An issue was discovered in Hashicorp Packer before 2.3.1. The recommended sudoers configuration for Vagrant on Linux is insecure. If the host has been configured according to this documentation, non-privileged users on the host can leverage a wildcard in the sudoers configuration to execute arbitrary commands as root.
An incorrect TLB flush issue was found in the Linux kernel’s GPU i915 kernel driver, potentially leading to random memory corruption or data leaks. This flaw could allow a local user to crash the system or escalate their privileges on the system.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: af_unix: Don't return OOB skb in manage_oob(). syzbot reported use-after-free in unix_stream_recv_urg(). [0] The scenario is 1. send(MSG_OOB) 2. recv(MSG_OOB) -> The consumed OOB remains in recv queue 3. send(MSG_OOB) 4. recv() -> manage_oob() returns the next skb of the consumed OOB -> This is also OOB, but unix_sk(sk)->oob_skb is not cleared 5. recv(MSG_OOB) -> unix_sk(sk)->oob_skb is used but already freed The recent commit 8594d9b85c07 ("af_unix: Don't call skb_get() for OOB skb.") uncovered the issue. If the OOB skb is consumed and the next skb is peeked in manage_oob(), we still need to check if the skb is OOB. Let's do so by falling back to the following checks in manage_oob() and add the test case in selftest. Note that we need to add a similar check for SIOCATMARK. [0]: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in unix_stream_read_actor+0xa6/0xb0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2959 Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880326abcc4 by task syz-executor178/5235 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5235 Comm: syz-executor178 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc5-syzkaller-00742-gfbdaffe41adc #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:119 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601 unix_stream_read_actor+0xa6/0xb0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2959 unix_stream_recv_urg+0x1df/0x320 net/unix/af_unix.c:2640 unix_stream_read_generic+0x2456/0x2520 net/unix/af_unix.c:2778 unix_stream_recvmsg+0x22b/0x2c0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2996 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1046 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0x22f/0x280 net/socket.c:1068 ____sys_recvmsg+0x1db/0x470 net/socket.c:2816 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2858 [inline] __sys_recvmsg+0x2f0/0x3e0 net/socket.c:2888 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f5360d6b4e9 Code: 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 37 17 00 00 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fff29b3a458 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002f RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fff29b3a638 RCX: 00007f5360d6b4e9 RDX: 0000000000002001 RSI: 0000000020000640 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f5360dde610 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 00007fff29b3a628 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 </TASK> Allocated by task 5235: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:312 [inline] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x66/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:338 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3988 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4037 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x16b/0x320 mm/slub.c:4080 __alloc_skb+0x1c3/0x440 net/core/skbuff.c:667 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1320 [inline] alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc3/0x770 net/core/skbuff.c:6528 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x91a/0xa60 net/core/sock.c:2815 sock_alloc_send_skb include/net/sock.h:1778 [inline] queue_oob+0x108/0x680 net/unix/af_unix.c:2198 unix_stream_sendmsg+0xd24/0xf80 net/unix/af_unix.c:2351 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2597 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2651 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2680 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 5235: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 ---truncated---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: dwc3: st: fix probed platform device ref count on probe error path The probe function never performs any paltform device allocation, thus error path "undo_platform_dev_alloc" is entirely bogus. It drops the reference count from the platform device being probed. If error path is triggered, this will lead to unbalanced device reference counts and premature release of device resources, thus possible use-after-free when releasing remaining devm-managed resources.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86: Acquire kvm->srcu when handling KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS Grab kvm->srcu when processing KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS, as KVM will forcibly leave nested VMX/SVM if SMM mode is being toggled, and leaving nested VMX reads guest memory. Note, kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events() can also be called from KVM_RUN via sync_regs(), which already holds SRCU. I.e. trying to precisely use kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock() around the problematic SMM code would cause problems. Acquiring SRCU isn't all that expensive, so for simplicity, grab it unconditionally for KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS. ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm #552 Not tainted ----------------------------- include/linux/kvm_host.h:1027 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 1 lock held by repro/1071: #0: ffff88811e424430 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm] stack backtrace: CPU: 15 PID: 1071 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm #552 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x7f/0x90 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x13f/0x1a0 kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot+0x168/0x190 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_read_guest+0x3e/0x90 [kvm] nested_vmx_load_msr+0x6b/0x1d0 [kvm_intel] load_vmcs12_host_state+0x432/0xb40 [kvm_intel] vmx_leave_nested+0x30/0x40 [kvm_intel] kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events+0x15d/0x2b0 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x1107/0x1750 [kvm] ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70 ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x7d/0x970 [kvm] ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x497/0x970 [kvm] ? lock_acquire+0xba/0x2d0 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x40c/0x6f0 ? lock_release+0xb7/0x270 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x82/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7ff11eb1b539 </TASK>
NVIDIA vGPU driver contains a vulnerability in the guest kernel mode driver and Virtual GPU Manager (vGPU plugin), in which an input length is not validated, which may lead to information disclosure, tampering of data or denial of service. This affects vGPU version 12.x (prior to 12.2) and version 11.x (prior to 11.4).
The futex_requeue function in kernel/futex.c in the Linux kernel through 3.14.5 does not ensure that calls have two different futex addresses, which allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted FUTEX_REQUEUE command that facilitates unsafe waiter modification.
off-by-one in io_uring module.
An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel 5.5 through 5.7.9, as used in Xen through 4.13.x for x86 PV guests. An attacker may be granted the I/O port permissions of an unrelated task. This occurs because tss_invalidate_io_bitmap mishandling causes a loss of synchronization between the I/O bitmaps of TSS and Xen, aka CID-cadfad870154.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_sysfs: Fix attempting to call device_add multiple times device_add shall not be called multiple times as stated in its documentation: 'Do not call this routine or device_register() more than once for any device structure' Syzkaller reports a bug as follows [1]: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:33! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN [...] Call Trace: <TASK> __list_add include/linux/list.h:69 [inline] list_add_tail include/linux/list.h:102 [inline] kobj_kset_join lib/kobject.c:164 [inline] kobject_add_internal+0x18f/0x8f0 lib/kobject.c:214 kobject_add_varg lib/kobject.c:358 [inline] kobject_add+0x150/0x1c0 lib/kobject.c:410 device_add+0x368/0x1e90 drivers/base/core.c:3452 hci_conn_add_sysfs+0x9b/0x1b0 net/bluetooth/hci_sysfs.c:53 hci_le_cis_estabilished_evt+0x57c/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6799 hci_le_meta_evt+0x2b8/0x510 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7110 hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7440 [inline] hci_event_packet+0x63d/0xfd0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7495 hci_rx_work+0xae7/0x1230 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4007 process_one_work+0x991/0x1610 kernel/workqueue.c:2289 worker_thread+0x665/0x1080 kernel/workqueue.c:2436 kthread+0x2e4/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:306 </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix extent map use-after-free when handling missing device in read_one_chunk Store the error code before freeing the extent_map. Though it's reference counted structure, in that function it's the first and last allocation so this would lead to a potential use-after-free. The error can happen eg. when chunk is stored on a missing device and the degraded mount option is missing. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216721
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/mgag200: Bind I2C lifetime to DRM device Managed cleanup with devm_add_action_or_reset() will release the I2C adapter when the underlying Linux device goes away. But the connector still refers to it, so this cleanup leaves behind a stale pointer in struct drm_connector.ddc. Bind the lifetime of the I2C adapter to the connector's lifetime by using DRM's managed release. When the DRM device goes away (after the Linux device) DRM will first clean up the connector and then clean up the I2C adapter.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: replace BTRFS_MAX_EXTENT_SIZE with fs_info->max_extent_size On zoned filesystem, data write out is limited by max_zone_append_size, and a large ordered extent is split according the size of a bio. OTOH, the number of extents to be written is calculated using BTRFS_MAX_EXTENT_SIZE, and that estimated number is used to reserve the metadata bytes to update and/or create the metadata items. The metadata reservation is done at e.g, btrfs_buffered_write() and then released according to the estimation changes. Thus, if the number of extent increases massively, the reserved metadata can run out. The increase of the number of extents easily occurs on zoned filesystem if BTRFS_MAX_EXTENT_SIZE > max_zone_append_size. And, it causes the following warning on a small RAM environment with disabling metadata over-commit (in the following patch). [75721.498492] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [75721.505624] BTRFS: block rsv 1 returned -28 [75721.512230] WARNING: CPU: 24 PID: 2327559 at fs/btrfs/block-rsv.c:537 btrfs_use_block_rsv+0x560/0x760 [btrfs] [75721.581854] CPU: 24 PID: 2327559 Comm: kworker/u64:10 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 5.18.0-rc2-BTRFS-ZNS+ #109 [75721.597200] Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/H12SSL-NT, BIOS 2.0 02/22/2021 [75721.607310] Workqueue: btrfs-endio-write btrfs_work_helper [btrfs] [75721.616209] RIP: 0010:btrfs_use_block_rsv+0x560/0x760 [btrfs] [75721.646649] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000fbdf3e0 EFLAGS: 00010286 [75721.654126] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000004000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [75721.663524] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: fffff52001f7be6e [75721.672921] RBP: ffffc9000fbdf420 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff889f8d1fc6c7 [75721.682493] R10: ffffed13f1a3f8d8 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88980a3c0e28 [75721.692284] R13: ffff889b66590000 R14: ffff88980a3c0e40 R15: ffff88980a3c0e8a [75721.701878] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff889f8d000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [75721.712601] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [75721.720726] CR2: 000055d12e05c018 CR3: 0000800193594000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 [75721.730499] Call Trace: [75721.735166] <TASK> [75721.739886] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x1e1/0x1100 [btrfs] [75721.747545] ? btrfs_alloc_logged_file_extent+0x550/0x550 [btrfs] [75721.756145] ? btrfs_get_32+0xea/0x2d0 [btrfs] [75721.762852] ? btrfs_get_32+0xea/0x2d0 [btrfs] [75721.769520] ? push_leaf_left+0x420/0x620 [btrfs] [75721.776431] ? memcpy+0x4e/0x60 [75721.781931] split_leaf+0x433/0x12d0 [btrfs] [75721.788392] ? btrfs_get_token_32+0x580/0x580 [btrfs] [75721.795636] ? push_for_double_split.isra.0+0x420/0x420 [btrfs] [75721.803759] ? leaf_space_used+0x15d/0x1a0 [btrfs] [75721.811156] btrfs_search_slot+0x1bc3/0x2790 [btrfs] [75721.818300] ? lock_downgrade+0x7c0/0x7c0 [75721.824411] ? free_extent_buffer.part.0+0x107/0x200 [btrfs] [75721.832456] ? split_leaf+0x12d0/0x12d0 [btrfs] [75721.839149] ? free_extent_buffer.part.0+0x14f/0x200 [btrfs] [75721.846945] ? free_extent_buffer+0x13/0x20 [btrfs] [75721.853960] ? btrfs_release_path+0x4b/0x190 [btrfs] [75721.861429] btrfs_csum_file_blocks+0x85c/0x1500 [btrfs] [75721.869313] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x16/0x80 [75721.876085] ? lock_release+0x552/0xf80 [75721.881957] ? btrfs_del_csums+0x8c0/0x8c0 [btrfs] [75721.888886] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [75721.895152] ? do_raw_read_unlock+0x44/0x80 [75721.901323] ? _raw_write_lock_irq+0x60/0x80 [75721.907983] ? btrfs_global_root+0xb9/0xe0 [btrfs] [75721.915166] ? btrfs_csum_root+0x12b/0x180 [btrfs] [75721.921918] ? btrfs_get_global_root+0x820/0x820 [btrfs] [75721.929166] ? _raw_write_unlock+0x23/0x40 [75721.935116] ? unpin_extent_cache+0x1e3/0x390 [btrfs] [75721.942041] btrfs_finish_ordered_io.isra.0+0xa0c/0x1dc0 [btrfs] [75721.949906] ? try_to_wake_up+0x30/0x14a0 [75721.955700] ? btrfs_unlink_subvol+0xda0/0xda0 [btrfs] [75721.962661] ? rcu ---truncated---
Insecure permissions in Nakivo Backup & Replication Director version 9.4.0.r43656 on Linux allow local users to access the Nakivo Director web interface and gain root privileges. This occurs because the database containing the users of the web application and the password-recovery secret value is readable.
Use-after-free vulnerability in the Linux kernel exploitable by a local attacker due to reuse of a DCCP socket with an attached dccps_hc_tx_ccid object as a listener after being released. Fixed in Ubuntu Linux kernel 5.4.0-51.56, 5.3.0-68.63, 4.15.0-121.123, 4.4.0-193.224, 3.13.0.182.191 and 3.2.0-149.196.
NVIDIA NeMo library for all platforms contains a vulnerability in the model loading component, where an attacker could cause code injection by loading .nemo files with maliciously crafted metadata. A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to remote code execution and data tampering.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: igb: fix a use-after-free issue in igb_clean_tx_ring Fix the following use-after-free bug in igb_clean_tx_ring routine when the NIC is running in XDP mode. The issue can be triggered redirecting traffic into the igb NIC and then closing the device while the traffic is flowing. [ 73.322719] CPU: 1 PID: 487 Comm: xdp_redirect Not tainted 5.18.3-apu2 #9 [ 73.330639] Hardware name: PC Engines APU2/APU2, BIOS 4.0.7 02/28/2017 [ 73.337434] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xa7/0xf0 [ 73.362283] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000081f798 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 73.367761] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc90000420f80 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 73.375200] RDX: ffff88811ad22d00 RSI: ffff88811ad171e0 RDI: ffff88811ad171e0 [ 73.382590] RBP: 0000000000000900 R08: ffffffff82298f28 R09: 0000000000000058 [ 73.390008] R10: 0000000000000219 R11: ffffffff82280f40 R12: 0000000000000090 [ 73.397356] R13: ffff888102343a40 R14: ffff88810359e0e4 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 73.404806] FS: 00007ff38d31d740(0000) GS:ffff88811ad00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 73.413129] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 73.419096] CR2: 000055cff35f13f8 CR3: 0000000106391000 CR4: 00000000000406e0 [ 73.426565] Call Trace: [ 73.429087] <TASK> [ 73.431314] igb_clean_tx_ring+0x43/0x140 [igb] [ 73.436002] igb_down+0x1d7/0x220 [igb] [ 73.439974] __igb_close+0x3c/0x120 [igb] [ 73.444118] igb_xdp+0x10c/0x150 [igb] [ 73.447983] ? igb_pci_sriov_configure+0x70/0x70 [igb] [ 73.453362] dev_xdp_install+0xda/0x110 [ 73.457371] dev_xdp_attach+0x1da/0x550 [ 73.461369] do_setlink+0xfd0/0x10f0 [ 73.465166] ? __nla_validate_parse+0x89/0xc70 [ 73.469714] rtnl_setlink+0x11a/0x1e0 [ 73.473547] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x145/0x3d0 [ 73.477709] ? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x130/0x130 [ 73.482258] netlink_rcv_skb+0x8d/0x110 [ 73.486229] netlink_unicast+0x230/0x340 [ 73.490317] netlink_sendmsg+0x215/0x470 [ 73.494395] __sys_sendto+0x179/0x190 [ 73.498268] ? move_addr_to_user+0x37/0x70 [ 73.502547] ? __sys_getsockname+0x84/0xe0 [ 73.506853] ? netlink_setsockopt+0x1c1/0x4a0 [ 73.511349] ? __sys_setsockopt+0xc8/0x1d0 [ 73.515636] __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 [ 73.519603] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x80 [ 73.523399] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 73.528712] RIP: 0033:0x7ff38d41f20c [ 73.551866] RSP: 002b:00007fff3b945a68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 73.559640] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007ff38d41f20c [ 73.567066] RDX: 0000000000000034 RSI: 00007fff3b945b30 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 73.574457] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 73.581852] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff3b945ab0 [ 73.589179] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 00007fff3b945b30 [ 73.596545] </TASK> [ 73.598842] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nilfs2: fix use-after-free bug of ns_writer on remount If a nilfs2 filesystem is downgraded to read-only due to metadata corruption on disk and is remounted read/write, or if emergency read-only remount is performed, detaching a log writer and synchronizing the filesystem can be done at the same time. In these cases, use-after-free of the log writer (hereinafter nilfs->ns_writer) can happen as shown in the scenario below: Task1 Task2 -------------------------------- ------------------------------ nilfs_construct_segment nilfs_segctor_sync init_wait init_waitqueue_entry add_wait_queue schedule nilfs_remount (R/W remount case) nilfs_attach_log_writer nilfs_detach_log_writer nilfs_segctor_destroy kfree finish_wait _raw_spin_lock_irqsave __raw_spin_lock_irqsave do_raw_spin_lock debug_spin_lock_before <-- use-after-free While Task1 is sleeping, nilfs->ns_writer is freed by Task2. After Task1 waked up, Task1 accesses nilfs->ns_writer which is already freed. This scenario diagram is based on the Shigeru Yoshida's post [1]. This patch fixes the issue by not detaching nilfs->ns_writer on remount so that this UAF race doesn't happen. Along with this change, this patch also inserts a few necessary read-only checks with superblock instance where only the ns_writer pointer was used to check if the filesystem is read-only.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFC: NULL out the dev->rfkill to prevent UAF Commit 3e3b5dfcd16a ("NFC: reorder the logic in nfc_{un,}register_device") assumes the device_is_registered() in function nfc_dev_up() will help to check when the rfkill is unregistered. However, this check only take effect when device_del(&dev->dev) is done in nfc_unregister_device(). Hence, the rfkill object is still possible be dereferenced. The crash trace in latest kernel (5.18-rc2): [ 68.760105] ================================================================== [ 68.760330] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x3ec1/0x6750 [ 68.760756] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888009c93018 by task fuzz/313 [ 68.760756] [ 68.760756] CPU: 0 PID: 313 Comm: fuzz Not tainted 5.18.0-rc2 #4 [ 68.760756] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 68.760756] Call Trace: [ 68.760756] <TASK> [ 68.760756] dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d [ 68.760756] print_report.cold+0x5e/0x5db [ 68.760756] ? __lock_acquire+0x3ec1/0x6750 [ 68.760756] kasan_report+0xbe/0x1c0 [ 68.760756] ? __lock_acquire+0x3ec1/0x6750 [ 68.760756] __lock_acquire+0x3ec1/0x6750 [ 68.760756] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x410/0x410 [ 68.760756] ? register_lock_class+0x18d0/0x18d0 [ 68.760756] lock_acquire+0x1ac/0x4f0 [ 68.760756] ? rfkill_blocked+0xe/0x60 [ 68.760756] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x410/0x410 [ 68.760756] ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x12c0/0x12c0 [ 68.760756] ? nla_get_range_signed+0x540/0x540 [ 68.760756] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4e/0x50 [ 68.760756] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x39/0x50 [ 68.760756] ? rfkill_blocked+0xe/0x60 [ 68.760756] rfkill_blocked+0xe/0x60 [ 68.760756] nfc_dev_up+0x84/0x260 [ 68.760756] nfc_genl_dev_up+0x90/0xe0 [ 68.760756] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1f4/0x2f0 [ 68.760756] ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse.constprop.0+0x230/0x230 [ 68.760756] ? security_capable+0x51/0x90 [ 68.760756] genl_rcv_msg+0x280/0x500 [ 68.760756] ? genl_get_cmd+0x3c0/0x3c0 [ 68.760756] ? lock_acquire+0x1ac/0x4f0 [ 68.760756] ? nfc_genl_dev_down+0xe0/0xe0 [ 68.760756] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x410/0x410 [ 68.760756] netlink_rcv_skb+0x11b/0x340 [ 68.760756] ? genl_get_cmd+0x3c0/0x3c0 [ 68.760756] ? netlink_ack+0x9c0/0x9c0 [ 68.760756] ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x136/0xb00 [ 68.760756] genl_rcv+0x1f/0x30 [ 68.760756] netlink_unicast+0x430/0x710 [ 68.760756] ? memset+0x20/0x40 [ 68.760756] ? netlink_attachskb+0x740/0x740 [ 68.760756] ? __build_skb_around+0x1f4/0x2a0 [ 68.760756] netlink_sendmsg+0x75d/0xc00 [ 68.760756] ? netlink_unicast+0x710/0x710 [ 68.760756] ? netlink_unicast+0x710/0x710 [ 68.760756] sock_sendmsg+0xdf/0x110 [ 68.760756] __sys_sendto+0x19e/0x270 [ 68.760756] ? __ia32_sys_getpeername+0xa0/0xa0 [ 68.760756] ? fd_install+0x178/0x4c0 [ 68.760756] ? fd_install+0x195/0x4c0 [ 68.760756] ? kernel_fpu_begin_mask+0x1c0/0x1c0 [ 68.760756] __x64_sys_sendto+0xd8/0x1b0 [ 68.760756] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0xbf/0x130 [ 68.760756] ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x1d/0x50 [ 68.760756] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 68.760756] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 68.760756] RIP: 0033:0x7f67fb50e6b3 ... [ 68.760756] RSP: 002b:00007f67fa91fe90 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 68.760756] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f67fb50e6b3 [ 68.760756] RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 0000559354603090 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 68.760756] RBP: 00007f67fa91ff00 R08: 00007f67fa91fedc R09: 000000000000000c [ 68.760756] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007ffe824d496e [ 68.760756] R13: 00007ffe824d496f R14: 00007f67fa120000 R15: 0000000000000003 [ 68.760756] </TASK> [ 68.760756] [ 68.760756] Allocated by task 279: [ 68.760756] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 [ ---truncated---
ovirt-engine 3.2 running on Linux kernel 3.1 and newer creates certain files world-writeable due to an upstream kernel change which impacted how python's os.chmod() works when passed a mode of '-1'.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath11k: update channel list in reg notifier instead reg worker Currently when ath11k gets a new channel list, it will be processed according to the following steps: 1. update new channel list to cfg80211 and queue reg_work. 2. cfg80211 handles new channel list during reg_work. 3. update cfg80211's handled channel list to firmware by ath11k_reg_update_chan_list(). But ath11k will immediately execute step 3 after reg_work is just queued. Since step 2 is asynchronous, cfg80211 may not have completed handling the new channel list, which may leading to an out-of-bounds write error: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ath11k_reg_update_chan_list Call Trace: ath11k_reg_update_chan_list+0xbfe/0xfe0 [ath11k] kfree+0x109/0x3a0 ath11k_regd_update+0x1cf/0x350 [ath11k] ath11k_regd_update_work+0x14/0x20 [ath11k] process_one_work+0xe35/0x14c0 Should ensure step 2 is completely done before executing step 3. Thus Wen raised patch[1]. When flag NL80211_REGDOM_SET_BY_DRIVER is set, cfg80211 will notify ath11k after step 2 is done. So enable the flag NL80211_REGDOM_SET_BY_DRIVER then cfg80211 will notify ath11k after step 2 is done. At this time, there will be no KASAN bug during the execution of the step 3. [1] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-wireless/patch/20230201065313.27203-1-quic_wgong@quicinc.com/ Tested-on: WCN6855 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HSP.1.1-03125-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_LITE-3
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ath11k: free peer for station when disconnect from AP for QCA6390/WCN6855 Commit b4a0f54156ac ("ath11k: move peer delete after vdev stop of station for QCA6390 and WCN6855") is to fix firmware crash by changing the WMI command sequence, but actually skip all the peer delete operation, then it lead commit 58595c9874c6 ("ath11k: Fixing dangling pointer issue upon peer delete failure") not take effect, and then happened a use-after-free warning from KASAN. because the peer->sta is not set to NULL and then used later. Change to only skip the WMI_PEER_DELETE_CMDID for QCA6390/WCN6855. log of user-after-free: [ 534.888665] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ath11k_dp_rx_update_peer_stats+0x912/0xc10 [ath11k] [ 534.888696] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881396bb1b8 by task rtcwake/2860 [ 534.888705] CPU: 4 PID: 2860 Comm: rtcwake Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 5.15.0-wt-ath+ #523 [ 534.888712] Hardware name: Intel(R) Client Systems NUC8i7HVK/NUC8i7HVB, BIOS HNKBLi70.86A.0067.2021.0528.1339 05/28/2021 [ 534.888716] Call Trace: [ 534.888720] <IRQ> [ 534.888726] dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d [ 534.888736] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x170 [ 534.888745] ? ath11k_dp_rx_update_peer_stats+0x912/0xc10 [ath11k] [ 534.888771] kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf [ 534.888783] ? ath11k_dp_rx_update_peer_stats+0x912/0xc10 [ath11k] [ 534.888810] ath11k_dp_rx_update_peer_stats+0x912/0xc10 [ath11k] [ 534.888840] ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_status+0x529/0xa70 [ath11k] [ 534.888874] ? ath11k_dp_rx_mon_status_bufs_replenish+0x3f0/0x3f0 [ath11k] [ 534.888897] ? check_prev_add+0x20f0/0x20f0 [ 534.888922] ? __lock_acquire+0xb72/0x1870 [ 534.888937] ? find_held_lock+0x33/0x110 [ 534.888954] ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_rings+0x297/0x520 [ath11k] [ 534.888981] ? rcu_read_unlock+0x40/0x40 [ 534.888990] ? ath11k_dp_rx_pdev_alloc+0xd90/0xd90 [ath11k] [ 534.889026] ath11k_dp_service_mon_ring+0x67/0xe0 [ath11k] [ 534.889053] ? ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_rings+0x520/0x520 [ath11k] [ 534.889075] call_timer_fn+0x167/0x4a0 [ 534.889084] ? add_timer_on+0x3b0/0x3b0 [ 534.889103] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare.part.0+0x18c/0x370 [ 534.889117] __run_timers.part.0+0x539/0x8b0 [ 534.889123] ? ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_rings+0x520/0x520 [ath11k] [ 534.889157] ? call_timer_fn+0x4a0/0x4a0 [ 534.889164] ? mark_lock_irq+0x1c30/0x1c30 [ 534.889173] ? clockevents_program_event+0xdd/0x280 [ 534.889189] ? mark_held_locks+0xa5/0xe0 [ 534.889203] run_timer_softirq+0x97/0x180 [ 534.889213] __do_softirq+0x276/0x86a [ 534.889230] __irq_exit_rcu+0x11c/0x180 [ 534.889238] irq_exit_rcu+0x5/0x20 [ 534.889244] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8e/0xc0 [ 534.889251] </IRQ> [ 534.889254] <TASK> [ 534.889259] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20 [ 534.889265] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x38/0x70 [ 534.889271] Code: 74 24 10 e8 ea c2 bf fd 48 89 ef e8 12 53 c0 fd 81 e3 00 02 00 00 75 25 9c 58 f6 c4 02 75 2d 48 85 db 74 01 fb bf 01 00 00 00 <e8> 13 a7 b5 fd 65 8b 05 cc d9 9c 5e 85 c0 74 0a 5b 5d c3 e8 a0 ee [ 534.889276] RSP: 0018:ffffc90002e5f880 EFLAGS: 00000206 [ 534.889284] RAX: 0000000000000006 RBX: 0000000000000200 RCX: ffffffff9f256f10 [ 534.889289] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffa1c6e420 RDI: 0000000000000001 [ 534.889293] RBP: ffff8881095e6200 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffffffa40d2b8f [ 534.889298] R10: fffffbfff481a571 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8881095e6e68 [ 534.889302] R13: ffffc90002e5f908 R14: 0000000000000246 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 534.889316] ? mark_lock+0xd0/0x14a0 [ 534.889332] klist_next+0x1d4/0x450 [ 534.889340] ? dpm_wait_for_subordinate+0x2d0/0x2d0 [ 534.889350] device_for_each_child+0xa8/0x140 [ 534.889360] ? device_remove_class_symlinks+0x1b0/0x1b0 [ 534.889370] ? __lock_release+0x4bd/0x9f0 [ 534.889378] ? dpm_suspend+0x26b/0x3f0 [ 534.889390] dpm_wait_for_subordinate+ ---truncated---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: atlantic: fix aq_vec index out of range error The final update statement of the for loop exceeds the array range, the dereference of self->aq_vec[i] is not checked and then leads to the index out of range error. Also fixed this kind of coding style in other for loop. [ 97.937604] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/ethernet/aquantia/atlantic/aq_nic.c:1404:48 [ 97.937607] index 8 is out of range for type 'aq_vec_s *[8]' [ 97.937608] CPU: 38 PID: 3767 Comm: kworker/u256:18 Not tainted 5.19.0+ #2 [ 97.937610] Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision 7865 Tower/, BIOS 1.0.0 06/12/2022 [ 97.937611] Workqueue: events_unbound async_run_entry_fn [ 97.937616] Call Trace: [ 97.937617] <TASK> [ 97.937619] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63 [ 97.937624] dump_stack+0x10/0x16 [ 97.937626] ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x3f [ 97.937627] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x44/0x49 [ 97.937629] ? __scm_send+0x348/0x440 [ 97.937632] ? aq_vec_stop+0x72/0x80 [atlantic] [ 97.937639] aq_nic_stop+0x1b6/0x1c0 [atlantic] [ 97.937644] aq_suspend_common+0x88/0x90 [atlantic] [ 97.937648] aq_pm_suspend_poweroff+0xe/0x20 [atlantic] [ 97.937653] pci_pm_suspend+0x7e/0x1a0 [ 97.937655] ? pci_pm_suspend_noirq+0x2b0/0x2b0 [ 97.937657] dpm_run_callback+0x54/0x190 [ 97.937660] __device_suspend+0x14c/0x4d0 [ 97.937661] async_suspend+0x23/0x70 [ 97.937663] async_run_entry_fn+0x33/0x120 [ 97.937664] process_one_work+0x21f/0x3f0 [ 97.937666] worker_thread+0x4a/0x3c0 [ 97.937668] ? process_one_work+0x3f0/0x3f0 [ 97.937669] kthread+0xf0/0x120 [ 97.937671] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 [ 97.937672] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 97.937676] </TASK> v2. fixed "warning: variable 'aq_vec' set but not used" v3. simplified a for loop
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: hns3: add vlan list lock to protect vlan list When adding port base VLAN, vf VLAN need to remove from HW and modify the vlan state in vf VLAN list as false. If the periodicity task is freeing the same node, it may cause "use after free" error. This patch adds a vlan list lock to protect the vlan list.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ftrace: Fix use-after-free for dynamic ftrace_ops KASAN reported a use-after-free with ftrace ops [1]. It was found from vmcore that perf had registered two ops with the same content successively, both dynamic. After unregistering the second ops, a use-after-free occurred. In ftrace_shutdown(), when the second ops is unregistered, the FTRACE_UPDATE_CALLS command is not set because there is another enabled ops with the same content. Also, both ops are dynamic and the ftrace callback function is ftrace_ops_list_func, so the FTRACE_UPDATE_TRACE_FUNC command will not be set. Eventually the value of 'command' will be 0 and ftrace_shutdown() will skip the rcu synchronization. However, ftrace may be activated. When the ops is released, another CPU may be accessing the ops. Add the missing synchronization to fix this problem. [1] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __ftrace_ops_list_func kernel/trace/ftrace.c:7020 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ftrace_ops_list_func+0x2b0/0x31c kernel/trace/ftrace.c:7049 Read of size 8 at addr ffff56551965bbc8 by task syz-executor.2/14468 CPU: 1 PID: 14468 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.10.0 #7 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x40c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:132 show_stack+0x30/0x40 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:196 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1b4/0x248 lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x28/0x48c mm/kasan/report.c:387 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:547 [inline] kasan_report+0x118/0x210 mm/kasan/report.c:564 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:187 [inline] __asan_load8+0x98/0xc0 mm/kasan/generic.c:253 __ftrace_ops_list_func kernel/trace/ftrace.c:7020 [inline] ftrace_ops_list_func+0x2b0/0x31c kernel/trace/ftrace.c:7049 ftrace_graph_call+0x0/0x4 __might_sleep+0x8/0x100 include/linux/perf_event.h:1170 __might_fault mm/memory.c:5183 [inline] __might_fault+0x58/0x70 mm/memory.c:5171 do_strncpy_from_user lib/strncpy_from_user.c:41 [inline] strncpy_from_user+0x1f4/0x4b0 lib/strncpy_from_user.c:139 getname_flags+0xb0/0x31c fs/namei.c:149 getname+0x2c/0x40 fs/namei.c:209 [...] Allocated by task 14445: kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:48 kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:479 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0x110/0x13c mm/kasan/common.c:449 kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x14 mm/kasan/common.c:493 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x440/0x924 mm/slub.c:2950 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:563 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:675 [inline] perf_event_alloc.part.0+0xb4/0x1350 kernel/events/core.c:11230 perf_event_alloc kernel/events/core.c:11733 [inline] __do_sys_perf_event_open kernel/events/core.c:11831 [inline] __se_sys_perf_event_open+0x550/0x15f4 kernel/events/core.c:11723 __arm64_sys_perf_event_open+0x6c/0x80 kernel/events/core.c:11723 [...] Freed by task 14445: kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:48 kasan_set_track+0x24/0x34 mm/kasan/common.c:56 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x40 mm/kasan/generic.c:358 __kasan_slab_free.part.0+0x11c/0x1b0 mm/kasan/common.c:437 __kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:445 [inline] kasan_slab_free+0x2c/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:446 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1569 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1608 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:3179 [inline] kfree+0x12c/0xc10 mm/slub.c:4176 perf_event_alloc.part.0+0xa0c/0x1350 kernel/events/core.c:11434 perf_event_alloc kernel/events/core.c:11733 [inline] __do_sys_perf_event_open kernel/events/core.c:11831 [inline] __se_sys_perf_event_open+0x550/0x15f4 kernel/events/core.c:11723 [...]
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: m_can: m_can_tx_handler(): fix use after free of skb can_put_echo_skb() will clone skb then free the skb. Move the can_put_echo_skb() for the m_can version 3.0.x directly before the start of the xmit in hardware, similar to the 3.1.x branch.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cifs: fix double free race when mount fails in cifs_get_root() When cifs_get_root() fails during cifs_smb3_do_mount() we call deactivate_locked_super() which eventually will call delayed_free() which will free the context. In this situation we should not proceed to enter the out: section in cifs_smb3_do_mount() and free the same resources a second time. [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rcu_cblist_dequeue+0x32/0x60 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888364f4d110 by task swapper/1/0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Tainted: G OE 5.17.0-rc3+ #4 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.0 12/17/2019 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] Call Trace: [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] <IRQ> [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x78 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x24/0x150 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] ? rcu_cblist_dequeue+0x32/0x60 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] kasan_report.cold+0x7d/0x117 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] ? rcu_cblist_dequeue+0x32/0x60 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] __asan_load8+0x86/0xa0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] rcu_cblist_dequeue+0x32/0x60 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] rcu_core+0x547/0xca0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] ? call_rcu+0x3c0/0x3c0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] ? lock_is_held_type+0xea/0x140 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] rcu_core_si+0xe/0x10 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] __do_softirq+0x1d4/0x67b [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] __irq_exit_rcu+0x100/0x150 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] irq_exit_rcu+0xe/0x30 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] sysvec_hyperv_stimer0+0x9d/0xc0 ... [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] Freed by task 58179: [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] kasan_set_free_info+0x24/0x40 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] ____kasan_slab_free+0x137/0x170 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] __kasan_slab_free+0x12/0x20 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] slab_free_freelist_hook+0xb3/0x1d0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] kfree+0xcd/0x520 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x149/0xbe0 [cifs] [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] smb3_get_tree+0x1a0/0x2e0 [cifs] [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] vfs_get_tree+0x52/0x140 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] path_mount+0x635/0x10c0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] __x64_sys_mount+0x1bf/0x210 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xc0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] Last potentially related work creation: [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xb6/0xc0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] kasan_record_aux_stack_noalloc+0xb/0x10 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] call_rcu+0x76/0x3c0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] cifs_umount+0xce/0xe0 [cifs] [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] cifs_kill_sb+0xc8/0xe0 [cifs] [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] deactivate_locked_super+0x5d/0xd0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] cifs_smb3_do_mount+0xab9/0xbe0 [cifs] [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] smb3_get_tree+0x1a0/0x2e0 [cifs] [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] vfs_get_tree+0x52/0x140 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] path_mount+0x635/0x10c0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] __x64_sys_mount+0x1bf/0x210 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xc0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: adc: tsc2046: fix memory corruption by preventing array overflow On one side we have indio_dev->num_channels includes all physical channels + timestamp channel. On other side we have an array allocated only for physical channels. So, fix memory corruption by ARRAY_SIZE() instead of num_channels variable. Note the first case is a cleanup rather than a fix as the software timestamp channel bit in active_scanmask is never set by the IIO core.
An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel 4.4 through 5.7.1. drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c has an integer overflow if k_ascii is called several times in a row, aka CID-b86dab054059. NOTE: Members in the community argue that the integer overflow does not lead to a security issue in this case.
snd_ctl_elem_add in sound/core/control.c in the Linux kernel through 5.6.3 has a count=info->owner line, which later affects a private_size*count multiplication for unspecified "interesting side effects." NOTE: kernel engineers dispute this finding, because it could be relevant only if new callers were added that were unfamiliar with the misuse of the info->owner field to represent data unrelated to the "owner" concept. The existing callers, SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_ADD and SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_REPLACE, have been designed to misuse the info->owner field in a safe way
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: topology: Keep the cpumask unchanged when printing cpumap During fuzz testing, the following warning was discovered: different return values (15 and 11) from vsnprintf("%*pbl ", ...) test:keyward is WARNING in kvasprintf WARNING: CPU: 55 PID: 1168477 at lib/kasprintf.c:30 kvasprintf+0x121/0x130 Call Trace: kvasprintf+0x121/0x130 kasprintf+0xa6/0xe0 bitmap_print_to_buf+0x89/0x100 core_siblings_list_read+0x7e/0xb0 kernfs_file_read_iter+0x15b/0x270 new_sync_read+0x153/0x260 vfs_read+0x215/0x290 ksys_read+0xb9/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x56/0x100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0xe2 The call trace shows that kvasprintf() reported this warning during the printing of core_siblings_list. kvasprintf() has several steps: (1) First, calculate the length of the resulting formatted string. (2) Allocate a buffer based on the returned length. (3) Then, perform the actual string formatting. (4) Check whether the lengths of the formatted strings returned in steps (1) and (2) are consistent. If the core_cpumask is modified between steps (1) and (3), the lengths obtained in these two steps may not match. Indeed our test includes cpu hotplugging, which should modify core_cpumask while printing. To fix this issue, cache the cpumask into a temporary variable before calling cpumap_print_{list, cpumask}_to_buf(), to keep it unchanged during the printing process.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: Remove the direct link to net_device The similar patch in siw is in the link: https://git.kernel.org/rdma/rdma/c/16b87037b48889 This problem also occurred in RXE. The following analyze this problem. In the following Call Traces: " BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dev_get_flags+0x188/0x1d0 net/core/dev.c:8782 Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880554640b0 by task kworker/1:4/5295 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5295 Comm: kworker/1:4 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3-syzkaller-00399-g9197b73fd7bb #0 Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 Workqueue: infiniband ib_cache_event_task Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601 dev_get_flags+0x188/0x1d0 net/core/dev.c:8782 rxe_query_port+0x12d/0x260 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c:60 __ib_query_port drivers/infiniband/core/device.c:2111 [inline] ib_query_port+0x168/0x7d0 drivers/infiniband/core/device.c:2143 ib_cache_update+0x1a9/0xb80 drivers/infiniband/core/cache.c:1494 ib_cache_event_task+0xf3/0x1e0 drivers/infiniband/core/cache.c:1568 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa65/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x2f2/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 </TASK> " 1). In the link [1], " infiniband syz2: set down " This means that on 839.350575, the event ib_cache_event_task was sent andi queued in ib_wq. 2). In the link [1], " team0 (unregistering): Port device team_slave_0 removed " It indicates that before 843.251853, the net device should be freed. 3). In the link [1], " BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dev_get_flags+0x188/0x1d0 " This means that on 850.559070, this slab-use-after-free problem occurred. In all, on 839.350575, the event ib_cache_event_task was sent and queued in ib_wq, before 843.251853, the net device veth was freed. on 850.559070, this event was executed, and the mentioned freed net device was called. Thus, the above call trace occurred. [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=12e7025f980000
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm: zynqmp_kms: Unplug DRM device before removal Prevent userspace accesses to the DRM device from causing use-after-frees by unplugging the device before we remove it. This causes any further userspace accesses to result in an error without further calls into this driver's internals.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: uvcvideo: Fix double free in error path If the uvc_status_init() function fails to allocate the int_urb, it will free the dev->status pointer but doesn't reset the pointer to NULL. This results in the kfree() call in uvc_status_cleanup() trying to double-free the memory. Fix it by resetting the dev->status pointer to NULL after freeing it. Reviewed by: Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@chromium.org>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp_bpf: Fix the sk_mem_uncharge logic in tcp_bpf_sendmsg The current sk memory accounting logic in __SK_REDIRECT is pre-uncharging tosend bytes, which is either msg->sg.size or a smaller value apply_bytes. Potential problems with this strategy are as follows: - If the actual sent bytes are smaller than tosend, we need to charge some bytes back, as in line 487, which is okay but seems not clean. - When tosend is set to apply_bytes, as in line 417, and (ret < 0), we may miss uncharging (msg->sg.size - apply_bytes) bytes. [...] 415 tosend = msg->sg.size; 416 if (psock->apply_bytes && psock->apply_bytes < tosend) 417 tosend = psock->apply_bytes; [...] 443 sk_msg_return(sk, msg, tosend); 444 release_sock(sk); 446 origsize = msg->sg.size; 447 ret = tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir(sk_redir, redir_ingress, 448 msg, tosend, flags); 449 sent = origsize - msg->sg.size; [...] 454 lock_sock(sk); 455 if (unlikely(ret < 0)) { 456 int free = sk_msg_free_nocharge(sk, msg); 458 if (!cork) 459 *copied -= free; 460 } [...] 487 if (eval == __SK_REDIRECT) 488 sk_mem_charge(sk, tosend - sent); [...] When running the selftest test_txmsg_redir_wait_sndmem with txmsg_apply, the following warning will be reported: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 57 at net/ipv4/af_inet.c:156 inet_sock_destruct+0x190/0x1a0 Modules linked in: CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 57 Comm: kworker/6:0 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1.bm.1-amd64+ #43 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events sk_psock_destroy RIP: 0010:inet_sock_destruct+0x190/0x1a0 RSP: 0018:ffffad0a8021fe08 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000000011 RBX: ffff9aab4475b900 RCX: ffff9aab481a0800 RDX: 0000000000000303 RSI: 0000000000000011 RDI: ffff9aab4475b900 RBP: ffff9aab4475b990 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff9aab40050ec0 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff9aae6fdb1d01 R12: ffff9aab49c60400 R13: ffff9aab49c60598 R14: ffff9aab49c60598 R15: dead000000000100 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9aae6fd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007ffec7e47bd8 CR3: 00000001a1a1c004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn+0x89/0x130 ? inet_sock_destruct+0x190/0x1a0 ? report_bug+0xfc/0x1e0 ? handle_bug+0x5c/0xa0 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? inet_sock_destruct+0x190/0x1a0 __sk_destruct+0x25/0x220 sk_psock_destroy+0x2b2/0x310 process_scheduled_works+0xa3/0x3e0 worker_thread+0x117/0x240 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xcf/0x100 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- In __SK_REDIRECT, a more concise way is delaying the uncharging after sent bytes are finalized, and uncharge this value. When (ret < 0), we shall invoke sk_msg_free. Same thing happens in case __SK_DROP, when tosend is set to apply_bytes, we may miss uncharging (msg->sg.size - apply_bytes) bytes. The same warning will be reported in selftest. [...] 468 case __SK_DROP: 469 default: 470 sk_msg_free_partial(sk, msg, tosend); 471 sk_msg_apply_bytes(psock, tosend); 472 *copied -= (tosend + delta); 473 return -EACCES; [...] So instead of sk_msg_free_partial we can do sk_msg_free here.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Fix array-index-out-of-bounds in dml2/FCLKChangeSupport [Why] Potential out of bounds access in dml2_calculate_rq_and_dlg_params() because the value of out_lowest_state_idx used as an index for FCLKChangeSupport array can be greater than 1. [How] Currently dml2 core specifies identical values for all FCLKChangeSupport elements. Always use index 0 in the condition to avoid out of bounds access.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: intel/ipu6: remove cpu latency qos request on error Fix cpu latency qos list corruption like below. It happens when we do not remove cpu latency request on error path and free corresponding memory. [ 30.634378] l7 kernel: list_add corruption. prev->next should be next (ffffffff9645e960), but was 0000000100100001. (prev=ffff8e9e877e20a8). [ 30.634388] l7 kernel: WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 2008 at lib/list_debug.c:32 __list_add_valid_or_report+0x83/0xa0 <snip> [ 30.634640] l7 kernel: Call Trace: [ 30.634650] l7 kernel: <TASK> [ 30.634659] l7 kernel: ? __list_add_valid_or_report+0x83/0xa0 [ 30.634669] l7 kernel: ? __warn.cold+0x93/0xf6 [ 30.634678] l7 kernel: ? __list_add_valid_or_report+0x83/0xa0 [ 30.634690] l7 kernel: ? report_bug+0xff/0x140 [ 30.634702] l7 kernel: ? handle_bug+0x58/0x90 [ 30.634712] l7 kernel: ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 [ 30.634723] l7 kernel: ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [ 30.634733] l7 kernel: ? __list_add_valid_or_report+0x83/0xa0 [ 30.634742] l7 kernel: plist_add+0xdd/0x140 [ 30.634754] l7 kernel: pm_qos_update_target+0xa0/0x1f0 [ 30.634764] l7 kernel: cpu_latency_qos_update_request+0x61/0xc0 [ 30.634773] l7 kernel: intel_dp_aux_xfer+0x4c7/0x6e0 [i915 1f824655ed04687c2b0d23dbce759fa785f6d033]
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: watch_queue: Fix filter limit check In watch_queue_set_filter(), there are a couple of places where we check that the filter type value does not exceed what the type_filter bitmap can hold. One place calculates the number of bits by: if (tf[i].type >= sizeof(wfilter->type_filter) * 8) which is fine, but the second does: if (tf[i].type >= sizeof(wfilter->type_filter) * BITS_PER_LONG) which is not. This can lead to a couple of out-of-bounds writes due to a too-large type: (1) __set_bit() on wfilter->type_filter (2) Writing more elements in wfilter->filters[] than we allocated. Fix this by just using the proper WATCH_TYPE__NR instead, which is the number of types we actually know about. The bug may cause an oops looking something like: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in watch_queue_set_filter+0x659/0x740 Write of size 4 at addr ffff88800d2c66bc by task watch_queue_oob/611 ... Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x150 ... kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b ... watch_queue_set_filter+0x659/0x740 ... __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Allocated by task 611: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0 watch_queue_set_filter+0x23a/0x740 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800d2c66a0 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-32 of size 32 The buggy address is located 28 bytes inside of 32-byte region [ffff88800d2c66a0, ffff88800d2c66c0)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: rtlwifi: remove unused check_buddy_priv Commit 2461c7d60f9f ("rtlwifi: Update header file") introduced a global list of private data structures. Later on, commit 26634c4b1868 ("rtlwifi Modify existing bits to match vendor version 2013.02.07") started adding the private data to that list at probe time and added a hook, check_buddy_priv to find the private data from a similar device. However, that function was never used. Besides, though there is a lock for that list, it is never used. And when the probe fails, the private data is never removed from the list. This would cause a second probe to access freed memory. Remove the unused hook, structures and members, which will prevent the potential race condition on the list and its corruption during a second probe when probe fails.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: fix possible UAF in sctp_v6_available() A lockdep report [1] with CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST=y hints that sctp_v6_available() is calling dev_get_by_index_rcu() and ipv6_chk_addr() without holding rcu. [1] ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.12.0-rc5-virtme #1216 Tainted: G W ----------------------------- net/core/dev.c:876 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 1 lock held by sctp_hello/31495: #0: ffff9f1ebbdb7418 (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sctp_bind (./arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:27 net/sctp/socket.c:315) sctp stack backtrace: CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 31495 Comm: sctp_hello Tainted: G W 6.12.0-rc5-virtme #1216 Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123) lockdep_rcu_suspicious (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6822) dev_get_by_index_rcu (net/core/dev.c:876 (discriminator 7)) sctp_v6_available (net/sctp/ipv6.c:701) sctp sctp_do_bind (net/sctp/socket.c:400 (discriminator 1)) sctp sctp_bind (net/sctp/socket.c:320) sctp inet6_bind_sk (net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:465) ? security_socket_bind (security/security.c:4581 (discriminator 1)) __sys_bind (net/socket.c:1848 net/socket.c:1869) ? do_user_addr_fault (./include/linux/rcupdate.h:347 ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:880 ./include/linux/mm.h:729 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1340) ? do_user_addr_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:84 (discriminator 13) ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:98 (discriminator 13) ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:882 (discriminator 13) ./include/linux/mm.h:729 (discriminator 13) arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1340 (discriminator 13)) __x64_sys_bind (net/socket.c:1877 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:1875 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:1875 (discriminator 1)) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 (discriminator 1)) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) RIP: 0033:0x7f59b934a1e7 Code: 44 00 00 48 8b 15 39 8c 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bd 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 b8 31 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 09 8c 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 All code ======== 0: 44 00 00 add %r8b,(%rax) 3: 48 8b 15 39 8c 0c 00 mov 0xc8c39(%rip),%rdx # 0xc8c43 a: f7 d8 neg %eax c: 64 89 02 mov %eax,%fs:(%rdx) f: b8 ff ff ff ff mov $0xffffffff,%eax 14: eb bd jmp 0xffffffffffffffd3 16: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 cs nopw 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) 1d: 00 00 00 20: 0f 1f 00 nopl (%rax) 23: b8 31 00 00 00 mov $0x31,%eax 28: 0f 05 syscall 2a:* 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff cmp $0xfffffffffffff001,%rax <-- trapping instruction 30: 73 01 jae 0x33 32: c3 ret 33: 48 8b 0d 09 8c 0c 00 mov 0xc8c09(%rip),%rcx # 0xc8c43 3a: f7 d8 neg %eax 3c: 64 89 01 mov %eax,%fs:(%rcx) 3f: 48 rex.W Code starting with the faulting instruction =========================================== 0: 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff cmp $0xfffffffffffff001,%rax 6: 73 01 jae 0x9 8: c3 ret 9: 48 8b 0d 09 8c 0c 00 mov 0xc8c09(%rip),%rcx # 0xc8c19 10: f7 d8 neg %eax 12: 64 89 01 mov %eax,%fs:(%rcx) 15: 48 rex.W RSP: 002b:00007ffe2d0ad398 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000031 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe2d0ad3d0 RCX: 00007f59b934a1e7 RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 00007ffe2d0ad3d0 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 0000000000000005 R08: 1999999999999999 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f59b9253298 R11: 000000000000 ---truncated---
A memory leak flaw was found in the Linux kernel’s io_uring functionality in how a user registers a buffer ring with IORING_REGISTER_PBUF_RING, mmap() it, and then frees it. This flaw allows a local user to crash or potentially escalate their privileges on the system.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: Duplicate SPI Handling The issue originates when Strongswan initiates an XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI Netlink message, which triggers the kernel function xfrm_alloc_spi(). This function is expected to ensure uniqueness of the Security Parameter Index (SPI) for inbound Security Associations (SAs). However, it can return success even when the requested SPI is already in use, leading to duplicate SPIs assigned to multiple inbound SAs, differentiated only by their destination addresses. This behavior causes inconsistencies during SPI lookups for inbound packets. Since the lookup may return an arbitrary SA among those with the same SPI, packet processing can fail, resulting in packet drops. According to RFC 4301 section 4.4.2 , for inbound processing a unicast SA is uniquely identified by the SPI and optionally protocol. Reproducing the Issue Reliably: To consistently reproduce the problem, restrict the available SPI range in charon.conf : spi_min = 0x10000000 spi_max = 0x10000002 This limits the system to only 2 usable SPI values. Next, create more than 2 Child SA. each using unique pair of src/dst address. As soon as the 3rd Child SA is initiated, it will be assigned a duplicate SPI, since the SPI pool is already exhausted. With a narrow SPI range, the issue is consistently reproducible. With a broader/default range, it becomes rare and unpredictable. Current implementation: xfrm_spi_hash() lookup function computes hash using daddr, proto, and family. So if two SAs have the same SPI but different destination addresses, then they will: a. Hash into different buckets b. Be stored in different linked lists (byspi + h) c. Not be seen in the same hlist_for_each_entry_rcu() iteration. As a result, the lookup will result in NULL and kernel allows that Duplicate SPI Proposed Change: xfrm_state_lookup_spi_proto() does a truly global search - across all states, regardless of hash bucket and matches SPI and proto.
kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c in the Linux kernel through 3.17.2 does not properly handle private syscall numbers during use of the perf subsystem, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and OOPS) or bypass the ASLR protection mechanism via a crafted application.
NVIDIA GPU Display Driver for Windows and Linux contains a vulnerability where a user can cause an untrusted pointer dereference by executing a driver API. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to denial of service, information disclosure, and data tampering.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: ISO: Fix UAF on iso_sock_timeout conn->sk maybe have been unlinked/freed while waiting for iso_conn_lock so this checks if the conn->sk is still valid by checking if it part of iso_sk_list.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: octeontx2-pf: Fix use-after-free bugs in otx2_sync_tstamp() The original code relies on cancel_delayed_work() in otx2_ptp_destroy(), which does not ensure that the delayed work item synctstamp_work has fully completed if it was already running. This leads to use-after-free scenarios where otx2_ptp is deallocated by otx2_ptp_destroy(), while synctstamp_work remains active and attempts to dereference otx2_ptp in otx2_sync_tstamp(). Furthermore, the synctstamp_work is cyclic, the likelihood of triggering the bug is nonnegligible. A typical race condition is illustrated below: CPU 0 (cleanup) | CPU 1 (delayed work callback) otx2_remove() | otx2_ptp_destroy() | otx2_sync_tstamp() cancel_delayed_work() | kfree(ptp) | | ptp = container_of(...); //UAF | ptp-> //UAF This is confirmed by a KASAN report: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0 Write of size 8 at addr ffff88800aa09a18 by task bash/136 ... Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0x55/0x70 print_report+0xcf/0x610 ? __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0 kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0 ? __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0 __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0 ? __pfx___run_timer_base.part.0+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_read_tsc+0x10/0x10 ? ktime_get+0x60/0x140 ? lapic_next_event+0x11/0x20 ? clockevents_program_event+0x1d4/0x2a0 run_timer_softirq+0xd1/0x190 handle_softirqs+0x16a/0x550 irq_exit_rcu+0xaf/0xe0 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x80 </IRQ> ... Allocated by task 1: kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0x90 otx2_ptp_init+0xb1/0x860 otx2_probe+0x4eb/0xc30 local_pci_probe+0xdc/0x190 pci_device_probe+0x2fe/0x470 really_probe+0x1ca/0x5c0 __driver_probe_device+0x248/0x310 driver_probe_device+0x44/0x120 __driver_attach+0xd2/0x310 bus_for_each_dev+0xed/0x170 bus_add_driver+0x208/0x500 driver_register+0x132/0x460 do_one_initcall+0x89/0x300 kernel_init_freeable+0x40d/0x720 kernel_init+0x1a/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x10c/0x1a0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Freed by task 136: kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3a/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x3f/0x50 kfree+0x137/0x370 otx2_ptp_destroy+0x38/0x80 otx2_remove+0x10d/0x4c0 pci_device_remove+0xa6/0x1d0 device_release_driver_internal+0xf8/0x210 pci_stop_bus_device+0x105/0x150 pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device_locked+0x15/0x30 remove_store+0xcc/0xe0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x2c3/0x440 vfs_write+0x871/0xd70 ksys_write+0xee/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0xac/0x280 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f ... Replace cancel_delayed_work() with cancel_delayed_work_sync() to ensure that the delayed work item is properly canceled before the otx2_ptp is deallocated. This bug was initially identified through static analysis. To reproduce and test it, I simulated the OcteonTX2 PCI device in QEMU and introduced artificial delays within the otx2_sync_tstamp() function to increase the likelihood of triggering the bug.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: pm: fix UaF read in mptcp_pm_nl_rm_addr_or_subflow Syzkaller reported this splat: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mptcp_pm_nl_rm_addr_or_subflow+0xb44/0xcc0 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:881 Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880569ac858 by task syz.1.2799/14662 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 14662 Comm: syz.1.2799 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2-syzkaller-00307-g36c254515dc6 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0xc3/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0xd9/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:601 mptcp_pm_nl_rm_addr_or_subflow+0xb44/0xcc0 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:881 mptcp_pm_nl_rm_subflow_received net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:914 [inline] mptcp_nl_remove_id_zero_address+0x305/0x4a0 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1572 mptcp_pm_nl_del_addr_doit+0x5c9/0x770 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1603 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x202/0x2f0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x565/0x800 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210 netlink_rcv_skb+0x165/0x410 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2551 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1331 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x53c/0x7f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1357 netlink_sendmsg+0x8b8/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1901 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:729 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:744 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x9ae/0xb40 net/socket.c:2607 ___sys_sendmsg+0x135/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2661 __sys_sendmsg+0x117/0x1f0 net/socket.c:2690 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:165 [inline] __do_fast_syscall_32+0x73/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:386 do_fast_syscall_32+0x32/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:411 entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x84/0x8e RIP: 0023:0xf7fe4579 Code: b8 01 10 06 03 74 b4 01 10 07 03 74 b0 01 10 08 03 74 d8 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 51 52 55 89 e5 0f 34 cd 80 <5d> 5a 59 c3 90 90 90 90 8d b4 26 00 00 00 00 8d b4 26 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00000000f574556c EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000172 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000b RCX: 0000000020000140 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Allocated by task 5387: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:47 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:878 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1014 [inline] subflow_create_ctx+0x87/0x2a0 net/mptcp/subflow.c:1803 subflow_ulp_init+0xc3/0x4d0 net/mptcp/subflow.c:1956 __tcp_set_ulp net/ipv4/tcp_ulp.c:146 [inline] tcp_set_ulp+0x326/0x7f0 net/ipv4/tcp_ulp.c:167 mptcp_subflow_create_socket+0x4ae/0x10a0 net/mptcp/subflow.c:1764 __mptcp_subflow_connect+0x3cc/0x1490 net/mptcp/subflow.c:1592 mptcp_pm_create_subflow_or_signal_addr+0xbda/0x23a0 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:642 mptcp_pm_nl_fully_established net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:650 [inline] mptcp_pm_nl_work+0x3a1/0x4f0 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:943 mptcp_worker+0x15a/0x1240 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2777 process_one_work+0x958/0x1b30 kernel/workqueue.c:3229 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3310 [inline] worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf00 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x2c1/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/ke ---truncated---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: sched: fix use-after-free in taprio_change() In 'taprio_change()', 'admin' pointer may become dangling due to sched switch / removal caused by 'advance_sched()', and critical section protected by 'q->current_entry_lock' is too small to prevent from such a scenario (which causes use-after-free detected by KASAN). Fix this by prefer 'rcu_replace_pointer()' over 'rcu_assign_pointer()' to update 'admin' immediately before an attempt to schedule freeing.
NVIDIA GPU driver for Windows and Linux contains a vulnerability where a user can cause an out-of-bounds write. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, denial of service, escalation of privileges, information disclosure, and data tampering.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: altmode should keep reference to parent The altmode device release refers to its parent device, but without keeping a reference to it. When registering the altmode, get a reference to the parent and put it in the release function. Before this fix, when using CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE, we see issues like this: [ 43.572860] kobject: 'port0.0' (ffff8880057ba008): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 3000) [ 43.573532] kobject: 'port0.1' (ffff8880057bd008): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 1000) [ 43.574407] kobject: 'port0' (ffff8880057b9008): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 3000) [ 43.575059] kobject: 'port1.0' (ffff8880057ca008): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 4000) [ 43.575908] kobject: 'port1.1' (ffff8880057c9008): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 4000) [ 43.576908] kobject: 'typec' (ffff8880062dbc00): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 4000) [ 43.577769] kobject: 'port1' (ffff8880057bf008): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 3000) [ 46.612867] ================================================================== [ 46.613402] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in typec_altmode_release+0x38/0x129 [ 46.614003] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880057b9118 by task kworker/2:1/48 [ 46.614538] [ 46.614668] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 48 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1-00138-gedbae730ad31 #535 [ 46.615391] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 46.616042] Workqueue: events kobject_delayed_cleanup [ 46.616446] Call Trace: [ 46.616648] <TASK> [ 46.616820] dump_stack_lvl+0x5b/0x7c [ 46.617112] ? typec_altmode_release+0x38/0x129 [ 46.617470] print_report+0x14c/0x49e [ 46.617769] ? rcu_read_unlock_sched+0x56/0x69 [ 46.618117] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x19a/0x1ab [ 46.618456] ? kmem_cache_debug_flags+0xc/0x1d [ 46.618807] ? typec_altmode_release+0x38/0x129 [ 46.619161] kasan_report+0x8d/0xb4 [ 46.619447] ? typec_altmode_release+0x38/0x129 [ 46.619809] ? process_scheduled_works+0x3cb/0x85f [ 46.620185] typec_altmode_release+0x38/0x129 [ 46.620537] ? process_scheduled_works+0x3cb/0x85f [ 46.620907] device_release+0xaf/0xf2 [ 46.621206] kobject_delayed_cleanup+0x13b/0x17a [ 46.621584] process_scheduled_works+0x4f6/0x85f [ 46.621955] ? __pfx_process_scheduled_works+0x10/0x10 [ 46.622353] ? hlock_class+0x31/0x9a [ 46.622647] ? lock_acquired+0x361/0x3c3 [ 46.622956] ? move_linked_works+0x46/0x7d [ 46.623277] worker_thread+0x1ce/0x291 [ 46.623582] ? __kthread_parkme+0xc8/0xdf [ 46.623900] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 46.624236] kthread+0x17e/0x190 [ 46.624501] ? kthread+0xfb/0x190 [ 46.624756] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 46.625015] ret_from_fork+0x20/0x40 [ 46.625268] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 46.625532] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 46.625805] </TASK> [ 46.625953] [ 46.626056] Allocated by task 678: [ 46.626287] kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x44 [ 46.626555] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x2d [ 46.626811] __kasan_kmalloc+0x3f/0x4d [ 46.627049] __kmalloc_noprof+0x1bf/0x1f0 [ 46.627362] typec_register_port+0x23/0x491 [ 46.627698] cros_typec_probe+0x634/0xbb6 [ 46.628026] platform_probe+0x47/0x8c [ 46.628311] really_probe+0x20a/0x47d [ 46.628605] device_driver_attach+0x39/0x72 [ 46.628940] bind_store+0x87/0xd7 [ 46.629213] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1aa/0x218 [ 46.629574] vfs_write+0x1d6/0x29b [ 46.629856] ksys_write+0xcd/0x13b [ 46.630128] do_syscall_64+0xd4/0x139 [ 46.630420] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 46.630820] [ 46.630946] Freed by task 48: [ 46.631182] kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x44 [ 46.631493] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x2d [ 46.631799] kasan_save_free_info+0x3f/0x4d [ 46.632144] __kasan_slab_free+0x37/0x45 [ 46.632474] ---truncated---