Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows unauthenticated remote denial of service via memory exhaustion. The fragment reassembly path in 'Elixir.Bandit.WebSocket.Connection':handle_frame/3 in lib/bandit/websocket/connection.ex appends every incoming Continuation{fin: false} frame's payload to a per-connection iolist with no cumulative size cap. The existing max_frame_size option only bounds individual frames; a peer that streams an unbounded number of continuation frames without ever setting fin=1 grows BEAM heap linearly until the OS or a supervisor kills the process. Because the accumulation happens before WebSock.handle_in/2 is called, the application has no opportunity to interpose a size check. Phoenix Channels and LiveView both run over WebSock on Bandit, so a stock Phoenix application exposes this surface as soon as it accepts socket connections. This issue affects bandit: from 0.5.0 before 1.11.0.

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows unauthenticated remote denial of service via memory exhaustion. The chunked clause of 'Elixir.Bandit.HTTP1.Socket':read_data/2 in lib/bandit/http1/socket.ex ignores the caller-supplied :length option when reading HTTP/1 chunked request bodies. Instead of capping the accumulated body at the configured limit (e.g. Plug.Parsers' default 8 MB), do_read_chunked_data!/5 buffers every received chunk into an iolist unconditionally and materializes the entire body as a single binary. The function always returns {:ok, body, ...}, so callers cannot interpose a 413 response. Because Plug.Parsers runs before routing and authentication in the standard Phoenix endpoint, an unauthenticated attacker needs no valid route or credentials. Sending a single Transfer-Encoding: chunked POST request with an arbitrarily large body to any path causes the BEAM process to exhaust available memory and be terminated by the OS OOM killer. The content-length path in the same function correctly enforces the limit and is not affected. This issue affects bandit: from 1.4.0 before 1.11.1.

A vulnerability has been identified in Capital Embedded AR Classic 431-422 (All versions), Capital Embedded AR Classic R20-11 (All versions < V2303), Nucleus NET (All versions), Nucleus ReadyStart V3 (All versions < V2017.02.4), Nucleus ReadyStart V4 (All versions < V4.1.0), Nucleus Source Code (All versions including affected IPv6 stack). The function that processes the Hop-by-Hop extension header in IPv6 packets and its options lacks any checks against the length field of the header, allowing attackers to put the function into an infinite loop by supplying arbitrary length values.

Marked is a markdown parser and compiler. From 18.0.0 to 18.0.1, a critical Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability exists in marked. By providing a specific 3-byte input sequence a tab, a vertical tab, and a newline (\x09\x0b\n)—an unauthenticated attacker can trigger an infinite recursion loop during parsing. This leads to unbounded memory allocation, causing the host Node.js application to crash via Memory Exhaustion (OOM). This vulnerability is fixed in 18.0.2.

When a Client SSL profile is configured with Allow Dynamic Record Sizing on a UDP virtual server, undisclosed traffic can cause the Traffic Management Microkernel (TMM) to terminate.  Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.

When reading binary Ion data through Amazon.IonDotnet using the RawBinaryReader class, Amazon.IonDotnet does not check the number of bytes read from the underlying stream while deserializing the binary format. If the Ion data is malformed or truncated, this triggers an infinite loop condition that could potentially result in a denial of service. Users should upgrade to Amazon.IonDotnet version 1.3.1 and ensure any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes.

facil.io is a C micro-framework for web applications. Prior to commit 5128747363055201d3ecf0e29bf0a961703c9fa0, `fio_json_parse` can enter an infinite loop when it encounters a nested JSON value starting with `i` or `I`. The process spins in user space and pegs one CPU core at ~100% instead of returning a parse error. Because `iodine` vendors the same parser code, the issue also affects `iodine` when it parses attacker-controlled JSON. The smallest reproducer I found is `[i`. The quoted-value form that originally exposed the issue, `[""i`, reaches the same bug because the parser tolerates missing commas and then treats the trailing `i` as the start of another value. Commit 5128747363055201d3ecf0e29bf0a961703c9fa0 fixes the issue.

A vulnerability has been identified in Capital Embedded AR Classic 431-422 (All versions), Capital Embedded AR Classic R20-11 (All versions < V2303), Nucleus NET (All versions), Nucleus ReadyStart V3 (All versions < V2017.02.4), Nucleus ReadyStart V4 (All versions < V4.1.0), Nucleus Source Code (All versions including affected IPv6 stack). The function that processes IPv6 headers does not check the lengths of extension header options, allowing attackers to put this function into an infinite loop with crafted length values.

OpenDJ is an LDAPv3 compliant directory service. OpenDJ prior to 4.9.3 contains a denial-of-service (DoS) vulnerability that causes the server to become unresponsive to all LDAP requests without crashing or restarting. This issue occurs when an alias loop exists in the LDAP database. If an ldapsearch request is executed with alias dereferencing set to "always" on this alias entry, the server stops responding to all future requests. Fortunately, the server can be restarted without data corruption. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.9.3.

Cloudflare quiche was discovered to be vulnerable to an infinite loop when sending packets containing RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames. QUIC connections possess a set of connection identifiers (IDs); see Section 5.1 of RFC 9000 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-5.1 . Once the QUIC handshake completes, a local endpoint is responsible for issuing and retiring Connection IDs that are used by the remote peer to populate the Destination Connection ID field in packets sent from remote to local. Each Connection ID has a sequence number to ensure synchronization between peers. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability by first completing a handshake and then sending a specially-crafted set of frames that trigger a connection ID retirement in the victim. When the victim attempts to send a packet containing RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames, Section 19.16 of RFC 9000 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-19.6 requires that the sequence number of the retired connection ID must not be the same as the sequence number of the connection ID used by the packet. In other words, a packet cannot contain a frame that retires itself. In scenarios such as path migration, it is possible for there to be multiple active paths with different active connection IDs that could be used to retire each other. The exploit triggered an unintentional behaviour of a quiche design feature that supports retirement across paths while maintaining full connection ID synchronization, leading to an infinite loop.This issue affects quiche: from 0.15.0 before 0.24.5.