In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm thin: Fix ABBA deadlock between shrink_slab and dm_pool_abort_metadata Following concurrent processes: P1(drop cache) P2(kworker) drop_caches_sysctl_handler drop_slab shrink_slab down_read(&shrinker_rwsem) - LOCK A do_shrink_slab super_cache_scan prune_icache_sb dispose_list evict ext4_evict_inode ext4_clear_inode ext4_discard_preallocations ext4_mb_load_buddy_gfp ext4_mb_init_cache ext4_read_block_bitmap_nowait ext4_read_bh_nowait submit_bh dm_submit_bio do_worker process_deferred_bios commit metadata_operation_failed dm_pool_abort_metadata down_write(&pmd->root_lock) - LOCK B __destroy_persistent_data_objects dm_block_manager_destroy dm_bufio_client_destroy unregister_shrinker down_write(&shrinker_rwsem) thin_map | dm_thin_find_block ↓ down_read(&pmd->root_lock) --> ABBA deadlock , which triggers hung task: [ 76.974820] INFO: task kworker/u4:3:63 blocked for more than 15 seconds. [ 76.976019] Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4-00011-g8f17dd350364-dirty #910 [ 76.978521] task:kworker/u4:3 state:D stack:0 pid:63 ppid:2 [ 76.978534] Workqueue: dm-thin do_worker [ 76.978552] Call Trace: [ 76.978564] __schedule+0x6ba/0x10f0 [ 76.978582] schedule+0x9d/0x1e0 [ 76.978588] rwsem_down_write_slowpath+0x587/0xdf0 [ 76.978600] down_write+0xec/0x110 [ 76.978607] unregister_shrinker+0x2c/0xf0 [ 76.978616] dm_bufio_client_destroy+0x116/0x3d0 [ 76.978625] dm_block_manager_destroy+0x19/0x40 [ 76.978629] __destroy_persistent_data_objects+0x5e/0x70 [ 76.978636] dm_pool_abort_metadata+0x8e/0x100 [ 76.978643] metadata_operation_failed+0x86/0x110 [ 76.978649] commit+0x6a/0x230 [ 76.978655] do_worker+0xc6e/0xd90 [ 76.978702] process_one_work+0x269/0x630 [ 76.978714] worker_thread+0x266/0x630 [ 76.978730] kthread+0x151/0x1b0 [ 76.978772] INFO: task test.sh:2646 blocked for more than 15 seconds. [ 76.979756] Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4-00011-g8f17dd350364-dirty #910 [ 76.982111] task:test.sh state:D stack:0 pid:2646 ppid:2459 [ 76.982128] Call Trace: [ 76.982139] __schedule+0x6ba/0x10f0 [ 76.982155] schedule+0x9d/0x1e0 [ 76.982159] rwsem_down_read_slowpath+0x4f4/0x910 [ 76.982173] down_read+0x84/0x170 [ 76.982177] dm_thin_find_block+0x4c/0xd0 [ 76.982183] thin_map+0x201/0x3d0 [ 76.982188] __map_bio+0x5b/0x350 [ 76.982195] dm_submit_bio+0x2b6/0x930 [ 76.982202] __submit_bio+0x123/0x2d0 [ 76.982209] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x101/0x3e0 [ 76.982222] submit_bio_noacct+0x389/0x770 [ 76.982227] submit_bio+0x50/0xc0 [ 76.982232] submit_bh_wbc+0x15e/0x230 [ 76.982238] submit_bh+0x14/0x20 [ 76.982241] ext4_read_bh_nowait+0xc5/0x130 [ 76.982247] ext4_read_block_bitmap_nowait+0x340/0xc60 [ 76.982254] ext4_mb_init_cache+0x1ce/0xdc0 [ 76.982259] ext4_mb_load_buddy_gfp+0x987/0xfa0 [ 76.982263] ext4_discard_preallocations+0x45d/0x830 [ 76.982274] ext4_clear_inode+0x48/0xf0 [ 76.982280] ext4_evict_inode+0xcf/0xc70 [ 76.982285] evict+0x119/0x2b0 [ 76.982290] dispose_list+0x43/0xa0 [ 76.982294] prune_icache_sb+0x64/0x90 [ 76.982298] super_cache_scan+0x155/0x210 [ 76.982303] do_shrink_slab+0x19e/0x4e0 [ 76.982310] shrink_slab+0x2bd/0x450 [ 76.982317] drop_slab+0xcc/0x1a0 [ 76.982323] drop_caches_sysctl_handler+0xb7/0xe0 [ 76.982327] proc_sys_call_handler+0x1bc/0x300 [ 76.982331] proc_sys_write+0x17/0x20 [ 76.982334] vfs_write+0x3d3/0x570 [ 76.982342] ksys_write+0x73/0x160 [ 76.982347] __x64_sys_write+0x1e/0x30 [ 76.982352] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 [ 76.982357] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Funct ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: qla2xxx: During vport delete send async logout explicitly During vport delete, it is observed that during unload we hit a crash because of stale entries in outstanding command array. For all these stale I/O entries, eh_abort was issued and aborted (fast_fail_io = 2009h) but I/Os could not complete while vport delete is in process of deleting. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000001c #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI Workqueue: qla2xxx_wq qla_do_work [qla2xxx] RIP: 0010:dma_direct_unmap_sg+0x51/0x1e0 RSP: 0018:ffffa1e1e150fc68 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000021 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000021 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8ce208a7a0d0 RBP: ffff8ce208a7a0d0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8ce378aac9c8 R10: ffff8ce378aac8a0 R11: ffffa1e1e150f9d8 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8ce378aac9c8 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8d217f000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000000001c CR3: 0000002089acc000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 Call Trace: <TASK> qla2xxx_qpair_sp_free_dma+0x417/0x4e0 ? qla2xxx_qpair_sp_compl+0x10d/0x1a0 ? qla2x00_status_entry+0x768/0x2830 ? newidle_balance+0x2f0/0x430 ? dequeue_entity+0x100/0x3c0 ? qla24xx_process_response_queue+0x6a1/0x19e0 ? __schedule+0x2d5/0x1140 ? qla_do_work+0x47/0x60 ? process_one_work+0x267/0x440 ? process_one_work+0x440/0x440 ? worker_thread+0x2d/0x3d0 ? process_one_work+0x440/0x440 ? kthread+0x156/0x180 ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50 ? ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 </TASK> Send out async logout explicitly for all the ports during vport delete.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: kprobes: don't call disarm_kprobe() for disabled kprobes The assumption in __disable_kprobe() is wrong, and it could try to disarm an already disarmed kprobe and fire the WARN_ONCE() below. [0] We can easily reproduce this issue. 1. Write 0 to /sys/kernel/debug/kprobes/enabled. # echo 0 > /sys/kernel/debug/kprobes/enabled 2. Run execsnoop. At this time, one kprobe is disabled. # /usr/share/bcc/tools/execsnoop & [1] 2460 PCOMM PID PPID RET ARGS # cat /sys/kernel/debug/kprobes/list ffffffff91345650 r __x64_sys_execve+0x0 [FTRACE] ffffffff91345650 k __x64_sys_execve+0x0 [DISABLED][FTRACE] 3. Write 1 to /sys/kernel/debug/kprobes/enabled, which changes kprobes_all_disarmed to false but does not arm the disabled kprobe. # echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/kprobes/enabled # cat /sys/kernel/debug/kprobes/list ffffffff91345650 r __x64_sys_execve+0x0 [FTRACE] ffffffff91345650 k __x64_sys_execve+0x0 [DISABLED][FTRACE] 4. Kill execsnoop, when __disable_kprobe() calls disarm_kprobe() for the disabled kprobe and hits the WARN_ONCE() in __disarm_kprobe_ftrace(). # fg /usr/share/bcc/tools/execsnoop ^C Actually, WARN_ONCE() is fired twice, and __unregister_kprobe_top() misses some cleanups and leaves the aggregated kprobe in the hash table. Then, __unregister_trace_kprobe() initialises tk->rp.kp.list and creates an infinite loop like this. aggregated kprobe.list -> kprobe.list -. ^ | '.__.' In this situation, these commands fall into the infinite loop and result in RCU stall or soft lockup. cat /sys/kernel/debug/kprobes/list : show_kprobe_addr() enters into the infinite loop with RCU. /usr/share/bcc/tools/execsnoop : warn_kprobe_rereg() holds kprobe_mutex, and __get_valid_kprobe() is stuck in the loop. To avoid the issue, make sure we don't call disarm_kprobe() for disabled kprobes. [0] Failed to disarm kprobe-ftrace at __x64_sys_execve+0x0/0x40 (error -2) WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 2460 at kernel/kprobes.c:1130 __disarm_kprobe_ftrace.isra.19 (kernel/kprobes.c:1129) Modules linked in: ena CPU: 6 PID: 2460 Comm: execsnoop Not tainted 5.19.0+ #28 Hardware name: Amazon EC2 c5.2xlarge/, BIOS 1.0 10/16/2017 RIP: 0010:__disarm_kprobe_ftrace.isra.19 (kernel/kprobes.c:1129) Code: 24 8b 02 eb c1 80 3d c4 83 f2 01 00 75 d4 48 8b 75 00 89 c2 48 c7 c7 90 fa 0f 92 89 04 24 c6 05 ab 83 01 e8 e4 94 f0 ff <0f> 0b 8b 04 24 eb b1 89 c6 48 c7 c7 60 fa 0f 92 89 04 24 e8 cc 94 RSP: 0018:ffff9e6ec154bd98 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff930f7b00 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000080000001 RSI: ffffffff921461c5 RDI: 00000000ffffffff RBP: ffff89c504286da8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000fffeffff R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff9e6ec154bc28 R12: ffff89c502394e40 R13: ffff89c502394c00 R14: ffff9e6ec154bc00 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fe800398740(0000) GS:ffff89c812d80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000c00057f010 CR3: 0000000103b54006 CR4: 00000000007706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> __disable_kprobe (kernel/kprobes.c:1716) disable_kprobe (kernel/kprobes.c:2392) __disable_trace_kprobe (kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c:340) disable_trace_kprobe (kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c:429) perf_trace_event_unreg.isra.2 (./include/linux/tracepoint.h:93 kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c:168) perf_kprobe_destroy (kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c:295) _free_event (kernel/events/core.c:4971) perf_event_release_kernel (kernel/events/core.c:5176) perf_release (kernel/events/core.c:5186) __fput (fs/file_table.c:321) task_work_run (./include/linux/ ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: pm8001: Fix tag leaks on error In pm8001_chip_set_dev_state_req(), pm8001_chip_fw_flash_update_req(), pm80xx_chip_phy_ctl_req() and pm8001_chip_reg_dev_req() add missing calls to pm8001_tag_free() to free the allocated tag when pm8001_mpi_build_cmd() fails. Similarly, in pm8001_exec_internal_task_abort(), if the chip ->task_abort method fails, the tag allocated for the abort request task must be freed. Add the missing call to pm8001_tag_free().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86: Forcibly leave nested virt when SMM state is toggled Forcibly leave nested virtualization operation if userspace toggles SMM state via KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS or KVM_SYNC_X86_EVENTS. If userspace forces the vCPU out of SMM while it's post-VMXON and then injects an SMI, vmx_enter_smm() will overwrite vmx->nested.smm.vmxon and end up with both vmxon=false and smm.vmxon=false, but all other nVMX state allocated. Don't attempt to gracefully handle the transition as (a) most transitions are nonsencial, e.g. forcing SMM while L2 is running, (b) there isn't sufficient information to handle all transitions, e.g. SVM wants access to the SMRAM save state, and (c) KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS must precede KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE during state restore as the latter disallows putting the vCPU into L2 if SMM is active, and disallows tagging the vCPU as being post-VMXON in SMM if SMM is not active. Abuse of KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS manifests as a WARN and memory leak in nVMX due to failure to free vmcs01's shadow VMCS, but the bug goes far beyond just a memory leak, e.g. toggling SMM on while L2 is active puts the vCPU in an architecturally impossible state. WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3606 at free_loaded_vmcs arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2665 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3606 at free_loaded_vmcs+0x158/0x1a0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2656 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 3606 Comm: syz-executor725 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:free_loaded_vmcs arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2665 [inline] RIP: 0010:free_loaded_vmcs+0x158/0x1a0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2656 Code: <0f> 0b eb b3 e8 8f 4d 9f 00 e9 f7 fe ff ff 48 89 df e8 92 4d 9f 00 Call Trace: <TASK> kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy+0x72/0x2f0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11123 kvm_vcpu_destroy arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:441 [inline] kvm_destroy_vcpus+0x11f/0x290 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:460 kvm_free_vcpus arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11564 [inline] kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x2e8/0x470 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11676 kvm_destroy_vm arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1217 [inline] kvm_put_kvm+0x4fa/0xb00 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1250 kvm_vm_release+0x3f/0x50 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1273 __fput+0x286/0x9f0 fs/file_table.c:311 task_work_run+0xdd/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:164 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:32 [inline] do_exit+0xb29/0x2a30 kernel/exit.c:806 do_group_exit+0xd2/0x2f0 kernel/exit.c:935 get_signal+0x4b0/0x28c0 kernel/signal.c:2862 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x2a9/0x1c40 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:868 handle_signal_work kernel/entry/common.c:148 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:172 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x17d/0x290 kernel/entry/common.c:207 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:289 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x60 kernel/entry/common.c:300 do_syscall_64+0x42/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae </TASK>

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/sqpoll: ensure task state is TASK_RUNNING when running task_work When the sqpoll is exiting and cancels pending work items, it may need to run task_work. If this happens from within io_uring_cancel_generic(), then it may be under waiting for the io_uring_task waitqueue. This results in the below splat from the scheduler, as the ring mutex may be attempted grabbed while in a TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE state. Ensure that the task state is set appropriately for that, just like what is done for the other cases in io_run_task_work(). do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=1 set at [<0000000029387fd2>] prepare_to_wait+0x88/0x2fc WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 59939 at kernel/sched/core.c:8561 __might_sleep+0xf4/0x140 Modules linked in: CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 59939 Comm: iou-sqp-59938 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3-00113-g8d020023b155 #7456 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 61400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : __might_sleep+0xf4/0x140 lr : __might_sleep+0xf4/0x140 sp : ffff80008c5e7830 x29: ffff80008c5e7830 x28: ffff0000d93088c0 x27: ffff60001c2d7230 x26: dfff800000000000 x25: ffff0000e16b9180 x24: ffff80008c5e7a50 x23: 1ffff000118bcf4a x22: ffff0000e16b9180 x21: ffff0000e16b9180 x20: 000000000000011b x19: ffff80008310fac0 x18: 1ffff000118bcd90 x17: 30303c5b20746120 x16: 74657320313d6574 x15: 0720072007200720 x14: 0720072007200720 x13: 0720072007200720 x12: ffff600036c64f0b x11: 1fffe00036c64f0a x10: ffff600036c64f0a x9 : dfff800000000000 x8 : 00009fffc939b0f6 x7 : ffff0001b6327853 x6 : 0000000000000001 x5 : ffff0001b6327850 x4 : ffff600036c64f0b x3 : ffff8000803c35bc x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0000e16b9180 Call trace: __might_sleep+0xf4/0x140 mutex_lock+0x84/0x124 io_handle_tw_list+0xf4/0x260 tctx_task_work_run+0x94/0x340 io_run_task_work+0x1ec/0x3c0 io_uring_cancel_generic+0x364/0x524 io_sq_thread+0x820/0x124c ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: idxd: Let probe fail when workqueue cannot be enabled The workqueue is enabled when the appropriate driver is loaded and disabled when the driver is removed. When the driver is removed it assumes that the workqueue was enabled successfully and proceeds to free allocations made during workqueue enabling. Failure during workqueue enabling does not prevent the driver from being loaded. This is because the error path within drv_enable_wq() returns success unless a second failure is encountered during the error path. By returning success it is possible to load the driver even if the workqueue cannot be enabled and allocations that do not exist are attempted to be freed during driver remove. Some examples of problematic flows: (a) idxd_dmaengine_drv_probe() -> drv_enable_wq() -> idxd_wq_request_irq(): In above flow, if idxd_wq_request_irq() fails then idxd_wq_unmap_portal() is called on error exit path, but drv_enable_wq() returns 0 because idxd_wq_disable() succeeds. The driver is thus loaded successfully. idxd_dmaengine_drv_remove()->drv_disable_wq()->idxd_wq_unmap_portal() Above flow on driver unload triggers the WARN in devm_iounmap() because the device resource has already been removed during error path of drv_enable_wq(). (b) idxd_dmaengine_drv_probe() -> drv_enable_wq() -> idxd_wq_request_irq(): In above flow, if idxd_wq_request_irq() fails then idxd_wq_init_percpu_ref() is never called to initialize the percpu counter, yet the driver loads successfully because drv_enable_wq() returns 0. idxd_dmaengine_drv_remove()->__idxd_wq_quiesce()->percpu_ref_kill(): Above flow on driver unload triggers a BUG when attempting to drop the initial ref of the uninitialized percpu ref: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010 Fix the drv_enable_wq() error path by returning the original error that indicates failure of workqueue enabling. This ensures that the probe fails when an error is encountered and the driver remove paths are only attempted when the workqueue was enabled successfully.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: af_alg - get rid of alg_memory_allocated alg_memory_allocated does not seem to be really used. alg_proto does have a .memory_allocated field, but no corresponding .sysctl_mem. This means sk_has_account() returns true, but all sk_prot_mem_limits() users will trigger a NULL dereference [1]. THis was not a problem until SO_RESERVE_MEM addition. general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] CPU: 1 PID: 3591 Comm: syz-executor153 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc3-syzkaller-00316-gb81b1829e7e3 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:sk_prot_mem_limits include/net/sock.h:1523 [inline] RIP: 0010:sock_reserve_memory+0x1d7/0x330 net/core/sock.c:1000 Code: 08 00 74 08 48 89 ef e8 27 20 bb f9 4c 03 7c 24 10 48 8b 6d 00 48 83 c5 08 48 89 e8 48 c1 e8 03 48 b9 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df <80> 3c 08 00 74 08 48 89 ef e8 fb 1f bb f9 48 8b 6d 00 4c 89 ff 48 RSP: 0018:ffffc90001f1fb68 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff88814aabc000 RCX: dffffc0000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff90e18120 RBP: 0000000000000008 R08: dffffc0000000000 R09: fffffbfff21c3025 R10: fffffbfff21c3025 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff8d109840 R13: 0000000000001002 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 0000555556e08300(0000) GS:ffff8880b9b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fc74416f130 CR3: 0000000073d9e000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> sock_setsockopt+0x14a9/0x3a30 net/core/sock.c:1446 __sys_setsockopt+0x5af/0x980 net/socket.c:2176 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2191 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2188 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb1/0xc0 net/socket.c:2188 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7fc7440fddc9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 51 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffe98f07968 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007fc7440fddc9 RDX: 0000000000000049 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 00007ffe98f07990 R10: 0000000020000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe98f0798c R13: 00007ffe98f079a0 R14: 00007ffe98f079e0 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:sk_prot_mem_limits include/net/sock.h:1523 [inline] RIP: 0010:sock_reserve_memory+0x1d7/0x330 net/core/sock.c:1000 Code: 08 00 74 08 48 89 ef e8 27 20 bb f9 4c 03 7c 24 10 48 8b 6d 00 48 83 c5 08 48 89 e8 48 c1 e8 03 48 b9 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df <80> 3c 08 00 74 08 48 89 ef e8 fb 1f bb f9 48 8b 6d 00 4c 89 ff 48 RSP: 0018:ffffc90001f1fb68 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff88814aabc000 RCX: dffffc0000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff90e18120 RBP: 0000000000000008 R08: dffffc0000000000 R09: fffffbfff21c3025 R10: fffffbfff21c3025 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff8d109840 R13: 0000000000001002 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 0000555556e08300(0000) GS:ffff8880b9b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fc74416f130 CR3: 0000000073d9e000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: dvb-frontends: dib3000mb: fix uninit-value in dib3000_write_reg Syzbot reports [1] an uninitialized value issue found by KMSAN in dib3000_read_reg(). Local u8 rb[2] is used in i2c_transfer() as a read buffer; in case that call fails, the buffer may end up with some undefined values. Since no elaborate error handling is expected in dib3000_write_reg(), simply zero out rb buffer to mitigate the problem. [1] Syzkaller report dvb-usb: bulk message failed: -22 (6/0) ===================================================== BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in dib3000mb_attach+0x2d8/0x3c0 drivers/media/dvb-frontends/dib3000mb.c:758 dib3000mb_attach+0x2d8/0x3c0 drivers/media/dvb-frontends/dib3000mb.c:758 dibusb_dib3000mb_frontend_attach+0x155/0x2f0 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dibusb-mb.c:31 dvb_usb_adapter_frontend_init+0xed/0x9a0 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-dvb.c:290 dvb_usb_adapter_init drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c:90 [inline] dvb_usb_init drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c:186 [inline] dvb_usb_device_init+0x25a8/0x3760 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c:310 dibusb_probe+0x46/0x250 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dibusb-mb.c:110 ... Local variable rb created at: dib3000_read_reg+0x86/0x4e0 drivers/media/dvb-frontends/dib3000mb.c:54 dib3000mb_attach+0x123/0x3c0 drivers/media/dvb-frontends/dib3000mb.c:758 ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/sti: avoid potential dereference of error pointers The return value of drm_atomic_get_crtc_state() needs to be checked. To avoid use of error pointer 'crtc_state' in case of the failure.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: md: Replace snprintf with scnprintf Current code produces a warning as shown below when total characters in the constituent block device names plus the slashes exceeds 200. snprintf() returns the number of characters generated from the given input, which could cause the expression “200 – len” to wrap around to a large positive number. Fix this by using scnprintf() instead, which returns the actual number of characters written into the buffer. [ 1513.267938] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 1513.267943] WARNING: CPU: 15 PID: 37247 at <snip>/lib/vsprintf.c:2509 vsnprintf+0x2c8/0x510 [ 1513.267944] Modules linked in: <snip> [ 1513.267969] CPU: 15 PID: 37247 Comm: mdadm Not tainted 5.4.0-1085-azure #90~18.04.1-Ubuntu [ 1513.267969] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.1 05/09/2022 [ 1513.267971] RIP: 0010:vsnprintf+0x2c8/0x510 <-snip-> [ 1513.267982] Call Trace: [ 1513.267986] snprintf+0x45/0x70 [ 1513.267990] ? disk_name+0x71/0xa0 [ 1513.267993] dump_zones+0x114/0x240 [raid0] [ 1513.267996] ? _cond_resched+0x19/0x40 [ 1513.267998] raid0_run+0x19e/0x270 [raid0] [ 1513.268000] md_run+0x5e0/0xc50 [ 1513.268003] ? security_capable+0x3f/0x60 [ 1513.268005] do_md_run+0x19/0x110 [ 1513.268006] md_ioctl+0x195e/0x1f90 [ 1513.268007] blkdev_ioctl+0x91f/0x9f0 [ 1513.268010] block_ioctl+0x3d/0x50 [ 1513.268012] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa9/0x640 [ 1513.268014] ? __fput+0x162/0x260 [ 1513.268016] ksys_ioctl+0x75/0x80 [ 1513.268017] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a/0x20 [ 1513.268019] do_syscall_64+0x5e/0x200 [ 1513.268021] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: hinic: avoid kernel hung in hinic_get_stats64() When using hinic device as a bond slave device, and reading device stats of master bond device, the kernel may hung. The kernel panic calltrace as follows: Kernel panic - not syncing: softlockup: hung tasks Call trace: native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x1ec/0x31c dev_get_stats+0x60/0xcc dev_seq_printf_stats+0x40/0x120 dev_seq_show+0x1c/0x40 seq_read_iter+0x3c8/0x4dc seq_read+0xe0/0x130 proc_reg_read+0xa8/0xe0 vfs_read+0xb0/0x1d4 ksys_read+0x70/0xfc __arm64_sys_read+0x20/0x30 el0_svc_common+0x88/0x234 do_el0_svc+0x2c/0x90 el0_svc+0x1c/0x30 el0_sync_handler+0xa8/0xb0 el0_sync+0x148/0x180 And the calltrace of task that actually caused kernel hungs as follows: __switch_to+124 __schedule+548 schedule+72 schedule_timeout+348 __down_common+188 __down+24 down+104 hinic_get_stats64+44 [hinic] dev_get_stats+92 bond_get_stats+172 [bonding] dev_get_stats+92 dev_seq_printf_stats+60 dev_seq_show+24 seq_read_iter+964 seq_read+220 proc_reg_read+164 vfs_read+172 ksys_read+108 __arm64_sys_read+28 el0_svc_common+132 do_el0_svc+40 el0_svc+24 el0_sync_handler+164 el0_sync+324 When getting device stats from bond, kernel will call bond_get_stats(). It first holds the spinlock bond->stats_lock, and then call hinic_get_stats64() to collect hinic device's stats. However, hinic_get_stats64() calls `down(&nic_dev->mgmt_lock)` to protect its critical section, which may schedule current task out. And if system is under high pressure, the task cannot be woken up immediately, which eventually triggers kernel hung panic. Since previous patch has replaced hinic_dev.tx_stats/rx_stats with local variable in hinic_get_stats64(), there is nothing need to be protected by lock, so just removing down()/up() is ok.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Check null pointers before using dc->clk_mgr [WHY & HOW] dc->clk_mgr is null checked previously in the same function, indicating it might be null. Passing "dc" to "dc->hwss.apply_idle_power_optimizations", which dereferences null "dc->clk_mgr". (The function pointer resolves to "dcn35_apply_idle_power_optimizations".) This fixes 1 FORWARD_NULL issue reported by Coverity.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ACPI: x86: Add adev NULL check to acpi_quirk_skip_serdev_enumeration() acpi_dev_hid_match() does not check for adev == NULL, dereferencing it unconditional. Add a check for adev being NULL before calling acpi_dev_hid_match(). At the moment acpi_quirk_skip_serdev_enumeration() is never called with a controller_parent without an ACPI companion, but better safe than sorry.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ipv4: fix route with nexthop object delete warning FRR folks have hit a kernel warning[1] while deleting routes[2] which is caused by trying to delete a route pointing to a nexthop id without specifying nhid but matching on an interface. That is, a route is found but we hit a warning while matching it. The warning is from fib_info_nh() in include/net/nexthop.h because we run it on a fib_info with nexthop object. The call chain is: inet_rtm_delroute -> fib_table_delete -> fib_nh_match (called with a nexthop fib_info and also with fc_oif set thus calling fib_info_nh on the fib_info and triggering the warning). The fix is to not do any matching in that branch if the fi has a nexthop object because those are managed separately. I.e. we should match when deleting without nh spec and should fail when deleting a nexthop route with old-style nh spec because nexthop objects are managed separately, e.g.: $ ip r show 1.2.3.4/32 1.2.3.4 nhid 12 via 192.168.11.2 dev dummy0 $ ip r del 1.2.3.4/32 $ ip r del 1.2.3.4/32 nhid 12 <both should work> $ ip r del 1.2.3.4/32 dev dummy0 <should fail with ESRCH> [1] [ 523.462226] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 523.462230] WARNING: CPU: 14 PID: 22893 at include/net/nexthop.h:468 fib_nh_match+0x210/0x460 [ 523.462236] Modules linked in: dummy rpcsec_gss_krb5 xt_socket nf_socket_ipv4 nf_socket_ipv6 ip6table_raw iptable_raw bpf_preload xt_statistic ip_set ip_vs_sh ip_vs_wrr ip_vs_rr ip_vs xt_mark nf_tables xt_nat veth nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype br_netfilter overlay dm_crypt nfsv3 nfs fscache netfs vhost_net vhost vhost_iotlb tap tun xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack 8021q garp mrp ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 ip6table_mangle ip6table_nat iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bridge stp llc rfcomm snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer rpcrdma rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core ip6table_filter xt_comment ip6_tables vboxnetadp(OE) vboxnetflt(OE) vboxdrv(OE) qrtr bnep binfmt_misc xfs vfat fat squashfs loop nvidia_drm(POE) nvidia_modeset(POE) nvidia_uvm(POE) nvidia(POE) intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic ledtrig_audio snd_hda_codec_hdmi btusb btrtl iwlmvm uvcvideo btbcm snd_hda_intel edac_mce_amd [ 523.462274] videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops btintel snd_intel_dspcfg videobuf2_v4l2 snd_intel_sdw_acpi bluetooth snd_usb_audio snd_hda_codec mac80211 snd_usbmidi_lib joydev snd_hda_core videobuf2_common kvm_amd snd_rawmidi snd_hwdep snd_seq videodev ccp snd_seq_device libarc4 ecdh_generic mc snd_pcm kvm iwlwifi snd_timer drm_kms_helper snd cfg80211 cec soundcore irqbypass rapl wmi_bmof i2c_piix4 rfkill k10temp pcspkr acpi_cpufreq nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc drm zram ip_tables crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel nvme sp5100_tco r8169 nvme_core wmi ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler fuse [ 523.462300] CPU: 14 PID: 22893 Comm: ip Tainted: P OE 5.16.18-200.fc35.x86_64 #1 [ 523.462302] Hardware name: Micro-Star International Co., Ltd. MS-7C37/MPG X570 GAMING EDGE WIFI (MS-7C37), BIOS 1.C0 10/29/2020 [ 523.462303] RIP: 0010:fib_nh_match+0x210/0x460 [ 523.462304] Code: 7c 24 20 48 8b b5 90 00 00 00 e8 bb ee f4 ff 48 8b 7c 24 20 41 89 c4 e8 ee eb f4 ff 45 85 e4 0f 85 2e fe ff ff e9 4c ff ff ff <0f> 0b e9 17 ff ff ff 3c 0a 0f 85 61 fe ff ff 48 8b b5 98 00 00 00 [ 523.462306] RSP: 0018:ffffaa53d4d87928 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 523.462307] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffaa53d4d87a90 RCX: ffffaa53d4d87bb0 [ 523.462308] RDX: ffff9e3d2ee6be80 RSI: ffffaa53d4d87a90 RDI: ffffffff920ed380 [ 523.462309] RBP: ffff9e3d2ee6be80 R08: 0000000000000064 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 523.462310] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000031 [ 523.462310] R13: 0000000000000020 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff9e3d331054e0 [ 523.462311] FS: 00007f2455 ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: core: Fix possible NULL dereference caused by kunit_kzalloc() kunit_kzalloc() may return a NULL pointer, dereferencing it without NULL check may lead to NULL dereference. Add NULL checks for all the kunit_kzalloc() in sound_kunit.c

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: Avoid overwriting the copies of clcsock callback functions The callback functions of clcsock will be saved and replaced during the fallback. But if the fallback happens more than once, then the copies of these callback functions will be overwritten incorrectly, resulting in a loop call issue: clcsk->sk_error_report |- smc_fback_error_report() <------------------------------| |- smc_fback_forward_wakeup() | (loop) |- clcsock_callback() (incorrectly overwritten) | |- smc->clcsk_error_report() ------------------| So this patch fixes the issue by saving these function pointers only once in the fallback and avoiding overwriting.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: octeontx2-pf: handle otx2_mbox_get_rsp errors in otx2_dcbnl.c Add error pointer check after calling otx2_mbox_get_rsp().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/deadline: Fix warning in migrate_enable for boosted tasks When running the following command: while true; do stress-ng --cyclic 30 --timeout 30s --minimize --quiet done a warning is eventually triggered: WARNING: CPU: 43 PID: 2848 at kernel/sched/deadline.c:794 setup_new_dl_entity+0x13e/0x180 ... Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df ? enqueue_dl_entity+0x631/0x6e0 ? setup_new_dl_entity+0x13e/0x180 ? __warn+0x7e/0xd0 ? report_bug+0x11a/0x1a0 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70 ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 enqueue_dl_entity+0x631/0x6e0 enqueue_task_dl+0x7d/0x120 __do_set_cpus_allowed+0xe3/0x280 __set_cpus_allowed_ptr_locked+0x140/0x1d0 __set_cpus_allowed_ptr+0x54/0xa0 migrate_enable+0x7e/0x150 rt_spin_unlock+0x1c/0x90 group_send_sig_info+0xf7/0x1a0 ? kill_pid_info+0x1f/0x1d0 kill_pid_info+0x78/0x1d0 kill_proc_info+0x5b/0x110 __x64_sys_kill+0x93/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 RIP: 0033:0x7f0dab31f92b This warning occurs because set_cpus_allowed dequeues and enqueues tasks with the ENQUEUE_RESTORE flag set. If the task is boosted, the warning is triggered. A boosted task already had its parameters set by rt_mutex_setprio, and a new call to setup_new_dl_entity is unnecessary, hence the WARN_ON call. Check if we are requeueing a boosted task and avoid calling setup_new_dl_entity if that's the case.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_queue: fix possible use-after-free Eric Dumazet says: The sock_hold() side seems suspect, because there is no guarantee that sk_refcnt is not already 0. On failure, we cannot queue the packet and need to indicate an error. The packet will be dropped by the caller. v2: split skb prefetch hunk into separate change

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: wait for fixup workers before stopping cleaner kthread during umount During unmount, at close_ctree(), we have the following steps in this order: 1) Park the cleaner kthread - this doesn't destroy the kthread, it basically halts its execution (wake ups against it work but do nothing); 2) We stop the cleaner kthread - this results in freeing the respective struct task_struct; 3) We call btrfs_stop_all_workers() which waits for any jobs running in all the work queues and then free the work queues. Syzbot reported a case where a fixup worker resulted in a crash when doing a delayed iput on its inode while attempting to wake up the cleaner at btrfs_add_delayed_iput(), because the task_struct of the cleaner kthread was already freed. This can happen during unmount because we don't wait for any fixup workers still running before we call kthread_stop() against the cleaner kthread, which stops and free all its resources. Fix this by waiting for any fixup workers at close_ctree() before we call kthread_stop() against the cleaner and run pending delayed iputs. The stack traces reported by syzbot were the following: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x77/0x2050 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5065 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880272a8a18 by task kworker/u8:3/52 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 52 Comm: kworker/u8:3 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 Workqueue: btrfs-fixup btrfs_work_helper Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601 __lock_acquire+0x77/0x2050 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5065 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xd5/0x120 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162 class_raw_spinlock_irqsave_constructor include/linux/spinlock.h:551 [inline] try_to_wake_up+0xb0/0x1480 kernel/sched/core.c:4154 btrfs_writepage_fixup_worker+0xc16/0xdf0 fs/btrfs/inode.c:2842 btrfs_work_helper+0x390/0xc50 fs/btrfs/async-thread.c:314 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa63/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 </TASK> Allocated by task 2: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:319 [inline] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x66/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:345 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:247 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4086 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4135 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x16b/0x320 mm/slub.c:4187 alloc_task_struct_node kernel/fork.c:180 [inline] dup_task_struct+0x57/0x8c0 kernel/fork.c:1107 copy_process+0x5d1/0x3d50 kernel/fork.c:2206 kernel_clone+0x223/0x880 kernel/fork.c:2787 kernel_thread+0x1bc/0x240 kernel/fork.c:2849 create_kthread kernel/kthread.c:412 [inline] kthreadd+0x60d/0x810 kernel/kthread.c:765 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 Freed by task 61: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:579 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x59/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:230 [inline] slab_free_h ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbdev: efifb: Register sysfs groups through driver core The driver core can register and cleanup sysfs groups already. Make use of that functionality to simplify the error handling and cleanup. Also avoid a UAF race during unregistering where the sysctl attributes were usable after the info struct was freed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block, bfq: fix possible UAF for bfqq->bic with merge chain 1) initial state, three tasks: Process 1 Process 2 Process 3 (BIC1) (BIC2) (BIC3) | Λ | Λ | Λ | | | | | | V | V | V | bfqq1 bfqq2 bfqq3 process ref: 1 1 1 2) bfqq1 merged to bfqq2: Process 1 Process 2 Process 3 (BIC1) (BIC2) (BIC3) | | | Λ \--------------\| | | V V | bfqq1--------->bfqq2 bfqq3 process ref: 0 2 1 3) bfqq2 merged to bfqq3: Process 1 Process 2 Process 3 (BIC1) (BIC2) (BIC3) here -> Λ | | \--------------\ \-------------\| V V bfqq1--------->bfqq2---------->bfqq3 process ref: 0 1 3 In this case, IO from Process 1 will get bfqq2 from BIC1 first, and then get bfqq3 through merge chain, and finially handle IO by bfqq3. Howerver, current code will think bfqq2 is owned by BIC1, like initial state, and set bfqq2->bic to BIC1. bfq_insert_request -> by Process 1 bfqq = bfq_init_rq(rq) bfqq = bfq_get_bfqq_handle_split bfqq = bic_to_bfqq -> get bfqq2 from BIC1 bfqq->ref++ rq->elv.priv[0] = bic rq->elv.priv[1] = bfqq if (bfqq_process_refs(bfqq) == 1) bfqq->bic = bic -> record BIC1 to bfqq2 __bfq_insert_request new_bfqq = bfq_setup_cooperator -> get bfqq3 from bfqq2->new_bfqq bfqq_request_freed(bfqq) new_bfqq->ref++ rq->elv.priv[1] = new_bfqq -> handle IO by bfqq3 Fix the problem by checking bfqq is from merge chain fist. And this might fix a following problem reported by our syzkaller(unreproducible): ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bfq_do_early_stable_merge block/bfq-iosched.c:5692 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bfq_do_or_sched_stable_merge block/bfq-iosched.c:5805 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bfq_get_queue+0x25b0/0x2610 block/bfq-iosched.c:5889 Write of size 1 at addr ffff888123839eb8 by task kworker/0:1H/18595 CPU: 0 PID: 18595 Comm: kworker/0:1H Tainted: G L 6.6.0-07439-gba2303cacfda #6 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_requeue_work Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:364 [inline] print_report+0x10d/0x610 mm/kasan/report.c:475 kasan_report+0x8e/0xc0 mm/kasan/report.c:588 bfq_do_early_stable_merge block/bfq-iosched.c:5692 [inline] bfq_do_or_sched_stable_merge block/bfq-iosched.c:5805 [inline] bfq_get_queue+0x25b0/0x2610 block/bfq-iosched.c:5889 bfq_get_bfqq_handle_split+0x169/0x5d0 block/bfq-iosched.c:6757 bfq_init_rq block/bfq-iosched.c:6876 [inline] bfq_insert_request block/bfq-iosched.c:6254 [inline] bfq_insert_requests+0x1112/0x5cf0 block/bfq-iosched.c:6304 blk_mq_insert_request+0x290/0x8d0 block/blk-mq.c:2593 blk_mq_requeue_work+0x6bc/0xa70 block/blk-mq.c:1502 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2627 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0x432/0x13f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2700 worker_thread+0x6f2/0x1160 kernel/workqueue.c:2781 kthread+0x33c/0x440 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:305 </TASK> Allocated by task 20776: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x87/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:328 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:188 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:763 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3458 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1a4/0x6f0 mm/slub.c:3503 ioc_create_icq block/blk-ioc.c:370 [inline] ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/ttm: Fix dummy res NULL ptr deref bug Check the bo->resource value before accessing the resource mem_type. v2: Fix commit description unwrapped warning <log snip> [ 40.191227][ T184] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI [ 40.192995][ T184] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017] [ 40.194411][ T184] CPU: 1 PID: 184 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-00721-gb297c22b7070 #1 [ 40.196063][ T184] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-debian-1.16.0-4 04/01/2014 [ 40.199605][ T184] RIP: 0010:ttm_bo_validate+0x1b3/0x240 [ttm] [ 40.200754][ T184] Code: e8 72 c5 ff ff 83 f8 b8 74 d4 85 c0 75 54 49 8b 9e 58 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8d 7b 10 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 04 3c 03 7e 44 8b 53 10 31 c0 85 d2 0f 85 58 [ 40.203685][ T184] RSP: 0018:ffffc900006df0c8 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 40.204630][ T184] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 1ffff1102f4bb71b [ 40.205864][ T184] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffc900006df208 RDI: 0000000000000010 [ 40.207102][ T184] RBP: 1ffff920000dbe1a R08: ffffc900006df208 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 40.208394][ T184] R10: ffff88817a5f0000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffc900006df110 [ 40.209692][ T184] R13: ffffc900006df0f0 R14: ffff88817a5db800 R15: ffffc900006df208 [ 40.210862][ T184] FS: 00007f6b1d16e8c0(0000) GS:ffff88839d700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 40.212250][ T184] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 40.213275][ T184] CR2: 000055a1001d4ff0 CR3: 00000001700f4000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 [ 40.214469][ T184] Call Trace: [ 40.214974][ T184] <TASK> [ 40.215438][ T184] ? ttm_bo_bounce_temp_buffer+0x140/0x140 [ttm] [ 40.216572][ T184] ? mutex_spin_on_owner+0x240/0x240 [ 40.217456][ T184] ? drm_vma_offset_add+0xaa/0x100 [drm] [ 40.218457][ T184] ttm_bo_init_reserved+0x3d6/0x540 [ttm] [ 40.219410][ T184] ? shmem_get_inode+0x744/0x980 [ 40.220231][ T184] ttm_bo_init_validate+0xb1/0x200 [ttm] [ 40.221172][ T184] ? bo_driver_evict_flags+0x340/0x340 [drm_vram_helper] [ 40.222530][ T184] ? ttm_bo_init_reserved+0x540/0x540 [ttm] [ 40.223643][ T184] ? __do_sys_finit_module+0x11a/0x1c0 [ 40.224654][ T184] ? __shmem_file_setup+0x102/0x280 [ 40.234764][ T184] drm_gem_vram_create+0x305/0x480 [drm_vram_helper] [ 40.235766][ T184] ? bo_driver_evict_flags+0x340/0x340 [drm_vram_helper] [ 40.236846][ T184] ? __kasan_slab_free+0x108/0x180 [ 40.237650][ T184] drm_gem_vram_fill_create_dumb+0x134/0x340 [drm_vram_helper] [ 40.238864][ T184] ? local_pci_probe+0xdf/0x180 [ 40.239674][ T184] ? drmm_vram_helper_init+0x400/0x400 [drm_vram_helper] [ 40.240826][ T184] drm_client_framebuffer_create+0x19c/0x400 [drm] [ 40.241955][ T184] ? drm_client_buffer_delete+0x200/0x200 [drm] [ 40.243001][ T184] ? drm_client_pick_crtcs+0x554/0xb80 [drm] [ 40.244030][ T184] drm_fb_helper_generic_probe+0x23f/0x940 [drm_kms_helper] [ 40.245226][ T184] ? __cond_resched+0x1c/0xc0 [ 40.245987][ T184] ? drm_fb_helper_memory_range_to_clip+0x180/0x180 [drm_kms_helper] [ 40.247316][ T184] ? mutex_unlock+0x80/0x100 [ 40.248005][ T184] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x2c0/0x2c0 [ 40.249083][ T184] drm_fb_helper_single_fb_probe+0x907/0xf00 [drm_kms_helper] [ 40.250314][ T184] ? drm_fb_helper_check_var+0x1180/0x1180 [drm_kms_helper] [ 40.251540][ T184] ? __cond_resched+0x1c/0xc0 [ 40.252321][ T184] ? mutex_lock+0x9f/0x100 [ 40.253062][ T184] __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0xb9/0x2c0 [drm_kms_helper] [ 40.254394][ T184] drm_fbdev_client_hotplug+0x56f/0x840 [drm_kms_helper] [ 40.255477][ T184] drm_fbdev_generic_setup+0x165/0x3c0 [drm_kms_helper] [ 40.256607][ T184] bochs_pci_probe+0x6b7/0x900 [bochs] [ ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, sockmap: Several fixes to bpf_msg_pop_data Several fixes to bpf_msg_pop_data, 1. In sk_msg_shift_left, we should put_page 2. if (len == 0), return early is better 3. pop the entire sk_msg (last == msg->sg.size) should be supported 4. Fix for the value of variable "a" 5. In sk_msg_shift_left, after shifting, i has already pointed to the next element. Addtional sk_msg_iter_var_next may result in BUG.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ARM: 9410/1: vfp: Use asm volatile in fmrx/fmxr macros Floating point instructions in userspace can crash some arm kernels built with clang/LLD 17.0.6: BUG: unsupported FP instruction in kernel mode FPEXC == 0xc0000780 Internal error: Oops - undefined instruction: 0 [#1] ARM CPU: 0 PID: 196 Comm: vfp-reproducer Not tainted 6.10.0 #1 Hardware name: BCM2835 PC is at vfp_support_entry+0xc8/0x2cc LR is at do_undefinstr+0xa8/0x250 pc : [<c0101d50>] lr : [<c010a80c>] psr: a0000013 sp : dc8d1f68 ip : 60000013 fp : bedea19c r10: ec532b17 r9 : 00000010 r8 : 0044766c r7 : c0000780 r6 : ec532b17 r5 : c1c13800 r4 : dc8d1fb0 r3 : c10072c4 r2 : c0101c88 r1 : ec532b17 r0 : 0044766c Flags: NzCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none Control: 00c5387d Table: 0251c008 DAC: 00000051 Register r0 information: non-paged memory Register r1 information: vmalloc memory Register r2 information: non-slab/vmalloc memory Register r3 information: non-slab/vmalloc memory Register r4 information: 2-page vmalloc region Register r5 information: slab kmalloc-cg-2k Register r6 information: vmalloc memory Register r7 information: non-slab/vmalloc memory Register r8 information: non-paged memory Register r9 information: zero-size pointer Register r10 information: vmalloc memory Register r11 information: non-paged memory Register r12 information: non-paged memory Process vfp-reproducer (pid: 196, stack limit = 0x61aaaf8b) Stack: (0xdc8d1f68 to 0xdc8d2000) 1f60: 0000081f b6f69300 0000000f c10073f4 c10072c4 dc8d1fb0 1f80: ec532b17 0c532b17 0044766c b6f9ccd8 00000000 c010a80c 00447670 60000010 1fa0: ffffffff c1c13800 00c5387d c0100f10 b6f68af8 00448fc0 00000000 bedea188 1fc0: bedea314 00000001 00448ebc b6f9d000 00447608 b6f9ccd8 00000000 bedea19c 1fe0: bede9198 bedea188 b6e1061c 0044766c 60000010 ffffffff 00000000 00000000 Call trace: [<c0101d50>] (vfp_support_entry) from [<c010a80c>] (do_undefinstr+0xa8/0x250) [<c010a80c>] (do_undefinstr) from [<c0100f10>] (__und_usr+0x70/0x80) Exception stack(0xdc8d1fb0 to 0xdc8d1ff8) 1fa0: b6f68af8 00448fc0 00000000 bedea188 1fc0: bedea314 00000001 00448ebc b6f9d000 00447608 b6f9ccd8 00000000 bedea19c 1fe0: bede9198 bedea188 b6e1061c 0044766c 60000010 ffffffff Code: 0a000061 e3877202 e594003c e3a09010 (eef16a10) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]--- This is a minimal userspace reproducer on a Raspberry Pi Zero W: #include <stdio.h> #include <math.h> int main(void) { double v = 1.0; printf("%fn", NAN + *(volatile double *)&v); return 0; } Another way to consistently trigger the oops is: calvin@raspberry-pi-zero-w ~$ python -c "import json" The bug reproduces only when the kernel is built with DYNAMIC_DEBUG=n, because the pr_debug() calls act as barriers even when not activated. This is the output from the same kernel source built with the same compiler and DYNAMIC_DEBUG=y, where the userspace reproducer works as expected: VFP: bounce: trigger ec532b17 fpexc c0000780 VFP: emulate: INST=0xee377b06 SCR=0x00000000 VFP: bounce: trigger eef1fa10 fpexc c0000780 VFP: emulate: INST=0xeeb40b40 SCR=0x00000000 VFP: raising exceptions 30000000 calvin@raspberry-pi-zero-w ~$ ./vfp-reproducer nan Crudely grepping for vmsr/vmrs instructions in the otherwise nearly idential text for vfp_support_entry() makes the problem obvious: vmlinux.llvm.good [0xc0101cb8] <+48>: vmrs r7, fpexc vmlinux.llvm.good [0xc0101cd8] <+80>: vmsr fpexc, r0 vmlinux.llvm.good [0xc0101d20 ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ftrace: Fix regression with module command in stack_trace_filter When executing the following command: # echo "write*:mod:ext3" > /sys/kernel/tracing/stack_trace_filter The current mod command causes a null pointer dereference. While commit 0f17976568b3f ("ftrace: Fix regression with module command in stack_trace_filter") has addressed part of the issue, it left a corner case unhandled, which still results in a kernel crash.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86: stop playing stack games in profile_pc() The 'profile_pc()' function is used for timer-based profiling, which isn't really all that relevant any more to begin with, but it also ends up making assumptions based on the stack layout that aren't necessarily valid. Basically, the code tries to account the time spent in spinlocks to the caller rather than the spinlock, and while I support that as a concept, it's not worth the code complexity or the KASAN warnings when no serious profiling is done using timers anyway these days. And the code really does depend on stack layout that is only true in the simplest of cases. We've lost the comment at some point (I think when the 32-bit and 64-bit code was unified), but it used to say: Assume the lock function has either no stack frame or a copy of eflags from PUSHF. which explains why it just blindly loads a word or two straight off the stack pointer and then takes a minimal look at the values to just check if they might be eflags or the return pc: Eflags always has bits 22 and up cleared unlike kernel addresses but that basic stack layout assumption assumes that there isn't any lock debugging etc going on that would complicate the code and cause a stack frame. It causes KASAN unhappiness reported for years by syzkaller [1] and others [2]. With no real practical reason for this any more, just remove the code. Just for historical interest, here's some background commits relating to this code from 2006: 0cb91a229364 ("i386: Account spinlocks to the caller during profiling for !FP kernels") 31679f38d886 ("Simplify profile_pc on x86-64") and a code unification from 2009: ef4512882dbe ("x86: time_32/64.c unify profile_pc") but the basics of this thing actually goes back to before the git tree.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: ufs: core: Cancel RTC work during ufshcd_remove() Currently, RTC work is only cancelled during __ufshcd_wl_suspend(). When ufshcd is removed in ufshcd_remove(), RTC work is not cancelled. Due to this, any further trigger of the RTC work after ufshcd_remove() would result in a NULL pointer dereference as below: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000002a4 Workqueue: events ufshcd_rtc_work Call trace: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x34/0x8c pm_runtime_get_if_active+0x24/0xb4 ufshcd_rtc_work+0x124/0x19c process_scheduled_works+0x18c/0x2d8 worker_thread+0x144/0x280 kthread+0x11c/0x128 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Since RTC work accesses the ufshcd internal structures, it should be cancelled when ufshcd is removed. So do that in ufshcd_remove(), as per the order in ufshcd_init().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: enetc: deny offload of tc-based TSN features on VF interfaces TSN features on the ENETC (taprio, cbs, gate, police) are configured through a mix of command BD ring messages and port registers: enetc_port_rd(), enetc_port_wr(). Port registers are a region of the ENETC memory map which are only accessible from the PCIe Physical Function. They are not accessible from the Virtual Functions. Moreover, attempting to access these registers crashes the kernel: $ echo 1 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000\:00\:00.0/sriov_numvfs pci 0000:00:01.0: [1957:ef00] type 00 class 0x020001 fsl_enetc_vf 0000:00:01.0: Adding to iommu group 15 fsl_enetc_vf 0000:00:01.0: enabling device (0000 -> 0002) fsl_enetc_vf 0000:00:01.0 eno0vf0: renamed from eth0 $ tc qdisc replace dev eno0vf0 root taprio num_tc 8 map 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 \ queues 1@0 1@1 1@2 1@3 1@4 1@5 1@6 1@7 base-time 0 \ sched-entry S 0x7f 900000 sched-entry S 0x80 100000 flags 0x2 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff800009551a08 Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] PREEMPT SMP pc : enetc_setup_tc_taprio+0x170/0x47c lr : enetc_setup_tc_taprio+0x16c/0x47c Call trace: enetc_setup_tc_taprio+0x170/0x47c enetc_setup_tc+0x38/0x2dc taprio_change+0x43c/0x970 taprio_init+0x188/0x1e0 qdisc_create+0x114/0x470 tc_modify_qdisc+0x1fc/0x6c0 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x12c/0x390 Split enetc_setup_tc() into separate functions for the PF and for the VF drivers. Also remove enetc_qos.o from being included into enetc-vf.ko, since it serves absolutely no purpose there.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_conn: Use disable_delayed_work_sync This makes use of disable_delayed_work_sync instead cancel_delayed_work_sync as it not only cancel the ongoing work but also disables new submit which is disarable since the object holding the work is about to be freed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/gup: fix gup_pud_range() for dax For dax pud, pud_huge() returns true on x86. So the function works as long as hugetlb is configured. However, dax doesn't depend on hugetlb. Commit 414fd080d125 ("mm/gup: fix gup_pmd_range() for dax") fixed devmap-backed huge PMDs, but missed devmap-backed huge PUDs. Fix this as well. This fixes the below kernel panic: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x69e7c000cc478: 0000 [#1] SMP < snip > Call Trace: <TASK> get_user_pages_fast+0x1f/0x40 iov_iter_get_pages+0xc6/0x3b0 ? mempool_alloc+0x5d/0x170 bio_iov_iter_get_pages+0x82/0x4e0 ? bvec_alloc+0x91/0xc0 ? bio_alloc_bioset+0x19a/0x2a0 blkdev_direct_IO+0x282/0x480 ? __io_complete_rw_common+0xc0/0xc0 ? filemap_range_has_page+0x82/0xc0 generic_file_direct_write+0x9d/0x1a0 ? inode_update_time+0x24/0x30 __generic_file_write_iter+0xbd/0x1e0 blkdev_write_iter+0xb4/0x150 ? io_import_iovec+0x8d/0x340 io_write+0xf9/0x300 io_issue_sqe+0x3c3/0x1d30 ? sysvec_reschedule_ipi+0x6c/0x80 __io_queue_sqe+0x33/0x240 ? fget+0x76/0xa0 io_submit_sqes+0xe6a/0x18d0 ? __fget_light+0xd1/0x100 __x64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x199/0x880 ? __context_tracking_enter+0x1f/0x70 ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x24/0x30 ? irqentry_exit+0x1d/0x30 ? __context_tracking_exit+0xe/0x70 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb RIP: 0033:0x7fc97c11a7be < snip > </TASK> ---[ end trace 48b2e0e67debcaeb ]--- RIP: 0010:internal_get_user_pages_fast+0x340/0x990 < snip > Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Kernel Offset: disabled

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xen-netfront: Fix NULL sring after live migration A NAPI is setup for each network sring to poll data to kernel The sring with source host is destroyed before live migration and new sring with target host is setup after live migration. The NAPI for the old sring is not deleted until setup new sring with target host after migration. With busy_poll/busy_read enabled, the NAPI can be polled before got deleted when resume VM. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008 IP: xennet_poll+0xae/0xd20 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI Call Trace: finish_task_switch+0x71/0x230 timerqueue_del+0x1d/0x40 hrtimer_try_to_cancel+0xb5/0x110 xennet_alloc_rx_buffers+0x2a0/0x2a0 napi_busy_loop+0xdb/0x270 sock_poll+0x87/0x90 do_sys_poll+0x26f/0x580 tracing_map_insert+0x1d4/0x2f0 event_hist_trigger+0x14a/0x260 finish_task_switch+0x71/0x230 __schedule+0x256/0x890 recalc_sigpending+0x1b/0x50 xen_sched_clock+0x15/0x20 __rb_reserve_next+0x12d/0x140 ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x123/0x3d0 event_triggers_call+0x87/0xb0 trace_event_buffer_commit+0x1c4/0x210 xen_clocksource_get_cycles+0x15/0x20 ktime_get_ts64+0x51/0xf0 SyS_ppoll+0x160/0x1a0 SyS_ppoll+0x160/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x73/0x130 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x41/0xa6 ... RIP: xennet_poll+0xae/0xd20 RSP: ffffb4f041933900 CR2: 0000000000000008 ---[ end trace f8601785b354351c ]--- xen frontend should remove the NAPIs for the old srings before live migration as the bond srings are destroyed There is a tiny window between the srings are set to NULL and the NAPIs are disabled, It is safe as the NAPI threads are still frozen at that time

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mtd: parsers: qcom: Fix kernel panic on skipped partition In the event of a skipped partition (case when the entry name is empty) the kernel panics in the cleanup function as the name entry is NULL. Rework the parser logic by first checking the real partition number and then allocate the space and set the data for the valid partitions. The logic was also fundamentally wrong as with a skipped partition, the parts number returned was incorrect by not decreasing it for the skipped partitions.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: fix kernel panic when enabling bearer When enabling a bearer on a node, a kernel panic is observed: [ 4.498085] RIP: 0010:tipc_mon_prep+0x4e/0x130 [tipc] ... [ 4.520030] Call Trace: [ 4.520689] <IRQ> [ 4.521236] tipc_link_build_proto_msg+0x375/0x750 [tipc] [ 4.522654] tipc_link_build_state_msg+0x48/0xc0 [tipc] [ 4.524034] __tipc_node_link_up+0xd7/0x290 [tipc] [ 4.525292] tipc_rcv+0x5da/0x730 [tipc] [ 4.526346] ? __netif_receive_skb_core+0xb7/0xfc0 [ 4.527601] tipc_l2_rcv_msg+0x5e/0x90 [tipc] [ 4.528737] __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x20b/0x260 [ 4.530068] netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1bf/0x2e0 [ 4.531450] ? dev_gro_receive+0x4c2/0x680 [ 4.532512] napi_complete_done+0x6f/0x180 [ 4.533570] virtnet_poll+0x29c/0x42e [virtio_net] ... The node in question is receiving activate messages in another thread after changing bearer status to allow message sending/ receiving in current thread: thread 1 | thread 2 -------- | -------- | tipc_enable_bearer() | test_and_set_bit_lock() | tipc_bearer_xmit_skb() | | tipc_l2_rcv_msg() | tipc_rcv() | __tipc_node_link_up() | tipc_link_build_state_msg() | tipc_link_build_proto_msg() | tipc_mon_prep() | { | ... | // null-pointer dereference | u16 gen = mon->dom_gen; | ... | } // Not being executed yet | tipc_mon_create() | { | ... | // allocate | mon = kzalloc(); | ... | } | Monitoring pointer in thread 2 is dereferenced before monitoring data is allocated in thread 1. This causes kernel panic. This commit fixes it by allocating the monitoring data before enabling the bearer to receive messages.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix crash due to incorrect copy_map_value When both bpf_spin_lock and bpf_timer are present in a BPF map value, copy_map_value needs to skirt both objects when copying a value into and out of the map. However, the current code does not set both s_off and t_off in copy_map_value, which leads to a crash when e.g. bpf_spin_lock is placed in map value with bpf_timer, as bpf_map_update_elem call will be able to overwrite the other timer object. When the issue is not fixed, an overwriting can produce the following splat: [root@(none) bpf]# ./test_progs -t timer_crash [ 15.930339] bpf_testmod: loading out-of-tree module taints kernel. [ 16.037849] ================================================================== [ 16.038458] BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x32b/0x520 [ 16.038944] Write of size 8 at addr 0000000000043ec0 by task test_progs/325 [ 16.039399] [ 16.039514] CPU: 0 PID: 325 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G OE 5.16.0+ #278 [ 16.039983] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ArchLinux 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 16.040485] Call Trace: [ 16.040645] <TASK> [ 16.040805] dump_stack_lvl+0x59/0x73 [ 16.041069] ? __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x32b/0x520 [ 16.041427] kasan_report.cold+0x116/0x11b [ 16.041673] ? __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x32b/0x520 [ 16.042040] __pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x32b/0x520 [ 16.042328] ? memcpy+0x39/0x60 [ 16.042552] ? pv_hash+0xd0/0xd0 [ 16.042785] ? lockdep_hardirqs_off+0x95/0xd0 [ 16.043079] __bpf_spin_lock_irqsave+0xdf/0xf0 [ 16.043366] ? bpf_get_current_comm+0x50/0x50 [ 16.043608] ? jhash+0x11a/0x270 [ 16.043848] bpf_timer_cancel+0x34/0xe0 [ 16.044119] bpf_prog_c4ea1c0f7449940d_sys_enter+0x7c/0x81 [ 16.044500] bpf_trampoline_6442477838_0+0x36/0x1000 [ 16.044836] __x64_sys_nanosleep+0x5/0x140 [ 16.045119] do_syscall_64+0x59/0x80 [ 16.045377] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe4/0x140 [ 16.045670] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0xa/0x40 [ 16.046001] ? mark_held_locks+0x24/0x90 [ 16.046287] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 [ 16.046569] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x8/0x30 [ 16.046851] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7e/0x100 [ 16.047137] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 16.047405] RIP: 0033:0x7f9e4831718d [ 16.047602] Code: b4 0c 00 0f 05 eb a9 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d b3 6c 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 16.048764] RSP: 002b:00007fff488086b8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000023 [ 16.049275] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f9e48683740 RCX: 00007f9e4831718d [ 16.049747] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00007fff488086d0 [ 16.050225] RBP: 00007fff488086f0 R08: 00007fff488085d7 R09: 00007f9e4cb594a0 [ 16.050648] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007f9e484cde30 [ 16.051124] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 16.051608] </TASK> [ 16.051762] ==================================================================

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: dwc3: gadget: Fix looping of queued SG entries The dwc3_request->num_queued_sgs is decremented on completion. If a partially completed request is handled, then the dwc3_request->num_queued_sgs no longer reflects the total number of num_queued_sgs (it would be cleared). Correctly check the number of request SG entries remained to be prepare and queued. Failure to do this may cause null pointer dereference when accessing non-existent SG entry.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bnxt_en: Fix aggregation ID mask to prevent oops on 5760X chips The 5760X (P7) chip's HW GRO/LRO interface is very similar to that of the previous generation (5750X or P5). However, the aggregation ID fields in the completion structures on P7 have been redefined from 16 bits to 12 bits. The freed up 4 bits are redefined for part of the metadata such as the VLAN ID. The aggregation ID mask was not modified when adding support for P7 chips. Including the extra 4 bits for the aggregation ID can potentially cause the driver to store or fetch the packet header of GRO/LRO packets in the wrong TPA buffer. It may hit the BUG() condition in __skb_pull() because the SKB contains no valid packet header: kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:2766! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 1 PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/4 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.12.0-rc2+ #7 Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R760/0VRV9X, BIOS 1.0.1 12/27/2022 RIP: 0010:eth_type_trans+0xda/0x140 Code: 80 00 00 00 eb c1 8b 47 70 2b 47 74 48 8b 97 d0 00 00 00 83 f8 01 7e 1b 48 85 d2 74 06 66 83 3a ff 74 09 b8 00 04 00 00 eb a5 <0f> 0b b8 00 01 00 00 eb 9c 48 85 ff 74 eb 31 f6 b9 02 00 00 00 48 RSP: 0018:ff615003803fcc28 EFLAGS: 00010283 RAX: 00000000000022d2 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: ff2e8c25da334040 RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: ff2e8c25c1ce8000 RDI: ff2e8c25869f9000 RBP: ff2e8c258c31c000 R08: ff2e8c25da334000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ff2e8c25da3342c0 R11: ff2e8c25c1ce89c0 R12: ff2e8c258e0990b0 R13: ff2e8c25bb120000 R14: ff2e8c25c1ce89c0 R15: ff2e8c25869f9000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff2e8c34be300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055f05317e4c8 CR3: 000000108bac6006 CR4: 0000000000773ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? die+0x33/0x90 ? do_trap+0xd9/0x100 ? eth_type_trans+0xda/0x140 ? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80 ? eth_type_trans+0xda/0x140 ? exc_invalid_op+0x4e/0x70 ? eth_type_trans+0xda/0x140 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? eth_type_trans+0xda/0x140 bnxt_tpa_end+0x10b/0x6b0 [bnxt_en] ? bnxt_tpa_start+0x195/0x320 [bnxt_en] bnxt_rx_pkt+0x902/0xd90 [bnxt_en] ? __bnxt_tx_int.constprop.0+0x89/0x300 [bnxt_en] ? kmem_cache_free+0x343/0x440 ? __bnxt_tx_int.constprop.0+0x24f/0x300 [bnxt_en] __bnxt_poll_work+0x193/0x370 [bnxt_en] bnxt_poll_p5+0x9a/0x300 [bnxt_en] ? try_to_wake_up+0x209/0x670 __napi_poll+0x29/0x1b0 Fix it by redefining the aggregation ID mask for P5_PLUS chips to be 12 bits. This will work because the maximum aggregation ID is less than 4096 on all P5_PLUS chips.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: binder: fix memleak of proc->delivered_freeze If a freeze notification is cleared with BC_CLEAR_FREEZE_NOTIFICATION before calling binder_freeze_notification_done(), then it is detached from its reference (e.g. ref->freeze) but the work remains queued in proc->delivered_freeze. This leads to a memory leak when the process exits as any pending entries in proc->delivered_freeze are not freed: unreferenced object 0xffff38e8cfa36180 (size 64): comm "binder-util", pid 655, jiffies 4294936641 hex dump (first 32 bytes): b8 e9 9e c8 e8 38 ff ff b8 e9 9e c8 e8 38 ff ff .....8.......8.. 0b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 3c 1f 4b 00 00 00 00 00 ........<.K..... backtrace (crc 95983b32): [<000000000d0582cf>] kmemleak_alloc+0x34/0x40 [<000000009c99a513>] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x208/0x280 [<00000000313b1704>] binder_thread_write+0xdec/0x439c [<000000000cbd33bb>] binder_ioctl+0x1b68/0x22cc [<000000002bbedeeb>] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x124/0x190 [<00000000b439adee>] invoke_syscall+0x6c/0x254 [<00000000173558fc>] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xac/0x230 [<0000000084f72311>] do_el0_svc+0x40/0x58 [<000000008b872457>] el0_svc+0x38/0x78 [<00000000ee778653>] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c [<00000000a8ec61bf>] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 This patch fixes the leak by ensuring that any pending entries in proc->delivered_freeze are freed during binder_deferred_release().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: slcan: fix freed work crash The LTP test pty03 is causing a crash in slcan: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 348 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 6.0.8-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed 9d20364b934f5aab0a9bdf84e8f45cfdfae39dab Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: 0x0 (events) RIP: 0010:process_one_work (/home/rich/kernel/linux/kernel/workqueue.c:706 /home/rich/kernel/linux/kernel/workqueue.c:2185) Code: 49 89 ff 41 56 41 55 41 54 55 53 48 89 f3 48 83 ec 10 48 8b 06 48 8b 6f 48 49 89 c4 45 30 e4 a8 04 b8 00 00 00 00 4c 0f 44 e0 <49> 8b 44 24 08 44 8b a8 00 01 00 00 41 83 e5 20 f6 45 10 04 75 0e RSP: 0018:ffffaf7b40f47e98 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9d644e1b8b48 RCX: ffff9d649e439968 RDX: 00000000ffff8455 RSI: ffff9d644e1b8b48 RDI: ffff9d64764aa6c0 RBP: ffff9d649e4335c0 R08: 0000000000000c00 R09: ffff9d64764aa734 R10: 0000000000000007 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff9d649e4335e8 R14: ffff9d64490da780 R15: ffff9d64764aa6c0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9d649e400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 0000000036424000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> worker_thread (/home/rich/kernel/linux/kernel/workqueue.c:2436) kthread (/home/rich/kernel/linux/kernel/kthread.c:376) ret_from_fork (/home/rich/kernel/linux/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:312) Apparently, the slcan's tx_work is freed while being scheduled. While slcan_netdev_close() (netdev side) calls flush_work(&sl->tx_work), slcan_close() (tty side) does not. So when the netdev is never set UP, but the tty is stuffed with bytes and forced to wakeup write, the work is scheduled, but never flushed. So add an additional flush_work() to slcan_close() to be sure the work is flushed under all circumstances. The Fixes commit below moved flush_work() from slcan_close() to slcan_netdev_close(). What was the rationale behind it? Maybe we can drop the one in slcan_netdev_close()? I see the same pattern in can327. So it perhaps needs the very same fix.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: fix NULL deref in cleanup_bearer() syzbot found [1] that after blamed commit, ub->ubsock->sk was NULL when attempting the atomic_dec() : atomic_dec(&tipc_net(sock_net(ub->ubsock->sk))->wq_count); Fix this by caching the tipc_net pointer. [1] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000006: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5896 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1-next-20241203-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 Workqueue: events cleanup_bearer RIP: 0010:read_pnet include/net/net_namespace.h:387 [inline] RIP: 0010:sock_net include/net/sock.h:655 [inline] RIP: 0010:cleanup_bearer+0x1f7/0x280 net/tipc/udp_media.c:820 Code: 18 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 3c f7 99 f6 48 8b 1b 48 83 c3 30 e8 f0 e4 60 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 1a f7 99 f6 49 83 c7 e8 48 8b 1b RSP: 0018:ffffc9000410fb70 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000000006 RBX: 0000000000000030 RCX: ffff88802fe45a00 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffc9000410f900 RBP: ffff88807e1f0908 R08: ffffc9000410f907 R09: 1ffff92000821f20 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff52000821f21 R12: ffff888031d19980 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff88807e1f0918 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b8600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000556ca050b000 CR3: 0000000031c0c000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: ucsi: Fix null pointer dereference in trace ucsi_register_altmode checks IS_ERR for the alt pointer and treats NULL as valid. When CONFIG_TYPEC_DP_ALTMODE is not enabled, ucsi_register_displayport returns NULL which causes a NULL pointer dereference in trace. Rather than return NULL, call typec_port_register_altmode to register DisplayPort alternate mode as a non-controllable mode when CONFIG_TYPEC_DP_ALTMODE is not enabled.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: qede: confirm skb is allocated before using qede_build_skb() assumes build_skb() always works and goes straight to skb_reserve(). However, build_skb() can fail under memory pressure. This results in a kernel panic because the skb to reserve is NULL. Add a check in case build_skb() failed to allocate and return NULL. The NULL return is handled correctly in callers to qede_build_skb().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: skip reserved bytes warning on unmount after log cleanup failure After the recent changes made by commit c2e39305299f01 ("btrfs: clear extent buffer uptodate when we fail to write it") and its followup fix, commit 651740a5024117 ("btrfs: check WRITE_ERR when trying to read an extent buffer"), we can now end up not cleaning up space reservations of log tree extent buffers after a transaction abort happens, as well as not cleaning up still dirty extent buffers. This happens because if writeback for a log tree extent buffer failed, then we have cleared the bit EXTENT_BUFFER_UPTODATE from the extent buffer and we have also set the bit EXTENT_BUFFER_WRITE_ERR on it. Later on, when trying to free the log tree with free_log_tree(), which iterates over the tree, we can end up getting an -EIO error when trying to read a node or a leaf, since read_extent_buffer_pages() returns -EIO if an extent buffer does not have EXTENT_BUFFER_UPTODATE set and has the EXTENT_BUFFER_WRITE_ERR bit set. Getting that -EIO means that we return immediately as we can not iterate over the entire tree. In that case we never update the reserved space for an extent buffer in the respective block group and space_info object. When this happens we get the following traces when unmounting the fs: [174957.284509] BTRFS: error (device dm-0) in cleanup_transaction:1913: errno=-5 IO failure [174957.286497] BTRFS: error (device dm-0) in free_log_tree:3420: errno=-5 IO failure [174957.399379] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [174957.402497] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3206883 at fs/btrfs/block-group.c:127 btrfs_put_block_group+0x77/0xb0 [btrfs] [174957.407523] Modules linked in: btrfs overlay dm_zero (...) [174957.424917] CPU: 2 PID: 3206883 Comm: umount Tainted: G W 5.16.0-rc5-btrfs-next-109 #1 [174957.426689] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [174957.428716] RIP: 0010:btrfs_put_block_group+0x77/0xb0 [btrfs] [174957.429717] Code: 21 48 8b bd (...) [174957.432867] RSP: 0018:ffffb70d41cffdd0 EFLAGS: 00010206 [174957.433632] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff8b09c3848000 RCX: ffff8b0758edd1c8 [174957.434689] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffffc0b467e7 RDI: ffff8b0758edd000 [174957.436068] RBP: ffff8b0758edd000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [174957.437114] R10: 0000000000000246 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8b09c3848148 [174957.438140] R13: ffff8b09c3848198 R14: ffff8b0758edd188 R15: dead000000000100 [174957.439317] FS: 00007f328fb82800(0000) GS:ffff8b0a2d200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [174957.440402] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [174957.441164] CR2: 00007fff13563e98 CR3: 0000000404f4e005 CR4: 0000000000370ee0 [174957.442117] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [174957.443076] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [174957.443948] Call Trace: [174957.444264] <TASK> [174957.444538] btrfs_free_block_groups+0x255/0x3c0 [btrfs] [174957.445238] close_ctree+0x301/0x357 [btrfs] [174957.445803] ? call_rcu+0x16c/0x290 [174957.446250] generic_shutdown_super+0x74/0x120 [174957.446832] kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 [174957.447305] btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] [174957.447890] deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0xa0 [174957.448440] cleanup_mnt+0x147/0x1c0 [174957.448888] task_work_run+0x5c/0xa0 [174957.449336] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1e5/0x1f0 [174957.449934] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x16/0x40 [174957.450512] do_syscall_64+0x48/0xc0 [174957.450980] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [174957.451605] RIP: 0033:0x7f328fdc4a97 [174957.452059] Code: 03 0c 00 f7 (...) [174957.454320] RSP: 002b:00007fff13564ec8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6 [174957.455262] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f328feea264 RCX: 00007f328fdc4a97 [174957.456131] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000000 ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ethernet: ti: am65-cpsw: Fix NULL dereference on XDP_TX If number of TX queues are set to 1 we get a NULL pointer dereference during XDP_TX. ~# ethtool -L eth0 tx 1 ~# ./xdp-trafficgen udp -A <ipv6-src> -a <ipv6-dst> eth0 -t 2 Transmitting on eth0 (ifindex 2) [ 241.135257] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000030 Fix this by using actual TX queues instead of max TX queues when picking the TX channel in am65_cpsw_ndo_xdp_xmit().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mwifiex: Fix memcpy() field-spanning write warning in mwifiex_config_scan() Replace one-element array with a flexible-array member in `struct mwifiex_ie_types_wildcard_ssid_params` to fix the following warning on a MT8173 Chromebook (mt8173-elm-hana): [ 356.775250] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 356.784543] memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 6) of single field "wildcard_ssid_tlv->ssid" at drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c:904 (size 1) [ 356.813403] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 742 at drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c:904 mwifiex_scan_networks+0x4fc/0xf28 [mwifiex] The "(size 6)" above is exactly the length of the SSID of the network this device was connected to. The source of the warning looks like: ssid_len = user_scan_in->ssid_list[i].ssid_len; [...] memcpy(wildcard_ssid_tlv->ssid, user_scan_in->ssid_list[i].ssid, ssid_len); There is a #define WILDCARD_SSID_TLV_MAX_SIZE that uses sizeof() on this struct, but it already didn't account for the size of the one-element array, so it doesn't need to be changed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ax25: Fix refcount imbalance on inbound connections When releasing a socket in ax25_release(), we call netdev_put() to decrease the refcount on the associated ax.25 device. However, the execution path for accepting an incoming connection never calls netdev_hold(). This imbalance leads to refcount errors, and ultimately to kernel crashes. A typical call trace for the above situation will start with one of the following errors: refcount_t: decrement hit 0; leaking memory. refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. And will then have a trace like: Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x64/0x70 ? __warn+0x83/0x120 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xb2/0x100 ? report_bug+0x158/0x190 ? prb_read_valid+0x20/0x30 ? handle_bug+0x3e/0x70 ? exc_invalid_op+0x1c/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xb2/0x100 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xb2/0x100 ax25_release+0x2ad/0x360 __sock_release+0x35/0xa0 sock_close+0x19/0x20 [...] On reboot (or any attempt to remove the interface), the kernel gets stuck in an infinite loop: unregister_netdevice: waiting for ax0 to become free. Usage count = 0 This patch corrects these issues by ensuring that we call netdev_hold() and ax25_dev_hold() for new connections in ax25_accept(). This makes the logic leading to ax25_accept() match the logic for ax25_bind(): in both cases we increment the refcount, which is ultimately decremented in ax25_release().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: sdata can be NULL during AMPDU start ieee80211_tx_ba_session_handle_start() may get NULL for sdata when a deauthentication is ongoing. Here a trace triggering the race with the hostapd test multi_ap_fronthaul_on_ap: (gdb) list *drv_ampdu_action+0x46 0x8b16 is in drv_ampdu_action (net/mac80211/driver-ops.c:396). 391 int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; 392 393 might_sleep(); 394 395 sdata = get_bss_sdata(sdata); 396 if (!check_sdata_in_driver(sdata)) 397 return -EIO; 398 399 trace_drv_ampdu_action(local, sdata, params); 400 wlan0: moving STA 02:00:00:00:03:00 to state 3 wlan0: associated wlan0: deauthenticating from 02:00:00:00:03:00 by local choice (Reason: 3=DEAUTH_LEAVING) wlan3.sta1: Open BA session requested for 02:00:00:00:00:00 tid 0 wlan3.sta1: dropped frame to 02:00:00:00:00:00 (unauthorized port) wlan0: moving STA 02:00:00:00:03:00 to state 2 wlan0: moving STA 02:00:00:00:03:00 to state 1 wlan0: Removed STA 02:00:00:00:03:00 wlan0: Destroyed STA 02:00:00:00:03:00 BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffffffffffb48 PGD 11814067 P4D 11814067 PUD 11816067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 2 PID: 133397 Comm: kworker/u16:1 Tainted: G W 6.1.0-rc8-wt+ #59 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.0-20220807_005459-localhost 04/01/2014 Workqueue: phy3 ieee80211_ba_session_work [mac80211] RIP: 0010:drv_ampdu_action+0x46/0x280 [mac80211] Code: 53 48 89 f3 be 89 01 00 00 e8 d6 43 bf ef e8 21 46 81 f0 83 bb a0 1b 00 00 04 75 0e 48 8b 9b 28 0d 00 00 48 81 eb 10 0e 00 00 <8b> 93 58 09 00 00 f6 c2 20 0f 84 3b 01 00 00 8b 05 dd 1c 0f 00 85 RSP: 0018:ffffc900025ebd20 EFLAGS: 00010287 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: fffffffffffff1f0 RCX: ffff888102228240 RDX: 0000000080000000 RSI: ffffffff918c5de0 RDI: ffff888102228b40 RBP: ffffc900025ebd40 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888118c18ec0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffc900025ebd60 R15: ffff888018b7efb8 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88817a600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: fffffffffffffb48 CR3: 0000000105228006 CR4: 0000000000170ee0 Call Trace: <TASK> ieee80211_tx_ba_session_handle_start+0xd0/0x190 [mac80211] ieee80211_ba_session_work+0xff/0x2e0 [mac80211] process_one_work+0x29f/0x620 worker_thread+0x4d/0x3d0 ? process_one_work+0x620/0x620 kthread+0xfb/0x120 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 </TASK>

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nilfs2: fix missing cleanup on rollforward recovery error In an error injection test of a routine for mount-time recovery, KASAN found a use-after-free bug. It turned out that if data recovery was performed using partial logs created by dsync writes, but an error occurred before starting the log writer to create a recovered checkpoint, the inodes whose data had been recovered were left in the ns_dirty_files list of the nilfs object and were not freed. Fix this issue by cleaning up inodes that have read the recovery data if the recovery routine fails midway before the log writer starts.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommufd: Require drivers to supply the cache_invalidate_user ops If drivers don't do this then iommufd will oops invalidation ioctls with something like: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000086000004 EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000101059000 [0000000000000000] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 0000000086000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 2 PID: 371 Comm: qemu-system-aar Not tainted 6.8.0-rc7-gde77230ac23a #9 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 81400809 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=-c) pc : 0x0 lr : iommufd_hwpt_invalidate+0xa4/0x204 sp : ffff800080f3bcc0 x29: ffff800080f3bcf0 x28: ffff0000c369b300 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 00000000c1e334a0 x21: ffff0000c1e334a0 x20: ffff800080f3bd38 x19: ffff800080f3bd58 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000ffff8240d6d8 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000001000000002 x7 : 0000fffeac1ec950 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : ffff800080f3bd78 x4 : 0000000000000003 x3 : 0000000000000002 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff800080f3bcc8 x0 : ffff0000c6034d80 Call trace: 0x0 iommufd_fops_ioctl+0x154/0x274 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0xf0 invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 el0_svc+0x34/0xb4 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 All existing drivers implement this op for nesting, this is mostly a bisection aid.