In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Validate payload length and link_index in dc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async [Why&How] dc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async() copies payload->length bytes into a 16-byte stack buffer (dpaux.data[16]) guarded only by an ASSERT(), which is a no-op in release builds. If a caller ever passes length > 16 this results in a stack buffer overflow via memcpy. Additionally, link_index is used to dereference dc->links[] without bounds checking against dc->link_count, risking an out-of-bounds access. Replace the ASSERT with a hard runtime check that returns false when payload->length exceeds the destination buffer size, and add a bounds check for link_index before it is used. (cherry picked from commit ba4caa9fecdf7a38f98c878ad05a8a64148b6881)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: caam - use print_hex_dump_devel to guard key hex dumps Use print_hex_dump_devel() for dumping sensitive key material in *_setkey() to avoid leaking secrets at runtime when CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG is enabled.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: mediatek: vcodec: adding lock to protect encoder context list Add a lock for the ctx_list, to avoid accessing a NULL pointer within the 'vpu_enc_ipi_handler' function when the ctx_list has been deleted due to an unexpected behavior on the SCP IP block.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ebtables: zero chainstack array sashiko reports: looking at ebtables table translation, could a sparse cpu_possible_mask lead to an uninitialized pointer free? If cpu_possible_mask is sparse (for example, CPU 0 and CPU 2 are possible, but CPU 1 is not), the allocation loop skips CPU 1. If vmalloc_node() fails at CPU 2, the cleanup loop will blindly decrement and call vfree() on newinfo->chainstack[1]. Not a real-world bug, such allocation isn't expected to fail in the first place.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mfd: cros_ec: Delay dev_set_drvdata() until probe success If ec_device_probe() fails, cros_ec_class_release releases memory for the cros_ec_dev structure. However, because the drvdata was already set, sub-drivers like cros_ec_typec can still retrieve the stale pointer via the platform device. This leads to a use-after-free when cros_ec_typec attempts to access &typec->ec->ec->dev on a device that has already been released. Move dev_set_drvdata() to ensure that the pointer is only made available once all initialization steps have succeeded. sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/class/chromeos/cros_ec' Call trace: sysfs_do_create_link_sd+0x94/0xdc sysfs_create_link+0x30/0x44 device_add_class_symlinks+0x90/0x13c device_add+0xf0/0x50c ec_device_probe+0x150/0x4f0 platform_probe+0xa0/0xe0 ... BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in __memcpy+0x44/0x230 Write at addr f5ffff809e2d33ac by task kworker/u32:5/125 Pointer tag: [f5], memory tag: [fe] Tainted : [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: Google Navi unprovisioned 0x7FFFFFFF/sku0 board/sku3 Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func Call trace: __memcpy+0x44/0x230 cros_ec_check_features+0x60/0xcc [cros_ec_proto] cros_typec_probe+0xe8/0x6e0 [cros_ec_typec] platform_probe+0xa0/0xe0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ACPI: NFIT: core: Fix acpi_nfit_init() error cleanup If acpi_nfit_init() fails after adding the acpi_desc object to the acpi_descs list, that object is never removed from that list because the acpi_nfit_shutdown() devm action is not added for the NFIT device in that case. Next, the acpi_nfit_init() failure causes acpi_nfit_probe() to fail, the acpi_desc object is freed, and a dangling pointer is left behind in the acpi_descs. Any subsequent ACPI Machine Check Exception will trigger nfit_handle_mce() which iterates over acpi_descs and so a use-after-free will occur. Moreover, if acpi_nfit_probe() returns 0 after installing a notify handler for the NFIT device and without allocating the acpi_desc object and setting the NFIT device's driver data pointer, the acpi_desc object will be allocated by acpi_nfit_update_notify() and acpi_nfit_init() will be called to initialize it. Regardless of whether or not acpi_nfit_init() fails in that case, the acpi_nfit_shutdown() devm action is not added for the NFIT device and acpi_desc is never removed from the acpi_descs list. If the acpi_desc object is freed subsequently on driver removal, any subsequent ACPI MCE will lead to a use-after-free like in the previous case. To address the first issue mentioned above, make acpi_nfit_probe() call acpi_nfit_shutdown() directly on acpi_nfit_init() failures and to address the other one, add a remove callback to the driver and make it call acpi_nfit_shutdown(). Also, since it is now possible to pass NULL to acpi_nfit_shutdown() or the acpi_desc object passed to it may not have been initialized, add checks against NULL for acpi_desc and its nvdimm_bus field to that function and make acpi_nfit_unregister() clear the latter after unregistering the NVDIMM bus.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: compress: fix to cover {reserve,release}_compress_blocks() w/ cp_rwsem lock It needs to cover {reserve,release}_compress_blocks() w/ cp_rwsem lock to avoid racing with checkpoint, otherwise, filesystem metadata including blkaddr in dnode, inode fields and .total_valid_block_count may be corrupted after SPO case.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ipv6: fix NOREF dst use in seg6 and rpl lwtunnels seg6_input_core() and rpl_input() call ip6_route_input() which sets a NOREF dst on the skb, then pass it to dst_cache_set_ip6() invoking dst_hold() unconditionally. On PREEMPT_RT, ksoftirqd is preemptible and a higher-priority task can release the underlying pcpu_rt between the lookup and the caching through a concurrent FIB lookup on a shared nexthop. Simplified race sequence: ksoftirqd/X higher-prio task (same CPU X) ----------- -------------------------------- seg6_input_core(,skb)/rpl_input(skb) dst_cache_get() -> miss ip6_route_input(skb) -> ip6_pol_route(,skb,flags) [RT6_LOOKUP_F_DST_NOREF in flags] -> FIB lookup resolves fib6_nh [nhid=N route] -> rt6_make_pcpu_route() [creates pcpu_rt, refcount=1] pcpu_rt->sernum = fib6_sernum [fib6_sernum=W] -> cmpxchg(fib6_nh.rt6i_pcpu, NULL, pcpu_rt) [slot was empty, store succeeds] -> skb_dst_set_noref(skb, dst) [dst is pcpu_rt, refcount still 1] rt_genid_bump_ipv6() -> bumps fib6_sernum [fib6_sernum from W to Z] ip6_route_output() -> ip6_pol_route() -> FIB lookup resolves fib6_nh [nhid=N] -> rt6_get_pcpu_route() pcpu_rt->sernum != fib6_sernum [W <> Z, stale] -> prev = xchg(rt6i_pcpu, NULL) -> dst_release(prev) [prev is pcpu_rt, refcount 1->0, dead] dst = skb_dst(skb) [dst is the dead pcpu_rt] dst_cache_set_ip6(dst) -> dst_hold() on dead dst -> WARN / use-after-free For the race to occur, ksoftirqd must be preemptible (PREEMPT_RT without PREEMPT_RT_NEEDS_BH_LOCK) and a concurrent task must be able to release the pcpu_rt. Shared nexthop objects provide such a path, as two routes pointing to the same nhid share the same fib6_nh and its rt6i_pcpu entry. Fix seg6_input_core() and rpl_input() by calling skb_dst_force() after ip6_route_input() to force the NOREF dst into a refcounted one before caching. The output path is not affected as ip6_route_output() already returns a refcounted dst.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/dma-buf: fix UAF with retry loop Retry doesn't work here, since bo will be freed on error, leading to UAF. However, now that we do the alloc & init before the attach, we can now combine this as one unit and have the init do the alloc for us. This should make the retry safe. Reported by Sashiko. v2: Fix up the error unwind (CI) (cherry picked from commit 479669418253e0f27f8cf5db01a731352ea592e7)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: futex: Drop CLONE_THREAD requirement for private default hash alloc Currently need_futex_hash_allocate_default() depends on strict pthread semantics, abusing CLONE_THREAD. This breaks the non-concurrency assumptions when doing the mm->futex_ref pcpu allocations, leading to bugs[0] when sharing the mm in other ways; ie: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in futex_hash_put ... where the +1 bias can end up on a percpu counter that mm->futex_ref no longer points at. Loosen the check to cover any CLONE_VM clone, except vfork(). Excluding vfork keeps the existing paths untouched (no overhead), and we can't race in the first place: either the parent is suspended and the child runs alone, or mm->futex_ref is already allocated from an earlier CLONE_VM.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe: Fix error cleanup in xe_exec_queue_create_ioctl() Two error handling issues exist in xe_exec_queue_create_ioctl(): 1. When xe_hw_engine_group_add_exec_queue() fails, the error path jumps to put_exec_queue which skips xe_exec_queue_kill(). If the VM is in preempt fence mode, xe_vm_add_compute_exec_queue() has already added the queue to the VM's compute exec queue list. Skipping the kill leaves the queue on that list, leading to a dangling pointer after the queue is freed. 2. When xa_alloc() fails after xe_hw_engine_group_add_exec_queue() has succeeded, the error path does not call xe_hw_engine_group_del_exec_queue() to remove the queue from the hw engine group list. The queue is then freed while still linked into the hw engine group, causing a use-after-free. Fix both by: - Changing the xe_hw_engine_group_add_exec_queue() failure path to jump to kill_exec_queue so that xe_exec_queue_kill() properly removes the queue from the VM's compute list. - Adding a del_hw_engine_group label before kill_exec_queue for the xa_alloc() failure path, which removes the queue from the hw engine group before proceeding with the rest of the cleanup. (cherry picked from commit 37c831f401746a45d510b312b0ed7a77b1e06ec8)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: fix double-free in tipc_buf_append() tipc_msg_validate() can potentially reallocate the skb it is validating, freeing the old one. In tipc_buf_append(), it was being called with a pointer to a local variable which was a copy of the caller's skb pointer. If the skb was reallocated and validation subsequently failed, the error handling path would free the original skb pointer, which had already been freed, leading to double-free. Fix this by checking if head now points to a newly allocated reassembled skb. If it does, reassign *headbuf for later freeing operations.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: fix possible UAF in icmpv6_rcv() Caching saddr and daddr before pskb_pull() is problematic since skb->head can change. Remove these temporary variables: - We only access &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr and &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr when net_dbg_ratelimited() is called in the slow path. - Avoid potential future misuse after pskb_pull() call.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: sh: aica: reorder cleanup operations to avoid UAF bugs The dreamcastcard->timer could schedule the spu_dma_work and the spu_dma_work could also arm the dreamcastcard->timer. When the snd_pcm_substream is closing, the aica_channel will be deallocated. But it could still be dereferenced in the worker thread. The reason is that del_timer() will return directly regardless of whether the timer handler is running or not and the worker could be rescheduled in the timer handler. As a result, the UAF bug will happen. The racy situation is shown below: (Thread 1) | (Thread 2) snd_aicapcm_pcm_close() | ... | run_spu_dma() //worker | mod_timer() flush_work() | del_timer() | aica_period_elapsed() //timer kfree(dreamcastcard->channel) | schedule_work() | run_spu_dma() //worker ... | dreamcastcard->channel-> //USE In order to mitigate this bug and other possible corner cases, call mod_timer() conditionally in run_spu_dma(), then implement PCM sync_stop op to cancel both the timer and worker. The sync_stop op will be called from PCM core appropriately when needed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: jfs: Fix uaf in dbFreeBits [syzbot reported] ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:587 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __mutex_lock+0xfe/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880229254b0 by task syz-executor357/5216 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5216 Comm: syz-executor357 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc3-syzkaller-00156-gd7a5aa4b3c00 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 06/27/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:119 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:587 [inline] __mutex_lock+0xfe/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752 dbFreeBits+0x7ea/0xd90 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2390 dbFreeDmap fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2089 [inline] dbFree+0x35b/0x680 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:409 dbDiscardAG+0x8a9/0xa20 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:1650 jfs_ioc_trim+0x433/0x670 fs/jfs/jfs_discard.c:100 jfs_ioctl+0x2d0/0x3e0 fs/jfs/ioctl.c:131 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 Freed by task 5218: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:579 poison_slab_object+0xe0/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:240 __kasan_slab_free+0x37/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:256 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:184 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2252 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4473 [inline] kfree+0x149/0x360 mm/slub.c:4594 dbUnmount+0x11d/0x190 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:278 jfs_mount_rw+0x4ac/0x6a0 fs/jfs/jfs_mount.c:247 jfs_remount+0x3d1/0x6b0 fs/jfs/super.c:454 reconfigure_super+0x445/0x880 fs/super.c:1083 vfs_cmd_reconfigure fs/fsopen.c:263 [inline] vfs_fsconfig_locked fs/fsopen.c:292 [inline] __do_sys_fsconfig fs/fsopen.c:473 [inline] __se_sys_fsconfig+0xb6e/0xf80 fs/fsopen.c:345 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [Analysis] There are two paths (dbUnmount and jfs_ioc_trim) that generate race condition when accessing bmap, which leads to the occurrence of uaf. Use the lock s_umount to synchronize them, in order to avoid uaf caused by race condition.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: exfat: fix random stack corruption after get_block When get_block is called with a buffer_head allocated on the stack, such as do_mpage_readpage, stack corruption due to buffer_head UAF may occur in the following race condition situation. <CPU 0> <CPU 1> mpage_read_folio <<bh on stack>> do_mpage_readpage exfat_get_block bh_read __bh_read get_bh(bh) submit_bh wait_on_buffer ... end_buffer_read_sync __end_buffer_read_notouch unlock_buffer <<keep going>> ... ... ... ... <<bh is not valid out of mpage_read_folio>> . . another_function <<variable A on stack>> put_bh(bh) atomic_dec(bh->b_count) * stack corruption here * This patch returns -EAGAIN if a folio does not have buffers when bh_read needs to be called. By doing this, the caller can fallback to functions like block_read_full_folio(), create a buffer_head in the folio, and then call get_block again. Let's do not call bh_read() with on-stack buffer_head.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: pm: Fix uaf in __timer_delete_sync There are two paths to access mptcp_pm_del_add_timer, result in a race condition: CPU1 CPU2 ==== ==== net_rx_action napi_poll netlink_sendmsg __napi_poll netlink_unicast process_backlog netlink_unicast_kernel __netif_receive_skb genl_rcv __netif_receive_skb_one_core netlink_rcv_skb NF_HOOK genl_rcv_msg ip_local_deliver_finish genl_family_rcv_msg ip_protocol_deliver_rcu genl_family_rcv_msg_doit tcp_v4_rcv mptcp_pm_nl_flush_addrs_doit tcp_v4_do_rcv mptcp_nl_remove_addrs_list tcp_rcv_established mptcp_pm_remove_addrs_and_subflows tcp_data_queue remove_anno_list_by_saddr mptcp_incoming_options mptcp_pm_del_add_timer mptcp_pm_del_add_timer kfree(entry) In remove_anno_list_by_saddr(running on CPU2), after leaving the critical zone protected by "pm.lock", the entry will be released, which leads to the occurrence of uaf in the mptcp_pm_del_add_timer(running on CPU1). Keeping a reference to add_timer inside the lock, and calling sk_stop_timer_sync() with this reference, instead of "entry->add_timer". Move list_del(&entry->list) to mptcp_pm_del_add_timer and inside the pm lock, do not directly access any members of the entry outside the pm lock, which can avoid similar "entry->x" uaf.

A heap out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the Linux kernel's Performance Events system component can be exploited to achieve local privilege escalation. A perf_event's read_size can overflow, leading to an heap out-of-bounds increment or write in perf_read_group(). We recommend upgrading past commit 382c27f4ed28f803b1f1473ac2d8db0afc795a1b.

A use-after-free vulnerability in the Linux kernel's ipv4: igmp component can be exploited to achieve local privilege escalation. A race condition can be exploited to cause a timer be mistakenly registered on a RCU read locked object which is freed by another thread. We recommend upgrading past commit e2b706c691905fe78468c361aaabc719d0a496f1.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: VMCI: fix race between vmci_host_setup_notify and vmci_ctx_unset_notify During our test, it is found that a warning can be trigger in try_grab_folio as follow: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1678 at mm/gup.c:147 try_grab_folio+0x106/0x130 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1678 Comm: syz.3.31 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc5 #163 PREEMPT(undef) RIP: 0010:try_grab_folio+0x106/0x130 Call Trace: <TASK> follow_huge_pmd+0x240/0x8e0 follow_pmd_mask.constprop.0.isra.0+0x40b/0x5c0 follow_pud_mask.constprop.0.isra.0+0x14a/0x170 follow_page_mask+0x1c2/0x1f0 __get_user_pages+0x176/0x950 __gup_longterm_locked+0x15b/0x1060 ? gup_fast+0x120/0x1f0 gup_fast_fallback+0x17e/0x230 get_user_pages_fast+0x5f/0x80 vmci_host_unlocked_ioctl+0x21c/0xf80 RIP: 0033:0x54d2cd ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Digging into the source, context->notify_page may init by get_user_pages_fast and can be seen in vmci_ctx_unset_notify which will try to put_page. However get_user_pages_fast is not finished here and lead to following try_grab_folio warning. The race condition is shown as follow: cpu0 cpu1 vmci_host_do_set_notify vmci_host_setup_notify get_user_pages_fast(uva, 1, FOLL_WRITE, &context->notify_page); lockless_pages_from_mm gup_pgd_range gup_huge_pmd // update &context->notify_page vmci_host_do_set_notify vmci_ctx_unset_notify notify_page = context->notify_page; if (notify_page) put_page(notify_page); // page is freed __gup_longterm_locked __get_user_pages follow_trans_huge_pmd try_grab_folio // warn here To slove this, use local variable page to make notify_page can be seen after finish get_user_pages_fast.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vfio/pci: Clean up DMABUFs before disabling function On device shutdown, make vfio_pci_core_close_device() call vfio_pci_dma_buf_cleanup() before the function is disabled via vfio_pci_core_disable(). This ensures that all access via DMABUFs is revoked before the function's BARs become inaccessible. This fixes an issue where, if the function is disabled first, a tiny window exists in which the function's MSE is cleared and yet BARs could still be accessed via the DMABUF. The resources would also be freed and up for grabs by a different driver.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix racy issue under cocurrent smb2 tree disconnect There is UAF issue under cocurrent smb2 tree disconnect. This patch introduce TREE_CONN_EXPIRE flags for tcon to avoid cocurrent access.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tee: amdtee: fix use-after-free vulnerability in amdtee_close_session There is a potential race condition in amdtee_close_session that may cause use-after-free in amdtee_open_session. For instance, if a session has refcount == 1, and one thread tries to free this session via: kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); the reference count will get decremented, and the next step would be to call destroy_session(). However, if in another thread, amdtee_open_session() is called before destroy_session() has completed execution, alloc_session() may return 'sess' that will be freed up later in destroy_session() leading to use-after-free in amdtee_open_session. To fix this issue, treat decrement of sess->refcount and removal of 'sess' from session list in destroy_session() as a critical section, so that it is executed atomically.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/dma-buf: handle empty bo and UAF races There look to be some nasty races here when triggering the invalidate_mappings hook: 1) We do xe_bo_alloc() followed by the attach, before the actual full bo init step in xe_dma_buf_init_obj(). However the bo is visible on the attachments list after the attach. This is bad since exporter driver, say amdgpu, can at any time call back into our invalidate_mappings hook, with an empty/bogus bo, leading to potential bugs/crashes. 2) Similar to 1) but here we get a UAF, when the invalidate_mappings hook is triggered. For example, we get as far as xe_bo_init_locked() but this fails in some way. But here the bo will be freed on error, but we still have it attached from dma-buf pov, so if the invalidate_mappings is now triggered then the bo we access is gone and we trigger UAF and more bugs/crashes. To fix this, move the attach step until after we actually have a fully set up buffer object. Note that the bo is not published to userspace until later, so not sure what the comment "Don't publish the bo until we have a valid attachment", is referring to. We have at least two different customers reporting hitting a NULL ptr deref in evict_flags when importing something from amdgpu, followed by triggering the evict flow. Hit rate is also pretty low, which would hint at some kind of race, so something like 1) or 2) might explain this. v2: - Shuffle the order of the ops slightly (no functional change) - Improve the comment to better explain the ordering (Matt B) (cherry picked from commit af1f2ad0c59fe4e2f924c526f66e968289d77971)

A time-of-check to time-of-use issue exists in io_uring subsystem's IORING_OP_CLOSE operation in the Linux kernel's versions 5.6 - 5.11 (inclusive), which allows a local user to elevate their privileges to root. Introduced in b5dba59e0cf7e2cc4d3b3b1ac5fe81ddf21959eb, patched in 9eac1904d3364254d622bf2c771c4f85cd435fc2, backported to stable in 788d0824269bef539fe31a785b1517882eafed93.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu: Fix WARN_ON in __iommu_group_set_domain_nofail() due to reset In __iommu_group_set_domain_internal(), concurrent domain attachments are rejected when any device in the group is recovering. This is necessary to fence concurrent attachments to a multi-device group where devices might share the same RID due to PCI DMA alias quirks, but triggers the WARN_ON in __iommu_group_set_domain_nofail(). Other IOMMU_SET_DOMAIN_MUST_SUCCEED callers in detach/teardown paths, such as __iommu_group_set_core_domain and __iommu_release_dma_ownership, should not be rejected, as the domain would be freed anyway in these nofail paths while group->domain is still pointing to it. So pci_dev_reset_iommu_done() could trigger a UAF when re-attaching group->domain. Honor the IOMMU_SET_DOMAIN_MUST_SUCCEED flag, allowing the callers through the group->recovery_cnt fence, so as to update the group->domain pointer. Instead add a gdev->blocked check in the device iteration loop, to prevent any concurrent per-device detachment.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvmet-tcp: propagate nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec() errors to its callers Currently, when nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec() detects an out-of-bounds PDU length or offset, it triggers nvmet_tcp_fatal_error(cmd->queue) and returns early. However, because the function returns void, the callers are entirely unaware that a fatal error has occurred and that the cmd->recv_msg.msg_iter was left uninitialized. Callers such as nvmet_tcp_handle_h2c_data_pdu() proceed to blindly overwrite the queue state with queue->rcv_state = NVMET_TCP_RECV_DATA Consequently, the socket receiving loop may attempt to read incoming network data into the uninitialized iterator. Fix this by shifting the error handling responsibility to the callers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/psi: fix race between file release and pressure write A potential race condition exists between pressure write and cgroup file release regarding the priv member of struct kernfs_open_file, which triggers the uaf reported in [1]. Consider the following scenario involving execution on two separate CPUs: CPU0 CPU1 ==== ==== vfs_rmdir() kernfs_iop_rmdir() cgroup_rmdir() cgroup_kn_lock_live() cgroup_destroy_locked() cgroup_addrm_files() cgroup_rm_file() kernfs_remove_by_name() kernfs_remove_by_name_ns() vfs_write() __kernfs_remove() new_sync_write() kernfs_drain() kernfs_fop_write_iter() kernfs_drain_open_files() cgroup_file_write() kernfs_release_file() pressure_write() cgroup_file_release() ctx = of->priv; kfree(ctx); of->priv = NULL; cgroup_kn_unlock() cgroup_kn_lock_live() cgroup_get(cgrp) cgroup_kn_unlock() if (ctx->psi.trigger) // here, trigger uaf for ctx, that is of->priv The cgroup_rmdir() is protected by the cgroup_mutex, it also safeguards the memory deallocation of of->priv performed within cgroup_file_release(). However, the operations involving of->priv executed within pressure_write() are not entirely covered by the protection of cgroup_mutex. Consequently, if the code in pressure_write(), specifically the section handling the ctx variable executes after cgroup_file_release() has completed, a uaf vulnerability involving of->priv is triggered. Therefore, the issue can be resolved by extending the scope of the cgroup_mutex lock within pressure_write() to encompass all code paths involving of->priv, thereby properly synchronizing the race condition occurring between cgroup_file_release() and pressure_write(). And, if an live kn lock can be successfully acquired while executing the pressure write operation, it indicates that the cgroup deletion process has not yet reached its final stage; consequently, the priv pointer within open_file cannot be NULL. Therefore, the operation to retrieve the ctx value must be moved to a point *after* the live kn lock has been successfully acquired. In another situation, specifically after entering cgroup_kn_lock_live() but before acquiring cgroup_mutex, there exists a different class of race condition: CPU0: write memory.pressure CPU1: write cgroup.pressure=0 =========================== ============================= kernfs_fop_write_iter() kernfs_get_active_of(of) pressure_write() cgroup_kn_lock_live(memory.pressure) cgroup_tryget(cgrp) kernfs_break_active_protection(kn) ... blocks on cgroup_mutex cgroup_pressure_write() cgroup_kn_lock_live(cgroup.pressure) cgroup_file_show(memory.pressure, false) kernfs_show(false) kernfs_drain_open_files() cgroup_file_release(of) kfree(ctx) of->priv = NULL cgroup_kn_unlock() ... acquires cgroup_mutex ctx = of->priv; // may now be NULL if (ctx->psi.trigger) // NULL dereference Consequently, there is a possibility that of->priv is NULL, the pressure write needs to check for this. Now that the scope of the cgroup_mutex has been expanded, the original explicit cgroup_get/put operations are no longer necessary, this is because acquiring/releasing the live kn lock inherently executes a cgroup get/put operation. [1] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pressure_write+0xa4/0x210 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4011 Call Trace: pressure_write+0xa4/0x210 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4011 cgroup_file_write+0x36f/0x790 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:43 ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pipe: wakeup wr_wait after setting max_usage Commit c73be61cede5 ("pipe: Add general notification queue support") a regression was introduced that would lock up resized pipes under certain conditions. See the reproducer in [1]. The commit resizing the pipe ring size was moved to a different function, doing that moved the wakeup for pipe->wr_wait before actually raising pipe->max_usage. If a pipe was full before the resize occured it would result in the wakeup never actually triggering pipe_write. Set @max_usage and @nr_accounted before waking writers if this isn't a watch queue. [Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>: rewrite to account for watch queues]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: ccp - copy IV using skcipher ivsize AF_ALG rfc3686-ctr-aes-ccp requests pass an 8-byte IV to the driver. ccp_aes_complete() restores AES_BLOCK_SIZE bytes into the caller's IV buffer while RFC3686 skciphers expose an 8-byte IV, so the restore overruns the provided buffer. Use crypto_skcipher_ivsize() to copy only the algorithm's IV length.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: thunderbolt: Clamp XDomain response data copy to allocation size tb_xdp_properties_request() derives the per-packet copy length from the response header without checking that it fits in the previously allocated data buffer. A malicious peer can set its length field larger than the declared data_length, causing memcpy to write past the kcalloc allocation. Clamp the per-packet copy length so that the cumulative offset never exceeds data_len.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/list_lru: drain before clearing xarray entry on reparent memcg_reparent_list_lrus() clears the dying memcg's xarray entry with xas_store(&xas, NULL) before reparenting its per-node lists into the parent. This opens a window where a concurrent list_lru_del() arriving for the dying memcg sees xa_load() == NULL, walks to the parent in lock_list_lru_of_memcg(), takes the parent's per-node lock, and calls list_del_init() on an item still physically linked on the dying memcg's list. If another in-flight thread holds the dying memcg's per-node lock at the same moment (another list_lru_del, or a list_lru_walk_one running an isolate callback), both threads modify ->next/->prev pointers on the same physical list under different locks. Adjacent items can corrupt each other's links. Fix it by reversing the order: reparent each per-node list and mark the child's list lru dead and then clear the xarray entry. Any concurrent list_lru op that finds the still-set xarray entry either takes the dying memcg's per-node lock (synchronizing with the drain) or sees LONG_MIN and walks to the parent, where the items now live.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: inet: frags: fix use-after-free caused by the fqdir_pre_exit() flush On netns teardown, fqdir_pre_exit() walks the fqdir rhashtable and flushes every fragment queue that is not yet complete using inet_frag_queue_flush(). That helper frees all the skbs queued on the fragment queue but does not set INET_FRAG_COMPLETE, and leaves q->fragments_tail and q->last_run_head pointing at the freed skbs. The queue itself stays in the rhashtable. fqdir_pre_exit() first lowers high_thresh to 0 to stop new queue lookups, but it cannot stop a fragment that already obtained the queue through inet_frag_find() earlier and stalled just before taking the queue lock. Once that fragment resumes after the flush and takes the queue lock, it passes the INET_FRAG_COMPLETE check and then dereferences the freed fragments_tail. inet_frag_queue_insert() reads FRAG_CB() and ->len of that pointer and, on the append path, writes ->next_frag, causing a slab use-after-free. IPv6, nf_conntrack_reasm6 and 6lowpan reassembly share the same flush path and are affected as well. Reset rb_fragments, fragments_tail and last_run_head in inet_frag_queue_flush() so a flushed queue no longer points at the freed skbs. A fragment that resumes after the flush and takes the queue lock then finds an empty queue and starts a new run instead of dereferencing the freed fragments_tail. ip_frag_reinit() already performed this reset after its own flush, so drop the now duplicate code there.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: zram: fix use-after-free in zram_bvec_write_partial() zram_read_page() picks the sync or async backing device read path based on whether the parent bio is NULL. zram_bvec_write_partial() passes its parent bio down, so for ZRAM_WB slots the read is dispatched asynchronously and zram_read_page() returns 0 while the bio is still in flight. The caller then runs memcpy_from_bvec(), zram_write_page() and __free_page() on the buffer, leaving the async read to write into a freed page. zram_bvec_read_partial() was switched to NULL in commit 4e3c87b9421d ("zram: fix synchronous reads") for the same reason; the write_partial counterpart was missed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/ivpu: Fix signed integer truncation in IPC receive Fix potential buffer overflow where firmware-supplied data_size is cast to signed int before being used in min_t(). Large unsigned values (>= 0x80000000) become negative, causing unsigned wraparound and oversized memcpy operations that can overflow the stack buffer. Change min_t(int, ...) to min() as both values are unsigned and can be handled by min() without explicit cast.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/ivpu: Add buffer overflow check in MS get_info_ioctl Add validation that the info size returned from the metric stream info query is not exceeded when checked against the allocated buffer size. If the firmware returns a size larger than the buffer, reject the operation with -EOVERFLOW instead of proceeding with an incorrect buffer copy.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: Take the SRCU lock for page table walks in fault injection and AT emulation walk_s1() and kvm_walk_nested_s2() expect to be called while holding kvm->srcu to guard against memslot changes. While this is generally the case, __kvm_at_s12() and __kvm_find_s1_desc_level() call into the respective walkers without taking kvm->srcu. Fix by acquiring kvm->srcu prior to the table walk in both instances.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nat: use kfree_rcu to release ops Florian Westphal says: "Historically this is not an issue, even for normal base hooks: the data path doesn't use the original nf_hook_ops that are used to register the callbacks. However, in v5.14 I added the ability to dump the active netfilter hooks from userspace. This code will peek back into the nf_hook_ops that are available at the tail of the pointer-array blob used by the datapath. The nat hooks are special, because they are called indirectly from the central nat dispatcher hook. They are currently invisible to the nfnl hook dump subsystem though. But once that changes the nat ops structures have to be deferred too." Update nf_nat_register_fn() to deal with partial exposition of the hooks from error path which can be also an issue for nfnetlink_hook.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: vgic-its: Drop the translation cache reference only for the erased entry vgic_its_invalidate_cache() walks the per-ITS translation cache with xa_for_each() and drops the cache's reference on each entry with vgic_put_irq(). It puts the iterated pointer, though, rather than the value returned by xa_erase(). The function is called from contexts that do not exclude one another: the ITS command handlers hold its_lock, the GITS_CTLR write path holds cmd_lock, and the path that clears EnableLPIs in a redistributor's GICR_CTLR holds neither. Two or more of them can drain the same cache concurrently, and if each one observes the same entry, erases it and then puts it, the single reference the cache holds on that entry is dropped more than once. The entry can then be freed while an ITE still maps it. xa_erase() is atomic and returns the previous entry, so put only the entry that this context actually removed. The cache reference is then dropped exactly once per entry even when the invalidations run concurrently, and the behavior is unchanged when only one context runs.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: revalidate list cursor after sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() in SCTP_SENDALL The SCTP_SENDALL path in sctp_sendmsg() iterates ep->asocs with list_for_each_entry_safe(), which caches the next entry in @tmp before the loop body runs. The body calls sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc(), which may drop the socket lock inside sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(). While the lock is dropped, another thread can SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF the association cached in @tmp, migrating it to a new endpoint via sctp_sock_migrate() (list_del_init() + list_add_tail() to newep->asocs), and optionally close the new socket which frees the association via kfree_rcu(). The cached @tmp can also be freed by a network ABORT for that association, processed in softirq while the lock is dropped. sctp_wait_for_sndbuf() revalidates @asoc (the current entry) on re-lock via the "sk != asoc->base.sk" and "asoc->base.dead" checks, but nothing revalidates @tmp. After a successful return, the iterator advances to the stale @tmp, yielding either a use-after-free (if the peeled socket was closed) or a list-walk onto the new endpoint's list head (type confusion of &newep->asocs as a struct sctp_association *). Both are reachable from CapEff=0; the type-confusion path gives controlled indirect call via the outqueue.sched->init_sid pointer. Fix by re-deriving @tmp from @asoc after sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() returns. @asoc is known to still be on ep->asocs at that point: the only callers that list_del an association from ep->asocs are sctp_association_free() (which sets asoc->base.dead) and sctp_assoc_migrate() (which changes asoc->base.sk), and sctp_wait_for_sndbuf() checks both under the lock before any successful return; a tripped check propagates as err < 0 and the loop bails before the re-derive. The SCTP_ABORT path in sctp_sendmsg_check_sflags() returns 0 and the loop hits 'continue' before sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() is ever called, so the @tmp cached by list_for_each_entry_safe() still covers the lock-held free that ba59fb027307 ("sctp: walk the list of asoc safely") was added for.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hfsplus: fix held lock freed on hfsplus_fill_super() hfsplus_fill_super() calls hfs_find_init() to initialize a search structure, which acquires tree->tree_lock. If the subsequent call to hfsplus_cat_build_key() fails, the function jumps to the out_put_root error label without releasing the lock. The later cleanup path then frees the tree data structure with the lock still held, triggering a held lock freed warning. Fix this by adding the missing hfs_find_exit(&fd) call before jumping to the out_put_root error label. This ensures that tree->tree_lock is properly released on the error path. The bug was originally detected on v6.13-rc1 using an experimental static analysis tool we are developing, and we have verified that the issue persists in the latest mainline kernel. The tool is specifically designed to detect memory management issues. It is currently under active development and not yet publicly available. We confirmed the bug by runtime testing under QEMU with x86_64 defconfig, lockdep enabled, and CONFIG_HFSPLUS_FS=y. To trigger the error path, we used GDB to dynamically shrink the max_unistr_len parameter to 1 before hfsplus_asc2uni() is called. This forces hfsplus_asc2uni() to naturally return -ENAMETOOLONG, which propagates to hfsplus_cat_build_key() and exercises the faulty error path. The following warning was observed during mount: ========================= WARNING: held lock freed! 7.0.0-rc3-00016-gb4f0dd314b39 #4 Not tainted ------------------------- mount/174 is freeing memory ffff888103f92000-ffff888103f92fff, with a lock still held there! ffff888103f920b0 (&tree->tree_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: hfsplus_find_init+0x154/0x1e0 2 locks held by mount/174: #0: ffff888103f960e0 (&type->s_umount_key#42/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: alloc_super.constprop.0+0x167/0xa40 #1: ffff888103f920b0 (&tree->tree_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: hfsplus_find_init+0x154/0x1e0 stack backtrace: CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 174 Comm: mount Not tainted 7.0.0-rc3-00016-gb4f0dd314b39 #4 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x82/0xd0 debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x13a/0x180 kfree+0x16b/0x510 ? hfsplus_fill_super+0xcb4/0x18a0 hfsplus_fill_super+0xcb4/0x18a0 ? __pfx_hfsplus_fill_super+0x10/0x10 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? bdev_open+0x65f/0xc30 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? pointer+0x4ce/0xbf0 ? trace_contention_end+0x11c/0x150 ? __pfx_pointer+0x10/0x10 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? bdev_open+0x79b/0xc30 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? vsnprintf+0x6da/0x1270 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x157/0x740 ? __pfx_vsnprintf+0x10/0x10 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x80 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? irqentry_exit+0x17b/0x5e0 ? trace_irq_disable.constprop.0+0x116/0x150 ? __pfx_hfsplus_fill_super+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_hfsplus_fill_super+0x10/0x10 get_tree_bdev_flags+0x302/0x580 ? __pfx_get_tree_bdev_flags+0x10/0x10 ? vfs_parse_fs_qstr+0x129/0x1a0 ? __pfx_vfs_parse_fs_qstr+0x3/0x10 vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x320 fc_mount+0x10/0x1d0 path_mount+0x5c5/0x21c0 ? __pfx_path_mount+0x10/0x10 ? trace_irq_enable.constprop.0+0x116/0x150 ? trace_irq_enable.constprop.0+0x116/0x150 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? kmem_cache_free+0x307/0x540 ? user_path_at+0x51/0x60 ? __x64_sys_mount+0x212/0x280 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f __x64_sys_mount+0x212/0x280 ? __pfx___x64_sys_mount+0x10/0x10 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? trace_irq_enable.constprop.0+0x116/0x150 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f do_syscall_64+0x111/0x680 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7ffacad55eae Code: 48 8b 0d 85 1f 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 8 RSP: 002b ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/uapi: Reject coh_none PAT index for CPU cached memory in madvise Add validation in xe_vm_madvise_ioctl() to reject PAT indices with XE_COH_NONE coherency mode when applied to CPU cached memory. Using coh_none with CPU cached buffers is a security issue. When the kernel clears pages before reallocation, the clear operation stays in CPU cache (dirty). GPU with coh_none can bypass CPU caches and read stale sensitive data directly from DRAM, potentially leaking data from previously freed pages of other processes. This aligns with the existing validation in vm_bind path (xe_vm_bind_ioctl_validate_bo). v2(Matthew brost) - Add fixes - Move one debug print to better place v3(Matthew Auld) - Should be drm/xe/uapi - More Cc v4(Shuicheng Lin) - Fix kmem leak issues by the way v5 - Remove kmem leak because it has been merged by another patch v6 - Remove the fix which is not related to current fix v7 - No change v8 - Rebase v9 - Limit the restrictions to iGPU v10 - No change (cherry picked from commit 016ccdb674b8c899940b3944952c96a6a490d10a)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/mlx4: Fix mis-use of RCU in mlx4_srq_event() Sashiko points out the radix_tree itself is RCU safe, but nothing ever frees the mlx4_srq struct with RCU, and it isn't even accessed within the RCU critical section. It also will crash if an event is delivered before the srq object is finished initializing. Use the spinlock since it isn't easy to make RCU work, use refcount_inc_not_zero() to protect against partially initialized objects, and order the refcount_set() to be after the srq is fully initialized.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/iwcm: Fix workqueue list corruption by removing work_list The commit e1168f0 ("RDMA/iwcm: Simplify cm_event_handler()") changed the work submission logic to unconditionally call queue_work() with the expectation that queue_work() would have no effect if work was already pending. The problem is that a free list of struct iwcm_work is used (for which struct work_struct is embedded), so each call to queue_work() is basically unique and therefore does indeed queue the work. This causes a problem in the work handler which walks the work_list until it's empty to process entries. This means that a single run of the work handler could process item N+1 and release it back to the free list while the actual workqueue entry is still queued. It could then get reused (INIT_WORK...) and lead to list corruption in the workqueue logic. Fix this by just removing the work_list. The workqueue already does this for us. This fixes the following error that was observed when stress testing with ucmatose on an Intel E830 in iWARP mode: [ 151.465780] list_del corruption. next->prev should be ffff9f0915c69c08, but was ffff9f0a1116be08. (next=ffff9f0a15b11c08) [ 151.466639] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 151.466986] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:67! [ 151.467349] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 151.467753] CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 2306 Comm: kworker/u64:18 Not tainted 6.19.0-rc4+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 151.468466] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 151.469192] Workqueue: 0x0 (iw_cm_wq) [ 151.469478] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xf0/0x100 [ 151.469942] Code: c7 58 5f 4c b2 e8 10 50 aa ff 0f 0b 48 89 ef e8 36 57 cb ff 48 8b 55 08 48 89 e9 48 89 de 48 c7 c7 a8 5f 4c b2 e8 f0 4f aa ff <0f> 0b 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 [ 151.471323] RSP: 0000:ffffb15644e7bd68 EFLAGS: 00010046 [ 151.471712] RAX: 000000000000006d RBX: ffff9f0915c69c08 RCX: 0000000000000027 [ 151.472243] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9f0a37d9c600 [ 151.472768] RBP: ffff9f0a15b11c08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffff7fff [ 151.473294] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffb15644e7bba8 R12: ffff9f092339ee68 [ 151.473817] R13: ffff9f0900059c28 R14: ffff9f092339ee78 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 151.474344] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9f0a847b5000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 151.474934] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 151.475362] CR2: 0000559e233a9088 CR3: 000000020296b004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 [ 151.475895] PKRU: 55555554 [ 151.476118] Call Trace: [ 151.476331] <TASK> [ 151.476497] move_linked_works+0x49/0xa0 [ 151.476792] __pwq_activate_work.isra.46+0x2f/0xa0 [ 151.477151] pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x1e0/0x2f0 [ 151.477479] process_scheduled_works+0x1c8/0x410 [ 151.477823] worker_thread+0x125/0x260 [ 151.478108] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 151.478430] kthread+0xfe/0x240 [ 151.478671] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 151.478955] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 151.479240] ret_from_fork+0x208/0x270 [ 151.479523] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 151.479806] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 151.480103] </TASK>

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched_ext: Read scx_root under scx_cgroup_ops_rwsem in cgroup setters scx_group_set_{weight,idle,bandwidth}() cache scx_root before acquiring scx_cgroup_ops_rwsem, so the pointer can be stale by the time the op runs. If the loaded scheduler is disabled and freed (via RCU work) and another is enabled between the naked load and the rwsem acquire, the reader sees scx_cgroup_enabled=true (the new scheduler's) but dereferences the freed one - UAF on SCX_HAS_OP(sch, ...) / SCX_CALL_OP(sch, ...). scx_cgroup_enabled is toggled only under scx_cgroup_ops_rwsem write (scx_cgroup_{init,exit}), so reading scx_root inside the rwsem read section correlates @sch with the enabled snapshot.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix potential UAF and double free in smb2_open_file() Zero out @err_iov and @err_buftype before retrying SMB2_open() to prevent an UAF bug if @data != NULL, otherwise a double free.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks The existing SELinux security model for overlayfs is to allow access if the current task is able to access the top level file (the "user" file) and the mounter's credentials are sufficient to access the lower level file (the "backing" file). Unfortunately, the current code does not properly enforce these access controls for both mmap() and mprotect() operations on overlayfs filesystems. This patch makes use of the newly created security_mmap_backing_file() LSM hook to provide the missing backing file enforcement for mmap() operations, and leverages the backing file API and new LSM blob to provide the necessary information to properly enforce the mprotect() access controls.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: defensively unhash xfrm_state lists in __xfrm_state_delete KASAN reproduces a slab-use-after-free in __xfrm_state_delete()'s hlist_del_rcu calls under syzkaller load on linux-6.12.y stable (reproduced on 6.12.47, also reachable via the same code path on torvalds/master and on the ipsec tree). Nine unique signatures cluster in the xfrm_state lifecycle, the load-bearing one being: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __hlist_del include/linux/list.h:990 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hlist_del_rcu include/linux/rculist.h:516 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __xfrm_state_delete net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881198bcb70 by task kworker/u8:9/435 Workqueue: netns cleanup_net Call Trace: __hlist_del / hlist_del_rcu __xfrm_state_delete xfrm_state_delete xfrm_state_flush xfrm_state_fini ops_exit_list cleanup_net The other observed signatures hit the same slab object from __xfrm_state_lookup, xfrm_alloc_spi, __xfrm_state_insert and an OOB write variant of __xfrm_state_delete, all on the byseq/byspi hash chains. __xfrm_state_delete() guards its byseq and byspi unhashes with value-based predicates: if (x->km.seq) hlist_del_rcu(&x->byseq); if (x->id.spi) hlist_del_rcu(&x->byspi); while everywhere else in the file (e.g. state_cache, state_cache_input) the safer hlist_unhashed() check is used. xfrm_alloc_spi() sets x->id.spi = newspi inside xfrm_state_lock and then immediately inserts into byspi, but a path that observes x->id.spi != 0 outside of xfrm_state_lock can still skip-or-hit the byspi unhash inconsistently with whether x is actually on the list. The same holds for x->km.seq versus byseq, and the bydst/bysrc unhashes have no predicate at all, so a second __xfrm_state_delete() on the same object writes through LIST_POISON pprev. The defensive change here: - Use hlist_del_init_rcu() instead of hlist_del_rcu() on bydst, bysrc, byseq and byspi so a second deletion is a no-op rather than a write through LIST_POISON pprev. The byseq/byspi nodes are already initialised in xfrm_state_alloc(). - Test hlist_unhashed() rather than the value predicate for byseq/byspi, so the unhash decision tracks list state rather than mutable scalar fields. Empirical verification: applied this patch on top of v6.12.47, rebuilt, and re-ran the same syzkaller harness for 1h16m on a previously-crashy configuration that produced ~100 hits each of slab-use-after-free Read in xfrm_alloc_spi / Read in __xfrm_state_lookup / Write in __xfrm_state_delete. After the patch, 7.1M execs across 32 VMs at ~1550 exec/sec produced zero xfrm_state UAF/OOB hits. /proc/slabinfo confirms the xfrm_state slab is actively allocated and freed during the run (~143 KiB resident), so the fuzzer is still exercising those code paths -- they just no longer crash. Reproduction: - Linux 6.12.47 x86_64 + KASAN_GENERIC + KASAN_INLINE + KCOV - syzkaller @ 746545b8b1e4c3a128db8652b340d3df90ce61db - 32 QEMU/KVM VMs x 2 vCPU on AWS c5.metal bare metal - 9 unique signatures collected in ~9h, all within xfrm_state lifecycle

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/mana: Validate rx_hash_key_len Sashiko points out that rx_hash_key_len comes from a uAPI structure and is blindly passed to memcpy, allowing the userspace to trash kernel memory. Bounds check it so the memcpy cannot overflow.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dlm: validate length in dlm_search_rsb_tree The len parameter in dlm_dump_rsb_name() is not validated and comes from network messages. When it exceeds DLM_RESNAME_MAXLEN, it can cause out-of-bounds write in dlm_search_rsb_tree(). Add length validation to prevent potential buffer overflow.