In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm rq: fix double free of blk_mq_tag_set in dev remove after table load fails When loading a device-mapper table for a request-based mapped device, and the allocation/initialization of the blk_mq_tag_set for the device fails, a following device remove will cause a double free. E.g. (dmesg): device-mapper: core: Cannot initialize queue for request-based dm-mq mapped device device-mapper: ioctl: unable to set up device queue for new table. Unable to handle kernel pointer dereference in virtual kernel address space Failing address: 0305e098835de000 TEID: 0305e098835de803 Fault in home space mode while using kernel ASCE. AS:000000025efe0007 R3:0000000000000024 Oops: 0038 ilc:3 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: ... lots of modules ... Supported: Yes, External CPU: 0 PID: 7348 Comm: multipathd Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W X 5.3.18-53-default #1 SLE15-SP3 Hardware name: IBM 8561 T01 7I2 (LPAR) Krnl PSW : 0704e00180000000 000000025e368eca (kfree+0x42/0x330) R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:2 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 Krnl GPRS: 000000000000004a 000000025efe5230 c1773200d779968d 0000000000000000 000000025e520270 000000025e8d1b40 0000000000000003 00000007aae10000 000000025e5202a2 0000000000000001 c1773200d779968d 0305e098835de640 00000007a8170000 000003ff80138650 000000025e5202a2 000003e00396faa8 Krnl Code: 000000025e368eb8: c4180041e100 lgrl %r1,25eba50b8 000000025e368ebe: ecba06b93a55 risbg %r11,%r10,6,185,58 #000000025e368ec4: e3b010000008 ag %r11,0(%r1) >000000025e368eca: e310b0080004 lg %r1,8(%r11) 000000025e368ed0: a7110001 tmll %r1,1 000000025e368ed4: a7740129 brc 7,25e369126 000000025e368ed8: e320b0080004 lg %r2,8(%r11) 000000025e368ede: b904001b lgr %r1,%r11 Call Trace: [<000000025e368eca>] kfree+0x42/0x330 [<000000025e5202a2>] blk_mq_free_tag_set+0x72/0xb8 [<000003ff801316a8>] dm_mq_cleanup_mapped_device+0x38/0x50 [dm_mod] [<000003ff80120082>] free_dev+0x52/0xd0 [dm_mod] [<000003ff801233f0>] __dm_destroy+0x150/0x1d0 [dm_mod] [<000003ff8012bb9a>] dev_remove+0x162/0x1c0 [dm_mod] [<000003ff8012a988>] ctl_ioctl+0x198/0x478 [dm_mod] [<000003ff8012ac8a>] dm_ctl_ioctl+0x22/0x38 [dm_mod] [<000000025e3b11ee>] ksys_ioctl+0xbe/0xe0 [<000000025e3b127a>] __s390x_sys_ioctl+0x2a/0x40 [<000000025e8c15ac>] system_call+0xd8/0x2c8 Last Breaking-Event-Address: [<000000025e52029c>] blk_mq_free_tag_set+0x6c/0xb8 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oops When allocation/initialization of the blk_mq_tag_set fails in dm_mq_init_request_queue(), it is uninitialized/freed, but the pointer is not reset to NULL; so when dev_remove() later gets into dm_mq_cleanup_mapped_device() it sees the pointer and tries to uninitialize and free it again. Fix this by setting the pointer to NULL in dm_mq_init_request_queue() error-handling. Also set it to NULL in dm_mq_cleanup_mapped_device().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cachefiles: fix incorrect dentry refcount in cachefiles_cull() The patch mentioned below changed cachefiles_bury_object() to expect 2 references to the 'rep' dentry. Three of the callers were changed to use start_removing_dentry() which takes an extra reference so in those cases the call gets the expected references. However there is another call to cachefiles_bury_object() in cachefiles_cull() which did not need to be changed to use start_removing_dentry() and so was not properly considered. It still passed the dentry with just one reference so the net result is that a reference is lost. To meet the expectations of cachefiles_bury_object(), cachefiles_cull() must take an extra reference before the call. It will be dropped by cachefiles_bury_object().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: nexthop: fix percpu use-after-free in remove_nh_grp_entry When removing a nexthop from a group, remove_nh_grp_entry() publishes the new group via rcu_assign_pointer() then immediately frees the removed entry's percpu stats with free_percpu(). However, the synchronize_net() grace period in the caller remove_nexthop_from_groups() runs after the free. RCU readers that entered before the publish still see the old group and can dereference the freed stats via nh_grp_entry_stats_inc() -> get_cpu_ptr(nhge->stats), causing a use-after-free on percpu memory. Fix by deferring the free_percpu() until after synchronize_net() in the caller. Removed entries are chained via nh_list onto a local deferred free list. After the grace period completes and all RCU readers have finished, the percpu stats are safely freed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: usb-audio: Add sanity check for OOB writes at silencing At silencing the playback URB packets in the implicit fb mode before the actual playback, we blindly assume that the received packets fit with the buffer size. But when the setup in the capture stream differs from the playback stream (e.g. due to the USB core limitation of max packet size), such an inconsistency may lead to OOB writes to the buffer, resulting in a crash. For addressing it, add a sanity check of the transfer buffer size at prepare_silent_urb(), and stop the data copy if the received data overflows. Also, report back the transfer error properly from there, too. Note that this doesn't fix the root cause of the playback error itself, but this merely covers the kernel Oops.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Reset register ID for BPF_END value tracking When a register undergoes a BPF_END (byte swap) operation, its scalar value is mutated in-place. If this register previously shared a scalar ID with another register (e.g., after an `r1 = r0` assignment), this tie must be broken. Currently, the verifier misses resetting `dst_reg->id` to 0 for BPF_END. Consequently, if a conditional jump checks the swapped register, the verifier incorrectly propagates the learned bounds to the linked register, leading to false confidence in the linked register's value and potentially allowing out-of-bounds memory accesses. Fix this by explicitly resetting `dst_reg->id` to 0 in the BPF_END case to break the scalar tie, similar to how BPF_NEG handles it via `__mark_reg_known`.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_conntrack_helper: pass helper to expect cleanup nf_conntrack_helper_unregister() calls nf_ct_expect_iterate_destroy() to remove expectations belonging to the helper being unregistered. However, it passes NULL instead of the helper pointer as the data argument, so expect_iter_me() never matches any expectation and all of them survive the cleanup. After unregister returns, nfnl_cthelper_del() frees the helper object immediately. Subsequent expectation dumps or packet-driven init_conntrack() calls then dereference the freed exp->helper, causing a use-after-free. Pass the actual helper pointer so expectations referencing it are properly destroyed before the helper object is freed. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in string+0x38f/0x430 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888003b14d20 by task poc/103 Call Trace: string+0x38f/0x430 vsnprintf+0x3cc/0x1170 seq_printf+0x17a/0x240 exp_seq_show+0x2e5/0x560 seq_read_iter+0x419/0x1280 proc_reg_read+0x1ac/0x270 vfs_read+0x179/0x930 ksys_read+0xef/0x1c0 Freed by task 103: The buggy address is located 32 bytes inside of freed 192-byte region [ffff888003b14d00, ffff888003b14dc0)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: usb: kaweth: remove TX queue manipulation in kaweth_set_rx_mode kaweth_set_rx_mode(), the ndo_set_rx_mode callback, calls netif_stop_queue() and netif_wake_queue(). These are TX queue flow control functions unrelated to RX multicast configuration. The premature netif_wake_queue() can re-enable TX while tx_urb is still in-flight, leading to a double usb_submit_urb() on the same URB: kaweth_start_xmit() { netif_stop_queue(); usb_submit_urb(kaweth->tx_urb); } kaweth_set_rx_mode() { netif_stop_queue(); netif_wake_queue(); // wakes TX queue before URB is done } kaweth_start_xmit() { netif_stop_queue(); usb_submit_urb(kaweth->tx_urb); // URB submitted while active } This triggers the WARN in usb_submit_urb(): "URB submitted while active" This is a similar class of bug fixed in rtl8150 by - commit 958baf5eaee3 ("net: usb: Remove disruptive netif_wake_queue in rtl8150_set_multicast"). Also kaweth_set_rx_mode() is already functionally broken, the real set_rx_mode action is performed by kaweth_async_set_rx_mode(), which in turn is not a no-op only at ndo_open() time.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: fix out-of-bounds write in ocfs2_write_end_inline KASAN reports a use-after-free write of 4086 bytes in ocfs2_write_end_inline, called from ocfs2_write_end_nolock during a copy_file_range splice fallback on a corrupted ocfs2 filesystem mounted on a loop device. The actual bug is an out-of-bounds write past the inode block buffer, not a true use-after-free. The write overflows into an adjacent freed page, which KASAN reports as UAF. The root cause is that ocfs2_try_to_write_inline_data trusts the on-disk id_count field to determine whether a write fits in inline data. On a corrupted filesystem, id_count can exceed the physical maximum inline data capacity, causing writes to overflow the inode block buffer. Call trace (crash path): vfs_copy_file_range (fs/read_write.c:1634) do_splice_direct splice_direct_to_actor iter_file_splice_write ocfs2_file_write_iter generic_perform_write ocfs2_write_end ocfs2_write_end_nolock (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1949) ocfs2_write_end_inline (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1915) memcpy_from_folio <-- KASAN: write OOB So add id_count upper bound check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to alongside the existing i_size check to fix it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_conn: fix potential UAF in set_cig_params_sync hci_conn lookup and field access must be covered by hdev lock in set_cig_params_sync, otherwise it's possible it is freed concurrently. Take hdev lock to prevent hci_conn from being deleted or modified concurrently. Just RCU lock is not suitable here, as we also want to avoid "tearing" in the configuration.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: prevent possible UaF in addrconf_permanent_addr() The mentioned helper try to warn the user about an exceptional condition, but the message is delivered too late, accessing the ipv6 after its possible deletion. Reorder the statement to avoid the possible UaF; while at it, place the warning outside the idev->lock as it needs no protection.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: LoongArch: Add architecture specific huge_pte_clear() When executing mm selftests run_vmtests.sh, there is such an error: BUG: Bad page state in process uffd-unit-tests pfn:00000 page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x0 flags: 0xffff0000002000(reserved|node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0xffff) raw: 00ffff0000002000 ffffbf0000000008 ffffbf0000000008 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_FREE flag(s) set Modules linked in: snd_seq_dummy snd_seq snd_seq_device rfkill vfat fat virtio_balloon efi_pstore virtio_net pstore net_failover failover fuse nfnetlink virtio_scsi virtio_gpu virtio_dma_buf dm_multipath efivarfs CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1913 Comm: uffd-unit-tests Not tainted 6.12.0 #184 Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022 Stack : 900000047c8ac000 0000000000000000 9000000000223a7c 900000047c8ac000 900000047c8af690 900000047c8af698 0000000000000000 900000047c8af7d8 900000047c8af7d0 900000047c8af7d0 900000047c8af5b0 0000000000000001 0000000000000001 900000047c8af698 10b3c7d53da40d26 0000010000000000 0000000000000022 0000000fffffffff fffffffffe000000 ffff800000000000 000000000000002f 0000800000000000 000000017a6d4000 90000000028f8940 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 90000000025aa5e0 9000000002905000 0000000000000000 90000000028f8940 ffff800000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 9000000000223a94 000000012001839c 00000000000000b0 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 0000000000071c1d ... Call Trace: [<9000000000223a94>] show_stack+0x5c/0x180 [<9000000001c3fd64>] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0xa0 [<900000000056aa08>] bad_page+0x1a0/0x1f0 [<9000000000574978>] free_unref_folios+0xbf0/0xd20 [<90000000004e65cc>] folios_put_refs+0x1a4/0x2b8 [<9000000000599a0c>] free_pages_and_swap_cache+0x164/0x260 [<9000000000547698>] tlb_batch_pages_flush+0xa8/0x1c0 [<9000000000547f30>] tlb_finish_mmu+0xa8/0x218 [<9000000000543cb8>] exit_mmap+0x1a0/0x360 [<9000000000247658>] __mmput+0x78/0x200 [<900000000025583c>] do_exit+0x43c/0xde8 [<9000000000256490>] do_group_exit+0x68/0x110 [<9000000000256554>] sys_exit_group+0x1c/0x20 [<9000000001c413b4>] do_syscall+0x94/0x130 [<90000000002216d8>] handle_syscall+0xb8/0x158 Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint BUG: non-zero pgtables_bytes on freeing mm: -16384 On LoongArch system, invalid huge pte entry should be invalid_pte_table or a single _PAGE_HUGE bit rather than a zero value. And it should be the same with invalid pmd entry, since pmd_none() is called by function free_pgd_range() and pmd_none() return 0 by huge_pte_clear(). So single _PAGE_HUGE bit is also treated as a valid pte table and free_pte_range() will be called in free_pmd_range(). free_pmd_range() pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr); do { next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end); if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd)) continue; free_pte_range(tlb, pmd, addr); } while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end); Here invalid_pte_table is used for both invalid huge pte entry and pmd entry.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Refactor amdgpu_gem_va_ioctl for Handling Last Fence Update and Timeline Management v4 This commit simplifies the amdgpu_gem_va_ioctl function, key updates include: - Moved the logic for managing the last update fence directly into amdgpu_gem_va_update_vm. - Introduced checks for the timeline point to enable conditional replacement or addition of fences. v2: Addressed review comments from Christian. v3: Updated comments (Christian). v4: The previous version selected the fence too early and did not manage its reference correctly, which could lead to stale or freed fences being used. This resulted in refcount underflows and could crash when updating GPU timelines. The fence is now chosen only after the VA mapping work is completed, and its reference is taken safely. After exporting it to the VM timeline syncobj, the driver always drops its local fence reference, ensuring balanced refcounting and avoiding use-after-free on dma_fence. Crash signature: [ 205.828135] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. [ 205.832963] WARNING: CPU: 30 PID: 7274 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xbe/0x110 ... [ 206.074014] Call Trace: [ 206.076488] <TASK> [ 206.078608] amdgpu_gem_va_ioctl+0x6ea/0x740 [amdgpu] [ 206.084040] ? __pfx_amdgpu_gem_va_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu] [ 206.089994] drm_ioctl_kernel+0x86/0xe0 [drm] [ 206.094415] drm_ioctl+0x26e/0x520 [drm] [ 206.098424] ? __pfx_amdgpu_gem_va_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu] [ 206.104402] amdgpu_drm_ioctl+0x4b/0x80 [amdgpu] [ 206.109387] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x96/0xe0 [ 206.113156] do_syscall_64+0x66/0x2d0 ... [ 206.553351] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc0dfde90 ... [ 206.553378] RIP: 0010:dma_fence_signal_timestamp_locked+0x39/0xe0 ... [ 206.553405] Call Trace: [ 206.553409] <IRQ> [ 206.553415] ? __pfx_drm_sched_fence_free_rcu+0x10/0x10 [gpu_sched] [ 206.553424] dma_fence_signal+0x30/0x60 [ 206.553427] drm_sched_job_done.isra.0+0x123/0x150 [gpu_sched] [ 206.553434] dma_fence_signal_timestamp_locked+0x6e/0xe0 [ 206.553437] dma_fence_signal+0x30/0x60 [ 206.553441] amdgpu_fence_process+0xd8/0x150 [amdgpu] [ 206.553854] sdma_v4_0_process_trap_irq+0x97/0xb0 [amdgpu] [ 206.554353] edac_mce_amd(E) ee1004(E) [ 206.554270] amdgpu_irq_dispatch+0x150/0x230 [amdgpu] [ 206.554702] amdgpu_ih_process+0x6a/0x180 [amdgpu] [ 206.555101] amdgpu_irq_handler+0x23/0x60 [amdgpu] [ 206.555500] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x4a/0x1c0 [ 206.555506] handle_irq_event+0x38/0x80 [ 206.555509] handle_edge_irq+0x92/0x1e0 [ 206.555513] __common_interrupt+0x3e/0xb0 [ 206.555519] common_interrupt+0x80/0xa0 [ 206.555525] </IRQ> [ 206.555527] <TASK> ... [ 206.555650] RIP: 0010:dma_fence_signal_timestamp_locked+0x39/0xe0 ... [ 206.555667] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: mana: fix use-after-free in add_adev() error path If auxiliary_device_add() fails, add_adev() jumps to add_fail and calls auxiliary_device_uninit(adev). The auxiliary device has its release callback set to adev_release(), which frees the containing struct mana_adev. Since adev is embedded in struct mana_adev, the subsequent fall-through to init_fail and access to adev->id may result in a use-after-free. Fix this by saving the allocated auxiliary device id in a local variable before calling auxiliary_device_add(), and use that saved id in the cleanup path after auxiliary_device_uninit().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: SCO: fix race conditions in sco_sock_connect() sco_sock_connect() checks sk_state and sk_type without holding the socket lock. Two concurrent connect() syscalls on the same socket can both pass the check and enter sco_connect(), leading to use-after-free. The buggy scenario involves three participants and was confirmed with additional logging instrumentation: Thread A (connect): HCI disconnect: Thread B (connect): sco_sock_connect(sk) sco_sock_connect(sk) sk_state==BT_OPEN sk_state==BT_OPEN (pass, no lock) (pass, no lock) sco_connect(sk): sco_connect(sk): hci_dev_lock hci_dev_lock hci_connect_sco <- blocked -> hcon1 sco_conn_add->conn1 lock_sock(sk) sco_chan_add: conn1->sk = sk sk->conn = conn1 sk_state=BT_CONNECT release_sock hci_dev_unlock hci_dev_lock sco_conn_del: lock_sock(sk) sco_chan_del: sk->conn=NULL conn1->sk=NULL sk_state= BT_CLOSED SOCK_ZAPPED release_sock hci_dev_unlock (unblocked) hci_connect_sco -> hcon2 sco_conn_add -> conn2 lock_sock(sk) sco_chan_add: sk->conn=conn2 sk_state= BT_CONNECT // zombie sk! release_sock hci_dev_unlock Thread B revives a BT_CLOSED + SOCK_ZAPPED socket back to BT_CONNECT. Subsequent cleanup triggers double sock_put() and use-after-free. Meanwhile conn1 is leaked as it was orphaned when sco_conn_del() cleared the association. Fix this by: - Moving lock_sock() before the sk_state/sk_type checks in sco_sock_connect() to serialize concurrent connect attempts - Fixing the sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET check to actually return the error instead of just assigning it - Adding a state re-check in sco_connect() after lock_sock() to catch state changes during the window between the locks - Adding sco_pi(sk)->conn check in sco_chan_add() to prevent double-attach of a socket to multiple connections - Adding hci_conn_drop() on sco_chan_add failure to prevent HCI connection leaks

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: light: Add check for array bounds in veml6075_read_int_time_ms The array contains only 5 elements, but the index calculated by veml6075_read_int_time_index can range from 0 to 7, which could lead to out-of-bounds access. The check prevents this issue. Coverity Issue CID 1574309: (#1 of 1): Out-of-bounds read (OVERRUN) overrun-local: Overrunning array veml6075_it_ms of 5 4-byte elements at element index 7 (byte offset 31) using index int_index (which evaluates to 7) This is hardening against potentially broken hardware. Good to have but not necessary to backport.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: erofs: fix runtime warning on truncate_folio_batch_exceptionals() Commit 0e2f80afcfa6("fs/dax: ensure all pages are idle prior to filesystem unmount") introduced the WARN_ON_ONCE to capture whether the filesystem has removed all DAX entries or not and applied the fix to xfs and ext4. Apply the missed fix on erofs to fix the runtime warning: [ 5.266254] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 5.266274] WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 3109 at mm/truncate.c:89 truncate_folio_batch_exceptionals+0xff/0x260 [ 5.266294] Modules linked in: [ 5.266999] CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 3109 Comm: umount Tainted: G S 6.16.0+ #6 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 5.267012] Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC [ 5.267017] Hardware name: Dell Inc. OptiPlex 5000/05WXFV, BIOS 1.5.1 08/24/2022 [ 5.267024] RIP: 0010:truncate_folio_batch_exceptionals+0xff/0x260 [ 5.267076] Code: 00 00 41 39 df 7f 11 eb 78 83 c3 01 49 83 c4 08 41 39 df 74 6c 48 63 f3 48 83 fe 1f 0f 83 3c 01 00 00 43 f6 44 26 08 01 74 df <0f> 0b 4a 8b 34 22 4c 89 ef 48 89 55 90 e8 ff 54 1f 00 48 8b 55 90 [ 5.267083] RSP: 0018:ffffc900013f36c8 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 5.267095] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 5.267101] RDX: ffffc900013f3790 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8882a1407898 [ 5.267108] RBP: ffffc900013f3740 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 5.267113] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 5.267119] R13: ffff8882a1407ab8 R14: ffffc900013f3888 R15: 0000000000000001 [ 5.267125] FS: 00007aaa8b437800(0000) GS:ffff88850025b000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 5.267132] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 5.267138] CR2: 00007aaa8b3aac10 CR3: 000000024f764000 CR4: 0000000000f52ef0 [ 5.267144] PKRU: 55555554 [ 5.267150] Call Trace: [ 5.267154] <TASK> [ 5.267181] truncate_inode_pages_range+0x118/0x5e0 [ 5.267193] ? save_trace+0x54/0x390 [ 5.267296] truncate_inode_pages_final+0x43/0x60 [ 5.267309] evict+0x2a4/0x2c0 [ 5.267339] dispose_list+0x39/0x80 [ 5.267352] evict_inodes+0x150/0x1b0 [ 5.267376] generic_shutdown_super+0x41/0x180 [ 5.267390] kill_block_super+0x1b/0x50 [ 5.267402] erofs_kill_sb+0x81/0x90 [erofs] [ 5.267436] deactivate_locked_super+0x32/0xb0 [ 5.267450] deactivate_super+0x46/0x60 [ 5.267460] cleanup_mnt+0xc3/0x170 [ 5.267475] __cleanup_mnt+0x12/0x20 [ 5.267485] task_work_run+0x5d/0xb0 [ 5.267499] exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x144/0x170 [ 5.267512] do_syscall_64+0x2b9/0x7c0 [ 5.267523] ? __lock_acquire+0x665/0x2ce0 [ 5.267535] ? __lock_acquire+0x665/0x2ce0 [ 5.267560] ? lock_acquire+0xcd/0x300 [ 5.267573] ? find_held_lock+0x31/0x90 [ 5.267582] ? mntput_no_expire+0x97/0x4e0 [ 5.267606] ? mntput_no_expire+0xa1/0x4e0 [ 5.267625] ? mntput+0x24/0x50 [ 5.267634] ? path_put+0x1e/0x30 [ 5.267647] ? do_faccessat+0x120/0x2f0 [ 5.267677] ? do_syscall_64+0x1a2/0x7c0 [ 5.267686] ? from_kgid_munged+0x17/0x30 [ 5.267703] ? from_kuid_munged+0x13/0x30 [ 5.267711] ? __do_sys_getuid+0x3d/0x50 [ 5.267724] ? do_syscall_64+0x1a2/0x7c0 [ 5.267732] ? irqentry_exit+0x77/0xb0 [ 5.267743] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 [ 5.267752] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 [ 5.267765] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 5.267772] RIP: 0033:0x7aaa8b32a9fb [ 5.267781] Code: c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 f3 0f 1e fa 31 f6 e9 05 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8 a6 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 05 c3 0f 1f 40 00 48 8b 15 e9 83 0d 00 f7 d8 [ 5.267787] RSP: 002b:00007ffd7c4c9468 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6 [ 5.267796] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00005a61592a8b00 RCX: 00007aaa8b32a9fb [ 5.267802] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00005a61592b2080 [ 5.267806] RBP: 00007ffd7c4c9540 R08: 00007aaa8b403b20 R09: 0000000000000020 [ 5.267812] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005a61592a8c00 [ 5.267817] R13: 00000000 ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFC: nci: uart: Set tty->disc_data only in success path Setting tty->disc_data before opening the NCI device means we need to clean it up on error paths. This also opens some short window if device starts sending data, even before NCIUARTSETDRIVER IOCTL succeeded (broken hardware?). Close the window by exposing tty->disc_data only on the success path, when opening of the NCI device and try_module_get() succeeds. The code differs in error path in one aspect: tty->disc_data won't be ever assigned thus NULL-ified. This however should not be relevant difference, because of "tty->disc_data=NULL" in nci_uart_tty_open().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfs: Fix unbuffered write error handling If all the subrequests in an unbuffered write stream fail, the subrequest collector doesn't update the stream->transferred value and it retains its initial LONG_MAX value. Unfortunately, if all active streams fail, then we take the smallest value of { LONG_MAX, LONG_MAX, ... } as the value to set in wreq->transferred - which is then returned from ->write_iter(). LONG_MAX was chosen as the initial value so that all the streams can be quickly assessed by taking the smallest value of all stream->transferred - but this only works if we've set any of them. Fix this by adding a flag to indicate whether the value in stream->transferred is valid and checking that when we integrate the values. stream->transferred can then be initialised to zero. This was found by running the generic/750 xfstest against cifs with cache=none. It splices data to the target file. Once (if) it has used up all the available scratch space, the writes start failing with ENOSPC. This causes ->write_iter() to fail. However, it was returning wreq->transferred, i.e. LONG_MAX, rather than an error (because it thought the amount transferred was non-zero) and iter_file_splice_write() would then try to clean up that amount of pipe bufferage - leading to an oops when it overran. The kernel log showed: CIFS: VFS: Send error in write = -28 followed by: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 with: RIP: 0010:iter_file_splice_write+0x3a4/0x520 do_splice+0x197/0x4e0 or: RIP: 0010:pipe_buf_release (include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h:282) iter_file_splice_write (fs/splice.c:755) Also put a warning check into splice to announce if ->write_iter() returned that it had written more than it was asked to.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: fix a UAF when vma->mm is freed after vma->vm_refcnt got dropped By inducing delays in the right places, Jann Horn created a reproducer for a hard to hit UAF issue that became possible after VMAs were allowed to be recycled by adding SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU to their cache. Race description is borrowed from Jann's discovery report: lock_vma_under_rcu() looks up a VMA locklessly with mas_walk() under rcu_read_lock(). At that point, the VMA may be concurrently freed, and it can be recycled by another process. vma_start_read() then increments the vma->vm_refcnt (if it is in an acceptable range), and if this succeeds, vma_start_read() can return a recycled VMA. In this scenario where the VMA has been recycled, lock_vma_under_rcu() will then detect the mismatching ->vm_mm pointer and drop the VMA through vma_end_read(), which calls vma_refcount_put(). vma_refcount_put() drops the refcount and then calls rcuwait_wake_up() using a copy of vma->vm_mm. This is wrong: It implicitly assumes that the caller is keeping the VMA's mm alive, but in this scenario the caller has no relation to the VMA's mm, so the rcuwait_wake_up() can cause UAF. The diagram depicting the race: T1 T2 T3 == == == lock_vma_under_rcu mas_walk <VMA gets removed from mm> mmap <the same VMA is reallocated> vma_start_read __refcount_inc_not_zero_limited_acquire munmap __vma_enter_locked refcount_add_not_zero vma_end_read vma_refcount_put __refcount_dec_and_test rcuwait_wait_event <finish operation> rcuwait_wake_up [UAF] Note that rcuwait_wait_event() in T3 does not block because refcount was already dropped by T1. At this point T3 can exit and free the mm causing UAF in T1. To avoid this we move vma->vm_mm verification into vma_start_read() and grab vma->vm_mm to stabilize it before vma_refcount_put() operation. [surenb@google.com: v3]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bus: fsl-mc: fix double-free on mc_dev The blamed commit tried to simplify how the deallocations are done but, in the process, introduced a double-free on the mc_dev variable. In case the MC device is a DPRC, a new mc_bus is allocated and the mc_dev variable is just a reference to one of its fields. In this circumstance, on the error path only the mc_bus should be freed. This commit introduces back the following checkpatch warning which is a false-positive. WARNING: kfree(NULL) is safe and this check is probably not required + if (mc_bus) + kfree(mc_bus);

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ftrace: Fix UAF when lookup kallsym after ftrace disabled The following issue happens with a buggy module: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc05d0218 PGD 1bd66f067 P4D 1bd66f067 PUD 1bd671067 PMD 101808067 PTE 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS RIP: 0010:sized_strscpy+0x81/0x2f0 RSP: 0018:ffff88812d76fa08 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffc0601010 RCX: dffffc0000000000 RDX: 0000000000000038 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff88812608da2d RBP: 8080808080808080 R08: ffff88812608da2d R09: ffff88812608da68 R10: ffff88812608d82d R11: ffff88812608d810 R12: 0000000000000038 R13: ffff88812608da2d R14: ffffffffc05d0218 R15: fefefefefefefeff FS: 00007fef552de740(0000) GS:ffff8884251c7000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffffc05d0218 CR3: 00000001146f0000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ftrace_mod_get_kallsym+0x1ac/0x590 update_iter_mod+0x239/0x5b0 s_next+0x5b/0xa0 seq_read_iter+0x8c9/0x1070 seq_read+0x249/0x3b0 proc_reg_read+0x1b0/0x280 vfs_read+0x17f/0x920 ksys_read+0xf3/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x2e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e The above issue may happen as follows: (1) Add kprobe tracepoint; (2) insmod test.ko; (3) Module triggers ftrace disabled; (4) rmmod test.ko; (5) cat /proc/kallsyms; --> Will trigger UAF as test.ko already removed; ftrace_mod_get_kallsym() ... strscpy(module_name, mod_map->mod->name, MODULE_NAME_LEN); ... The problem is when a module triggers an issue with ftrace and sets ftrace_disable. The ftrace_disable is set when an anomaly is discovered and to prevent any more damage, ftrace stops all text modification. The issue that happened was that the ftrace_disable stops more than just the text modification. When a module is loaded, its init functions can also be traced. Because kallsyms deletes the init functions after a module has loaded, ftrace saves them when the module is loaded and function tracing is enabled. This allows the output of the function trace to show the init function names instead of just their raw memory addresses. When a module is removed, ftrace_release_mod() is called, and if ftrace_disable is set, it just returns without doing anything more. The problem here is that it leaves the mod_list still around and if kallsyms is called, it will call into this code and access the module memory that has already been freed as it will return: strscpy(module_name, mod_map->mod->name, MODULE_NAME_LEN); Where the "mod" no longer exists and triggers a UAF bug.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe: Make dma-fences compliant with the safe access rules Xe can free some of the data pointed to by the dma-fences it exports. Most notably the timeline name can get freed if userspace closes the associated submit queue. At the same time the fence could have been exported to a third party (for example a sync_fence fd) which will then cause an use- after-free on subsequent access. To make this safe we need to make the driver compliant with the newly documented dma-fence rules. Driver has to ensure a RCU grace period between signalling a fence and freeing any data pointed to by said fence. For the timeline name we simply make the queue be freed via kfree_rcu and for the shared lock associated with multiple queues we add a RCU grace period before freeing the per GT structure holding the lock.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: media: atomisp: Fix stack buffer overflow in gmin_get_var_int() When gmin_get_config_var() calls efi.get_variable() and the EFI variable is larger than the expected buffer size, two behaviors combine to create a stack buffer overflow: 1. gmin_get_config_var() does not return the proper error code when efi.get_variable() fails. It returns the stale 'ret' value from earlier operations instead of indicating the EFI failure. 2. When efi.get_variable() returns EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, it updates *out_len to the required buffer size but writes no data to the output buffer. However, due to bug #1, gmin_get_var_int() believes the call succeeded. The caller gmin_get_var_int() then performs: - Allocates val[CFG_VAR_NAME_MAX + 1] (65 bytes) on stack - Calls gmin_get_config_var(dev, is_gmin, var, val, &len) with len=64 - If EFI variable is >64 bytes, efi.get_variable() sets len=required_size - Due to bug #1, thinks call succeeded with len=required_size - Executes val[len] = 0, writing past end of 65-byte stack buffer This creates a stack buffer overflow when EFI variables are larger than 64 bytes. Since EFI variables can be controlled by firmware or system configuration, this could potentially be exploited for code execution. Fix the bug by returning proper error codes from gmin_get_config_var() based on EFI status instead of stale 'ret' value. The gmin_get_var_int() function is called during device initialization for camera sensor configuration on Intel Bay Trail and Cherry Trail platforms using the atomisp camera stack.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/amd: Avoid stack buffer overflow from kernel cmdline While the kernel command line is considered trusted in most environments, avoid writing 1 byte past the end of "acpiid" if the "str" argument is maximum length.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: tegra: check msg length in SMBUS block read For SMBUS block read, do not continue to read if the message length passed from the device is '0' or greater than the maximum allowed bytes.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/core: Prevent VMA split of buffer mappings The perf mmap code is careful about mmap()'ing the user page with the ringbuffer and additionally the auxiliary buffer, when the event supports it. Once the first mapping is established, subsequent mapping have to use the same offset and the same size in both cases. The reference counting for the ringbuffer and the auxiliary buffer depends on this being correct. Though perf does not prevent that a related mapping is split via mmap(2), munmap(2) or mremap(2). A split of a VMA results in perf_mmap_open() calls, which take reference counts, but then the subsequent perf_mmap_close() calls are not longer fulfilling the offset and size checks. This leads to reference count leaks. As perf already has the requirement for subsequent mappings to match the initial mapping, the obvious consequence is that VMA splits, caused by resizing of a mapping or partial unmapping, have to be prevented. Implement the vm_operations_struct::may_split() callback and return unconditionally -EINVAL. That ensures that the mapping offsets and sizes cannot be changed after the fact. Remapping to a different fixed address with the same size is still possible as it takes the references for the new mapping and drops those of the old mapping.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: plug races between subflow fail and subflow creation We have races similar to the one addressed by the previous patch between subflow failing and additional subflow creation. They are just harder to trigger. The solution is similar. Use a separate flag to track the condition 'socket state prevent any additional subflow creation' protected by the fallback lock. The socket fallback makes such flag true, and also receiving or sending an MP_FAIL option. The field 'allow_infinite_fallback' is now always touched under the relevant lock, we can drop the ONCE annotation on write.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: codecs: wcd9375: Fix double free of regulator supplies Driver gets regulator supplies in probe path with devm_regulator_bulk_get(), so should not call regulator_bulk_free() in error and remove paths to avoid double free.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: habanalabs: fix UAF in export_dmabuf() As soon as we'd inserted a file reference into descriptor table, another thread could close it. That's fine for the case when all we are doing is returning that descriptor to userland (it's a race, but it's a userland race and there's nothing the kernel can do about it). However, if we follow fd_install() with any kind of access to objects that would be destroyed on close (be it the struct file itself or anything destroyed by its ->release()), we have a UAF. dma_buf_fd() is a combination of reserving a descriptor and fd_install(). habanalabs export_dmabuf() calls it and then proceeds to access the objects destroyed on close. In particular, it grabs an extra reference to another struct file that will be dropped as part of ->release() for ours; that "will be" is actually "might have already been". Fix that by reserving descriptor before anything else and do fd_install() only when everything had been set up. As a side benefit, we no longer have the failure exit with file already created, but reference to underlying file (as well as ->dmabuf_export_cnt, etc.) not grabbed yet; unlike dma_buf_fd(), fd_install() can't fail.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: LoongArch: KVM: Check validity of "num_cpu" from user space The maximum supported cpu number is EIOINTC_ROUTE_MAX_VCPUS about irqchip EIOINTC, here add validation about cpu number to avoid array pointer overflow.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: nbpfaxi: Fix memory corruption in probe() The nbpf->chan[] array is allocated earlier in the nbpf_probe() function and it has "num_channels" elements. These three loops iterate one element farther than they should and corrupt memory. The changes to the second loop are more involved. In this case, we're copying data from the irqbuf[] array into the nbpf->chan[] array. If the data in irqbuf[i] is the error IRQ then we skip it, so the iterators are not in sync. I added a check to ensure that we don't go beyond the end of the irqbuf[] array. I'm pretty sure this can't happen, but it seemed harmless to add a check. On the other hand, after the loop has ended there is a check to ensure that the "chan" iterator is where we expect it to be. In the original code we went one element beyond the end of the array so the iterator wasn't in the correct place and it would always return -EINVAL. However, now it will always be in the correct place. I deleted the check since we know the result.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: comedi: Make insn_rw_emulate_bits() do insn->n samples The `insn_rw_emulate_bits()` function is used as a default handler for `INSN_READ` instructions for subdevices that have a handler for `INSN_BITS` but not for `INSN_READ`. Similarly, it is used as a default handler for `INSN_WRITE` instructions for subdevices that have a handler for `INSN_BITS` but not for `INSN_WRITE`. It works by emulating the `INSN_READ` or `INSN_WRITE` instruction handling with a constructed `INSN_BITS` instruction. However, `INSN_READ` and `INSN_WRITE` instructions are supposed to be able read or write multiple samples, indicated by the `insn->n` value, but `insn_rw_emulate_bits()` currently only handles a single sample. For `INSN_READ`, the comedi core will copy `insn->n` samples back to user-space. (That triggered KASAN kernel-infoleak errors when `insn->n` was greater than 1, but that is being fixed more generally elsewhere in the comedi core.) Make `insn_rw_emulate_bits()` either handle `insn->n` samples, or return an error, to conform to the general expectation for `INSN_READ` and `INSN_WRITE` handlers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xen: fix UAF in dmabuf_exp_from_pages() [dma_buf_fd() fixes; no preferences regarding the tree it goes through - up to xen folks] As soon as we'd inserted a file reference into descriptor table, another thread could close it. That's fine for the case when all we are doing is returning that descriptor to userland (it's a race, but it's a userland race and there's nothing the kernel can do about it). However, if we follow fd_install() with any kind of access to objects that would be destroyed on close (be it the struct file itself or anything destroyed by its ->release()), we have a UAF. dma_buf_fd() is a combination of reserving a descriptor and fd_install(). gntdev dmabuf_exp_from_pages() calls it and then proceeds to access the objects destroyed on close - starting with gntdev_dmabuf itself. Fix that by doing reserving descriptor before anything else and do fd_install() only when everything had been set up.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: fix UAF on smcsk after smc_listen_out() BPF CI testing report a UAF issue: [ 16.446633] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000003 0 [ 16.447134] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mod e [ 16.447516] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present pag e [ 16.447878] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 16.448063] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPT I [ 16.448409] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G OE 6.13.0-rc3-g89e8a75fda73-dirty #4 2 [ 16.449124] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODUL E [ 16.449502] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/201 4 [ 16.450201] Workqueue: smc_hs_wq smc_listen_wor k [ 16.450531] RIP: 0010:smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159 0 [ 16.452158] RSP: 0018:ffffb5ab40053d98 EFLAGS: 0001024 6 [ 16.452526] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 000000000000030 0 [ 16.452994] RDX: 0000000000000280 RSI: 00003513840053f0 RDI: 000000000000000 0 [ 16.453492] RBP: ffffa097808e3800 R08: ffffa09782dba1e0 R09: 000000000000000 5 [ 16.453987] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffa0978274640 0 [ 16.454497] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffa09782d4092 0 [ 16.454996] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa097bbc00000(0000) knlGS:000000000000000 0 [ 16.455557] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003 3 [ 16.455961] CR2: 0000000000000030 CR3: 0000000102788004 CR4: 0000000000770ef 0 [ 16.456459] PKRU: 5555555 4 [ 16.456654] Call Trace : [ 16.456832] <TASK > [ 16.456989] ? __die+0x23/0x7 0 [ 16.457215] ? page_fault_oops+0x180/0x4c 0 [ 16.457508] ? __lock_acquire+0x3e6/0x249 0 [ 16.457801] ? exc_page_fault+0x68/0x20 0 [ 16.458080] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x3 0 [ 16.458389] ? smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159 0 [ 16.458689] ? smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159 0 [ 16.458987] ? lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x10 0 [ 16.459284] process_one_work+0x1ea/0x6d 0 [ 16.459570] worker_thread+0x1c3/0x38 0 [ 16.459839] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x1 0 [ 16.460144] kthread+0xe0/0x11 0 [ 16.460372] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x1 0 [ 16.460640] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x5 0 [ 16.460896] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x1 0 [ 16.461166] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x3 0 [ 16.461453] </TASK > [ 16.461616] Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(OE) [last unloaded: bpf_testmod(OE) ] [ 16.462134] CR2: 000000000000003 0 [ 16.462380] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 16.462710] RIP: 0010:smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x1590 The direct cause of this issue is that after smc_listen_out_connected(), newclcsock->sk may be NULL since it will releases the smcsk. Therefore, if the application closes the socket immediately after accept, newclcsock->sk can be NULL. A possible execution order could be as follows: smc_listen_work | userspace ----------------------------------------------------------------- lock_sock(sk) | smc_listen_out_connected() | | \- smc_listen_out | | | \- release_sock | | |- sk->sk_data_ready() | | fd = accept(); | close(fd); | \- socket->sk = NULL; /* newclcsock->sk is NULL now */ SMC_STAT_SERV_SUCC_INC(sock_net(newclcsock->sk)) Since smc_listen_out_connected() will not fail, simply swapping the order of the code can easily fix this issue.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drbd: add missing kref_get in handle_write_conflicts With `two-primaries` enabled, DRBD tries to detect "concurrent" writes and handle write conflicts, so that even if you write to the same sector simultaneously on both nodes, they end up with the identical data once the writes are completed. In handling "superseeded" writes, we forgot a kref_get, resulting in a premature drbd_destroy_device and use after free, and further to kernel crashes with symptoms. Relevance: No one should use DRBD as a random data generator, and apparently all users of "two-primaries" handle concurrent writes correctly on layer up. That is cluster file systems use some distributed lock manager, and live migration in virtualization environments stops writes on one node before starting writes on the other node. Which means that other than for "test cases", this code path is never taken in real life. FYI, in DRBD 9, things are handled differently nowadays. We still detect "write conflicts", but no longer try to be smart about them. We decided to disconnect hard instead: upper layers must not submit concurrent writes. If they do, that's their fault.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: fsl-edma: free irq correctly in remove path Add fsl_edma->txirq/errirq check to avoid below warning because no errirq at i.MX9 platform. Otherwise there will be kernel dump: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 11 at kernel/irq/devres.c:144 devm_free_irq+0x74/0x80 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u8:0 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7#18 Hardware name: NXP i.MX93 11X11 EVK board (DT) Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : devm_free_irq+0x74/0x80 lr : devm_free_irq+0x48/0x80 Call trace: devm_free_irq+0x74/0x80 (P) devm_free_irq+0x48/0x80 (L) fsl_edma_remove+0xc4/0xc8 platform_remove+0x28/0x44 device_remove+0x4c/0x80

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vsock/vmci: Clear the vmci transport packet properly when initializing it In vmci_transport_packet_init memset the vmci_transport_packet before populating the fields to avoid any uninitialised data being left in the structure.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: open_tree_attr: do not allow id-mapping changes without OPEN_TREE_CLONE As described in commit 7a54947e727b ('Merge patch series "fs: allow changing idmappings"'), open_tree_attr(2) was necessary in order to allow for a detached mount to be created and have its idmappings changed without the risk of any racing threads operating on it. For this reason, mount_setattr(2) still does not allow for id-mappings to be changed. However, there was a bug in commit 2462651ffa76 ("fs: allow changing idmappings") which allowed users to bypass this restriction by calling open_tree_attr(2) *without* OPEN_TREE_CLONE. can_idmap_mount() prevented this bug from allowing an attached mountpoint's id-mapping from being modified (thanks to an is_anon_ns() check), but this still allows for detached (but visible) mounts to have their be id-mapping changed. This risks the same UAF and locking issues as described in the merge commit, and was likely unintentional.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/core: Exit early on perf_mmap() fail When perf_mmap() fails to allocate a buffer, it still invokes the event_mapped() callback of the related event. On X86 this might increase the perf_rdpmc_allowed reference counter. But nothing undoes this as perf_mmap_close() is never called in this case, which causes another reference count leak. Return early on failure to prevent that.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: jfs: upper bound check of tree index in dbAllocAG When computing the tree index in dbAllocAG, we never check if we are out of bounds realative to the size of the stree. This could happen in a scenario where the filesystem metadata are corrupted.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: libwx: remove duplicate page_pool_put_full_page() page_pool_put_full_page() should only be invoked when freeing Rx buffers or building a skb if the size is too short. At other times, the pages need to be reused. So remove the redundant page put. In the original code, double free pages cause kernel panic: [ 876.949834] __irq_exit_rcu+0xc7/0x130 [ 876.949836] common_interrupt+0xb8/0xd0 [ 876.949838] </IRQ> [ 876.949838] <TASK> [ 876.949840] asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40 [ 876.949841] RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0xc2/0x420 [ 876.949843] Code: 00 00 e8 d1 1d 5e ff e8 ac f0 ff ff 49 89 c5 0f 1f 44 00 00 31 ff e8 cd fc 5c ff 45 84 ff 0f 85 40 02 00 00 fb 0f 1f 44 00 00 <45> 85 f6 0f 88 84 01 00 00 49 63 d6 48 8d 04 52 48 8d 04 82 49 8d [ 876.949844] RSP: 0018:ffffaa7340267e78 EFLAGS: 00000246 [ 876.949845] RAX: ffff9e3f135be000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 876.949846] RDX: 000000cc2dc4cb7c RSI: ffffffff89ee49ae RDI: ffffffff89ef9f9e [ 876.949847] RBP: ffff9e378f940800 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 00000000000000ed [ 876.949848] R10: 000000000000afc8 R11: ffff9e3e9e5a9b6c R12: ffffffff8a6d8580 [ 876.949849] R13: 000000cc2dc4cb7c R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 876.949852] ? cpuidle_enter_state+0xb3/0x420 [ 876.949855] cpuidle_enter+0x29/0x40 [ 876.949857] cpuidle_idle_call+0xfd/0x170 [ 876.949859] do_idle+0x7a/0xc0 [ 876.949861] cpu_startup_entry+0x25/0x30 [ 876.949862] start_secondary+0x117/0x140 [ 876.949864] common_startup_64+0x13e/0x148 [ 876.949867] </TASK> [ 876.949868] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 876.949869] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 876.949870] list_del corruption, ffffead40445a348->next is NULL [ 876.949873] WARNING: CPU: 14 PID: 0 at lib/list_debug.c:52 __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x67/0x120 [ 876.949875] Modules linked in: snd_hrtimer(E) bnep(E) binfmt_misc(E) amdgpu(E) squashfs(E) vfat(E) loop(E) fat(E) amd_atl(E) snd_hda_codec_realtek(E) intel_rapl_msr(E) snd_hda_codec_generic(E) intel_rapl_common(E) snd_hda_scodec_component(E) snd_hda_codec_hdmi(E) snd_hda_intel(E) edac_mce_amd(E) snd_intel_dspcfg(E) snd_hda_codec(E) snd_hda_core(E) amdxcp(E) kvm_amd(E) snd_hwdep(E) gpu_sched(E) drm_panel_backlight_quirks(E) cec(E) snd_pcm(E) drm_buddy(E) snd_seq_dummy(E) drm_ttm_helper(E) btusb(E) kvm(E) snd_seq_oss(E) btrtl(E) ttm(E) btintel(E) snd_seq_midi(E) btbcm(E) drm_exec(E) snd_seq_midi_event(E) i2c_algo_bit(E) snd_rawmidi(E) bluetooth(E) drm_suballoc_helper(E) irqbypass(E) snd_seq(E) ghash_clmulni_intel(E) sha512_ssse3(E) drm_display_helper(E) aesni_intel(E) snd_seq_device(E) rfkill(E) snd_timer(E) gf128mul(E) drm_client_lib(E) drm_kms_helper(E) snd(E) i2c_piix4(E) joydev(E) soundcore(E) wmi_bmof(E) ccp(E) k10temp(E) i2c_smbus(E) gpio_amdpt(E) i2c_designware_platform(E) gpio_generic(E) sg(E) [ 876.949914] i2c_designware_core(E) sch_fq_codel(E) parport_pc(E) drm(E) ppdev(E) lp(E) parport(E) fuse(E) nfnetlink(E) ip_tables(E) ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 sd_mod sfp mdio_i2c i2c_core txgbe ahci ngbe pcs_xpcs libahci libwx r8169 phylink libata realtek ptp pps_core video wmi [ 876.949933] CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/14 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W E 6.16.0-rc2+ #20 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 876.949935] Tainted: [W]=WARN, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 876.949936] Hardware name: Micro-Star International Co., Ltd. MS-7E16/X670E GAMING PLUS WIFI (MS-7E16), BIOS 1.90 12/31/2024 [ 876.949936] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x67/0x120 [ 876.949938] Code: 00 00 00 48 39 7d 08 0f 85 a6 00 00 00 5b b8 01 00 00 00 5d 41 5c e9 73 0d 93 ff 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 a0 31 e8 89 e8 59 7c b3 ff <0f> 0b 31 c0 5b 5d 41 5c e9 57 0d 93 ff 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 c8 31 e8 [ 876.949940] RSP: 0018:ffffaa73405d0c60 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 876.949941] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffead40445a348 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 876.949942] RDX: 0000000000000105 RSI: 00000 ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: fix use-after-free in amdgpu_userq_suspend+0x51a/0x5a0 [ +0.000020] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in amdgpu_userq_suspend+0x51a/0x5a0 [amdgpu] [ +0.000817] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88812eec8c58 by task amd_pci_unplug/1733 [ +0.000027] CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 1733 Comm: amd_pci_unplug Tainted: G W 6.14.0+ #2 [ +0.000009] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ +0.000003] Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/ROG STRIX B550-F GAMING (WI-FI), BIOS 1401 12/03/2020 [ +0.000004] Call Trace: [ +0.000004] <TASK> [ +0.000003] dump_stack_lvl+0x76/0xa0 [ +0.000011] print_report+0xce/0x600 [ +0.000009] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000006] ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x76/0x200 [ +0.000007] ? kasan_addr_to_slab+0xd/0xb0 [ +0.000006] ? amdgpu_userq_suspend+0x51a/0x5a0 [amdgpu] [ +0.000707] kasan_report+0xbe/0x110 [ +0.000006] ? amdgpu_userq_suspend+0x51a/0x5a0 [amdgpu] [ +0.000541] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x30 [ +0.000005] amdgpu_userq_suspend+0x51a/0x5a0 [amdgpu] [ +0.000535] ? stop_cpsch+0x396/0x600 [amdgpu] [ +0.000556] ? stop_cpsch+0x429/0x600 [amdgpu] [ +0.000536] ? __pfx_amdgpu_userq_suspend+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu] [ +0.000536] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000004] ? kgd2kfd_suspend+0x132/0x1d0 [amdgpu] [ +0.000542] amdgpu_device_fini_hw+0x581/0xe90 [amdgpu] [ +0.000485] ? down_write+0xbb/0x140 [ +0.000007] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath.constprop.0+0x317/0x360 [ +0.000005] ? __pfx_amdgpu_device_fini_hw+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu] [ +0.000482] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30 [ +0.000004] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000004] ? up_write+0x55/0xb0 [ +0.000007] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000005] ? blocking_notifier_chain_unregister+0x6c/0xc0 [ +0.000008] amdgpu_driver_unload_kms+0x69/0x90 [amdgpu] [ +0.000484] amdgpu_pci_remove+0x93/0x130 [amdgpu] [ +0.000482] pci_device_remove+0xae/0x1e0 [ +0.000008] device_remove+0xc7/0x180 [ +0.000008] device_release_driver_internal+0x3d4/0x5a0 [ +0.000007] device_release_driver+0x12/0x20 [ +0.000004] pci_stop_bus_device+0x104/0x150 [ +0.000006] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device_locked+0x1b/0x40 [ +0.000005] remove_store+0xd7/0xf0 [ +0.000005] ? __pfx_remove_store+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000006] ? __pfx__copy_from_iter+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000006] ? __pfx_dev_attr_store+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000006] dev_attr_store+0x3f/0x80 [ +0.000006] sysfs_kf_write+0x125/0x1d0 [ +0.000004] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000005] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30 [ +0.000005] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x2ea/0x490 [ +0.000005] ? rw_verify_area+0x70/0x420 [ +0.000005] ? __pfx_kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000006] vfs_write+0x90d/0xe70 [ +0.000005] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000005] ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000004] ? local_clock+0x15/0x30 [ +0.000008] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000004] ? __kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80 [ +0.000005] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000004] ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 [ +0.000004] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000004] ? fdget_pos+0x1d3/0x500 [ +0.000007] ksys_write+0x119/0x220 [ +0.000005] ? putname+0x1c/0x30 [ +0.000006] ? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000007] __x64_sys_write+0x72/0xc0 [ +0.000006] x64_sys_call+0x18ab/0x26f0 [ +0.000006] do_syscall_64+0x7c/0x170 [ +0.000004] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000004] ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000006] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000004] ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 [ +0.000003] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000004] ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x21/0xb0 [ +0.000006] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000004] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x4e/0x240 [ +0.000005] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000004] ? do_syscall_64+0x88/0x170 [ +0.000003] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ +0.000004] ? irqentry_exit+0x43/0x50 [ +0.000004] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5 ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mtk-sd: Prevent memory corruption from DMA map failure If msdc_prepare_data() fails to map the DMA region, the request is not prepared for data receiving, but msdc_start_data() proceeds the DMA with previous setting. Since this will lead a memory corruption, we have to stop the request operation soon after the msdc_prepare_data() fails to prepare it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: Always pass notifications when child class becomes empty Certain classful qdiscs may invoke their classes' dequeue handler on an enqueue operation. This may unexpectedly empty the child qdisc and thus make an in-flight class passive via qlen_notify(). Most qdiscs do not expect such behaviour at this point in time and may re-activate the class eventually anyways which will lead to a use-after-free. The referenced fix commit attempted to fix this behavior for the HFSC case by moving the backlog accounting around, though this turned out to be incomplete since the parent's parent may run into the issue too. The following reproducer demonstrates this use-after-free: tc qdisc add dev lo root handle 1: drr tc filter add dev lo parent 1: basic classid 1:1 tc class add dev lo parent 1: classid 1:1 drr tc qdisc add dev lo parent 1:1 handle 2: hfsc def 1 tc class add dev lo parent 2: classid 2:1 hfsc rt m1 8 d 1 m2 0 tc qdisc add dev lo parent 2:1 handle 3: netem tc qdisc add dev lo parent 3:1 handle 4: blackhole echo 1 | socat -u STDIN UDP4-DATAGRAM:127.0.0.1:8888 tc class delete dev lo classid 1:1 echo 1 | socat -u STDIN UDP4-DATAGRAM:127.0.0.1:8888 Since backlog accounting issues leading to a use-after-frees on stale class pointers is a recurring pattern at this point, this patch takes a different approach. Instead of trying to fix the accounting, the patch ensures that qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog always calls qlen_notify when the child qdisc is empty. This solves the problem because deletion of qdiscs always involves a call to qdisc_reset() and / or qdisc_purge_queue() which ultimately resets its qlen to 0 thus causing the following qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() to report to the parent. Note that this may call qlen_notify on passive classes multiple times. This is not a problem after the recent patch series that made all the classful qdiscs qlen_notify() handlers idempotent.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: linearize cloned gso packets in sctp_rcv A cloned head skb still shares these frag skbs in fraglist with the original head skb. It's not safe to access these frag skbs. syzbot reported two use-of-uninitialized-memory bugs caused by this: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in sctp_inq_pop+0x15b7/0x1920 net/sctp/inqueue.c:211 sctp_inq_pop+0x15b7/0x1920 net/sctp/inqueue.c:211 sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x1a7/0xc50 net/sctp/associola.c:998 sctp_inq_push+0x2ef/0x380 net/sctp/inqueue.c:88 sctp_backlog_rcv+0x397/0xdb0 net/sctp/input.c:331 sk_backlog_rcv+0x13b/0x420 include/net/sock.h:1122 __release_sock+0x1da/0x330 net/core/sock.c:3106 release_sock+0x6b/0x250 net/core/sock.c:3660 sctp_wait_for_connect+0x487/0x820 net/sctp/socket.c:9360 sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc+0x1ec1/0x1f00 net/sctp/socket.c:1885 sctp_sendmsg+0x32b9/0x4a80 net/sctp/socket.c:2031 inet_sendmsg+0x25a/0x280 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:851 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline] and BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x34e/0xbc0 net/sctp/associola.c:987 sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x34e/0xbc0 net/sctp/associola.c:987 sctp_inq_push+0x2a3/0x350 net/sctp/inqueue.c:88 sctp_backlog_rcv+0x3c7/0xda0 net/sctp/input.c:331 sk_backlog_rcv+0x142/0x420 include/net/sock.h:1148 __release_sock+0x1d3/0x330 net/core/sock.c:3213 release_sock+0x6b/0x270 net/core/sock.c:3767 sctp_wait_for_connect+0x458/0x820 net/sctp/socket.c:9367 sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc+0x223a/0x2260 net/sctp/socket.c:1886 sctp_sendmsg+0x3910/0x49f0 net/sctp/socket.c:2032 inet_sendmsg+0x269/0x2a0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:851 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline] This patch fixes it by linearizing cloned gso packets in sctp_rcv().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/amlogic: Replace smp_processor_id() with raw_smp_processor_id() in meson_ddr_pmu_create() The Amlogic DDR PMU driver meson_ddr_pmu_create() function incorrectly uses smp_processor_id(), which assumes disabled preemption. This leads to kernel warnings during module loading because meson_ddr_pmu_create() can be called in a preemptible context. Following kernel warning and stack trace: [ 31.745138] [ T2289] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: (udev-worker)/2289 [ 31.745154] [ T2289] caller is debug_smp_processor_id+0x28/0x38 [ 31.745172] [ T2289] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 2289 Comm: (udev-worker) Tainted: GW 6.14.0-0-MANJARO-ARM #1 59519addcbca6ba8de735e151fd7b9e97aac7ff0 [ 31.745181] [ T2289] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 31.745183] [ T2289] Hardware name: Hardkernel ODROID-N2Plus (DT) [ 31.745188] [ T2289] Call trace: [ 31.745191] [ T2289] show_stack+0x28/0x40 (C) [ 31.745199] [ T2289] dump_stack_lvl+0x4c/0x198 [ 31.745205] [ T2289] dump_stack+0x20/0x50 [ 31.745209] [ T2289] check_preemption_disabled+0xec/0xf0 [ 31.745213] [ T2289] debug_smp_processor_id+0x28/0x38 [ 31.745216] [ T2289] meson_ddr_pmu_create+0x200/0x560 [meson_ddr_pmu_g12 8095101c49676ad138d9961e3eddaee10acca7bd] [ 31.745237] [ T2289] g12_ddr_pmu_probe+0x20/0x38 [meson_ddr_pmu_g12 8095101c49676ad138d9961e3eddaee10acca7bd] [ 31.745246] [ T2289] platform_probe+0x98/0xe0 [ 31.745254] [ T2289] really_probe+0x144/0x3f8 [ 31.745258] [ T2289] __driver_probe_device+0xb8/0x180 [ 31.745261] [ T2289] driver_probe_device+0x54/0x268 [ 31.745264] [ T2289] __driver_attach+0x11c/0x288 [ 31.745267] [ T2289] bus_for_each_dev+0xfc/0x160 [ 31.745274] [ T2289] driver_attach+0x34/0x50 [ 31.745277] [ T2289] bus_add_driver+0x160/0x2b0 [ 31.745281] [ T2289] driver_register+0x78/0x120 [ 31.745285] [ T2289] __platform_driver_register+0x30/0x48 [ 31.745288] [ T2289] init_module+0x30/0xfe0 [meson_ddr_pmu_g12 8095101c49676ad138d9961e3eddaee10acca7bd] [ 31.745298] [ T2289] do_one_initcall+0x11c/0x438 [ 31.745303] [ T2289] do_init_module+0x68/0x228 [ 31.745311] [ T2289] load_module+0x118c/0x13a8 [ 31.745315] [ T2289] __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x274/0x390 [ 31.745320] [ T2289] invoke_syscall+0x74/0x108 [ 31.745326] [ T2289] el0_svc_common+0x90/0xf8 [ 31.745330] [ T2289] do_el0_svc+0x2c/0x48 [ 31.745333] [ T2289] el0_svc+0x60/0x150 [ 31.745337] [ T2289] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x80/0x118 [ 31.745341] [ T2289] el0t_64_sync+0x1b8/0x1c0 Changes replaces smp_processor_id() with raw_smp_processor_id() to ensure safe CPU ID retrieval in preemptible contexts.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix potential use-after-free in oplock/lease break ack If ksmbd_iov_pin_rsp return error, use-after-free can happen by accessing opinfo->state and opinfo_put and ksmbd_fd_put could called twice.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: lan743x: Modify the EEPROM and OTP size for PCI1xxxx devices Maximum OTP and EEPROM size for hearthstone PCI1xxxx devices are 8 Kb and 64 Kb respectively. Adjust max size definitions and return correct EEPROM length based on device. Also prevent out-of-bound read/write.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Squashfs: check return result of sb_min_blocksize Syzkaller reports an "UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in squashfs_bio_read" bug. Syzkaller forks multiple processes which after mounting the Squashfs filesystem, issues an ioctl("/dev/loop0", LOOP_SET_BLOCK_SIZE, 0x8000). Now if this ioctl occurs at the same time another process is in the process of mounting a Squashfs filesystem on /dev/loop0, the failure occurs. When this happens the following code in squashfs_fill_super() fails. ---- msblk->devblksize = sb_min_blocksize(sb, SQUASHFS_DEVBLK_SIZE); msblk->devblksize_log2 = ffz(~msblk->devblksize); ---- sb_min_blocksize() returns 0, which means msblk->devblksize is set to 0. As a result, ffz(~msblk->devblksize) returns 64, and msblk->devblksize_log2 is set to 64. This subsequently causes the UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in fs/squashfs/block.c:195:36 shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type 'u64' (aka 'unsigned long long') This commit adds a check for a 0 return by sb_min_blocksize().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: fix KMSAN uninit-value in extent_info usage KMSAN reported a use of uninitialized value in `__is_extent_mergeable()` and `__is_back_mergeable()` via the read extent tree path. The root cause is that `get_read_extent_info()` only initializes three fields (`fofs`, `blk`, `len`) of `struct extent_info`, leaving the remaining fields uninitialized. This leads to undefined behavior when those fields are accessed later, especially during extent merging. Fix it by zero-initializing the `extent_info` struct before population.