In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix NULL ptr deref in crypto_aead_setkey() Neither SMB3.0 or SMB3.02 supports encryption negotiate context, so when SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_ENCRYPTION flag is set in the negotiate response, the client uses AES-128-CCM as the default cipher. See MS-SMB2 3.3.5.4. Commit b0abcd65ec54 ("smb: client: fix UAF in async decryption") added a @server->cipher_type check to conditionally call smb3_crypto_aead_allocate(), but that check would always be false as @server->cipher_type is unset for SMB3.02. Fix the following KASAN splat by setting @server->cipher_type for SMB3.02 as well. mount.cifs //srv/share /mnt -o vers=3.02,seal,... BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in crypto_aead_setkey+0x2c/0x130 Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000020 by task mount.cifs/1095 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1095 Comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 6.12.0 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 ? crypto_aead_setkey+0x2c/0x130 kasan_report+0xda/0x110 ? crypto_aead_setkey+0x2c/0x130 crypto_aead_setkey+0x2c/0x130 crypt_message+0x258/0xec0 [cifs] ? __asan_memset+0x23/0x50 ? __pfx_crypt_message+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? mark_lock+0xb0/0x6a0 ? hlock_class+0x32/0xb0 ? mark_lock+0xb0/0x6a0 smb3_init_transform_rq+0x352/0x3f0 [cifs] ? lock_acquire.part.0+0xf4/0x2a0 smb_send_rqst+0x144/0x230 [cifs] ? __pfx_smb_send_rqst+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? hlock_class+0x32/0xb0 ? smb2_setup_request+0x225/0x3a0 [cifs] ? __pfx_cifs_compound_last_callback+0x10/0x10 [cifs] compound_send_recv+0x59b/0x1140 [cifs] ? __pfx_compound_send_recv+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? __create_object+0x5e/0x90 ? hlock_class+0x32/0xb0 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9a/0xf0 cifs_send_recv+0x23/0x30 [cifs] SMB2_tcon+0x3ec/0xb30 [cifs] ? __pfx_SMB2_tcon+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? lock_acquire.part.0+0xf4/0x2a0 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 ? do_raw_spin_trylock+0xc6/0x120 ? lock_acquire+0x3f/0x90 ? _get_xid+0x16/0xd0 [cifs] ? __pfx_SMB2_tcon+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? cifs_get_smb_ses+0xcdd/0x10a0 [cifs] cifs_get_smb_ses+0xcdd/0x10a0 [cifs] ? __pfx_cifs_get_smb_ses+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? cifs_get_tcp_session+0xaa0/0xca0 [cifs] cifs_mount_get_session+0x8a/0x210 [cifs] dfs_mount_share+0x1b0/0x11d0 [cifs] ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_dfs_mount_share+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? lock_acquire.part.0+0xf4/0x2a0 ? find_held_lock+0x8a/0xa0 ? hlock_class+0x32/0xb0 ? lock_release+0x203/0x5d0 cifs_mount+0xb3/0x3d0 [cifs] ? do_raw_spin_trylock+0xc6/0x120 ? __pfx_cifs_mount+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? lock_acquire+0x3f/0x90 ? find_nls+0x16/0xa0 ? smb3_update_mnt_flags+0x372/0x3b0 [cifs] cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x1e2/0xc80 [cifs] ? __pfx_vfs_parse_fs_string+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x10/0x10 [cifs] smb3_get_tree+0x1bf/0x330 [cifs] vfs_get_tree+0x4a/0x160 path_mount+0x3c1/0xfb0 ? kasan_quarantine_put+0xc7/0x1d0 ? __pfx_path_mount+0x10/0x10 ? kmem_cache_free+0x118/0x3e0 ? user_path_at+0x74/0xa0 __x64_sys_mount+0x1a6/0x1e0 ? __pfx___x64_sys_mount+0x10/0x10 ? mark_held_locks+0x1a/0x90 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Fix use-after-free of nreq in reqsk_timer_handler(). The cited commit replaced inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop_and_put() with __inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop() and reqsk_put() in reqsk_timer_handler(). Then, oreq should be passed to reqsk_put() instead of req; otherwise use-after-free of nreq could happen when reqsk is migrated but the retry attempt failed (e.g. due to timeout). Let's pass oreq to reqsk_put().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: 6fire: Release resources at card release The current 6fire code tries to release the resources right after the call of usb6fire_chip_abort(). But at this moment, the card object might be still in use (as we're calling snd_card_free_when_closed()). For avoid potential UAFs, move the release of resources to the card's private_free instead of the manual call of usb6fire_chip_destroy() at the USB disconnect callback.

A use-after-free vulnerability in the Linux Kernel io_uring system can be exploited to achieve local privilege escalation. The io_file_get_fixed function lacks the presence of ctx->uring_lock which can lead to a Use-After-Free vulnerability due a race condition with fixed files getting unregistered. We recommend upgrading past commit da24142b1ef9fd5d36b76e36bab328a5b27523e8.

The eBPF ALU32 bounds tracking for bitwise ops (AND, OR and XOR) in the Linux kernel did not properly update 32-bit bounds, which could be turned into out of bounds reads and writes in the Linux kernel and therefore, arbitrary code execution. This issue was fixed via commit 049c4e13714e ("bpf: Fix alu32 const subreg bound tracking on bitwise operations") (v5.13-rc4) and backported to the stable kernels in v5.12.4, v5.11.21, and v5.10.37. The AND/OR issues were introduced by commit 3f50f132d840 ("bpf: Verifier, do explicit ALU32 bounds tracking") (5.7-rc1) and the XOR variant was introduced by 2921c90d4718 ("bpf:Fix a verifier failure with xor") ( 5.10-rc1).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: usb: fix possible use-after-free in smsc75xx_bind The commit 46a8b29c6306 ("net: usb: fix memory leak in smsc75xx_bind") fails to clean up the work scheduled in smsc75xx_reset-> smsc75xx_set_multicast, which leads to use-after-free if the work is scheduled to start after the deallocation. In addition, this patch also removes a dangling pointer - dev->data[0]. This patch calls cancel_work_sync to cancel the scheduled work and set the dangling pointer to NULL.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: usb-audio: Fix potential out-of-bound accesses for Extigy and Mbox devices A bogus device can provide a bNumConfigurations value that exceeds the initial value used in usb_get_configuration for allocating dev->config. This can lead to out-of-bounds accesses later, e.g. in usb_destroy_configuration.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/i915/gt: Fix potential UAF by revoke of fence registers CI has been sporadically reporting the following issue triggered by igt@i915_selftest@live@hangcheck on ADL-P and similar machines: <6> [414.049203] i915: Running intel_hangcheck_live_selftests/igt_reset_evict_fence ... <6> [414.068804] i915 0000:00:02.0: [drm] GT0: GUC: submission enabled <6> [414.068812] i915 0000:00:02.0: [drm] GT0: GUC: SLPC enabled <3> [414.070354] Unable to pin Y-tiled fence; err:-4 <3> [414.071282] i915_vma_revoke_fence:301 GEM_BUG_ON(!i915_active_is_idle(&fence->active)) ... <4>[ 609.603992] ------------[ cut here ]------------ <2>[ 609.603995] kernel BUG at drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_ggtt_fencing.c:301! <4>[ 609.604003] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI <4>[ 609.604006] CPU: 0 PID: 268 Comm: kworker/u64:3 Tainted: G U W 6.9.0-CI_DRM_14785-g1ba62f8cea9c+ #1 <4>[ 609.604008] Hardware name: Intel Corporation Alder Lake Client Platform/AlderLake-P DDR4 RVP, BIOS RPLPFWI1.R00.4035.A00.2301200723 01/20/2023 <4>[ 609.604010] Workqueue: i915 __i915_gem_free_work [i915] <4>[ 609.604149] RIP: 0010:i915_vma_revoke_fence+0x187/0x1f0 [i915] ... <4>[ 609.604271] Call Trace: <4>[ 609.604273] <TASK> ... <4>[ 609.604716] __i915_vma_evict+0x2e9/0x550 [i915] <4>[ 609.604852] __i915_vma_unbind+0x7c/0x160 [i915] <4>[ 609.604977] force_unbind+0x24/0xa0 [i915] <4>[ 609.605098] i915_vma_destroy+0x2f/0xa0 [i915] <4>[ 609.605210] __i915_gem_object_pages_fini+0x51/0x2f0 [i915] <4>[ 609.605330] __i915_gem_free_objects.isra.0+0x6a/0xc0 [i915] <4>[ 609.605440] process_scheduled_works+0x351/0x690 ... In the past, there were similar failures reported by CI from other IGT tests, observed on other platforms. Before commit 63baf4f3d587 ("drm/i915/gt: Only wait for GPU activity before unbinding a GGTT fence"), i915_vma_revoke_fence() was waiting for idleness of vma->active via fence_update(). That commit introduced vma->fence->active in order for the fence_update() to be able to wait selectively on that one instead of vma->active since only idleness of fence registers was needed. But then, another commit 0d86ee35097a ("drm/i915/gt: Make fence revocation unequivocal") replaced the call to fence_update() in i915_vma_revoke_fence() with only fence_write(), and also added that GEM_BUG_ON(!i915_active_is_idle(&fence->active)) in front. No justification was provided on why we might then expect idleness of vma->fence->active without first waiting on it. The issue can be potentially caused by a race among revocation of fence registers on one side and sequential execution of signal callbacks invoked on completion of a request that was using them on the other, still processed in parallel to revocation of those fence registers. Fix it by waiting for idleness of vma->fence->active in i915_vma_revoke_fence(). (cherry picked from commit 24bb052d3dd499c5956abad5f7d8e4fd07da7fb1)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: under NFSv4.1, fix double svc_xprt_put on rpc_create failure On error situation `clp->cl_cb_conn.cb_xprt` should not be given a reference to the xprt otherwise both client cleanup and the error handling path of the caller call to put it. Better to delay handing over the reference to a later branch. [ 72.530665] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. [ 72.531933] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 173 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xcf/0x120 [ 72.533075] Modules linked in: nfsd(OE) nfsv4(OE) nfsv3(OE) nfs(OE) lockd(OE) compat_nfs_ssc(OE) nfs_acl(OE) rpcsec_gss_krb5(OE) auth_rpcgss(OE) rpcrdma(OE) dns_resolver fscache netfs grace rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm sunrpc(OE) mlx5_ib mlx5_core mlxfw pci_hyperv_intf ib_uverbs ib_core xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nft_counter xt_addrtype nft_compat br_netfilter bridge stp llc nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set overlay nf_tables nfnetlink crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel xfs serio_raw virtio_net virtio_blk net_failover failover fuse [last unloaded: sunrpc] [ 72.540389] CPU: 0 PID: 173 Comm: kworker/u16:5 Tainted: G OE 5.15.82-dan #1 [ 72.541511] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM/RHEL-AV, BIOS 1.16.0-3.module+el8.7.0+1084+97b81f61 04/01/2014 [ 72.542717] Workqueue: nfsd4_callbacks nfsd4_run_cb_work [nfsd] [ 72.543575] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xcf/0x120 [ 72.544299] Code: 55 00 0f 0b 5d e9 01 50 98 00 80 3d 75 9e 39 08 00 0f 85 74 ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 e8 d1 60 8e c6 05 61 9e 39 08 01 e8 f6 51 55 00 <0f> 0b 5d e9 d9 4f 98 00 80 3d 4b 9e 39 08 00 0f 85 4c ff ff ff 48 [ 72.546666] RSP: 0018:ffffb3f841157cf0 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 72.547393] RAX: 0000000000000026 RBX: ffff89ac6231d478 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 72.548324] RDX: ffff89adb7c2c2c0 RSI: ffff89adb7c205c0 RDI: ffff89adb7c205c0 [ 72.549271] RBP: ffffb3f841157cf0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffefffff [ 72.550209] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffb3f841157ad0 R12: ffff89ac6231d180 [ 72.551142] R13: ffff89ac6231d478 R14: ffff89ac40c06180 R15: ffff89ac6231d4b0 [ 72.552089] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff89adb7c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 72.553175] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 72.553934] CR2: 0000563a310506a8 CR3: 0000000109a66000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 [ 72.554874] Call Trace: [ 72.555278] <TASK> [ 72.555614] svc_xprt_put+0xaf/0xe0 [sunrpc] [ 72.556276] nfsd4_process_cb_update.isra.11+0xb7/0x410 [nfsd] [ 72.557087] ? update_load_avg+0x82/0x610 [ 72.557652] ? cpuacct_charge+0x60/0x70 [ 72.558212] ? dequeue_entity+0xdb/0x3e0 [ 72.558765] ? queued_spin_unlock+0x9/0x20 [ 72.559358] nfsd4_run_cb_work+0xfc/0x270 [nfsd] [ 72.560031] process_one_work+0x1df/0x390 [ 72.560600] worker_thread+0x37/0x3b0 [ 72.561644] ? process_one_work+0x390/0x390 [ 72.562247] kthread+0x12f/0x150 [ 72.562710] ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50 [ 72.563309] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 72.563818] </TASK> [ 72.564189] ---[ end trace 031117b1c72ec616 ]--- [ 72.566019] list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev (ffff89ac4977e538), but was ffff89ac4763e018. (next=ffff89ac4763e018). [ 72.567647] ------------[ cut here ]------------

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath12k: fix warning when unbinding If there is an error during some initialization related to firmware, the buffers dp->tx_ring[i].tx_status are released. However this is released again when the device is unbinded (ath12k_pci), and we get: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2098 at mm/slub.c:4689 free_large_kmalloc+0x4d/0x80 Call Trace: free_large_kmalloc ath12k_dp_free ath12k_core_deinit ath12k_pci_remove ... The issue is always reproducible from a VM because the MSI addressing initialization is failing. In order to fix the issue, just set the buffers to NULL after releasing in order to avoid the double free.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: mmio: Fix use-after-free Read in kvm_vm_ioctl_unregister_coalesced_mmio BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kvm_vm_ioctl_unregister_coalesced_mmio+0x7c/0x1ec arch/arm64/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/coalesced_mmio.c:183 Read of size 8 at addr ffff0000c03a2500 by task syz-executor083/4269 CPU: 5 PID: 4269 Comm: syz-executor083 Not tainted 5.10.0 #7 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2d0 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:132 show_stack+0x28/0x34 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:196 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x110/0x164 lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description+0x78/0x5c8 mm/kasan/report.c:385 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:545 [inline] kasan_report+0x148/0x1e4 mm/kasan/report.c:562 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline] __asan_load8+0xb4/0xbc mm/kasan/generic.c:252 kvm_vm_ioctl_unregister_coalesced_mmio+0x7c/0x1ec arch/arm64/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/coalesced_mmio.c:183 kvm_vm_ioctl+0xe30/0x14c4 arch/arm64/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3755 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:48 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:753 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:739 [inline] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xf88/0x131c fs/ioctl.c:739 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:36 [inline] invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:48 [inline] el0_svc_common arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:158 [inline] do_el0_svc+0x120/0x290 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:220 el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:367 el0_sync_handler+0x98/0x170 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:383 el0_sync+0x140/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:670 Allocated by task 4269: stack_trace_save+0x80/0xb8 kernel/stacktrace.c:121 kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:48 [inline] kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0xdc/0x120 mm/kasan/common.c:461 kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x14 mm/kasan/common.c:475 kmem_cache_alloc_trace include/linux/slab.h:450 [inline] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:552 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:664 [inline] kvm_vm_ioctl_register_coalesced_mmio+0x78/0x1cc arch/arm64/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/coalesced_mmio.c:146 kvm_vm_ioctl+0x7e8/0x14c4 arch/arm64/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3746 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:48 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:753 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:739 [inline] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xf88/0x131c fs/ioctl.c:739 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:36 [inline] invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:48 [inline] el0_svc_common arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:158 [inline] do_el0_svc+0x120/0x290 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:220 el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:367 el0_sync_handler+0x98/0x170 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:383 el0_sync+0x140/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:670 Freed by task 4269: stack_trace_save+0x80/0xb8 kernel/stacktrace.c:121 kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:48 [inline] kasan_set_track+0x38/0x6c mm/kasan/common.c:56 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x40 mm/kasan/generic.c:355 __kasan_slab_free+0x124/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:422 kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x1c mm/kasan/common.c:431 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1544 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1577 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:3142 [inline] kfree+0x104/0x38c mm/slub.c:4124 coalesced_mmio_destructor+0x94/0xa4 arch/arm64/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/coalesced_mmio.c:102 kvm_iodevice_destructor include/kvm/iodev.h:61 [inline] kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev+0x248/0x280 arch/arm64/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4374 kvm_vm_ioctl_unregister_coalesced_mmio+0x158/0x1ec arch/arm64/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/coalesced_mmio.c:186 kvm_vm_ioctl+0xe30/0x14c4 arch/arm64/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3755 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:48 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:753 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:739 [inline] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xf88/0x131c fs/ioctl.c:739 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:36 [inline] invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/sys ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: Fix response handling in iwl_mvm_send_recovery_cmd() 1. The size of the response packet is not validated. 2. The response buffer is not freed. Resolve these issues by switching to iwl_mvm_send_cmd_status(), which handles both size validation and frees the buffer.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: fix race in concurrent f2fs_stop_gc_thread In my test case, concurrent calls to f2fs shutdown report the following stack trace: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xc6cfff63bb5513fc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 678 Comm: f2fs_rep_shutdo Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-next-20241029-g6fb2fa9805c5-dirty #85 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x8b/0xa0 ? __die_body+0x26/0xa0 ? die_addr+0x54/0x90 ? exc_general_protection+0x24b/0x5c0 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 ? kthread_stop+0x46/0x390 f2fs_stop_gc_thread+0x6c/0x110 f2fs_do_shutdown+0x309/0x3a0 f2fs_ioc_shutdown+0x150/0x1c0 __f2fs_ioctl+0xffd/0x2ac0 f2fs_ioctl+0x76/0xe0 vfs_ioctl+0x23/0x60 __x64_sys_ioctl+0xce/0xf0 x64_sys_call+0x2b1b/0x4540 do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e The root cause is a race condition in f2fs_stop_gc_thread() called from different f2fs shutdown paths: [CPU0] [CPU1] ---------------------- ----------------------- f2fs_stop_gc_thread f2fs_stop_gc_thread gc_th = sbi->gc_thread gc_th = sbi->gc_thread kfree(gc_th) sbi->gc_thread = NULL < gc_th != NULL > kthread_stop(gc_th->f2fs_gc_task) //UAF The commit c7f114d864ac ("f2fs: fix to avoid use-after-free in f2fs_stop_gc_thread()") attempted to fix this issue by using a read semaphore to prevent races between shutdown and remount threads, but it fails to prevent all race conditions. Fix it by converting to write lock of s_umount in f2fs_do_shutdown().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: fix use-after-free in device_for_each_child() Syzbot has reported the following KASAN splat: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in device_for_each_child+0x18f/0x1a0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88801f605308 by task kbnepd bnep0/4980 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 4980 Comm: kbnepd bnep0 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc4-00161-gae90f6a6170d #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 ? device_for_each_child+0x18f/0x1a0 print_report+0x13a/0x4cb ? __virt_addr_valid+0x5e/0x590 ? __phys_addr+0xc6/0x150 ? device_for_each_child+0x18f/0x1a0 kasan_report+0xda/0x110 ? device_for_each_child+0x18f/0x1a0 ? __pfx_dev_memalloc_noio+0x10/0x10 device_for_each_child+0x18f/0x1a0 ? __pfx_device_for_each_child+0x10/0x10 pm_runtime_set_memalloc_noio+0xf2/0x180 netdev_unregister_kobject+0x1ed/0x270 unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x123c/0x1d80 ? __mutex_trylock_common+0xde/0x250 ? __pfx_unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x10/0x10 ? trace_contention_end+0xe6/0x140 ? __mutex_lock+0x4e7/0x8f0 ? __pfx_lock_acquire.part.0+0x10/0x10 ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xc0 ? unregister_netdev+0x12/0x30 unregister_netdevice_queue+0x30d/0x3f0 ? __pfx_unregister_netdevice_queue+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_down_write+0x10/0x10 unregister_netdev+0x1c/0x30 bnep_session+0x1fb3/0x2ab0 ? __pfx_bnep_session+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_woken_wake_function+0x10/0x10 ? __kthread_parkme+0x132/0x200 ? __pfx_bnep_session+0x10/0x10 ? kthread+0x13a/0x370 ? __pfx_bnep_session+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x2b7/0x370 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x48/0x80 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 4974: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 __kmalloc_noprof+0x1d1/0x440 hci_alloc_dev_priv+0x1d/0x2820 __vhci_create_device+0xef/0x7d0 vhci_write+0x2c7/0x480 vfs_write+0x6a0/0xfc0 ksys_write+0x12f/0x260 do_syscall_64+0xc7/0x250 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 4979: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x4f/0x70 kfree+0x141/0x490 hci_release_dev+0x4d9/0x600 bt_host_release+0x6a/0xb0 device_release+0xa4/0x240 kobject_put+0x1ec/0x5a0 put_device+0x1f/0x30 vhci_release+0x81/0xf0 __fput+0x3f6/0xb30 task_work_run+0x151/0x250 do_exit+0xa79/0x2c30 do_group_exit+0xd5/0x2a0 get_signal+0x1fcd/0x2210 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x93/0x780 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x140/0x290 do_syscall_64+0xd4/0x250 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f In 'hci_conn_del_sysfs()', 'device_unregister()' may be called when an underlying (kobject) reference counter is greater than 1. This means that reparenting (happened when the device is actually freed) is delayed and, during that delay, parent controller device (hciX) may be deleted. Since the latter may create a dangling pointer to freed parent, avoid that scenario by reparenting to NULL explicitly.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/ufence: Prefetch ufence addr to catch bogus address access_ok() only checks for addr overflow so also try to read the addr to catch invalid addr sent from userspace. (cherry picked from commit 9408c4508483ffc60811e910a93d6425b8e63928)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: usb: lan78xx: Fix double free issue with interrupt buffer allocation In lan78xx_probe(), the buffer `buf` was being freed twice: once implicitly through `usb_free_urb(dev->urb_intr)` with the `URB_FREE_BUFFER` flag and again explicitly by `kfree(buf)`. This caused a double free issue. To resolve this, reordered `kmalloc()` and `usb_alloc_urb()` calls to simplify the initialization sequence and removed the redundant `kfree(buf)`. Now, `buf` is allocated after `usb_alloc_urb()`, ensuring it is correctly managed by `usb_fill_int_urb()` and freed by `usb_free_urb()` as intended.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vdpa: solidrun: Fix UB bug with devres In psnet_open_pf_bar() and snet_open_vf_bar() a string later passed to pcim_iomap_regions() is placed on the stack. Neither pcim_iomap_regions() nor the functions it calls copy that string. Should the string later ever be used, this, consequently, causes undefined behavior since the stack frame will by then have disappeared. Fix the bug by allocating the strings on the heap through devm_kasprintf().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fsnotify: Fix ordering of iput() and watched_objects decrement Ensure the superblock is kept alive until we're done with iput(). Holding a reference to an inode is not allowed unless we ensure the superblock stays alive, which fsnotify does by keeping the watched_objects count elevated, so iput() must happen before the watched_objects decrement. This can lead to a UAF of something like sb->s_fs_info in tmpfs, but the UAF is hard to hit because race orderings that oops are more likely, thanks to the CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION() block in generic_shutdown_super(). Also, ensure that fsnotify_put_sb_watched_objects() doesn't call fsnotify_sb_watched_objects() on a superblock that may have already been freed, which would cause a UAF read of sb->s_fsnotify_info.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: clk: clk-loongson2: Fix memory corruption bug in struct loongson2_clk_provider Some heap space is allocated for the flexible structure `struct clk_hw_onecell_data` and its flexible-array member `hws` through the composite structure `struct loongson2_clk_provider` in function `loongson2_clk_probe()`, as shown below: 289 struct loongson2_clk_provider *clp; ... 296 for (p = data; p->name; p++) 297 clks_num++; 298 299 clp = devm_kzalloc(dev, struct_size(clp, clk_data.hws, clks_num), 300 GFP_KERNEL); Then some data is written into the flexible array: 350 clp->clk_data.hws[p->id] = hw; This corrupts `clk_lock`, which is the spinlock variable immediately following the `clk_data` member in `struct loongson2_clk_provider`: struct loongson2_clk_provider { void __iomem *base; struct device *dev; struct clk_hw_onecell_data clk_data; spinlock_t clk_lock; /* protect access to DIV registers */ }; The problem is that the flexible structure is currently placed in the middle of `struct loongson2_clk_provider` instead of at the end. Fix this by moving `struct clk_hw_onecell_data clk_data;` to the end of `struct loongson2_clk_provider`. Also, add a code comment to help prevent this from happening again in case new members are added to the structure in the future. This change also fixes the following -Wflex-array-member-not-at-end warning: drivers/clk/clk-loongson2.c:32:36: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sh: intc: Fix use-after-free bug in register_intc_controller() In the error handling for this function, d is freed without ever removing it from intc_list which would lead to a use after free. To fix this, let's only add it to the list after everything has succeeded.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vfio/pci: Properly hide first-in-list PCIe extended capability There are cases where a PCIe extended capability should be hidden from the user. For example, an unknown capability (i.e., capability with ID greater than PCI_EXT_CAP_ID_MAX) or a capability that is intentionally chosen to be hidden from the user. Hiding a capability is done by virtualizing and modifying the 'Next Capability Offset' field of the previous capability so it points to the capability after the one that should be hidden. The special case where the first capability in the list should be hidden is handled differently because there is no previous capability that can be modified. In this case, the capability ID and version are zeroed while leaving the next pointer intact. This hides the capability and leaves an anchor for the rest of the capability list. However, today, hiding the first capability in the list is not done properly if the capability is unknown, as struct vfio_pci_core_device->pci_config_map is set to the capability ID during initialization but the capability ID is not properly checked later when used in vfio_config_do_rw(). This leads to the following warning [1] and to an out-of-bounds access to ecap_perms array. Fix it by checking cap_id in vfio_config_do_rw(), and if it is greater than PCI_EXT_CAP_ID_MAX, use an alternative struct perm_bits for direct read only access instead of the ecap_perms array. Note that this is safe since the above is the only case where cap_id can exceed PCI_EXT_CAP_ID_MAX (except for the special capabilities, which are already checked before). [1] WARNING: CPU: 118 PID: 5329 at drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c:1900 vfio_pci_config_rw+0x395/0x430 [vfio_pci_core] CPU: 118 UID: 0 PID: 5329 Comm: simx-qemu-syste Not tainted 6.12.0+ #1 (snip) Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x69/0x80 ? __warn+0x8d/0x140 ? vfio_pci_config_rw+0x395/0x430 [vfio_pci_core] ? report_bug+0x18f/0x1a0 ? handle_bug+0x63/0xa0 ? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 ? vfio_pci_config_rw+0x395/0x430 [vfio_pci_core] ? vfio_pci_config_rw+0x244/0x430 [vfio_pci_core] vfio_pci_rw+0x101/0x1b0 [vfio_pci_core] vfio_pci_core_read+0x1d/0x30 [vfio_pci_core] vfio_device_fops_read+0x27/0x40 [vfio] vfs_read+0xbd/0x340 ? vfio_device_fops_unl_ioctl+0xbb/0x740 [vfio] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0xa4/0x4b0 __x64_sys_pread64+0x96/0xc0 x64_sys_call+0x1c3d/0x20d0 do_syscall_64+0x4d/0x120 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ima: fix buffer overrun in ima_eventdigest_init_common Function ima_eventdigest_init() calls ima_eventdigest_init_common() with HASH_ALGO__LAST which is then used to access the array hash_digest_size[] leading to buffer overrun. Have a conditional statement to handle this.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: resolve faulty mmap_region() error path behaviour The mmap_region() function is somewhat terrifying, with spaghetti-like control flow and numerous means by which issues can arise and incomplete state, memory leaks and other unpleasantness can occur. A large amount of the complexity arises from trying to handle errors late in the process of mapping a VMA, which forms the basis of recently observed issues with resource leaks and observable inconsistent state. Taking advantage of previous patches in this series we move a number of checks earlier in the code, simplifying things by moving the core of the logic into a static internal function __mmap_region(). Doing this allows us to perform a number of checks up front before we do any real work, and allows us to unwind the writable unmap check unconditionally as required and to perform a CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_MAPLE_TREE validation unconditionally also. We move a number of things here: 1. We preallocate memory for the iterator before we call the file-backed memory hook, allowing us to exit early and avoid having to perform complicated and error-prone close/free logic. We carefully free iterator state on both success and error paths. 2. The enclosing mmap_region() function handles the mapping_map_writable() logic early. Previously the logic had the mapping_map_writable() at the point of mapping a newly allocated file-backed VMA, and a matching mapping_unmap_writable() on success and error paths. We now do this unconditionally if this is a file-backed, shared writable mapping. If a driver changes the flags to eliminate VM_MAYWRITE, however doing so does not invalidate the seal check we just performed, and we in any case always decrement the counter in the wrapper. We perform a debug assert to ensure a driver does not attempt to do the opposite. 3. We also move arch_validate_flags() up into the mmap_region() function. This is only relevant on arm64 and sparc64, and the check is only meaningful for SPARC with ADI enabled. We explicitly add a warning for this arch if a driver invalidates this check, though the code ought eventually to be fixed to eliminate the need for this. With all of these measures in place, we no longer need to explicitly close the VMA on error paths, as we place all checks which might fail prior to a call to any driver mmap hook. This eliminates an entire class of errors, makes the code easier to reason about and more robust.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix use-after-free in SMB request handling A race condition exists between SMB request handling in `ksmbd_conn_handler_loop()` and the freeing of `ksmbd_conn` in the workqueue handler `handle_ksmbd_work()`. This leads to a UAF. - KASAN: slab-use-after-free Read in handle_ksmbd_work - KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rtlock_slowlock_locked This race condition arises as follows: - `ksmbd_conn_handler_loop()` waits for `conn->r_count` to reach zero: `wait_event(conn->r_count_q, atomic_read(&conn->r_count) == 0);` - Meanwhile, `handle_ksmbd_work()` decrements `conn->r_count` using `atomic_dec_return(&conn->r_count)`, and if it reaches zero, calls `ksmbd_conn_free()`, which frees `conn`. - However, after `handle_ksmbd_work()` decrements `conn->r_count`, it may still access `conn->r_count_q` in the following line: `waitqueue_active(&conn->r_count_q)` or `wake_up(&conn->r_count_q)` This results in a UAF, as `conn` has already been freed. The discovery of this UAF can be referenced in the following PR for syzkaller's support for SMB requests.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware: arm_scmi: Fix slab-use-after-free in scmi_bus_notifier() The scmi_dev->name is released prematurely in __scmi_device_destroy(), which causes slab-use-after-free when accessing scmi_dev->name in scmi_bus_notifier(). So move the release of scmi_dev->name to scmi_device_release() to avoid slab-use-after-free. | BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in strncmp+0xe4/0xec | Read of size 1 at addr ffffff80a482bcc0 by task swapper/0/1 | | CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.6.38-debug #1 | Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SA8775P Ride (DT) | Call trace: | dump_backtrace+0x94/0x114 | show_stack+0x18/0x24 | dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x60 | print_report+0xf4/0x5b0 | kasan_report+0xa4/0xec | __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x20/0x2c | strncmp+0xe4/0xec | scmi_bus_notifier+0x5c/0x54c | notifier_call_chain+0xb4/0x31c | blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x68/0x9c | bus_notify+0x54/0x78 | device_del+0x1bc/0x840 | device_unregister+0x20/0xb4 | __scmi_device_destroy+0xac/0x280 | scmi_device_destroy+0x94/0xd0 | scmi_chan_setup+0x524/0x750 | scmi_probe+0x7fc/0x1508 | platform_probe+0xc4/0x19c | really_probe+0x32c/0x99c | __driver_probe_device+0x15c/0x3c4 | driver_probe_device+0x5c/0x170 | __driver_attach+0x1c8/0x440 | bus_for_each_dev+0xf4/0x178 | driver_attach+0x3c/0x58 | bus_add_driver+0x234/0x4d4 | driver_register+0xf4/0x3c0 | __platform_driver_register+0x60/0x88 | scmi_driver_init+0xb0/0x104 | do_one_initcall+0xb4/0x664 | kernel_init_freeable+0x3c8/0x894 | kernel_init+0x24/0x1e8 | ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 | | Allocated by task 1: | kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x54 | kasan_set_track+0x2c/0x40 | kasan_save_alloc_info+0x24/0x34 | __kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xb8 | __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x6c/0x104 | kstrdup+0x48/0x84 | kstrdup_const+0x34/0x40 | __scmi_device_create.part.0+0x8c/0x408 | scmi_device_create+0x104/0x370 | scmi_chan_setup+0x2a0/0x750 | scmi_probe+0x7fc/0x1508 | platform_probe+0xc4/0x19c | really_probe+0x32c/0x99c | __driver_probe_device+0x15c/0x3c4 | driver_probe_device+0x5c/0x170 | __driver_attach+0x1c8/0x440 | bus_for_each_dev+0xf4/0x178 | driver_attach+0x3c/0x58 | bus_add_driver+0x234/0x4d4 | driver_register+0xf4/0x3c0 | __platform_driver_register+0x60/0x88 | scmi_driver_init+0xb0/0x104 | do_one_initcall+0xb4/0x664 | kernel_init_freeable+0x3c8/0x894 | kernel_init+0x24/0x1e8 | ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 | | Freed by task 1: | kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x54 | kasan_set_track+0x2c/0x40 | kasan_save_free_info+0x38/0x5c | __kasan_slab_free+0xe8/0x164 | __kmem_cache_free+0x11c/0x230 | kfree+0x70/0x130 | kfree_const+0x20/0x40 | __scmi_device_destroy+0x70/0x280 | scmi_device_destroy+0x94/0xd0 | scmi_chan_setup+0x524/0x750 | scmi_probe+0x7fc/0x1508 | platform_probe+0xc4/0x19c | really_probe+0x32c/0x99c | __driver_probe_device+0x15c/0x3c4 | driver_probe_device+0x5c/0x170 | __driver_attach+0x1c8/0x440 | bus_for_each_dev+0xf4/0x178 | driver_attach+0x3c/0x58 | bus_add_driver+0x234/0x4d4 | driver_register+0xf4/0x3c0 | __platform_driver_register+0x60/0x88 | scmi_driver_init+0xb0/0x104 | do_one_initcall+0xb4/0x664 | kernel_init_freeable+0x3c8/0x894 | kernel_init+0x24/0x1e8 | ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: kvm: Fix out-of-bounds array access In kvm_riscv_vcpu_sbi_init() the entry->ext_idx can contain an out-of-bound index. This is used as a special marker for the base extensions, that cannot be disabled. However, when traversing the extensions, that special marker is not checked prior indexing the array. Add an out-of-bounds check to the function.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block/ioctl: prefer different overflow check Running syzkaller with the newly reintroduced signed integer overflow sanitizer shows this report: [ 62.982337] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 62.985692] cgroup: Invalid name [ 62.986211] UBSAN: signed-integer-overflow in ../block/ioctl.c:36:46 [ 62.989370] 9pnet_fd: p9_fd_create_tcp (7343): problem connecting socket to 127.0.0.1 [ 62.992992] 9223372036854775807 + 4095 cannot be represented in type 'long long' [ 62.997827] 9pnet_fd: p9_fd_create_tcp (7345): problem connecting socket to 127.0.0.1 [ 62.999369] random: crng reseeded on system resumption [ 63.000634] GUP no longer grows the stack in syz-executor.2 (7353): 20002000-20003000 (20001000) [ 63.000668] CPU: 0 PID: 7353 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc2-00035-gb3ef86b5a957 #1 [ 63.000677] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 63.000682] Call Trace: [ 63.000686] <TASK> [ 63.000731] dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0 [ 63.000919] __get_user_pages+0x903/0xd30 [ 63.001030] __gup_longterm_locked+0x153e/0x1ba0 [ 63.001041] ? _raw_read_unlock_irqrestore+0x17/0x50 [ 63.001072] ? try_get_folio+0x29c/0x2d0 [ 63.001083] internal_get_user_pages_fast+0x1119/0x1530 [ 63.001109] iov_iter_extract_pages+0x23b/0x580 [ 63.001206] bio_iov_iter_get_pages+0x4de/0x1220 [ 63.001235] iomap_dio_bio_iter+0x9b6/0x1410 [ 63.001297] __iomap_dio_rw+0xab4/0x1810 [ 63.001316] iomap_dio_rw+0x45/0xa0 [ 63.001328] ext4_file_write_iter+0xdde/0x1390 [ 63.001372] vfs_write+0x599/0xbd0 [ 63.001394] ksys_write+0xc8/0x190 [ 63.001403] do_syscall_64+0xd4/0x1b0 [ 63.001421] ? arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x3a/0x60 [ 63.001479] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 [ 63.001535] RIP: 0033:0x7f7fd3ebf539 [ 63.001551] Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 f1 14 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 63.001562] RSP: 002b:00007f7fd32570c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 63.001584] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f7fd3ff3f80 RCX: 00007f7fd3ebf539 [ 63.001590] RDX: 4db6d1e4f7e43360 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000004 [ 63.001595] RBP: 00007f7fd3f1e496 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 63.001599] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 63.001604] R13: 0000000000000006 R14: 00007f7fd3ff3f80 R15: 00007ffd415ad2b8 ... [ 63.018142] ---[ end trace ]--- Historically, the signed integer overflow sanitizer did not work in the kernel due to its interaction with `-fwrapv` but this has since been changed [1] in the newest version of Clang; It was re-enabled in the kernel with Commit 557f8c582a9ba8ab ("ubsan: Reintroduce signed overflow sanitizer"). Let's rework this overflow checking logic to not actually perform an overflow during the check itself, thus avoiding the UBSAN splat. [1]: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/82432

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSv4.0: Fix a use-after-free problem in the asynchronous open() Yang Erkun reports that when two threads are opening files at the same time, and are forced to abort before a reply is seen, then the call to nfs_release_seqid() in nfs4_opendata_free() can result in a use-after-free of the pointer to the defunct rpc task of the other thread. The fix is to ensure that if the RPC call is aborted before the call to nfs_wait_on_sequence() is complete, then we must call nfs_release_seqid() in nfs4_open_release() before the rpc_task is freed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: uvcvideo: Skip parsing frames of type UVC_VS_UNDEFINED in uvc_parse_format This can lead to out of bounds writes since frames of this type were not taken into account when calculating the size of the frames buffer in uvc_parse_streaming.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ipset: add missing range check in bitmap_ip_uadt When tb[IPSET_ATTR_IP_TO] is not present but tb[IPSET_ATTR_CIDR] exists, the values of ip and ip_to are slightly swapped. Therefore, the range check for ip should be done later, but this part is missing and it seems that the vulnerability occurs. So we should add missing range checks and remove unnecessary range checks.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block, bfq: fix bfqq uaf in bfq_limit_depth() Set new allocated bfqq to bic or remove freed bfqq from bic are both protected by bfqd->lock, however bfq_limit_depth() is deferencing bfqq from bic without the lock, this can lead to UAF if the io_context is shared by multiple tasks. For example, test bfq with io_uring can trigger following UAF in v6.6: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bfqq_group+0x15/0x50 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x47/0x80 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x66/0x300 print_report+0x3e/0x70 kasan_report+0xb4/0xf0 bfqq_group+0x15/0x50 bfqq_request_over_limit+0x130/0x9a0 bfq_limit_depth+0x1b5/0x480 __blk_mq_alloc_requests+0x2b5/0xa00 blk_mq_get_new_requests+0x11d/0x1d0 blk_mq_submit_bio+0x286/0xb00 submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x331/0x400 __block_write_full_folio+0x3d0/0x640 writepage_cb+0x3b/0xc0 write_cache_pages+0x254/0x6c0 write_cache_pages+0x254/0x6c0 do_writepages+0x192/0x310 filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x95/0xc0 __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x99/0xd0 filemap_write_and_wait_range.part.0+0x4d/0xa0 blkdev_read_iter+0xef/0x1e0 io_read+0x1b6/0x8a0 io_issue_sqe+0x87/0x300 io_wq_submit_work+0xeb/0x390 io_worker_handle_work+0x24d/0x550 io_wq_worker+0x27f/0x6c0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 808602: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x83/0x90 kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1b1/0x6d0 bfq_get_queue+0x138/0xfa0 bfq_get_bfqq_handle_split+0xe3/0x2c0 bfq_init_rq+0x196/0xbb0 bfq_insert_request.isra.0+0xb5/0x480 bfq_insert_requests+0x156/0x180 blk_mq_insert_request+0x15d/0x440 blk_mq_submit_bio+0x8a4/0xb00 submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x331/0x400 __blkdev_direct_IO_async+0x2dd/0x330 blkdev_write_iter+0x39a/0x450 io_write+0x22a/0x840 io_issue_sqe+0x87/0x300 io_wq_submit_work+0xeb/0x390 io_worker_handle_work+0x24d/0x550 io_wq_worker+0x27f/0x6c0 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 Freed by task 808589: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x27/0x40 __kasan_slab_free+0x126/0x1b0 kmem_cache_free+0x10c/0x750 bfq_put_queue+0x2dd/0x770 __bfq_insert_request.isra.0+0x155/0x7a0 bfq_insert_request.isra.0+0x122/0x480 bfq_insert_requests+0x156/0x180 blk_mq_dispatch_plug_list+0x528/0x7e0 blk_mq_flush_plug_list.part.0+0xe5/0x590 __blk_flush_plug+0x3b/0x90 blk_finish_plug+0x40/0x60 do_writepages+0x19d/0x310 filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x95/0xc0 __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x99/0xd0 filemap_write_and_wait_range.part.0+0x4d/0xa0 blkdev_read_iter+0xef/0x1e0 io_read+0x1b6/0x8a0 io_issue_sqe+0x87/0x300 io_wq_submit_work+0xeb/0x390 io_worker_handle_work+0x24d/0x550 io_wq_worker+0x27f/0x6c0 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 Fix the problem by protecting bic_to_bfqq() with bfqd->lock.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ionic: fix use after netif_napi_del() When queues are started, netif_napi_add() and napi_enable() are called. If there are 4 queues and only 3 queues are used for the current configuration, only 3 queues' napi should be registered and enabled. The ionic_qcq_enable() checks whether the .poll pointer is not NULL for enabling only the using queue' napi. Unused queues' napi will not be registered by netif_napi_add(), so the .poll pointer indicates NULL. But it couldn't distinguish whether the napi was unregistered or not because netif_napi_del() doesn't reset the .poll pointer to NULL. So, ionic_qcq_enable() calls napi_enable() for the queue, which was unregistered by netif_napi_del(). Reproducer: ethtool -L <interface name> rx 1 tx 1 combined 0 ethtool -L <interface name> rx 0 tx 0 combined 1 ethtool -L <interface name> rx 0 tx 0 combined 4 Splat looks like: kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:6666! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 3 PID: 1057 Comm: kworker/3:3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2+ #16 Workqueue: events ionic_lif_deferred_work [ionic] RIP: 0010:napi_enable+0x3b/0x40 Code: 48 89 c2 48 83 e2 f6 80 b9 61 09 00 00 00 74 0d 48 83 bf 60 01 00 00 00 74 03 80 ce 01 f0 4f RSP: 0018:ffffb6ed83227d48 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff97560cda0828 RCX: 0000000000000029 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff97560cda0a28 RBP: ffffb6ed83227d50 R08: 0000000000000400 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff97560ce3c1a0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff975613ba0a20 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff975d5f780000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f8f734ee200 CR3: 0000000103e50000 CR4: 00000000007506f0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? die+0x33/0x90 ? do_trap+0xd9/0x100 ? napi_enable+0x3b/0x40 ? do_error_trap+0x83/0xb0 ? napi_enable+0x3b/0x40 ? napi_enable+0x3b/0x40 ? exc_invalid_op+0x4e/0x70 ? napi_enable+0x3b/0x40 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? napi_enable+0x3b/0x40 ionic_qcq_enable+0xb7/0x180 [ionic 59bdfc8a035436e1c4224ff7d10789e3f14643f8] ionic_start_queues+0xc4/0x290 [ionic 59bdfc8a035436e1c4224ff7d10789e3f14643f8] ionic_link_status_check+0x11c/0x170 [ionic 59bdfc8a035436e1c4224ff7d10789e3f14643f8] ionic_lif_deferred_work+0x129/0x280 [ionic 59bdfc8a035436e1c4224ff7d10789e3f14643f8] process_one_work+0x145/0x360 worker_thread+0x2bb/0x3d0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xcc/0x100 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/s390: Implement blocking domain This fixes a crash when surprise hot-unplugging a PCI device. This crash happens because during hot-unplug __iommu_group_set_domain_nofail() attaching the default domain fails when the platform no longer recognizes the device as it has already been removed and we end up with a NULL domain pointer and UAF. This is exactly the case referred to in the second comment in __iommu_device_set_domain() and just as stated there if we can instead attach the blocking domain the UAF is prevented as this can handle the already removed device. Implement the blocking domain to use this handling. With this change, the crash is fixed but we still hit a warning attempting to change DMA ownership on a blocked device.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: 9p: add missing locking around taking dentry fid list Fix a use-after-free on dentry's d_fsdata fid list when a thread looks up a fid through dentry while another thread unlinks it: UAF thread: refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. p9_fid_get linux/./include/net/9p/client.h:262 v9fs_fid_find+0x236/0x280 linux/fs/9p/fid.c:129 v9fs_fid_lookup_with_uid linux/fs/9p/fid.c:181 v9fs_fid_lookup+0xbf/0xc20 linux/fs/9p/fid.c:314 v9fs_vfs_getattr_dotl+0xf9/0x360 linux/fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c:400 vfs_statx+0xdd/0x4d0 linux/fs/stat.c:248 Freed by: p9_fid_destroy (inlined) p9_client_clunk+0xb0/0xe0 linux/net/9p/client.c:1456 p9_fid_put linux/./include/net/9p/client.h:278 v9fs_dentry_release+0xb5/0x140 linux/fs/9p/vfs_dentry.c:55 v9fs_remove+0x38f/0x620 linux/fs/9p/vfs_inode.c:518 vfs_unlink+0x29a/0x810 linux/fs/namei.c:4335 The problem is that d_fsdata was not accessed under d_lock, because d_release() normally is only called once the dentry is otherwise no longer accessible but since we also call it explicitly in v9fs_remove that lock is required: move the hlist out of the dentry under lock then unref its fids once they are no longer accessible.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: fix potential array underflow in ucsi_ccg_sync_control() The "command" variable can be controlled by the user via debugfs. The worry is that if con_index is zero then "&uc->ucsi->connector[con_index - 1]" would be an array underflow.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: habanalabs/gaudi: Fix a potential use after free in gaudi_memset_device_memory Our code analyzer reported a uaf. In gaudi_memset_device_memory, cb is get via hl_cb_kernel_create() with 2 refcount. If hl_cs_allocate_job() failed, the execution runs into release_cb branch. One ref of cb is dropped by hl_cb_put(cb) and could be freed if other thread also drops one ref. Then cb is used by cb->id later, which is a potential uaf. My patch add a variable 'id' to accept the value of cb->id before the hl_cb_put(cb) is called, to avoid the potential uaf.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: jffs2: fix use-after-free in jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem When we mount a jffs2 image, assume that the first few blocks of the image are normal and contain at least one xattr-related inode, but the next block is abnormal. As a result, an error is returned in jffs2_scan_eraseblock(). jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem() is then called in jffs2_build_filesystem() and then again in jffs2_do_fill_super(). Finally we can observe the following report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem+0x95/0x6ac Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881243384e0 by task mount/719 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x115/0x16b jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem+0x95/0x6ac jffs2_do_fill_super+0x84f/0xc30 jffs2_fill_super+0x2ea/0x4c0 mtd_get_sb+0x254/0x400 mtd_get_sb_by_nr+0x4f/0xd0 get_tree_mtd+0x498/0x840 jffs2_get_tree+0x25/0x30 vfs_get_tree+0x8d/0x2e0 path_mount+0x50f/0x1e50 do_mount+0x107/0x130 __se_sys_mount+0x1c5/0x2f0 __x64_sys_mount+0xc7/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x45/0x70 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Allocated by task 719: kasan_save_stack+0x23/0x60 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0x10b/0x120 kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 kmem_cache_alloc+0x1c0/0x870 jffs2_alloc_xattr_ref+0x2f/0xa0 jffs2_scan_medium.cold+0x3713/0x4794 jffs2_do_mount_fs.cold+0xa7/0x2253 jffs2_do_fill_super+0x383/0xc30 jffs2_fill_super+0x2ea/0x4c0 [...] Freed by task 719: kmem_cache_free+0xcc/0x7b0 jffs2_free_xattr_ref+0x78/0x98 jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem+0xa1/0x6ac jffs2_do_mount_fs.cold+0x5e6/0x2253 jffs2_do_fill_super+0x383/0xc30 jffs2_fill_super+0x2ea/0x4c0 [...] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881243384b8 which belongs to the cache jffs2_xattr_ref of size 48 The buggy address is located 40 bytes inside of 48-byte region [ffff8881243384b8, ffff8881243384e8) [...] ================================================================== The triggering of the BUG is shown in the following stack: ----------------------------------------------------------- jffs2_fill_super jffs2_do_fill_super jffs2_do_mount_fs jffs2_build_filesystem jffs2_scan_medium jffs2_scan_eraseblock <--- ERROR jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem <--- free jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem <--- free again ----------------------------------------------------------- An error is returned in jffs2_do_mount_fs(). If the error is returned by jffs2_sum_init(), the jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem() does not need to be executed. If the error is returned by jffs2_build_filesystem(), the jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem() also does not need to be executed again. So move jffs2_clear_xattr_subsystem() from 'out_inohash' to 'out_root' to fix this UAF problem.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hv_sock: Initializing vsk->trans to NULL to prevent a dangling pointer When hvs is released, there is a possibility that vsk->trans may not be initialized to NULL, which could lead to a dangling pointer. This issue is resolved by initializing vsk->trans to NULL.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: sched: flower: protect fl_walk() with rcu Patch that refactored fl_walk() to use idr_for_each_entry_continue_ul() also removed rcu protection of individual filters which causes following use-after-free when filter is deleted concurrently. Fix fl_walk() to obtain rcu read lock while iterating and taking the filter reference and temporary release the lock while calling arg->fn() callback that can sleep. KASAN trace: [ 352.773640] ================================================================== [ 352.775041] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in fl_walk+0x159/0x240 [cls_flower] [ 352.776304] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881c8251480 by task tc/2987 [ 352.777862] CPU: 3 PID: 2987 Comm: tc Not tainted 5.15.0-rc2+ #2 [ 352.778980] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 352.781022] Call Trace: [ 352.781573] dump_stack_lvl+0x46/0x5a [ 352.782332] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x140 [ 352.783400] ? fl_walk+0x159/0x240 [cls_flower] [ 352.784292] ? fl_walk+0x159/0x240 [cls_flower] [ 352.785138] kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf [ 352.785851] ? fl_walk+0x159/0x240 [cls_flower] [ 352.786587] kasan_check_range+0x145/0x1a0 [ 352.787337] fl_walk+0x159/0x240 [cls_flower] [ 352.788163] ? fl_put+0x10/0x10 [cls_flower] [ 352.789007] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath.constprop.0+0x220/0x220 [ 352.790102] tcf_chain_dump+0x231/0x450 [ 352.790878] ? tcf_chain_tp_delete_empty+0x170/0x170 [ 352.791833] ? __might_sleep+0x2e/0xc0 [ 352.792594] ? tfilter_notify+0x170/0x170 [ 352.793400] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath.constprop.0+0x220/0x220 [ 352.794477] tc_dump_tfilter+0x385/0x4b0 [ 352.795262] ? tc_new_tfilter+0x1180/0x1180 [ 352.796103] ? __mod_node_page_state+0x1f/0xc0 [ 352.796974] ? __build_skb_around+0x10e/0x130 [ 352.797826] netlink_dump+0x2c0/0x560 [ 352.798563] ? netlink_getsockopt+0x430/0x430 [ 352.799433] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath.constprop.0+0x220/0x220 [ 352.800542] __netlink_dump_start+0x356/0x440 [ 352.801397] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3ff/0x550 [ 352.802190] ? tc_new_tfilter+0x1180/0x1180 [ 352.802872] ? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x1f0/0x1f0 [ 352.803668] ? tc_new_tfilter+0x1180/0x1180 [ 352.804344] ? _copy_from_iter_nocache+0x800/0x800 [ 352.805202] ? kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 [ 352.805900] netlink_rcv_skb+0xc6/0x1f0 [ 352.806587] ? rht_deferred_worker+0x6b0/0x6b0 [ 352.807455] ? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x1f0/0x1f0 [ 352.808324] ? netlink_ack+0x4d0/0x4d0 [ 352.809086] ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x62/0x3d0 [ 352.809951] netlink_unicast+0x353/0x480 [ 352.810744] ? netlink_attachskb+0x430/0x430 [ 352.811586] ? __alloc_skb+0xd7/0x200 [ 352.812349] netlink_sendmsg+0x396/0x680 [ 352.813132] ? netlink_unicast+0x480/0x480 [ 352.813952] ? __import_iovec+0x192/0x210 [ 352.814759] ? netlink_unicast+0x480/0x480 [ 352.815580] sock_sendmsg+0x6c/0x80 [ 352.816299] ____sys_sendmsg+0x3a5/0x3c0 [ 352.817096] ? kernel_sendmsg+0x30/0x30 [ 352.817873] ? __ia32_sys_recvmmsg+0x150/0x150 [ 352.818753] ___sys_sendmsg+0xd8/0x140 [ 352.819518] ? sendmsg_copy_msghdr+0x110/0x110 [ 352.820402] ? ___sys_recvmsg+0xf4/0x1a0 [ 352.821110] ? __copy_msghdr_from_user+0x260/0x260 [ 352.821934] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x81/0xd0 [ 352.822680] ? __handle_mm_fault+0xef3/0x1b20 [ 352.823549] ? rb_insert_color+0x2a/0x270 [ 352.824373] ? copy_page_range+0x16b0/0x16b0 [ 352.825209] ? perf_event_update_userpage+0x2d0/0x2d0 [ 352.826190] ? __fget_light+0xd9/0xf0 [ 352.826941] __sys_sendmsg+0xb3/0x130 [ 352.827613] ? __sys_sendmsg_sock+0x20/0x20 [ 352.828377] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x2c5/0x8a0 [ 352.829184] ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x52/0x60 [ 352.830001] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x32/0x160 [ 352.830845] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 [ 352.831445] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 352.832331] RIP: 0033:0x7f7bee973c17 [ ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: regmap: set debugfs_name to NULL after it is freed There is a upstream commit cffa4b2122f5("regmap:debugfs: Fix a memory leak when calling regmap_attach_dev") that adds a if condition when create name for debugfs_name. With below function invoking logical, debugfs_name is freed in regmap_debugfs_exit(), but it is not created again because of the if condition introduced by above commit. regmap_reinit_cache() regmap_debugfs_exit() ... regmap_debugfs_init() So, set debugfs_name to NULL after it is freed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: stop qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog on TC_H_ROOT In qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog, Qdiscs with major handle ffff: are assumed to be either root or ingress. This assumption is bogus since it's valid to create egress qdiscs with major handle ffff: Budimir Markovic found that for qdiscs like DRR that maintain an active class list, it will cause a UAF with a dangling class pointer. In 066a3b5b2346, the concern was to avoid iterating over the ingress qdisc since its parent is itself. The proper fix is to stop when parent TC_H_ROOT is reached because the only way to retrieve ingress is when a hierarchy which does not contain a ffff: major handle call into qdisc_lookup with TC_H_MAJ(TC_H_ROOT). In the scenario where major ffff: is an egress qdisc in any of the tree levels, the updates will also propagate to TC_H_ROOT, which then the iteration must stop. net/sched/sch_api.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: bfa: Fix use-after-free in bfad_im_module_exit() BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x2aca/0x3a20 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881082d80c8 by task modprobe/25303 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x95/0xe0 print_report+0xcb/0x620 kasan_report+0xbd/0xf0 __lock_acquire+0x2aca/0x3a20 lock_acquire+0x19b/0x520 _raw_spin_lock+0x2b/0x40 attribute_container_unregister+0x30/0x160 fc_release_transport+0x19/0x90 [scsi_transport_fc] bfad_im_module_exit+0x23/0x60 [bfa] bfad_init+0xdb/0xff0 [bfa] do_one_initcall+0xdc/0x550 do_init_module+0x22d/0x6b0 load_module+0x4e96/0x5ff0 init_module_from_file+0xcd/0x130 idempotent_init_module+0x330/0x620 __x64_sys_finit_module+0xb3/0x110 do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> Allocated by task 25303: kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0x90 fc_attach_transport+0x4f/0x4740 [scsi_transport_fc] bfad_im_module_init+0x17/0x80 [bfa] bfad_init+0x23/0xff0 [bfa] do_one_initcall+0xdc/0x550 do_init_module+0x22d/0x6b0 load_module+0x4e96/0x5ff0 init_module_from_file+0xcd/0x130 idempotent_init_module+0x330/0x620 __x64_sys_finit_module+0xb3/0x110 do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 25303: kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x38/0x50 kfree+0x212/0x480 bfad_im_module_init+0x7e/0x80 [bfa] bfad_init+0x23/0xff0 [bfa] do_one_initcall+0xdc/0x550 do_init_module+0x22d/0x6b0 load_module+0x4e96/0x5ff0 init_module_from_file+0xcd/0x130 idempotent_init_module+0x330/0x620 __x64_sys_finit_module+0xb3/0x110 do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Above issue happens as follows: bfad_init error = bfad_im_module_init() fc_release_transport(bfad_im_scsi_transport_template); if (error) goto ext; ext: bfad_im_module_exit(); fc_release_transport(bfad_im_scsi_transport_template); --> Trigger double release Don't call bfad_im_module_exit() if bfad_im_module_init() failed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: PCI: Fix use-after-free of slot->bus on hot remove Dennis reports a boot crash on recent Lenovo laptops with a USB4 dock. Since commit 0fc70886569c ("thunderbolt: Reset USB4 v2 host router") and commit 59a54c5f3dbd ("thunderbolt: Reset topology created by the boot firmware"), USB4 v2 and v1 Host Routers are reset on probe of the thunderbolt driver. The reset clears the Presence Detect State and Data Link Layer Link Active bits at the USB4 Host Router's Root Port and thus causes hot removal of the dock. The crash occurs when pciehp is unbound from one of the dock's Downstream Ports: pciehp creates a pci_slot on bind and destroys it on unbind. The pci_slot contains a pointer to the pci_bus below the Downstream Port, but a reference on that pci_bus is never acquired. The pci_bus is destroyed before the pci_slot, so a use-after-free ensues when pci_slot_release() accesses slot->bus. In principle this should not happen because pci_stop_bus_device() unbinds pciehp (and therefore destroys the pci_slot) before the pci_bus is destroyed by pci_remove_bus_device(). However the stacktrace provided by Dennis shows that pciehp is unbound from pci_remove_bus_device() instead of pci_stop_bus_device(). To understand the significance of this, one needs to know that the PCI core uses a two step process to remove a portion of the hierarchy: It first unbinds all drivers in the sub-hierarchy in pci_stop_bus_device() and then actually removes the devices in pci_remove_bus_device(). There is no precaution to prevent driver binding in-between pci_stop_bus_device() and pci_remove_bus_device(). In Dennis' case, it seems removal of the hierarchy by pciehp races with driver binding by pci_bus_add_devices(). pciehp is bound to the Downstream Port after pci_stop_bus_device() has run, so it is unbound by pci_remove_bus_device() instead of pci_stop_bus_device(). Because the pci_bus has already been destroyed at that point, accesses to it result in a use-after-free. One might conclude that driver binding needs to be prevented after pci_stop_bus_device() has run. However it seems risky that pci_slot points to pci_bus without holding a reference. Solely relying on correct ordering of driver unbind versus pci_bus destruction is certainly not defensive programming. If pci_slot has a need to access data in pci_bus, it ought to acquire a reference. Amend pci_create_slot() accordingly. Dennis reports that the crash is not reproducible with this change. Abridged stacktrace: pcieport 0000:00:07.0: PME: Signaling with IRQ 156 pcieport 0000:00:07.0: pciehp: Slot #12 AttnBtn- PwrCtrl- MRL- AttnInd- PwrInd- HotPlug+ Surprise+ Interlock- NoCompl+ IbPresDis- LLActRep+ pci_bus 0000:20: dev 00, created physical slot 12 pcieport 0000:00:07.0: pciehp: Slot(12): Card not present ... pcieport 0000:21:02.0: pciehp: pcie_disable_notification: SLOTCTRL d8 write cmd 0 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 13 UID: 0 PID: 134 Comm: irq/156-pciehp Not tainted 6.11.0-devel+ #1 RIP: 0010:dev_driver_string+0x12/0x40 pci_destroy_slot pciehp_remove pcie_port_remove_service device_release_driver_internal bus_remove_device device_del device_unregister remove_iter device_for_each_child pcie_portdrv_remove pci_device_remove device_release_driver_internal bus_remove_device device_del pci_remove_bus_device (recursive invocation) pci_remove_bus_device pciehp_unconfigure_device pciehp_disable_slot pciehp_handle_presence_or_link_change pciehp_ist

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath9k: add range check for conn_rsp_epid in htc_connect_service() I found the following bug in my fuzzer: UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c:26:51 index 255 is out of range for type 'htc_endpoint [22]' CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 8 Comm: kworker/0:0 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-dirty #14 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events request_firmware_work_func Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x180/0x1b0 __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xd4/0x130 htc_issue_send.constprop.0+0x20c/0x230 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x70 ath9k_wmi_cmd+0x41d/0x610 ? mark_held_locks+0x9f/0xe0 ... Since this bug has been confirmed to be caused by insufficient verification of conn_rsp_epid, I think it would be appropriate to add a range check for conn_rsp_epid to htc_connect_service() to prevent the bug from occurring.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sunrpc: fix one UAF issue caused by sunrpc kernel tcp socket BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tcp_write_timer_handler+0x156/0x3e0 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888111f322cd by task swapper/0/0 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc4-dirty #7 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3d0 print_report+0xb4/0x270 kasan_report+0xbd/0xf0 tcp_write_timer_handler+0x156/0x3e0 tcp_write_timer+0x66/0x170 call_timer_fn+0xfb/0x1d0 __run_timers+0x3f8/0x480 run_timer_softirq+0x9b/0x100 handle_softirqs+0x153/0x390 __irq_exit_rcu+0x103/0x120 irq_exit_rcu+0xe/0x20 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x76/0x90 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 RIP: 0010:default_idle+0xf/0x20 Code: 4c 01 c7 4c 29 c2 e9 72 ff ff ff 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 66 90 0f 00 2d 33 f8 25 00 fb f4 <fa> c3 cc cc cc cc 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 RSP: 0018:ffffffffa2007e28 EFLAGS: 00000242 RAX: 00000000000f3b31 RBX: 1ffffffff4400fc7 RCX: ffffffffa09c3196 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff9f00590f RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed102360835d R10: ffff88811b041aeb R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffffffffa202d7c0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000000147d0 default_idle_call+0x6b/0xa0 cpuidle_idle_call+0x1af/0x1f0 do_idle+0xbc/0x130 cpu_startup_entry+0x33/0x40 rest_init+0x11f/0x210 start_kernel+0x39a/0x420 x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0x97/0xa0 common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 </TASK> Allocated by task 595: kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x87/0x90 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x12b/0x3f0 copy_net_ns+0x94/0x380 create_new_namespaces+0x24c/0x500 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0x75/0xf0 ksys_unshare+0x24e/0x4f0 __x64_sys_unshare+0x1f/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x70/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Freed by task 100: kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x54/0x70 kmem_cache_free+0x156/0x5d0 cleanup_net+0x5d3/0x670 process_one_work+0x776/0xa90 worker_thread+0x2e2/0x560 kthread+0x1a8/0x1f0 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x60 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Reproduction script: mkdir -p /mnt/nfsshare mkdir -p /mnt/nfs/netns_1 mkfs.ext4 /dev/sdb mount /dev/sdb /mnt/nfsshare systemctl restart nfs-server chmod 777 /mnt/nfsshare exportfs -i -o rw,no_root_squash *:/mnt/nfsshare ip netns add netns_1 ip link add name veth_1_peer type veth peer veth_1 ifconfig veth_1_peer 11.11.0.254 up ip link set veth_1 netns netns_1 ip netns exec netns_1 ifconfig veth_1 11.11.0.1 ip netns exec netns_1 /root/iptables -A OUTPUT -d 11.11.0.254 -p tcp \ --tcp-flags FIN FIN -j DROP (note: In my environment, a DESTROY_CLIENTID operation is always sent immediately, breaking the nfs tcp connection.) ip netns exec netns_1 timeout -s 9 300 mount -t nfs -o proto=tcp,vers=4.1 \ 11.11.0.254:/mnt/nfsshare /mnt/nfs/netns_1 ip netns del netns_1 The reason here is that the tcp socket in netns_1 (nfs side) has been shutdown and closed (done in xs_destroy), but the FIN message (with ack) is discarded, and the nfsd side keeps sending retransmission messages. As a result, when the tcp sock in netns_1 processes the received message, it sends the message (FIN message) in the sending queue, and the tcp timer is re-established. When the network namespace is deleted, the net structure accessed by tcp's timer handler function causes problems. To fix this problem, let's hold netns refcnt for the tcp kernel socket as done in other modules. This is an ugly hack which can easily be backported to earlier kernels. A proper fix which cleans up the interfaces will follow, but may not be so easy to backport.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: initramfs: avoid filename buffer overrun The initramfs filename field is defined in Documentation/driver-api/early-userspace/buffer-format.rst as: 37 cpio_file := ALGN(4) + cpio_header + filename + "\0" + ALGN(4) + data ... 55 ============= ================== ========================= 56 Field name Field size Meaning 57 ============= ================== ========================= ... 70 c_namesize 8 bytes Length of filename, including final \0 When extracting an initramfs cpio archive, the kernel's do_name() path handler assumes a zero-terminated path at @collected, passing it directly to filp_open() / init_mkdir() / init_mknod(). If a specially crafted cpio entry carries a non-zero-terminated filename and is followed by uninitialized memory, then a file may be created with trailing characters that represent the uninitialized memory. The ability to create an initramfs entry would imply already having full control of the system, so the buffer overrun shouldn't be considered a security vulnerability. Append the output of the following bash script to an existing initramfs and observe any created /initramfs_test_fname_overrunAA* path. E.g. ./reproducer.sh | gzip >> /myinitramfs It's easiest to observe non-zero uninitialized memory when the output is gzipped, as it'll overflow the heap allocated @out_buf in __gunzip(), rather than the initrd_start+initrd_size block. ---- reproducer.sh ---- nilchar="A" # change to "\0" to properly zero terminate / pad magic="070701" ino=1 mode=$(( 0100777 )) uid=0 gid=0 nlink=1 mtime=1 filesize=0 devmajor=0 devminor=1 rdevmajor=0 rdevminor=0 csum=0 fname="initramfs_test_fname_overrun" namelen=$(( ${#fname} + 1 )) # plus one to account for terminator printf "%s%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x%s" \ $magic $ino $mode $uid $gid $nlink $mtime $filesize \ $devmajor $devminor $rdevmajor $rdevminor $namelen $csum $fname termpadlen=$(( 1 + ((4 - ((110 + $namelen) & 3)) % 4) )) printf "%.s${nilchar}" $(seq 1 $termpadlen) ---- reproducer.sh ---- Symlink filename fields handled in do_symlink() won't overrun past the data segment, due to the explicit zero-termination of the symlink target. Fix filename buffer overrun by aborting the initramfs FSM if any cpio entry doesn't carry a zero-terminator at the expected (name_len - 1) offset.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: IB/qib: Protect from buffer overflow in struct qib_user_sdma_pkt fields Overflowing either addrlimit or bytes_togo can allow userspace to trigger a buffer overflow of kernel memory. Check for overflows in all the places doing math on user controlled buffers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: scsi_debug: Sanity check block descriptor length in resp_mode_select() In resp_mode_select() sanity check the block descriptor len to avoid UAF. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in resp_mode_select+0xa4c/0xb40 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:2509 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888026670f50 by task scsicmd/15032 CPU: 1 PID: 15032 Comm: scsicmd Not tainted 5.15.0-01d0625 #15 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x89/0xb5 lib/dump_stack.c:107 print_address_description.constprop.9+0x28/0x160 mm/kasan/report.c:257 kasan_report.cold.14+0x7d/0x117 mm/kasan/report.c:443 __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report_generic.c:306 resp_mode_select+0xa4c/0xb40 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:2509 schedule_resp+0x4af/0x1a10 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:5483 scsi_debug_queuecommand+0x8c9/0x1e70 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:7537 scsi_queue_rq+0x16b4/0x2d10 drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c:1521 blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0xb9b/0x2700 block/blk-mq.c:1640 __blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x28f/0x590 block/blk-mq-sched.c:325 blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x105/0x190 block/blk-mq-sched.c:358 __blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0xe5/0x150 block/blk-mq.c:1762 __blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queue+0x4f8/0x5c0 block/blk-mq.c:1839 blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x18d/0x350 block/blk-mq.c:1891 blk_mq_sched_insert_request+0x3db/0x4e0 block/blk-mq-sched.c:474 blk_execute_rq_nowait+0x16b/0x1c0 block/blk-exec.c:63 sg_common_write.isra.18+0xeb3/0x2000 drivers/scsi/sg.c:837 sg_new_write.isra.19+0x570/0x8c0 drivers/scsi/sg.c:775 sg_ioctl_common+0x14d6/0x2710 drivers/scsi/sg.c:941 sg_ioctl+0xa2/0x180 drivers/scsi/sg.c:1166 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x19d/0x220 fs/ioctl.c:52 do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:113

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xen-netback: take a reference to the RX task thread Do this in order to prevent the task from being freed if the thread returns (which can be triggered by the frontend) before the call to kthread_stop done as part of the backend tear down. Not taking the reference will lead to a use-after-free in that scenario. Such reference was taken before but dropped as part of the rework done in 2ac061ce97f4. Reintroduce the reference taking and add a comment this time explaining why it's needed. This is XSA-374 / CVE-2021-28691.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: igb: Fix use-after-free error during reset Cleans the next descriptor to watch (next_to_watch) when cleaning the TX ring. Failure to do so can cause invalid memory accesses. If igb_poll() runs while the controller is reset this can lead to the driver try to free a skb that was already freed. (The crash is harder to reproduce with the igb driver, but the same potential problem exists as the code is identical to igc)