In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: logitech-hidpp: Prevent use-after-free on force feedback initialisation failure Presently, if the force feedback initialisation fails when probing the Logitech G920 Driving Force Racing Wheel for Xbox One, an error number will be returned and propagated before the userspace infrastructure (sysfs and /dev/input) has been torn down. If userspace ignores the errors and continues to use its references to these dangling entities, a UAF will promptly follow. We have 2 options; continue to return the error, but ensure that all of the infrastructure is torn down accordingly or continue to treat this condition as a warning by emitting the message but returning success. It is thought that the original author's intention was to emit the warning but keep the device functional, less the force feedback feature, so let's go with that.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: fprobe events: Fix possible UAF on modules Commit ac91052f0ae5 ("tracing: tprobe-events: Fix leakage of module refcount") moved try_module_get() from __find_tracepoint_module_cb() to find_tracepoint() caller, but that introduced a possible UAF because the module can be unloaded before try_module_get(). In this case, the module object should be freed too. Thus, try_module_get() does not only fail but may access to the freed object. To avoid that, try_module_get() in __find_tracepoint_module_cb() again.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Fix use-after-free race in VM acquire Replace non-atomic vm->process_info assignment with cmpxchg() to prevent race when parent/child processes sharing a drm_file both try to acquire the same VM after fork(). (cherry picked from commit c7c573275ec20db05be769288a3e3bb2250ec618)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: iscsi: Fix conn use after free during resets If we haven't done a unbind target call we can race where iscsi_conn_teardown wakes up the EH thread and then frees the conn while those threads are still accessing the conn ehwait. We can only do one TMF per session so this just moves the TMF fields from the conn to the session. We can then rely on the iscsi_session_teardown->iscsi_remove_session->__iscsi_unbind_session call to remove the target and it's devices, and know after that point there is no device or scsi-ml callout trying to access the session.

An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 5.7. The KVM subsystem allows out-of-range access to memslots after a deletion, aka CID-0774a964ef56. This affects arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c, include/linux/kvm_host.h, and virt/kvm/kvm_main.c.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sch_cake: do not call cake_destroy() from cake_init() qdiscs are not supposed to call their own destroy() method from init(), because core stack already does that. syzbot was able to trigger use after free: DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lock->magic != lock) WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 21902 at kernel/locking/mutex.c:586 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:586 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 21902 at kernel/locking/mutex.c:586 __mutex_lock+0x9ec/0x12f0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:740 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 21902 Comm: syz-executor189 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc4-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:586 [inline] RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock+0x9ec/0x12f0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:740 Code: 08 84 d2 0f 85 19 08 00 00 8b 05 97 38 4b 04 85 c0 0f 85 27 f7 ff ff 48 c7 c6 20 00 ac 89 48 c7 c7 a0 fe ab 89 e8 bf 76 ba ff <0f> 0b e9 0d f7 ff ff 48 8b 44 24 40 48 8d b8 c8 08 00 00 48 89 f8 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000627f290 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88802315d700 RSI: ffffffff815f1db8 RDI: fffff52000c4fe44 RBP: ffff88818f28e000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffffff815ebb5e R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffffc9000627f458 R15: 0000000093c30000 FS: 0000555556abc400(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fda689c3303 CR3: 000000001cfbb000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> tcf_chain0_head_change_cb_del+0x2e/0x3d0 net/sched/cls_api.c:810 tcf_block_put_ext net/sched/cls_api.c:1381 [inline] tcf_block_put_ext net/sched/cls_api.c:1376 [inline] tcf_block_put+0xbc/0x130 net/sched/cls_api.c:1394 cake_destroy+0x3f/0x80 net/sched/sch_cake.c:2695 qdisc_create.constprop.0+0x9da/0x10f0 net/sched/sch_api.c:1293 tc_modify_qdisc+0x4c5/0x1980 net/sched/sch_api.c:1660 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x413/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5571 netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2496 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345 netlink_sendmsg+0x904/0xdf0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:724 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2409 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2463 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2492 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f1bb06badb9 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x7f1bb06bad8f. RSP: 002b:00007fff3012a658 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f1bb06badb9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200007c0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000003 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff3012a688 R13: 00007fff3012a6a0 R14: 00007fff3012a6e0 R15: 00000000000013c2 </TASK>

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: SOF: Intel: hda: Fix UAF when reloading module hda_generic_machine_select() appends -idisp to the tplg filename by allocating a new string with devm_kasprintf(), then stores the string right back into the global variable snd_soc_acpi_intel_hda_machines. When the module is unloaded, this memory is freed, resulting in a global variable pointing to freed memory. Reloading the module then triggers a use-after-free: BUG: KFENCE: use-after-free read in string+0x48/0xe0 Use-after-free read at 0x00000000967e0109 (in kfence-#99): string+0x48/0xe0 vsnprintf+0x329/0x6e0 devm_kvasprintf+0x54/0xb0 devm_kasprintf+0x58/0x80 hda_machine_select.cold+0x198/0x17a2 [snd_sof_intel_hda_generic] sof_probe_work+0x7f/0x600 [snd_sof] process_one_work+0x17b/0x330 worker_thread+0x2ce/0x3f0 kthread+0xcf/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 kfence-#99: 0x00000000198a940f-0x00000000ace47d9d, size=64, cache=kmalloc-64 allocated by task 333 on cpu 8 at 17.798069s (130.453553s ago): devm_kmalloc+0x52/0x120 devm_kvasprintf+0x66/0xb0 devm_kasprintf+0x58/0x80 hda_machine_select.cold+0x198/0x17a2 [snd_sof_intel_hda_generic] sof_probe_work+0x7f/0x600 [snd_sof] process_one_work+0x17b/0x330 worker_thread+0x2ce/0x3f0 kthread+0xcf/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 freed by task 1543 on cpu 4 at 141.586686s (6.665010s ago): release_nodes+0x43/0xb0 devres_release_all+0x90/0xf0 device_unbind_cleanup+0xe/0x70 device_release_driver_internal+0x1c1/0x200 driver_detach+0x48/0x90 bus_remove_driver+0x6d/0xf0 pci_unregister_driver+0x42/0xb0 __do_sys_delete_module+0x1d1/0x310 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x190 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Fix it by copying the match array with devm_kmemdup_array() before we modify it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: prevent possible UaF in addrconf_permanent_addr() The mentioned helper try to warn the user about an exceptional condition, but the message is delivered too late, accessing the ipv6 after its possible deletion. Reorder the statement to avoid the possible UaF; while at it, place the warning outside the idev->lock as it needs no protection.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sata_fsl: fix UAF in sata_fsl_port_stop when rmmod sata_fsl When the `rmmod sata_fsl.ko` command is executed in the PPC64 GNU/Linux, a bug is reported: ================================================================== BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on read at 0x80000800805b502c Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] NIP [c0000000000388a4] .ioread32+0x4/0x20 LR [80000000000c6034] .sata_fsl_port_stop+0x44/0xe0 [sata_fsl] Call Trace: .free_irq+0x1c/0x4e0 (unreliable) .ata_host_stop+0x74/0xd0 [libata] .release_nodes+0x330/0x3f0 .device_release_driver_internal+0x178/0x2c0 .driver_detach+0x64/0xd0 .bus_remove_driver+0x70/0xf0 .driver_unregister+0x38/0x80 .platform_driver_unregister+0x14/0x30 .fsl_sata_driver_exit+0x18/0xa20 [sata_fsl] .__se_sys_delete_module+0x1ec/0x2d0 .system_call_exception+0xfc/0x1f0 system_call_common+0xf8/0x200 ================================================================== The triggering of the BUG is shown in the following stack: driver_detach device_release_driver_internal __device_release_driver drv->remove(dev) --> platform_drv_remove/platform_remove drv->remove(dev) --> sata_fsl_remove iounmap(host_priv->hcr_base); <---- unmap kfree(host_priv); <---- free devres_release_all release_nodes dr->node.release(dev, dr->data) --> ata_host_stop ap->ops->port_stop(ap) --> sata_fsl_port_stop ioread32(hcr_base + HCONTROL) <---- UAF host->ops->host_stop(host) The iounmap(host_priv->hcr_base) and kfree(host_priv) functions should not be executed in drv->remove. These functions should be executed in host_stop after port_stop. Therefore, we move these functions to the new function sata_fsl_host_stop and bind the new function to host_stop.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: ignore xattrs past end Once inside 'ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all' we should ignore xattrs entries past the 'end' entry. This fixes the following KASAN reported issue: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0xb8c/0xe90 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888012c120c4 by task repro/2065 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2065 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.13.0-rc2+ #11 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x1fd/0x300 ? tcp_gro_dev_warn+0x260/0x260 ? _printk+0xc0/0x100 ? read_lock_is_recursive+0x10/0x10 ? irq_work_queue+0x72/0xf0 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x17b/0x4b0 print_address_description+0x78/0x390 print_report+0x107/0x1f0 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x17b/0x4b0 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x3ff/0x4b0 ? __phys_addr+0xb5/0x160 ? ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0xb8c/0xe90 kasan_report+0xcc/0x100 ? ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0xb8c/0xe90 ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0xb8c/0xe90 ? ext4_xattr_delete_inode+0xd30/0xd30 ? __ext4_journal_ensure_credits+0x5f0/0x5f0 ? __ext4_journal_ensure_credits+0x2b/0x5f0 ? inode_update_timestamps+0x410/0x410 ext4_xattr_delete_inode+0xb64/0xd30 ? ext4_truncate+0xb70/0xdc0 ? ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea+0x1d20/0x1d20 ? __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x670/0x670 ? ext4_journal_check_start+0x16f/0x240 ? ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink+0x2f2/0x3a0 ext4_evict_inode+0xc8c/0xff0 ? ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink+0x3a0/0x3a0 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x53/0x8a0 ? ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink+0x3a0/0x3a0 evict+0x4ac/0x950 ? proc_nr_inodes+0x310/0x310 ? trace_ext4_drop_inode+0xa2/0x220 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1a/0x30 ? iput+0x4cb/0x7e0 do_unlinkat+0x495/0x7c0 ? try_break_deleg+0x120/0x120 ? 0xffffffff81000000 ? __check_object_size+0x15a/0x210 ? strncpy_from_user+0x13e/0x250 ? getname_flags+0x1dc/0x530 __x64_sys_unlinkat+0xc8/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x65/0x110 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0x6f RIP: 0033:0x434ffd Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 8 RSP: 002b:00007ffc50fa7b28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000107 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc50fa7e18 RCX: 0000000000434ffd RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007ffc50fa7be0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 00007ffc50fa7e08 R14: 00000000004bbf30 R15: 0000000000000001 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888012c12000 which belongs to the cache filp of size 360 The buggy address is located 196 bytes inside of freed 360-byte region [ffff888012c12000, ffff888012c12168) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x12c12 head: order:1 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 flags: 0x40(head|node=0|zone=0) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 0000000000000040 ffff888000ad7640 ffffea0000497a00 dead000000000004 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000 head: 0000000000000040 ffff888000ad7640 ffffea0000497a00 dead000000000004 head: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000 head: 0000000000000001 ffffea00004b0481 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 head: 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888012c11f80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff888012c12000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb > ffff888012c12080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888012c12100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc ffff888012c12180: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/atmel-hlcdc: fix use-after-free of drm_crtc_commit after release The atmel_hlcdc_plane_atomic_duplicate_state() callback was copying the atmel_hlcdc_plane state structure without properly duplicating the drm_plane_state. In particular, state->commit remained set to the old state commit, which can lead to a use-after-free in the next drm_atomic_commit() call. Fix this by calling __drm_atomic_helper_duplicate_plane_state(), which correctly clones the base drm_plane_state (including the ->commit pointer). It has been seen when closing and re-opening the device node while another DRM client (e.g. fbdev) is still attached: ============================================================================= BUG kmalloc-64 (Not tainted): Poison overwritten ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0xc611b344-0xc611b344 @offset=836. First byte 0x6a instead of 0x6b FIX kmalloc-64: Restoring Poison 0xc611b344-0xc611b344=0x6b Allocated in drm_atomic_helper_setup_commit+0x1e8/0x7bc age=178 cpu=0 pid=29 drm_atomic_helper_setup_commit+0x1e8/0x7bc drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x3c/0x15c drm_atomic_commit+0xc0/0xf4 drm_framebuffer_remove+0x4cc/0x5a8 drm_mode_rmfb_work_fn+0x6c/0x80 process_one_work+0x12c/0x2cc worker_thread+0x2a8/0x400 kthread+0xc0/0xdc ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28 Freed in drm_atomic_helper_commit_hw_done+0x100/0x150 age=8 cpu=0 pid=169 drm_atomic_helper_commit_hw_done+0x100/0x150 drm_atomic_helper_commit_tail+0x64/0x8c commit_tail+0x168/0x18c drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x138/0x15c drm_atomic_commit+0xc0/0xf4 drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0x84/0xb8 drm_mode_setcrtc+0x32c/0x810 drm_ioctl+0x20c/0x488 sys_ioctl+0x14c/0xc20 ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54 Slab 0xef8bc360 objects=21 used=16 fp=0xc611b7c0 flags=0x200(workingset|zone=0) Object 0xc611b340 @offset=832 fp=0xc611b7c0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/page_alloc: clear page->private in free_pages_prepare() Several subsystems (slub, shmem, ttm, etc.) use page->private but don't clear it before freeing pages. When these pages are later allocated as high-order pages and split via split_page(), tail pages retain stale page->private values. This causes a use-after-free in the swap subsystem. The swap code uses page->private to track swap count continuations, assuming freshly allocated pages have page->private == 0. When stale values are present, swap_count_continued() incorrectly assumes the continuation list is valid and iterates over uninitialized page->lru containing LIST_POISON values, causing a crash: KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0xdead000000000100-0xdead000000000107] RIP: 0010:__do_sys_swapoff+0x1151/0x1860 Fix this by clearing page->private in free_pages_prepare(), ensuring all freed pages have clean state regardless of previous use.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: virt_wifi: remove SET_NETDEV_DEV to avoid use-after-free Currently we execute `SET_NETDEV_DEV(dev, &priv->lowerdev->dev)` for the virt_wifi net devices. However, unregistering a virt_wifi device in netdev_run_todo() can happen together with the device referenced by SET_NETDEV_DEV(). It can result in use-after-free during the ethtool operations performed on a virt_wifi device that is currently being unregistered. Such a net device can have the `dev.parent` field pointing to the freed memory, but ethnl_ops_begin() calls `pm_runtime_get_sync(dev->dev.parent)`. Let's remove SET_NETDEV_DEV for virt_wifi to avoid bugs like this: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __pm_runtime_resume+0xe2/0xf0 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810cfc46f8 by task pm/606 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x4d/0x70 print_report+0x170/0x4f3 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 kasan_report+0xda/0x110 ? __pm_runtime_resume+0xe2/0xf0 ? __pm_runtime_resume+0xe2/0xf0 __pm_runtime_resume+0xe2/0xf0 ethnl_ops_begin+0x49/0x270 ethnl_set_features+0x23c/0xab0 ? __pfx_ethnl_set_features+0x10/0x10 ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x11/0x20 ? local_clock_noinstr+0xf/0xf0 ? local_clock+0x10/0x30 ? kasan_save_track+0x25/0x60 ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0x90 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse.isra.0+0x150/0x2c0 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1e7/0x2c0 ? __pfx_genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_cred_has_capability.isra.0+0x10/0x10 ? stack_trace_save+0x8e/0xc0 genl_rcv_msg+0x411/0x660 ? __pfx_genl_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_ethnl_set_features+0x10/0x10 netlink_rcv_skb+0x121/0x380 ? __pfx_genl_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_netlink_rcv_skb+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_down_read+0x10/0x10 genl_rcv+0x23/0x30 netlink_unicast+0x60f/0x830 ? __pfx_netlink_unicast+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___alloc_skb+0x10/0x10 netlink_sendmsg+0x6ea/0xbc0 ? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 ? __futex_queue+0x10b/0x1f0 ____sys_sendmsg+0x7a2/0x950 ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x26b/0x430 ? __pfx_____sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_copy_msghdr_from_user+0x10/0x10 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf8/0x180 ? __pfx____sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_futex_wait+0x10/0x10 ? fdget+0x2e4/0x4a0 __sys_sendmsg+0x11f/0x1c0 ? __pfx___sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 do_syscall_64+0xe2/0x570 ? exc_page_fault+0x66/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> This fix may be combined with another one in the ethtool subsystem: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260322075917.254874-1-alex.popov@linux.com/T/#u

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: lan966x: fix use-after-free and leak in lan966x_fdma_reload() When lan966x_fdma_reload() fails to allocate new RX buffers, the restore path restarts DMA using old descriptors whose pages were already freed via lan966x_fdma_rx_free_pages(). Since page_pool_put_full_page() can release pages back to the buddy allocator, the hardware may DMA into memory now owned by other kernel subsystems. Additionally, on the restore path, the newly created page pool (if allocation partially succeeded) is overwritten without being destroyed, leaking it. Fix both issues by deferring the release of old pages until after the new allocation succeeds. Save the old page array before the allocation so old pages can be freed on the success path. On the failure path, the old descriptors, pages and page pool are all still valid, making the restore safe. Also ensure the restore path re-enables NAPI and wakes the netdev, matching the success path.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_conntrack_helper: pass helper to expect cleanup nf_conntrack_helper_unregister() calls nf_ct_expect_iterate_destroy() to remove expectations belonging to the helper being unregistered. However, it passes NULL instead of the helper pointer as the data argument, so expect_iter_me() never matches any expectation and all of them survive the cleanup. After unregister returns, nfnl_cthelper_del() frees the helper object immediately. Subsequent expectation dumps or packet-driven init_conntrack() calls then dereference the freed exp->helper, causing a use-after-free. Pass the actual helper pointer so expectations referencing it are properly destroyed before the helper object is freed. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in string+0x38f/0x430 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888003b14d20 by task poc/103 Call Trace: string+0x38f/0x430 vsnprintf+0x3cc/0x1170 seq_printf+0x17a/0x240 exp_seq_show+0x2e5/0x560 seq_read_iter+0x419/0x1280 proc_reg_read+0x1ac/0x270 vfs_read+0x179/0x930 ksys_read+0xef/0x1c0 Freed by task 103: The buggy address is located 32 bytes inside of freed 192-byte region [ffff888003b14d00, ffff888003b14dc0)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: roccat: fix use-after-free in roccat_report_event roccat_report_event() iterates over the device->readers list without holding the readers_lock. This allows a concurrent roccat_release() to remove and free a reader while it's still being accessed, leading to a use-after-free. Protect the readers list traversal with the readers_lock mutex.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: nexthop: fix percpu use-after-free in remove_nh_grp_entry When removing a nexthop from a group, remove_nh_grp_entry() publishes the new group via rcu_assign_pointer() then immediately frees the removed entry's percpu stats with free_percpu(). However, the synchronize_net() grace period in the caller remove_nexthop_from_groups() runs after the free. RCU readers that entered before the publish still see the old group and can dereference the freed stats via nh_grp_entry_stats_inc() -> get_cpu_ptr(nhge->stats), causing a use-after-free on percpu memory. Fix by deferring the free_percpu() until after synchronize_net() in the caller. Removed entries are chained via nh_list onto a local deferred free list. After the grace period completes and all RCU readers have finished, the percpu stats are safely freed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: as102: fix to not free memory after the device is registered in as102_usb_probe() In as102_usb driver, the following race condition occurs: ``` CPU0 CPU1 as102_usb_probe() kzalloc(); // alloc as102_dev_t .... usb_register_dev(); fd = sys_open("/path/to/dev"); // open as102 fd .... usb_deregister_dev(); .... kfree(); // free as102_dev_t .... sys_close(fd); as102_release() // UAF!! as102_usb_release() kfree(); // DFB!! ``` When a USB character device registered with usb_register_dev() is later unregistered (via usb_deregister_dev() or disconnect), the device node is removed so new open() calls fail. However, file descriptors that are already open do not go away immediately: they remain valid until the last reference is dropped and the driver's .release() is invoked. In as102, as102_usb_probe() calls usb_register_dev() and then, on an error path, does usb_deregister_dev() and frees as102_dev_t right away. If userspace raced a successful open() before the deregistration, that open FD will later hit as102_release() --> as102_usb_release() and access or free as102_dev_t again, occur a race to use-after-free and double-free vuln. The fix is to never kfree(as102_dev_t) directly once usb_register_dev() has succeeded. After deregistration, defer freeing memory to .release(). In other words, let release() perform the last kfree when the final open FD is closed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: reset: gpio: suppress bind attributes in sysfs This is a special device that's created dynamically and is supposed to stay in memory forever. We also currently don't have a devlink between it and the actual reset consumer. Suppress sysfs bind attributes so that user-space can't unbind the device because - as of now - it will cause a use-after-free splat from any user that puts the reset control handle.

A use-after-free flaw was found in Linux kernel before 5.19.2. This issue occurs in cmd_hdl_filter in drivers/staging/rtl8712/rtl8712_cmd.c, allowing an attacker to launch a local denial of service attack and gain escalation of privileges.

A use-after-free flaw was found in the Linux kernel MCTP (Management Component Transport Protocol) functionality. This issue occurs when a user simultaneously calls DROPTAG ioctl and socket close happens, which could allow a local user to crash the system or potentially escalate their privileges on the system.

Use After Free vulnerability in Linux Kernel allows Privilege Escalation. An improper Update of Reference Count in io_uring leads to Use-After-Free and Local Privilege Escalation. When io_msg_ring was invoked with a fixed file, it called io_fput_file() which improperly decreased its reference count (leading to Use-After-Free and Local Privilege Escalation). Fixed files are permanently registered to the ring, and should not be put separately. We recommend upgrading past commit https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fc7222c3a9f56271fba02aabbfbae999042f1679 https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fc7222c3a9f56271fba02aabbfbae999042f1679

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Fix fence put before wait in amdgpu_amdkfd_submit_ib amdgpu_amdkfd_submit_ib() submits a GPU job and gets a fence from amdgpu_ib_schedule(). This fence is used to wait for job completion. Currently, the code drops the fence reference using dma_fence_put() before calling dma_fence_wait(). If dma_fence_put() releases the last reference, the fence may be freed before dma_fence_wait() is called. This can lead to a use-after-free. Fix this by waiting on the fence first and releasing the reference only after dma_fence_wait() completes. Fixes the below: drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_amdkfd.c:697 amdgpu_amdkfd_submit_ib() warn: passing freed memory 'f' (line 696) (cherry picked from commit 8b9e5259adc385b61a6590a13b82ae0ac2bd3482)

The sctp_do_peeloff function in net/sctp/socket.c in the Linux kernel before 4.14 does not check whether the intended netns is used in a peel-off action, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: atomisp: Fix use after free in atomisp_alloc_css_stat_bufs() The "s3a_buf" is freed along with all the other items on the "asd->s3a_stats" list. It leads to a double free and a use after free.

An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 5.8.2. fs/io_uring.c has a use-after-free related to io_async_task_func and ctx reference holding, aka CID-6d816e088c35.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btintel: serialize btintel_hw_error() with hci_req_sync_lock btintel_hw_error() issues two __hci_cmd_sync() calls (HCI_OP_RESET and Intel exception-info retrieval) without holding hci_req_sync_lock(). This lets it race against hci_dev_do_close() -> btintel_shutdown_combined(), which also runs __hci_cmd_sync() under the same lock. When both paths manipulate hdev->req_status/req_rsp concurrently, the close path may free the response skb first, and the still-running hw_error path hits a slab-use-after-free in kfree_skb(). Wrap the whole recovery sequence in hci_req_sync_lock/unlock so it is serialized with every other synchronous HCI command issuer. Below is the data race report and the kasan report: BUG: data-race in __hci_cmd_sync_sk / btintel_shutdown_combined read of hdev->req_rsp at net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:199 by task kworker/u17:1/83: __hci_cmd_sync_sk+0x12f2/0x1c30 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:200 __hci_cmd_sync+0x55/0x80 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:223 btintel_hw_error+0x114/0x670 drivers/bluetooth/btintel.c:254 hci_error_reset+0x348/0xa30 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:1030 write/free by task ioctl/22580: btintel_shutdown_combined+0xd0/0x360 drivers/bluetooth/btintel.c:3648 hci_dev_close_sync+0x9ae/0x2c10 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5246 hci_dev_do_close+0x232/0x460 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:526 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sk_skb_reason_drop+0x43/0x380 net/core/skbuff.c:1202 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888144a738dc by task kworker/u17:1/83: __hci_cmd_sync_sk+0x12f2/0x1c30 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:200 __hci_cmd_sync+0x55/0x80 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:223 btintel_hw_error+0x186/0x670 drivers/bluetooth/btintel.c:260

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix trace_marker copy link list updates When the "copy_trace_marker" option is enabled for an instance, anything written into /sys/kernel/tracing/trace_marker is also copied into that instances buffer. When the option is set, that instance's trace_array descriptor is added to the marker_copies link list. This list is protected by RCU, as all iterations uses an RCU protected list traversal. When the instance is deleted, all the flags that were enabled are cleared. This also clears the copy_trace_marker flag and removes the trace_array descriptor from the list. The issue is after the flags are called, a direct call to update_marker_trace() is performed to clear the flag. This function returns true if the state of the flag changed and false otherwise. If it returns true here, synchronize_rcu() is called to make sure all readers see that its removed from the list. But since the flag was already cleared, the state does not change and the synchronization is never called, leaving a possible UAF bug. Move the clearing of all flags below the updating of the copy_trace_marker option which then makes sure the synchronization is performed. Also use the flag for checking the state in update_marker_trace() instead of looking at if the list is empty.

A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in Linux Kernel. This affects the function __mtk_ppe_check_skb of the file drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_ppe.c of the component Ethernet Handler. The manipulation leads to use after free. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-211935.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_tables: fix use-after-free in nf_tables_addchain() nf_tables_addchain() publishes the chain to table->chains via list_add_tail_rcu() (in nft_chain_add()) before registering hooks. If nf_tables_register_hook() then fails, the error path calls nft_chain_del() (list_del_rcu()) followed by nf_tables_chain_destroy() with no RCU grace period in between. This creates two use-after-free conditions: 1) Control-plane: nf_tables_dump_chains() traverses table->chains under rcu_read_lock(). A concurrent dump can still be walking the chain when the error path frees it. 2) Packet path: for NFPROTO_INET, nf_register_net_hook() briefly installs the IPv4 hook before IPv6 registration fails. Packets entering nft_do_chain() via the transient IPv4 hook can still be dereferencing chain->blob_gen_X when the error path frees the chain. Add synchronize_rcu() between nft_chain_del() and the chain destroy so that all RCU readers -- both dump threads and in-flight packet evaluation -- have finished before the chain is freed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: provide locking for v4_end_grace Writing to v4_end_grace can race with server shutdown and result in memory being accessed after it was freed - reclaim_str_hashtbl in particularly. We cannot hold nfsd_mutex across the nfsd4_end_grace() call as that is held while client_tracking_op->init() is called and that can wait for an upcall to nfsdcltrack which can write to v4_end_grace, resulting in a deadlock. nfsd4_end_grace() is also called by the landromat work queue and this doesn't require locking as server shutdown will stop the work and wait for it before freeing anything that nfsd4_end_grace() might access. However, we must be sure that writing to v4_end_grace doesn't restart the work item after shutdown has already waited for it. For this we add a new flag protected with nn->client_lock. It is set only while it is safe to make client tracking calls, and v4_end_grace only schedules work while the flag is set with the spinlock held. So this patch adds a nfsd_net field "client_tracking_active" which is set as described. Another field "grace_end_forced", is set when v4_end_grace is written. After this is set, and providing client_tracking_active is set, the laundromat is scheduled. This "grace_end_forced" field bypasses other checks for whether the grace period has finished. This resolves a race which can result in use-after-free.

A vulnerability was found in Linux Kernel. It has been classified as critical. This affects the function devlink_param_set/devlink_param_get of the file net/core/devlink.c of the component IPsec. The manipulation leads to use after free. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The identifier VDB-211929 was assigned to this vulnerability.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: sched: avoid qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() vs dequeue race for lockless qdiscs When shrinking the number of real tx queues, netif_set_real_num_tx_queues() calls qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() to flush qdiscs for queues which will no longer be used. qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() currently serializes qdisc_reset() with qdisc_lock(). However, for lockless qdiscs, the dequeue path is serialized by qdisc_run_begin/end() using qdisc->seqlock instead, so qdisc_reset() can run concurrently with __qdisc_run() and free skbs while they are still being dequeued, leading to UAF. This can easily be reproduced on e.g. virtio-net by imposing heavy traffic while frequently changing the number of queue pairs: iperf3 -ub0 -c $peer -t 0 & while :; do ethtool -L eth0 combined 1 ethtool -L eth0 combined 2 done With KASAN enabled, this leads to reports like: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __qdisc_run+0x133f/0x1760 ... Call Trace: <TASK> ... __qdisc_run+0x133f/0x1760 __dev_queue_xmit+0x248f/0x3550 ip_finish_output2+0xa42/0x2110 ip_output+0x1a7/0x410 ip_send_skb+0x2e6/0x480 udp_send_skb+0xb0a/0x1590 udp_sendmsg+0x13c9/0x1fc0 ... </TASK> Allocated by task 1270 on cpu 5 at 44.558414s: ... alloc_skb_with_frags+0x84/0x7c0 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x69a/0x830 __ip_append_data+0x1b86/0x48c0 ip_make_skb+0x1e8/0x2b0 udp_sendmsg+0x13a6/0x1fc0 ... Freed by task 1306 on cpu 3 at 44.558445s: ... kmem_cache_free+0x117/0x5e0 pfifo_fast_reset+0x14d/0x580 qdisc_reset+0x9e/0x5f0 netif_set_real_num_tx_queues+0x303/0x840 virtnet_set_channels+0x1bf/0x260 [virtio_net] ethnl_set_channels+0x684/0xae0 ethnl_default_set_doit+0x31a/0x890 ... Serialize qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() against the lockless dequeue path by taking qdisc->seqlock for TCQ_F_NOLOCK qdiscs, matching the serialization model already used by dev_reset_queue(). Additionally clear QDISC_STATE_NON_EMPTY after reset so the qdisc state reflects an empty queue, avoiding needless re-scheduling.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: qcom: q6apm: move component registration to unmanaged version q6apm component registers dais dynamically from ASoC toplology, which are allocated using device managed version apis. Allocating both component and dynamic dais using managed version could lead to incorrect free ordering, dai will be freed while component still holding references to it. Fix this issue by moving component to unmanged version so that the dai pointers are only freeded after the component is removed. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in snd_soc_del_component_unlocked+0x3d4/0x400 [snd_soc_core] Read of size 8 at addr ffff00084493a6e8 by task kworker/u48:0/3426 Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: LENOVO 21N2ZC5PUS/21N2ZC5PUS, BIOS N42ET57W (1.31 ) 08/08/2024 Workqueue: pdr_notifier_wq pdr_notifier_work [pdr_interface] Call trace: show_stack+0x28/0x7c (C) dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x80 print_report+0x160/0x4b4 kasan_report+0xac/0xfc __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x20/0x34 snd_soc_del_component_unlocked+0x3d4/0x400 [snd_soc_core] snd_soc_unregister_component_by_driver+0x50/0x88 [snd_soc_core] devm_component_release+0x30/0x5c [snd_soc_core] devres_release_all+0x13c/0x210 device_unbind_cleanup+0x20/0x190 device_release_driver_internal+0x350/0x468 device_release_driver+0x18/0x30 bus_remove_device+0x1a0/0x35c device_del+0x314/0x7f0 device_unregister+0x20/0xbc apr_remove_device+0x5c/0x7c [apr] device_for_each_child+0xd8/0x160 apr_pd_status+0x7c/0xa8 [apr] pdr_notifier_work+0x114/0x240 [pdr_interface] process_one_work+0x500/0xb70 worker_thread+0x630/0xfb0 kthread+0x370/0x6c0 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Allocated by task 77: kasan_save_stack+0x40/0x68 kasan_save_track+0x20/0x40 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x44/0x58 __kasan_kmalloc+0xbc/0xdc __kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x1f4/0x620 devm_kmalloc+0x7c/0x1c8 snd_soc_register_dai+0x50/0x4f0 [snd_soc_core] soc_tplg_pcm_elems_load+0x55c/0x1eb8 [snd_soc_core] snd_soc_tplg_component_load+0x4f8/0xb60 [snd_soc_core] audioreach_tplg_init+0x124/0x1fc [snd_q6apm] q6apm_audio_probe+0x10/0x1c [snd_q6apm] snd_soc_component_probe+0x5c/0x118 [snd_soc_core] soc_probe_component+0x44c/0xaf0 [snd_soc_core] snd_soc_bind_card+0xad0/0x2370 [snd_soc_core] snd_soc_register_card+0x3b0/0x4c0 [snd_soc_core] devm_snd_soc_register_card+0x50/0xc8 [snd_soc_core] x1e80100_platform_probe+0x208/0x368 [snd_soc_x1e80100] platform_probe+0xc0/0x188 really_probe+0x188/0x804 __driver_probe_device+0x158/0x358 driver_probe_device+0x60/0x190 __device_attach_driver+0x16c/0x2a8 bus_for_each_drv+0x100/0x194 __device_attach+0x174/0x380 device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20 bus_probe_device+0x124/0x154 deferred_probe_work_func+0x140/0x220 process_one_work+0x500/0xb70 worker_thread+0x630/0xfb0 kthread+0x370/0x6c0 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Freed by task 3426: kasan_save_stack+0x40/0x68 kasan_save_track+0x20/0x40 __kasan_save_free_info+0x4c/0x80 __kasan_slab_free+0x78/0xa0 kfree+0x100/0x4a4 devres_release_all+0x144/0x210 device_unbind_cleanup+0x20/0x190 device_release_driver_internal+0x350/0x468 device_release_driver+0x18/0x30 bus_remove_device+0x1a0/0x35c device_del+0x314/0x7f0 device_unregister+0x20/0xbc apr_remove_device+0x5c/0x7c [apr] device_for_each_child+0xd8/0x160 apr_pd_status+0x7c/0xa8 [apr] pdr_notifier_work+0x114/0x240 [pdr_interface] process_one_work+0x500/0xb70 worker_thread+0x630/0xfb0 kthread+0x370/0x6c0 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

A use-after-free flaw was found in D-Bus Development branch <= 1.13.16, dbus-1.12.x stable branch <= 1.12.18, and dbus-1.10.x and older branches <= 1.10.30 when a system has multiple usernames sharing the same UID. When a set of policy rules references these usernames, D-Bus may free some memory in the heap, which is still used by data structures necessary for the other usernames sharing the UID, possibly leading to a crash or other undefined behaviors

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: save ailp before dropping the AIL lock in push callbacks In xfs_inode_item_push() and xfs_qm_dquot_logitem_push(), the AIL lock is dropped to perform buffer IO. Once the cluster buffer no longer protects the log item from reclaim, the log item may be freed by background reclaim or the dquot shrinker. The subsequent spin_lock() call dereferences lip->li_ailp, which is a use-after-free. Fix this by saving the ailp pointer in a local variable while the AIL lock is held and the log item is guaranteed to be valid.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: mc, v4l2: serialize REINIT and REQBUFS with req_queue_mutex MEDIA_REQUEST_IOC_REINIT can run concurrently with VIDIOC_REQBUFS(0) queue teardown paths. This can race request object cleanup against vb2 queue cancellation and lead to use-after-free reports. We already serialize request queueing against STREAMON/OFF with req_queue_mutex. Extend that serialization to REQBUFS, and also take the same mutex in media_request_ioctl_reinit() so REINIT is in the same exclusion domain. This keeps request cleanup and queue cancellation from running in parallel for request-capable devices.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: erofs: fix UAF issue for file-backed mounts w/ directio option [ 9.269940][ T3222] Call trace: [ 9.269948][ T3222] ext4_file_read_iter+0xac/0x108 [ 9.269979][ T3222] vfs_iocb_iter_read+0xac/0x198 [ 9.269993][ T3222] erofs_fileio_rq_submit+0x12c/0x180 [ 9.270008][ T3222] erofs_fileio_submit_bio+0x14/0x24 [ 9.270030][ T3222] z_erofs_runqueue+0x834/0x8ac [ 9.270054][ T3222] z_erofs_read_folio+0x120/0x220 [ 9.270083][ T3222] filemap_read_folio+0x60/0x120 [ 9.270102][ T3222] filemap_fault+0xcac/0x1060 [ 9.270119][ T3222] do_pte_missing+0x2d8/0x1554 [ 9.270131][ T3222] handle_mm_fault+0x5ec/0x70c [ 9.270142][ T3222] do_page_fault+0x178/0x88c [ 9.270167][ T3222] do_translation_fault+0x38/0x54 [ 9.270183][ T3222] do_mem_abort+0x54/0xac [ 9.270208][ T3222] el0_da+0x44/0x7c [ 9.270227][ T3222] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x5c/0xf4 [ 9.270253][ T3222] el0t_64_sync+0x1bc/0x1c0 EROFS may encounter above panic when enabling file-backed mount w/ directio mount option, the root cause is it may suffer UAF in below race condition: - z_erofs_read_folio wq s_dio_done_wq - z_erofs_runqueue - erofs_fileio_submit_bio - erofs_fileio_rq_submit - vfs_iocb_iter_read - ext4_file_read_iter - ext4_dio_read_iter - iomap_dio_rw : bio was submitted and return -EIOCBQUEUED - dio_aio_complete_work - dio_complete - dio->iocb->ki_complete (erofs_fileio_ki_complete()) - kfree(rq) : it frees iocb, iocb.ki_filp can be UAF in file_accessed(). - file_accessed : access NULL file point Introduce a reference count in struct erofs_fileio_rq, and initialize it as two, both erofs_fileio_ki_complete() and erofs_fileio_rq_submit() will decrease reference count, the last one decreasing the reference count to zero will free rq.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: split gc into unlink and reclaim phase Yiming Qian reports Use-after-free in the pipapo set type: Under a large number of expired elements, commit-time GC can run for a very long time in a non-preemptible context, triggering soft lockup warnings and RCU stall reports (local denial of service). We must split GC in an unlink and a reclaim phase. We cannot queue elements for freeing until pointers have been swapped. Expired elements are still exposed to both the packet path and userspace dumpers via the live copy of the data structure. call_rcu() does not protect us: dump operations or element lookups starting after call_rcu has fired can still observe the free'd element, unless the commit phase has made enough progress to swap the clone and live pointers before any new reader has picked up the old version. This a similar approach as done recently for the rbtree backend in commit 35f83a75529a ("netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: don't gc elements on insert").

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Do not skip unrelated mode changes in DSC validation Starting with commit 17ce8a6907f7 ("drm/amd/display: Add dsc pre-validation in atomic check"), amdgpu resets the CRTC state mode_changed flag to false when recomputing the DSC configuration results in no timing change for a particular stream. However, this is incorrect in scenarios where a change in MST/DSC configuration happens in the same KMS commit as another (unrelated) mode change. For example, the integrated panel of a laptop may be configured differently (e.g., HDR enabled/disabled) depending on whether external screens are attached. In this case, plugging in external DP-MST screens may result in the mode_changed flag being dropped incorrectly for the integrated panel if its DSC configuration did not change during precomputation in pre_validate_dsc(). At this point, however, dm_update_crtc_state() has already created new streams for CRTCs with DSC-independent mode changes. In turn, amdgpu_dm_commit_streams() will never release the old stream, resulting in a memory leak. amdgpu_dm_atomic_commit_tail() will never acquire a reference to the new stream either, which manifests as a use-after-free when the stream gets disabled later on: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in dc_stream_release+0x25/0x90 [amdgpu] Write of size 4 at addr ffff88813d836524 by task kworker/9:9/29977 Workqueue: events drm_mode_rmfb_work_fn Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x88/0x320 ? dc_stream_release+0x25/0x90 [amdgpu] print_report+0xfc/0x1ff ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x225/0x4e0 ? dc_stream_release+0x25/0x90 [amdgpu] kasan_report+0xe1/0x180 ? dc_stream_release+0x25/0x90 [amdgpu] kasan_check_range+0x125/0x200 dc_stream_release+0x25/0x90 [amdgpu] dc_state_destruct+0x14d/0x5c0 [amdgpu] dc_state_release.part.0+0x4e/0x130 [amdgpu] dm_atomic_destroy_state+0x3f/0x70 [amdgpu] drm_atomic_state_default_clear+0x8ee/0xf30 ? drm_mode_object_put.part.0+0xb1/0x130 __drm_atomic_state_free+0x15c/0x2d0 atomic_remove_fb+0x67e/0x980 Since there is no reliable way of figuring out whether a CRTC has unrelated mode changes pending at the time of DSC validation, remember the value of the mode_changed flag from before the point where a CRTC was marked as potentially affected by a change in DSC configuration. Reset the mode_changed flag to this earlier value instead in pre_validate_dsc(). (cherry picked from commit cc7c7121ae082b7b82891baa7280f1ff2608f22b)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: fix race in concurrent f2fs_stop_gc_thread In my test case, concurrent calls to f2fs shutdown report the following stack trace: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xc6cfff63bb5513fc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 678 Comm: f2fs_rep_shutdo Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-next-20241029-g6fb2fa9805c5-dirty #85 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x8b/0xa0 ? __die_body+0x26/0xa0 ? die_addr+0x54/0x90 ? exc_general_protection+0x24b/0x5c0 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 ? kthread_stop+0x46/0x390 f2fs_stop_gc_thread+0x6c/0x110 f2fs_do_shutdown+0x309/0x3a0 f2fs_ioc_shutdown+0x150/0x1c0 __f2fs_ioctl+0xffd/0x2ac0 f2fs_ioctl+0x76/0xe0 vfs_ioctl+0x23/0x60 __x64_sys_ioctl+0xce/0xf0 x64_sys_call+0x2b1b/0x4540 do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e The root cause is a race condition in f2fs_stop_gc_thread() called from different f2fs shutdown paths: [CPU0] [CPU1] ---------------------- ----------------------- f2fs_stop_gc_thread f2fs_stop_gc_thread gc_th = sbi->gc_thread gc_th = sbi->gc_thread kfree(gc_th) sbi->gc_thread = NULL < gc_th != NULL > kthread_stop(gc_th->f2fs_gc_task) //UAF The commit c7f114d864ac ("f2fs: fix to avoid use-after-free in f2fs_stop_gc_thread()") attempted to fix this issue by using a read semaphore to prevent races between shutdown and remount threads, but it fails to prevent all race conditions. Fix it by converting to write lock of s_umount in f2fs_do_shutdown().

A use-after-free flaw was found in the Linux kernel’s SGI GRU driver in the way the first gru_file_unlocked_ioctl function is called by the user, where a fail pass occurs in the gru_check_chiplet_assignment function. This flaw allows a local user to crash or potentially escalate their privileges on the system.

In the Linux kernel 6.0.8, there is a use-after-free in ntfs_trim_fs in fs/ntfs3/bitmap.c.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/stat: deallocate damon_call() failure leaking damon_ctx damon_stat_start() always allocates the module's damon_ctx object (damon_stat_context). Meanwhile, if damon_call() in the function fails, the damon_ctx object is not deallocated. Hence, if the damon_call() is failed, and the user writes Y to “enabled” again, the previously allocated damon_ctx object is leaked. This cannot simply be fixed by deallocating the damon_ctx object when damon_call() fails. That's because damon_call() failure doesn't guarantee the kdamond main function, which accesses the damon_ctx object, is completely finished. In other words, if damon_stat_start() deallocates the damon_ctx object after damon_call() failure, the not-yet-terminated kdamond could access the freed memory (use-after-free). Fix the leak while avoiding the use-after-free by keeping returning damon_stat_start() without deallocating the damon_ctx object after damon_call() failure, but deallocating it when the function is invoked again and the kdamond is completely terminated. If the kdamond is not yet terminated, simply return -EAGAIN, as the kdamond will soon be terminated. The issue was discovered [1] by sashiko.

A vulnerability was found in Linux Kernel, where a refcount leak in llcp_sock_connect() causing use-after-free which might lead to privilege escalations.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mmc: vub300: fix use-after-free on disconnect The vub300 driver maintains an explicit reference count for the controller and its driver data and the last reference can in theory be dropped after the driver has been unbound. This specifically means that the controller allocation must not be device managed as that can lead to use-after-free. Note that the lifetime is currently also incorrectly tied the parent USB device rather than interface, which can lead to memory leaks if the driver is unbound without its device being physically disconnected (e.g. on probe deferral). Fix both issues by reverting to non-managed allocation of the controller.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: fix use-after-free in ocfs2_fault() when VM_FAULT_RETRY filemap_fault() may drop the mmap_lock before returning VM_FAULT_RETRY, as documented in mm/filemap.c: "If our return value has VM_FAULT_RETRY set, it's because the mmap_lock may be dropped before doing I/O or by lock_folio_maybe_drop_mmap()." When this happens, a concurrent munmap() can call remove_vma() and free the vm_area_struct via RCU. The saved 'vma' pointer in ocfs2_fault() then becomes a dangling pointer, and the subsequent trace_ocfs2_fault() call dereferences it -- a use-after-free. Fix this by saving ip_blkno as a plain integer before calling filemap_fault(), and removing vma from the trace event. Since ip_blkno is copied by value before the lock can be dropped, it remains valid regardless of what happens to the vma or inode afterward.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: lkkbd - disable pending work before freeing device lkkbd_interrupt() schedules lk->tq via schedule_work(), and the work handler lkkbd_reinit() dereferences the lkkbd structure and its serio/input_dev fields. lkkbd_disconnect() and error paths in lkkbd_connect() free the lkkbd structure without preventing the reinit work from being queued again until serio_close() returns. This can allow the work handler to run after the structure has been freed, leading to a potential use-after-free. Use disable_work_sync() instead of cancel_work_sync() to ensure the reinit work cannot be re-queued, and call it both in lkkbd_disconnect() and in lkkbd_connect() error paths after serio_open().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: 6fire: fix use-after-free on disconnect In usb6fire_chip_abort(), the chip struct is allocated as the card's private data (via snd_card_new with sizeof(struct sfire_chip)). When snd_card_free_when_closed() is called and no file handles are open, the card and embedded chip are freed synchronously. The subsequent chip->card = NULL write then hits freed slab memory. Call trace: usb6fire_chip_abort sound/usb/6fire/chip.c:59 [inline] usb6fire_chip_disconnect+0x348/0x358 sound/usb/6fire/chip.c:182 usb_unbind_interface+0x1a8/0x88c drivers/usb/core/driver.c:458 ... hub_event+0x1a04/0x4518 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5953 Fix by moving the card lifecycle out of usb6fire_chip_abort() and into usb6fire_chip_disconnect(). The card pointer is saved in a local before any teardown, snd_card_disconnect() is called first to prevent new opens, URBs are aborted while chip is still valid, and snd_card_free_when_closed() is called last so chip is never accessed after the card may be freed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/mm/fault: Fix kfence page fault reporting copy_from_kernel_nofault() can be called when doing read of /proc/kcore. /proc/kcore can have some unmapped kfence objects which when read via copy_from_kernel_nofault() can cause page faults. Since *_nofault() functions define their own fixup table for handling fault, use that instead of asking kfence to handle such faults. Hence we search the exception tables for the nip which generated the fault. If there is an entry then we let the fixup table handler handle the page fault by returning an error from within ___do_page_fault(). This can be easily triggered if someone tries to do dd from /proc/kcore. eg. dd if=/proc/kcore of=/dev/null bs=1M Some example false negatives: =============================== BUG: KFENCE: invalid read in copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x9c/0x1a0 Invalid read at 0xc0000000fdff0000: copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x9c/0x1a0 0xc00000000665f950 read_kcore_iter+0x57c/0xa04 proc_reg_read_iter+0xe4/0x16c vfs_read+0x320/0x3ec ksys_read+0x90/0x154 system_call_exception+0x120/0x310 system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec BUG: KFENCE: use-after-free read in copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x9c/0x1a0 Use-after-free read at 0xc0000000fe050000 (in kfence-#2): copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x9c/0x1a0 0xc00000000665f950 read_kcore_iter+0x57c/0xa04 proc_reg_read_iter+0xe4/0x16c vfs_read+0x320/0x3ec ksys_read+0x90/0x154 system_call_exception+0x120/0x310 system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec