Change to ieee80211_iterate_stations_mtx() to fix this issue. Tested-on: WCN6855 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HSP.1.1-03125-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_LITE-3.6510.30