In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/x86: Move event pointer setup earlier in x86_pmu_enable() A production AMD EPYC system crashed with a NULL pointer dereference in the PMU NMI handler: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000198 RIP: x86_perf_event_update+0xc/0xa0 Call Trace: <NMI> amd_pmu_v2_handle_irq+0x1a6/0x390 perf_event_nmi_handler+0x24/0x40 The faulting instruction is `cmpq $0x0, 0x198(%rdi)` with RDI=0, corresponding to the `if (unlikely(!hwc->event_base))` check in x86_perf_event_update() where hwc = &event->hw and event is NULL. drgn inspection of the vmcore on CPU 106 showed a mismatch between cpuc->active_mask and cpuc->events[]: active_mask: 0x1e (bits 1, 2, 3, 4) events[1]: 0xff1100136cbd4f38 (valid) events[2]: 0x0 (NULL, but active_mask bit 2 set) events[3]: 0xff1100076fd2cf38 (valid) events[4]: 0xff1100079e990a90 (valid) The event that should occupy events[2] was found in event_list[2] with hw.idx=2 and hw.state=0x0, confirming x86_pmu_start() had run (which clears hw.state and sets active_mask) but events[2] was never populated. Another event (event_list[0]) had hw.state=0x7 (STOPPED|UPTODATE|ARCH), showing it was stopped when the PMU rescheduled events, confirming the throttle-then-reschedule sequence occurred. The root cause is commit 7e772a93eb61 ("perf/x86: Fix NULL event access and potential PEBS record loss") which moved the cpuc->events[idx] assignment out of x86_pmu_start() and into step 2 of x86_pmu_enable(), after the PERF_HES_ARCH check. This broke any path that calls pmu->start() without going through x86_pmu_enable() -- specifically the unthrottle path: perf_adjust_freq_unthr_events() -> perf_event_unthrottle_group() -> perf_event_unthrottle() -> event->pmu->start(event, 0) -> x86_pmu_start() // sets active_mask but not events[] The race sequence is: 1. A group of perf events overflows, triggering group throttle via perf_event_throttle_group(). All events are stopped: active_mask bits cleared, events[] preserved (x86_pmu_stop no longer clears events[] after commit 7e772a93eb61). 2. While still throttled (PERF_HES_STOPPED), x86_pmu_enable() runs due to other scheduling activity. Stopped events that need to move counters get PERF_HES_ARCH set and events[old_idx] cleared. In step 2 of x86_pmu_enable(), PERF_HES_ARCH causes these events to be skipped -- events[new_idx] is never set. 3. The timer tick unthrottles the group via pmu->start(). Since commit 7e772a93eb61 removed the events[] assignment from x86_pmu_start(), active_mask[new_idx] is set but events[new_idx] remains NULL. 4. A PMC overflow NMI fires. The handler iterates active counters, finds active_mask[2] set, reads events[2] which is NULL, and crashes dereferencing it. Move the cpuc->events[hwc->idx] assignment in x86_pmu_enable() to before the PERF_HES_ARCH check, so that events[] is populated even for events that are not immediately started. This ensures the unthrottle path via pmu->start() always finds a valid event pointer.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: idpf: convert workqueues to unbound When a workqueue is created with `WQ_UNBOUND`, its work items are served by special worker-pools, whose host workers are not bound to any specific CPU. In the default configuration (i.e. when `queue_delayed_work` and friends do not specify which CPU to run the work item on), `WQ_UNBOUND` allows the work item to be executed on any CPU in the same node of the CPU it was enqueued on. While this solution potentially sacrifices locality, it avoids contention with other processes that might dominate the CPU time of the processor the work item was scheduled on. This is not just a theoretical problem: in a particular scenario misconfigured process was hogging most of the time from CPU0, leaving less than 0.5% of its CPU time to the kworker. The IDPF workqueues that were using the kworker on CPU0 suffered large completion delays as a result, causing performance degradation, timeouts and eventual system crash. * I have also run a manual test to gauge the performance improvement. The test consists of an antagonist process (`./stress --cpu 2`) consuming as much of CPU 0 as possible. This process is run under `taskset 01` to bind it to CPU0, and its priority is changed with `chrt -pQ 9900 10000 ${pid}` and `renice -n -20 ${pid}` after start. Then, the IDPF driver is forced to prefer CPU0 by editing all calls to `queue_delayed_work`, `mod_delayed_work`, etc... to use CPU 0. Finally, `ktraces` for the workqueue events are collected. Without the current patch, the antagonist process can force arbitrary delays between `workqueue_queue_work` and `workqueue_execute_start`, that in my tests were as high as `30ms`. With the current patch applied, the workqueue can be migrated to another unloaded CPU in the same node, and, keeping everything else equal, the maximum delay I could see was `6us`.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: clk: mmp2: call pm_genpd_init() only after genpd.name is set Setting the genpd's struct device's name with dev_set_name() is happening within pm_genpd_init(). If it remains NULL, things can blow up later, such as when crafting the devfs hierarchy for the power domain: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000 when read ... Call trace: strlen from start_creating+0x90/0x138 start_creating from debugfs_create_dir+0x20/0x178 debugfs_create_dir from genpd_debug_add.part.0+0x4c/0x144 genpd_debug_add.part.0 from genpd_debug_init+0x74/0x90 genpd_debug_init from do_one_initcall+0x5c/0x244 do_one_initcall from kernel_init_freeable+0x19c/0x1f4 kernel_init_freeable from kernel_init+0x1c/0x12c kernel_init from ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28 Bisecting tracks this crash back to commit 899f44531fe6 ("pmdomain: core: Add GENPD_FLAG_DEV_NAME_FW flag"), which exchanges use of genpd->name with dev_name(&genpd->dev) in genpd_debug_add.part().
A NULL pointer dereference flaw was found in the Linux kernel’s KVM module, which can lead to a denial of service in the x86_emulate_insn in arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c. This flaw occurs while executing an illegal instruction in guest in the Intel CPU.
Improper input validation in some Intel(R) Graphics Drivers for Windows* before version 26.20.100.7212 and before Linux kernel version 5.5 may allow a privileged user to potentially enable a denial of service via local access.
gss_mech_free in net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_mech_switch.c in the rpcsec_gss_krb5 implementation in the Linux kernel through 5.6.10 lacks certain domain_release calls, leading to a memory leak. Note: This was disputed with the assertion that the issue does not grant any access not already available. It is a problem that on unloading a specific kernel module some memory is leaked, but loading kernel modules is a privileged operation. A user could also write a kernel module to consume any amount of memory they like and load that replicating the effect of this bug
An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel through 5.6.11. btree_gc_coalesce in drivers/md/bcache/btree.c has a deadlock if a coalescing operation fails.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: Fix null-ptr-deref by sock_lock_init_class_and_name() and rmmod. When I ran the repro [0] and waited a few seconds, I observed two LOCKDEP splats: a warning immediately followed by a null-ptr-deref. [1] Reproduction Steps: 1) Mount CIFS 2) Add an iptables rule to drop incoming FIN packets for CIFS 3) Unmount CIFS 4) Unload the CIFS module 5) Remove the iptables rule At step 3), the CIFS module calls sock_release() for the underlying TCP socket, and it returns quickly. However, the socket remains in FIN_WAIT_1 because incoming FIN packets are dropped. At this point, the module's refcnt is 0 while the socket is still alive, so the following rmmod command succeeds. # ss -tan State Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address:Port Peer Address:Port FIN-WAIT-1 0 477 10.0.2.15:51062 10.0.0.137:445 # lsmod | grep cifs cifs 1159168 0 This highlights a discrepancy between the lifetime of the CIFS module and the underlying TCP socket. Even after CIFS calls sock_release() and it returns, the TCP socket does not die immediately in order to close the connection gracefully. While this is generally fine, it causes an issue with LOCKDEP because CIFS assigns a different lock class to the TCP socket's sk->sk_lock using sock_lock_init_class_and_name(). Once an incoming packet is processed for the socket or a timer fires, sk->sk_lock is acquired. Then, LOCKDEP checks the lock context in check_wait_context(), where hlock_class() is called to retrieve the lock class. However, since the module has already been unloaded, hlock_class() logs a warning and returns NULL, triggering the null-ptr-deref. If LOCKDEP is enabled, we must ensure that a module calling sock_lock_init_class_and_name() (CIFS, NFS, etc) cannot be unloaded while such a socket is still alive to prevent this issue. Let's hold the module reference in sock_lock_init_class_and_name() and release it when the socket is freed in sk_prot_free(). Note that sock_lock_init() clears sk->sk_owner for svc_create_socket() that calls sock_lock_init_class_and_name() for a listening socket, which clones a socket by sk_clone_lock() without GFP_ZERO. [0]: CIFS_SERVER="10.0.0.137" CIFS_PATH="//${CIFS_SERVER}/Users/Administrator/Desktop/CIFS_TEST" DEV="enp0s3" CRED="/root/WindowsCredential.txt" MNT=$(mktemp -d /tmp/XXXXXX) mount -t cifs ${CIFS_PATH} ${MNT} -o vers=3.0,credentials=${CRED},cache=none,echo_interval=1 iptables -A INPUT -s ${CIFS_SERVER} -j DROP for i in $(seq 10); do umount ${MNT} rmmod cifs sleep 1 done rm -r ${MNT} iptables -D INPUT -s ${CIFS_SERVER} -j DROP [1]: DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(1) WARNING: CPU: 10 PID: 0 at kernel/locking/lockdep.c:234 hlock_class (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:234 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:223) Modules linked in: cifs_arc4 nls_ucs2_utils cifs_md4 [last unloaded: cifs] CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/10 Not tainted 6.14.0 #36 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:hlock_class (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:234 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:223) ... Call Trace: <IRQ> __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4853 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5178) lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:469 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5853 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5816) _raw_spin_lock_nested (kernel/locking/spinlock.c:379) tcp_v4_rcv (./include/linux/skbuff.h:1678 ./include/net/tcp.h:2547 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2350) ... BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000c4 PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/10 Tainted: G W 6.14.0 #36 Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire (kernel/ ---truncated---
An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 5.4.17. drivers/spi/spi-dw.c allows attackers to cause a panic via concurrent calls to dw_spi_irq and dw_spi_transfer_one, aka CID-19b61392c5a8.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: fix NULL deref in mesh_matches_local() mesh_matches_local() unconditionally dereferences ie->mesh_config to compare mesh configuration parameters. When called from mesh_rx_csa_frame(), the parsed action-frame elements may not contain a Mesh Configuration IE, leaving ie->mesh_config NULL and triggering a kernel NULL pointer dereference. The other two callers are already safe: - ieee80211_mesh_rx_bcn_presp() checks !elems->mesh_config before calling mesh_matches_local() - mesh_plink_get_event() is only reached through mesh_process_plink_frame(), which checks !elems->mesh_config, too mesh_rx_csa_frame() is the only caller that passes raw parsed elements to mesh_matches_local() without guarding mesh_config. An adjacent attacker can exploit this by sending a crafted CSA action frame that includes a valid Mesh ID IE but omits the Mesh Configuration IE, crashing the kernel. The captured crash log: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address ... KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] Workqueue: events_unbound cfg80211_wiphy_work [...] Call Trace: <TASK> ? __pfx_mesh_matches_local (net/mac80211/mesh.c:65) ieee80211_mesh_rx_queued_mgmt (net/mac80211/mesh.c:1686) [...] ieee80211_iface_work (net/mac80211/iface.c:1754 net/mac80211/iface.c:1802) [...] cfg80211_wiphy_work (net/wireless/core.c:426) process_one_work (net/kernel/workqueue.c:3280) ? assign_work (net/kernel/workqueue.c:1219) worker_thread (net/kernel/workqueue.c:3352) ? __pfx_worker_thread (net/kernel/workqueue.c:3385) kthread (net/kernel/kthread.c:436) [...] ret_from_fork_asm (net/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:255) </TASK> This patch adds a NULL check for ie->mesh_config at the top of mesh_matches_local() to return false early when the Mesh Configuration IE is absent.
An issue was discovered in drivers/tty/n_gsm.c in the Linux kernel 6.2. There is a sleeping function called from an invalid context in gsmld_write, which will block the kernel. Note: This has been disputed by 3rd parties as not a valid vulnerability.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: phy: ti: phy-omap-usb2: Fix NULL pointer dereference for SRP If the external phy working together with phy-omap-usb2 does not implement send_srp(), we may still attempt to call it. This can happen on an idle Ethernet gadget triggering a wakeup for example: configfs-gadget.g1 gadget.0: ECM Suspend configfs-gadget.g1 gadget.0: Port suspended. Triggering wakeup ... Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000 when execute ... PC is at 0x0 LR is at musb_gadget_wakeup+0x1d4/0x254 [musb_hdrc] ... musb_gadget_wakeup [musb_hdrc] from usb_gadget_wakeup+0x1c/0x3c [udc_core] usb_gadget_wakeup [udc_core] from eth_start_xmit+0x3b0/0x3d4 [u_ether] eth_start_xmit [u_ether] from dev_hard_start_xmit+0x94/0x24c dev_hard_start_xmit from sch_direct_xmit+0x104/0x2e4 sch_direct_xmit from __dev_queue_xmit+0x334/0xd88 __dev_queue_xmit from arp_solicit+0xf0/0x268 arp_solicit from neigh_probe+0x54/0x7c neigh_probe from __neigh_event_send+0x22c/0x47c __neigh_event_send from neigh_resolve_output+0x14c/0x1c0 neigh_resolve_output from ip_finish_output2+0x1c8/0x628 ip_finish_output2 from ip_send_skb+0x40/0xd8 ip_send_skb from udp_send_skb+0x124/0x340 udp_send_skb from udp_sendmsg+0x780/0x984 udp_sendmsg from __sys_sendto+0xd8/0x158 __sys_sendto from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x58 Let's fix the issue by checking for send_srp() and set_vbus() before calling them. For USB peripheral only cases these both could be NULL.
An issue was discovered in xfs_agf_verify in fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_alloc.c in the Linux kernel through 5.6.10. Attackers may trigger a sync of excessive duration via an XFS v5 image with crafted metadata, aka CID-d0c7feaf8767.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bonding: check xdp prog when set bond mode Following operations can trigger a warning[1]: ip netns add ns1 ip netns exec ns1 ip link add bond0 type bond mode balance-rr ip netns exec ns1 ip link set dev bond0 xdp obj af_xdp_kern.o sec xdp ip netns exec ns1 ip link set bond0 type bond mode broadcast ip netns del ns1 When delete the namespace, dev_xdp_uninstall() is called to remove xdp program on bond dev, and bond_xdp_set() will check the bond mode. If bond mode is changed after attaching xdp program, the warning may occur. Some bond modes (broadcast, etc.) do not support native xdp. Set bond mode with xdp program attached is not good. Add check for xdp program when set bond mode. [1] ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 11 at net/core/dev.c:9912 unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x8d9/0x930 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u4:0 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc4 #107 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b3f840-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: netns cleanup_net RIP: 0010:unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x8d9/0x930 Code: 00 00 48 c7 c6 6f e3 a2 82 48 c7 c7 d0 b3 96 82 e8 9c 10 3e ... RSP: 0018:ffffc90000063d80 EFLAGS: 00000282 RAX: 00000000ffffffa1 RBX: ffff888004959000 RCX: 00000000ffffdfff RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000ffffffea RDI: ffffc90000063b48 RBP: ffffc90000063e28 R08: ffffffff82d39b28 R09: 0000000000009ffb R10: 0000000000000175 R11: ffffffff82d09b40 R12: ffff8880049598e8 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: dead000000000100 R15: ffffc90000045000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888007a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000d406b60 CR3: 000000000483e000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn+0x83/0x130 ? unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x8d9/0x930 ? report_bug+0x18e/0x1a0 ? handle_bug+0x54/0x90 ? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x8d9/0x930 ? bond_net_exit_batch_rtnl+0x5c/0x90 cleanup_net+0x237/0x3d0 process_one_work+0x163/0x390 worker_thread+0x293/0x3b0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xec/0x1e0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: binfmt_flat: Fix integer overflow bug on 32 bit systems Most of these sizes and counts are capped at 256MB so the math doesn't result in an integer overflow. The "relocs" count needs to be checked as well. Otherwise on 32bit systems the calculation of "full_data" could be wrong. full_data = data_len + relocs * sizeof(unsigned long);
A use-after-free flaw was found in the Linux kernel’s Amateur Radio AX.25 protocol functionality in the way a user connects with the protocol. This flaw allows a local user to crash the system.
Null pointer reference in some Intel(R) Graphics Drivers for Windows* before version 26.20.100.7212 and before version Linux kernel version 5.5 may allow a privileged user to potentially enable a denial of service via local access.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/nouveau/kms/nv50-: fix file release memory leak When using single_open() for opening, single_release() should be called, otherwise the 'op' allocated in single_open() will be leaked.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (acpi_power_meter) Fix deadlocks related to acpi_power_meter_notify() The acpi_power_meter driver's .notify() callback function, acpi_power_meter_notify(), calls hwmon_device_unregister() under a lock that is also acquired by callbacks in sysfs attributes of the device being unregistered which is prone to deadlocks between sysfs access and device removal. Address this by moving the hwmon device removal in acpi_power_meter_notify() outside the lock in question, but notice that doing it alone is not sufficient because two concurrent METER_NOTIFY_CONFIG notifications may be attempting to remove the same device at the same time. To prevent that from happening, add a new lock serializing the execution of the switch () statement in acpi_power_meter_notify(). For simplicity, it is a static mutex which should not be a problem from the performance perspective. The new lock also allows the hwmon_device_register_with_info() in acpi_power_meter_notify() to be called outside the inner lock because it prevents the other notifications handled by that function from manipulating the "resource" object while the hwmon device based on it is being registered. The sending of ACPI netlink messages from acpi_power_meter_notify() is serialized by the new lock too which generally helps to ensure that the order of handling firmware notifications is the same as the order of sending netlink messages related to them. In addition, notice that hwmon_device_register_with_info() may fail in which case resource->hwmon_dev will become an error pointer, so add checks to avoid attempting to unregister the hwmon device pointer to by it in that case to acpi_power_meter_notify() and acpi_power_meter_remove().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: add mutual exclusion in proc_sctp_do_udp_port() We must serialize calls to sctp_udp_sock_stop() and sctp_udp_sock_start() or risk a crash as syzbot reported: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000d: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000068-0x000000000000006f] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6551 Comm: syz.1.44 Not tainted 6.14.0-syzkaller-g7f2ff7b62617 #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025 RIP: 0010:kernel_sock_shutdown+0x47/0x70 net/socket.c:3653 Call Trace: <TASK> udp_tunnel_sock_release+0x68/0x80 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel_core.c:181 sctp_udp_sock_stop+0x71/0x160 net/sctp/protocol.c:930 proc_sctp_do_udp_port+0x264/0x450 net/sctp/sysctl.c:553 proc_sys_call_handler+0x3d0/0x5b0 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:601 iter_file_splice_write+0x91c/0x1150 fs/splice.c:738 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:935 [inline] direct_splice_actor+0x18f/0x6c0 fs/splice.c:1158 splice_direct_to_actor+0x342/0xa30 fs/splice.c:1102 do_splice_direct_actor fs/splice.c:1201 [inline] do_splice_direct+0x174/0x240 fs/splice.c:1227 do_sendfile+0xafd/0xe50 fs/read_write.c:1368 __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1429 [inline] __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1415 [inline] __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1d8/0x220 fs/read_write.c:1415 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: usb: etas_es58x: correctly anchor the urb in the read bulk callback When submitting an urb, that is using the anchor pattern, it needs to be anchored before submitting it otherwise it could be leaked if usb_kill_anchored_urbs() is called. This logic is correctly done elsewhere in the driver, except in the read bulk callback so do that here also.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvkm/gsp: correctly advance the read pointer of GSP message queue A GSP event message consists three parts: message header, RPC header, message body. GSP calculates the number of pages to write from the total size of a GSP message. This behavior can be observed from the movement of the write pointer. However, nvkm takes only the size of RPC header and message body as the message size when advancing the read pointer. When handling a two-page GSP message in the non rollback case, It wrongly takes the message body of the previous message as the message header of the next message. As the "message length" tends to be zero, in the calculation of size needs to be copied (0 - size of (message header)), the size needs to be copied will be "0xffffffxx". It also triggers a kernel panic due to a NULL pointer error. [ 547.614102] msg: 00000f90: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 40 d7 18 fb 8b 00 00 00 ........@....... [ 547.622533] msg: 00000fa0: 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 ................ [ 547.630965] msg: 00000fb0: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff ................ [ 547.639397] msg: 00000fc0: ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................ [ 547.647832] nvkm 0000:c1:00.0: gsp: peek msg rpc fn:0 len:0x0/0xffffffffffffffe0 [ 547.655225] nvkm 0000:c1:00.0: gsp: get msg rpc fn:0 len:0x0/0xffffffffffffffe0 [ 547.662532] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 [ 547.669485] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 547.674624] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 547.679755] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 547.682294] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 547.686643] CPU: 22 PID: 322 Comm: kworker/22:1 Tainted: G E 6.9.0-rc6+ #1 [ 547.694893] Hardware name: ASRockRack 1U1G-MILAN/N/ROMED8-NL, BIOS L3.12E 09/06/2022 [ 547.702626] Workqueue: events r535_gsp_msgq_work [nvkm] [ 547.707921] RIP: 0010:r535_gsp_msg_recv+0x87/0x230 [nvkm] [ 547.713375] Code: 00 8b 70 08 48 89 e1 31 d2 4c 89 f7 e8 12 f5 ff ff 48 89 c5 48 85 c0 0f 84 cf 00 00 00 48 81 fd 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 c4 00 00 00 <8b> 55 10 41 8b 46 30 85 d2 0f 85 f6 00 00 00 83 f8 04 76 10 ba 05 [ 547.732119] RSP: 0018:ffffabe440f87e10 EFLAGS: 00010203 [ 547.737335] RAX: 0000000000000010 RBX: 0000000000000008 RCX: 000000000000003f [ 547.744461] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffabe4480a8030 RDI: 0000000000000010 [ 547.751585] RBP: 0000000000000010 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffabe440f87bb0 [ 547.758707] R10: ffffabe440f87dc8 R11: 0000000000000010 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 547.765834] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9351df1e5000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 547.772958] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff93708eb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 547.781035] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 547.786771] CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 00000003cc220002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 [ 547.793896] PKRU: 55555554 [ 547.796600] Call Trace: [ 547.799046] <TASK> [ 547.801152] ? __die+0x20/0x70 [ 547.804211] ? page_fault_oops+0x75/0x170 [ 547.808221] ? print_hex_dump+0x100/0x160 [ 547.812226] ? exc_page_fault+0x64/0x150 [ 547.816152] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [ 547.820341] ? r535_gsp_msg_recv+0x87/0x230 [nvkm] [ 547.825184] r535_gsp_msgq_work+0x42/0x50 [nvkm] [ 547.829845] process_one_work+0x196/0x3d0 [ 547.833861] worker_thread+0x2fc/0x410 [ 547.837613] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 547.841885] kthread+0xdf/0x110 [ 547.845031] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 547.848775] ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50 [ 547.852354] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 547.856097] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 547.860019] </TASK> [ 547.862208] Modules linked in: nvkm(E) gsp_log(E) snd_seq_dummy(E) snd_hrtimer(E) snd_seq(E) snd_timer(E) snd_seq_device(E) snd(E) soundcore(E) rfkill(E) qrtr(E) vfat(E) fat(E) ipmi_ssif(E) amd_atl(E) intel_rapl_msr(E) intel_rapl_common(E) amd64_edac(E) mlx5_ib(E) edac_mce_amd(E) kvm_amd ---truncated---
An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 5.6. svm_cpu_uninit in arch/x86/kvm/svm.c has a memory leak, aka CID-d80b64ff297e. NOTE: third parties dispute this issue because it's a one-time leak at the boot, the size is negligible, and it can't be triggered at will
A NULL pointer dereference issue was found in KVM when releasing a vCPU with dirty ring support enabled. This flaw allows an unprivileged local attacker on the host to issue specific ioctl calls, causing a kernel oops condition that results in a denial of service.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: udp_tunnel: fix NULL deref caused by udp_sock_create6 when CONFIG_IPV6=n When CONFIG_IPV6 is disabled, the udp_sock_create6() function returns 0 (success) without actually creating a socket. Callers such as fou_create() then proceed to dereference the uninitialized socket pointer, resulting in a NULL pointer dereference. The captured NULL deref crash: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018 RIP: 0010:fou_nl_add_doit (net/ipv4/fou_core.c:590 net/ipv4/fou_core.c:764) [...] Call Trace: <TASK> genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.constprop.0 (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1114) genl_rcv_msg (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1194 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1209) [...] netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550) genl_rcv (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219) netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344) netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894) __sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:727 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:742 (discriminator 1)) __sys_sendto (./include/linux/file.h:62 (discriminator 1) ./include/linux/file.h:83 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2183 (discriminator 1)) __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2213 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2209 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2209 (discriminator 1)) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 (discriminator 1)) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (net/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) This patch makes udp_sock_create6 return -EPFNOSUPPORT instead, so callers correctly take their error paths. There is only one caller of the vulnerable function and only privileged users can trigger it.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/deadline: Fix missing ENQUEUE_REPLENISH during PI de-boosting Running stress-ng --schedpolicy 0 on an RT kernel on a big machine might lead to the following WARNINGs (edited). sched: DL de-boosted task PID 22725: REPLENISH flag missing WARNING: CPU: 93 PID: 0 at kernel/sched/deadline.c:239 dequeue_task_dl+0x15c/0x1f8 ... (running_bw underflow) Call trace: dequeue_task_dl+0x15c/0x1f8 (P) dequeue_task+0x80/0x168 deactivate_task+0x24/0x50 push_dl_task+0x264/0x2e0 dl_task_timer+0x1b0/0x228 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x188/0x378 hrtimer_interrupt+0xfc/0x260 ... The problem is that when a SCHED_DEADLINE task (lock holder) is changed to a lower priority class via sched_setscheduler(), it may fail to properly inherit the parameters of potential DEADLINE donors if it didn't already inherit them in the past (shorter deadline than donor's at that time). This might lead to bandwidth accounting corruption, as enqueue_task_dl() won't recognize the lock holder as boosted. The scenario occurs when: 1. A DEADLINE task (donor) blocks on a PI mutex held by another DEADLINE task (holder), but the holder doesn't inherit parameters (e.g., it already has a shorter deadline) 2. sched_setscheduler() changes the holder from DEADLINE to a lower class while still holding the mutex 3. The holder should now inherit DEADLINE parameters from the donor and be enqueued with ENQUEUE_REPLENISH, but this doesn't happen Fix the issue by introducing __setscheduler_dl_pi(), which detects when a DEADLINE (proper or boosted) task gets setscheduled to a lower priority class. In case, the function makes the task inherit DEADLINE parameters of the donoer (pi_se) and sets ENQUEUE_REPLENISH flag to ensure proper bandwidth accounting during the next enqueue operation.
A use-after-free vulnerability was found in the Linux kernel in drivers/net/hamradio. This flaw allows a local attacker with a user privilege to cause a denial of service (DOS) when the mkiss or sixpack device is detached and reclaim resources early.
An issue was discovered in drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_bridge.c in the Linux kernel 6.2. There is a NULL pointer dereference in vidtv_mux_stop_thread. In vidtv_stop_streaming, after dvb->mux=NULL occurs, it executes vidtv_mux_stop_thread(dvb->mux).
A use-after-free flaw was found in fs/ext4/namei.c:dx_insert_block() in the Linux kernel’s filesystem sub-component. This flaw allows a local attacker with a user privilege to cause a denial of service.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: dwc2: fix a devres leak in hw_enable upon suspend resume Each time the platform goes to low power, PM suspend / resume routines call: __dwc2_lowlevel_hw_enable -> devm_add_action_or_reset(). This adds a new devres each time. This may also happen at runtime, as dwc2_lowlevel_hw_enable() can be called from udc_start(). This can be seen with tracing: - echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/dev/devres_log/enable - go to low power - cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace A new "ADD" entry is found upon each low power cycle: ... devres_log: 49000000.usb-otg ADD 82a13bba devm_action_release (8 bytes) ... devres_log: 49000000.usb-otg ADD 49889daf devm_action_release (8 bytes) ... A second issue is addressed here: - regulator_bulk_enable() is called upon each PM cycle (suspend/resume). - regulator_bulk_disable() never gets called. So the reference count for these regulators constantly increase, by one upon each low power cycle, due to missing regulator_bulk_disable() call in __dwc2_lowlevel_hw_disable(). The original fix that introduced the devm_add_action_or_reset() call, fixed an issue during probe, that happens due to other errors in dwc2_driver_probe() -> dwc2_core_reset(). Then the probe fails without disabling regulators, when dr_mode == USB_DR_MODE_PERIPHERAL. Rather fix the error path: disable all the low level hardware in the error path, by using the "hsotg->ll_hw_enabled" flag. Checking dr_mode has been introduced to avoid a dual call to dwc2_lowlevel_hw_disable(). "ll_hw_enabled" should achieve the same (and is used currently in the remove() routine).
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix recvmsg() unconditional requeue If rxrpc_recvmsg() fails because MSG_DONTWAIT was specified but the call at the front of the recvmsg queue already has its mutex locked, it requeues the call - whether or not the call is already queued. The call may be on the queue because MSG_PEEK was also passed and so the call was not dequeued or because the I/O thread requeued it. The unconditional requeue may then corrupt the recvmsg queue, leading to things like UAFs or refcount underruns. Fix this by only requeuing the call if it isn't already on the queue - and moving it to the front if it is already queued. If we don't queue it, we have to put the ref we obtained by dequeuing it. Also, MSG_PEEK doesn't dequeue the call so shouldn't call rxrpc_notify_socket() for the call if we didn't use up all the data on the queue, so fix that also.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipmi: ipmb: initialise event handler read bytes IPMB doesn't use i2c reads, but the handler needs to set a value. Otherwise an i2c read will return an uninitialised value from the bus driver.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: PCI/MSI: Handle lack of irqdomain gracefully Alexandre observed a warning emitted from pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs() on a RISCV platform which does not provide PCI/MSI support: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1 at drivers/pci/msi/msi.h:121 pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs+0x2c/0x32 __pci_enable_msix_range+0x30c/0x596 pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs+0x2c/0x32 pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity+0xb8/0xe2 RISCV uses hierarchical interrupt domains and correctly does not implement the legacy fallback. The warning triggers from the legacy fallback stub. That warning is bogus as the PCI/MSI layer knows whether a PCI/MSI parent domain is associated with the device or not. There is a check for MSI-X, which has a legacy assumption. But that legacy fallback assumption is only valid when legacy support is enabled, but otherwise the check should simply return -ENOTSUPP. Loongarch tripped over the same problem and blindly enabled legacy support without implementing the legacy fallbacks. There are weak implementations which return an error, so the problem was papered over. Correct pci_msi_domain_supports() to evaluate the legacy mode and add the missing supported check into the MSI enable path to complete it.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: hsr: avoid potential out-of-bound access in fill_frame_info() syzbot is able to feed a packet with 14 bytes, pretending it is a vlan one. Since fill_frame_info() is relying on skb->mac_len already, extend the check to cover this case. BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in fill_frame_info net/hsr/hsr_forward.c:709 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in hsr_forward_skb+0x9ee/0x3b10 net/hsr/hsr_forward.c:724 fill_frame_info net/hsr/hsr_forward.c:709 [inline] hsr_forward_skb+0x9ee/0x3b10 net/hsr/hsr_forward.c:724 hsr_dev_xmit+0x2f0/0x350 net/hsr/hsr_device.c:235 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5002 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5011 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3590 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x247/0xa20 net/core/dev.c:3606 __dev_queue_xmit+0x366a/0x57d0 net/core/dev.c:4434 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3168 [inline] packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6c0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3146 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x91ae/0xa6f0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3178 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:726 __sys_sendto+0x594/0x750 net/socket.c:2197 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2204 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2200 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2200 x64_sys_call+0x346a/0x3c30 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:45 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4091 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4134 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x6bf/0xb80 mm/slub.c:4186 kmalloc_reserve+0x13d/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:587 __alloc_skb+0x363/0x7b0 net/core/skbuff.c:678 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1323 [inline] alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc8/0xd00 net/core/skbuff.c:6612 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xa81/0xbf0 net/core/sock.c:2881 packet_alloc_skb net/packet/af_packet.c:2995 [inline] packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3089 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x74c6/0xa6f0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3178 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:726 __sys_sendto+0x594/0x750 net/socket.c:2197 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2204 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2200 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2200 x64_sys_call+0x346a/0x3c30 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:45 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: mediatek: Check num_codecs is not zero to avoid panic during probe Following commit 13f58267cda3 ("ASoC: soc.h: don't create dummy Component via COMP_DUMMY()"), COMP_DUMMY() became an array with zero length, and only gets populated with the dummy struct after the card is registered. Since the sound card driver's probe happens before the card registration, accessing any of the members of a dummy component during probe will result in undefined behavior. This can be observed in the mt8188 and mt8195 machine sound drivers. By omitting a dai link subnode in the sound card's node in the Devicetree, the default uninitialized dummy codec is used, and when its dai_name pointer gets passed to strcmp() it results in a null pointer dereference and a kernel panic. In addition to that, set_card_codec_info() in the generic helpers file, mtk-soundcard-driver.c, will populate a dai link with a dummy codec when a dai link node is present in DT but with no codec property. The result is that at probe time, a dummy codec can either be uninitialized with num_codecs = 0, or be an initialized dummy codec, with num_codecs = 1 and dai_name = "snd-soc-dummy-dai". In order to accommodate for both situations, check that num_codecs is not zero before accessing the codecs' fields but still check for the codec's dai name against "snd-soc-dummy-dai" as needed. While at it, also drop the check that dai_name is not null in the mt8192 driver, introduced in commit 4d4e1b6319e5 ("ASoC: mediatek: mt8192: Check existence of dai_name before dereferencing"), as it is actually redundant given the preceding num_codecs != 0 check.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sit: do not call ipip6_dev_free() from sit_init_net() ipip6_dev_free is sit dev->priv_destructor, already called by register_netdevice() if something goes wrong. Alternative would be to make ipip6_dev_free() robust against multiple invocations, but other drivers do not implement this strategy. syzbot reported: dst_release underflow WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5059 at net/core/dst.c:173 dst_release+0xd8/0xe0 net/core/dst.c:173 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 5059 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc5-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:dst_release+0xd8/0xe0 net/core/dst.c:173 Code: 4c 89 f2 89 d9 31 c0 5b 41 5e 5d e9 da d5 44 f9 e8 1d 90 5f f9 c6 05 87 48 c6 05 01 48 c7 c7 80 44 99 8b 31 c0 e8 e8 67 29 f9 <0f> 0b eb 85 0f 1f 40 00 53 48 89 fb e8 f7 8f 5f f9 48 83 c3 a8 48 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000aa5faa0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: d6894a925dd15a00 RBX: 00000000ffffffff RCX: 0000000000040000 RDX: ffffc90005e19000 RSI: 000000000003ffff RDI: 0000000000040000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff816a1f42 R09: ffffed1017344f2c R10: ffffed1017344f2c R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000607f462b1358 R13: 1ffffffff1bfd305 R14: ffffe8ffffcb1358 R15: dffffc0000000000 FS: 00007f66c71a2700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f88aaed5058 CR3: 0000000023e0f000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> dst_cache_destroy+0x107/0x1e0 net/core/dst_cache.c:160 ipip6_dev_free net/ipv6/sit.c:1414 [inline] sit_init_net+0x229/0x550 net/ipv6/sit.c:1936 ops_init+0x313/0x430 net/core/net_namespace.c:140 setup_net+0x35b/0x9d0 net/core/net_namespace.c:326 copy_net_ns+0x359/0x5c0 net/core/net_namespace.c:470 create_new_namespaces+0x4ce/0xa00 kernel/nsproxy.c:110 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0x11e/0x180 kernel/nsproxy.c:226 ksys_unshare+0x57d/0xb50 kernel/fork.c:3075 __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3146 [inline] __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3144 [inline] __x64_sys_unshare+0x34/0x40 kernel/fork.c:3144 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f66c882ce99 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f66c71a2168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000110 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f66c893ff60 RCX: 00007f66c882ce99 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000048040200 RBP: 00007f66c8886ff1 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007fff6634832f R14: 00007f66c71a2300 R15: 0000000000022000 </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mt76: mt7921: fix kernel crash when the firmware fails to download Fix kernel crash when the firmware is missing or fails to download. [ 9.444758] kernel BUG at drivers/pci/msi.c:375! [ 9.449363] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 9.501033] pstate: a0400009 (NzCv daif +PAN -UAO) [ 9.505814] pc : free_msi_irqs+0x180/0x184 [ 9.509897] lr : free_msi_irqs+0x40/0x184 [ 9.513893] sp : ffffffc015193870 [ 9.517194] x29: ffffffc015193870 x28: 00000000f0e94fa2 [ 9.522492] x27: 0000000000000acd x26: 000000000000009a [ 9.527790] x25: ffffffc0152cee58 x24: ffffffdbb383e0d8 [ 9.533087] x23: ffffffdbb38628d0 x22: 0000000000040200 [ 9.538384] x21: ffffff8cf7de7318 x20: ffffff8cd65a2480 [ 9.543681] x19: ffffff8cf7de7000 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 9.548979] x17: ffffff8cf9ca03b4 x16: ffffffdc13ad9a34 [ 9.554277] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000080800 [ 9.559575] x13: ffffff8cd65a2980 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 9.564873] x11: ffffff8cfa45d820 x10: ffffff8cfa45d6d0 [ 9.570171] x9 : 0000000000000040 x8 : ffffff8ccef1b780 [ 9.575469] x7 : aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 9.580766] x5 : ffffffdc13824900 x4 : ffffff8ccefe0000 [ 9.586063] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000 [ 9.591362] x1 : 0000000000000125 x0 : ffffff8ccefe0000 [ 9.596660] Call trace: [ 9.599095] free_msi_irqs+0x180/0x184 [ 9.602831] pci_disable_msi+0x100/0x130 [ 9.606740] pci_free_irq_vectors+0x24/0x30 [ 9.610915] mt7921_pci_probe+0xbc/0x250 [mt7921e] [ 9.615693] pci_device_probe+0xd4/0x14c [ 9.619604] really_probe+0x134/0x2ec [ 9.623252] driver_probe_device+0x64/0xfc [ 9.627335] device_driver_attach+0x4c/0x6c [ 9.631506] __driver_attach+0xac/0xc0 [ 9.635243] bus_for_each_dev+0x8c/0xd4 [ 9.639066] driver_attach+0x2c/0x38 [ 9.642628] bus_add_driver+0xfc/0x1d0 [ 9.646365] driver_register+0x64/0xf8 [ 9.650101] __pci_register_driver+0x6c/0x7c [ 9.654360] init_module+0x28/0xfdc [mt7921e] [ 9.658704] do_one_initcall+0x13c/0x2d0 [ 9.662615] do_init_module+0x58/0x1e8 [ 9.666351] load_module+0xd80/0xeb4 [ 9.669912] __arm64_sys_finit_module+0xa8/0xe0 [ 9.674430] el0_svc_common+0xa4/0x16c [ 9.678168] el0_svc_compat_handler+0x2c/0x40 [ 9.682511] el0_svc_compat+0x8/0x10 [ 9.686076] Code: a94257f6 f9400bf7 a8c47bfd d65f03c0 (d4210000) [ 9.692155] ---[ end trace 7621f966afbf0a29 ]--- [ 9.697385] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 9.702599] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs [ 9.706549] Kernel Offset: 0x1c03600000 from 0xffffffc010000000 [ 9.712456] PHYS_OFFSET: 0xfffffff440000000 [ 9.716625] CPU features: 0x080026,2a80aa18 [ 9.720795] Memory Limit: none
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: spi: fix use-after-free of the add_lock mutex Commit 6098475d4cb4 ("spi: Fix deadlock when adding SPI controllers on SPI buses") introduced a per-controller mutex. But mutex_unlock() of said lock is called after the controller is already freed: spi_unregister_controller(ctlr) -> put_device(&ctlr->dev) -> spi_controller_release(dev) -> mutex_unlock(&ctrl->add_lock) Move the put_device() after the mutex_unlock().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: clk: qcom: ipq8074: fix PCI-E clock oops Fix PCI-E clock related kernel oops that are caused by a missing clock parent. pcie0_rchng_clk_src has num_parents set to 2 but only one parent is actually set via parent_hws, it should also have "XO" defined. This will cause the kernel to panic on a NULL pointer in clk_core_get_parent_by_index(). So, to fix this utilize clk_parent_data to provide gcc_xo_gpll0 parent data. Since there is already an existing static const char * const gcc_xo_gpll0[] used to provide the same parents via parent_names convert those users to clk_parent_data as well. Without this earlycon is needed to even catch the OOPS as it will reset the board before serial is initialized with the following: [ 0.232279] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000a00000000000 [ 0.232322] Mem abort info: [ 0.239094] ESR = 0x96000004 [ 0.241778] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 0.244908] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 0.250377] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 0.253236] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 0.256277] Data abort info: [ 0.261141] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 [ 0.264262] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [ 0.267820] [0000a00000000000] address between user and kernel address ranges [ 0.270954] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP [ 0.278067] Modules linked in: [ 0.282751] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.15.10 #0 [ 0.285882] Hardware name: Xiaomi AX3600 (DT) [ 0.292043] pstate: 20400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 0.296299] pc : clk_core_get_parent_by_index+0x68/0xec [ 0.303067] lr : __clk_register+0x1d8/0x820 [ 0.308273] sp : ffffffc01111b7d0 [ 0.312438] x29: ffffffc01111b7d0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000040 [ 0.315919] x26: 0000000000000002 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffffff8000308800 [ 0.323037] x23: ffffff8000308850 x22: ffffff8000308880 x21: ffffff8000308828 [ 0.330155] x20: 0000000000000028 x19: ffffff8000309700 x18: 0000000000000020 [ 0.337272] x17: 000000005cc86990 x16: 0000000000000004 x15: ffffff80001d9d0a [ 0.344391] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000006 [ 0.351508] x11: 0000000000000003 x10: 0101010101010101 x9 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.358626] x8 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x7 : 6468626f5e626266 x6 : 17000a3a403c1b06 [ 0.365744] x5 : 061b3c403a0a0017 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000001 [ 0.372863] x2 : 0000a00000000000 x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : ffffff8000309700 [ 0.379982] Call trace: [ 0.387091] clk_core_get_parent_by_index+0x68/0xec [ 0.389351] __clk_register+0x1d8/0x820 [ 0.394210] devm_clk_hw_register+0x5c/0xe0 [ 0.398030] devm_clk_register_regmap+0x44/0x8c [ 0.402198] qcom_cc_really_probe+0x17c/0x1d0 [ 0.406711] qcom_cc_probe+0x34/0x44 [ 0.411224] gcc_ipq8074_probe+0x18/0x30 [ 0.414869] platform_probe+0x68/0xe0 [ 0.418776] really_probe.part.0+0x9c/0x30c [ 0.422336] __driver_probe_device+0x98/0x144 [ 0.426329] driver_probe_device+0x44/0x11c [ 0.430842] __device_attach_driver+0xb4/0x120 [ 0.434836] bus_for_each_drv+0x68/0xb0 [ 0.439349] __device_attach+0xb0/0x170 [ 0.443081] device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20 [ 0.446901] bus_probe_device+0x9c/0xa4 [ 0.451067] device_add+0x35c/0x834 [ 0.454886] of_device_add+0x54/0x64 [ 0.458360] of_platform_device_create_pdata+0xc0/0x100 [ 0.462181] of_platform_bus_create+0x114/0x370 [ 0.467128] of_platform_bus_create+0x15c/0x370 [ 0.471641] of_platform_populate+0x50/0xcc [ 0.476155] of_platform_default_populate_init+0xa8/0xc8 [ 0.480324] do_one_initcall+0x50/0x1b0 [ 0.485877] kernel_init_freeable+0x234/0x29c [ 0.489436] kernel_init+0x24/0x120 [ 0.493948] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 0.497253] Code: d50323bf d65f03c0 f94002a2 b4000302 (f9400042) [ 0.501079] ---[ end trace 4ca7e1129da2abce ]---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, lockdown, audit: Fix buggy SELinux lockdown permission checks Commit 59438b46471a ("security,lockdown,selinux: implement SELinux lockdown") added an implementation of the locked_down LSM hook to SELinux, with the aim to restrict which domains are allowed to perform operations that would breach lockdown. This is indirectly also getting audit subsystem involved to report events. The latter is problematic, as reported by Ondrej and Serhei, since it can bring down the whole system via audit: 1) The audit events that are triggered due to calls to security_locked_down() can OOM kill a machine, see below details [0]. 2) It also seems to be causing a deadlock via avc_has_perm()/slow_avc_audit() when trying to wake up kauditd, for example, when using trace_sched_switch() tracepoint, see details in [1]. Triggering this was not via some hypothetical corner case, but with existing tools like runqlat & runqslower from bcc, for example, which make use of this tracepoint. Rough call sequence goes like: rq_lock(rq) -> -------------------------+ trace_sched_switch() -> | bpf_prog_xyz() -> +-> deadlock selinux_lockdown() -> | audit_log_end() -> | wake_up_interruptible() -> | try_to_wake_up() -> | rq_lock(rq) --------------+ What's worse is that the intention of 59438b46471a to further restrict lockdown settings for specific applications in respect to the global lockdown policy is completely broken for BPF. The SELinux policy rule for the current lockdown check looks something like this: allow <who> <who> : lockdown { <reason> }; However, this doesn't match with the 'current' task where the security_locked_down() is executed, example: httpd does a syscall. There is a tracing program attached to the syscall which triggers a BPF program to run, which ends up doing a bpf_probe_read_kernel{,_str}() helper call. The selinux_lockdown() hook does the permission check against 'current', that is, httpd in this example. httpd has literally zero relation to this tracing program, and it would be nonsensical having to write an SELinux policy rule against httpd to let the tracing helper pass. The policy in this case needs to be against the entity that is installing the BPF program. For example, if bpftrace would generate a histogram of syscall counts by user space application: bpftrace -e 'tracepoint:raw_syscalls:sys_enter { @[comm] = count(); }' bpftrace would then go and generate a BPF program from this internally. One way of doing it [for the sake of the example] could be to call bpf_get_current_task() helper and then access current->comm via one of bpf_probe_read_kernel{,_str}() helpers. So the program itself has nothing to do with httpd or any other random app doing a syscall here. The BPF program _explicitly initiated_ the lockdown check. The allow/deny policy belongs in the context of bpftrace: meaning, you want to grant bpftrace access to use these helpers, but other tracers on the system like my_random_tracer _not_. Therefore fix all three issues at the same time by taking a completely different approach for the security_locked_down() hook, that is, move the check into the program verification phase where we actually retrieve the BPF func proto. This also reliably gets the task (current) that is trying to install the BPF tracing program, e.g. bpftrace/bcc/perf/systemtap/etc, and it also fixes the OOM since we're moving this out of the BPF helper's fast-path which can be called several millions of times per second. The check is then also in line with other security_locked_down() hooks in the system where the enforcement is performed at open/load time, for example, open_kcore() for /proc/kcore access or module_sig_check() for module signatures just to pick f ---truncated---
A flaw was found in the filelock_init in fs/locks.c function in the Linux kernel. This issue can lead to host memory exhaustion due to memcg not limiting the number of Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX) file locks.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dma-buf/sync_file: Don't leak fences on merge failure Each add_fence() call does a dma_fence_get() on the relevant fence. In the error path, we weren't calling dma_fence_put() so all those fences got leaked. Also, in the krealloc_array failure case, we weren't freeing the fences array. Instead, ensure that i and fences are always zero-initialized and dma_fence_put() all the fences and kfree(fences) on every error path.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: pcm: oss: Limit the period size to 16MB Set the practical limit to the period size (the fragment shift in OSS) instead of a full 31bit; a too large value could lead to the exhaust of memory as we allocate temporary buffers of the period size, too. As of this patch, we set to 16MB limit, which should cover all use cases.
A flaw null pointer dereference in the Linux kernel UDF file system functionality was found in the way user triggers udf_file_write_iter function for the malicious UDF image. A local user could use this flaw to crash the system. Actual from Linux kernel 4.2-rc1 till 5.17-rc2.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring: fail cancellation for EXITING tasks WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 20 at fs/io_uring.c:6269 io_try_cancel_userdata+0x3c5/0x640 fs/io_uring.c:6269 CPU: 1 PID: 20 Comm: kworker/1:0 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 Workqueue: events io_fallback_req_func RIP: 0010:io_try_cancel_userdata+0x3c5/0x640 fs/io_uring.c:6269 Call Trace: <TASK> io_req_task_link_timeout+0x6b/0x1e0 fs/io_uring.c:6886 io_fallback_req_func+0xf9/0x1ae fs/io_uring.c:1334 process_one_work+0x9b2/0x1690 kernel/workqueue.c:2298 worker_thread+0x658/0x11f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2445 kthread+0x405/0x4f0 kernel/kthread.c:327 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295 </TASK> We need original task's context to do cancellations, so if it's dying and the callback is executed in a fallback mode, fail the cancellation attempt.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net_sched: fix NULL deref in fifo_set_limit() syzbot reported another NULL deref in fifo_set_limit() [1] I could repro the issue with : unshare -n tc qd add dev lo root handle 1:0 tbf limit 200000 burst 70000 rate 100Mbit tc qd replace dev lo parent 1:0 pfifo_fast tc qd change dev lo root handle 1:0 tbf limit 300000 burst 70000 rate 100Mbit pfifo_fast does not have a change() operation. Make fifo_set_limit() more robust about this. [1] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 PGD 1cf99067 P4D 1cf99067 PUD 7ca49067 PMD 0 Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 14443 Comm: syz-executor959 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc3-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:0x0 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffffffffd6. RSP: 0018:ffffc9000e2f7310 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffff8d6ecc00 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff888024c27910 RDI: ffff888071e34000 RBP: ffff888071e34000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffffff8fcfb947 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888024c27910 R13: ffff888071e34018 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88801ef74800 FS: 00007f321d897700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 00000000722c3000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: fifo_set_limit net/sched/sch_fifo.c:242 [inline] fifo_set_limit+0x198/0x210 net/sched/sch_fifo.c:227 tbf_change+0x6ec/0x16d0 net/sched/sch_tbf.c:418 qdisc_change net/sched/sch_api.c:1332 [inline] tc_modify_qdisc+0xd9a/0x1a60 net/sched/sch_api.c:1634 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x413/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5572 netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340 netlink_sendmsg+0x86d/0xdb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1929 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:724 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2409 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2463 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2492 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: authencesn - reject too-short AAD (assoclen<8) to match ESP/ESN spec authencesn assumes an ESP/ESN-formatted AAD. When assoclen is shorter than the minimum expected length, crypto_authenc_esn_decrypt() can advance past the end of the destination scatterlist and trigger a NULL pointer dereference in scatterwalk_map_and_copy(), leading to a kernel panic (DoS). Add a minimum AAD length check to fail fast on invalid inputs.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: cdc_eem: fix tx fixup skb leak when usbnet transmit a skb, eem fixup it in eem_tx_fixup(), if skb_copy_expand() failed, it return NULL, usbnet_start_xmit() will have no chance to free original skb. fix it by free orginal skb in eem_tx_fixup() first, then check skb clone status, if failed, return NULL to usbnet.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: Flush current cpu icache before other cpus On SiFive Unmatched, I recently fell onto the following BUG when booting: [ 0.000000] ftrace: allocating 36610 entries in 144 pages [ 0.000000] Oops - illegal instruction [#1] [ 0.000000] Modules linked in: [ 0.000000] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.13.1+ #5 [ 0.000000] Hardware name: SiFive HiFive Unmatched A00 (DT) [ 0.000000] epc : riscv_cpuid_to_hartid_mask+0x6/0xae [ 0.000000] ra : __sbi_rfence_v02+0xc8/0x10a [ 0.000000] epc : ffffffff80007240 ra : ffffffff80009964 sp : ffffffff81803e10 [ 0.000000] gp : ffffffff81a1ea70 tp : ffffffff8180f500 t0 : ffffffe07fe30000 [ 0.000000] t1 : 0000000000000004 t2 : 0000000000000000 s0 : ffffffff81803e60 [ 0.000000] s1 : 0000000000000000 a0 : ffffffff81a22238 a1 : ffffffff81803e10 [ 0.000000] a2 : 0000000000000000 a3 : 0000000000000000 a4 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.000000] a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : ffffffff8000989c a7 : 0000000052464e43 [ 0.000000] s2 : ffffffff81a220c8 s3 : 0000000000000000 s4 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.000000] s5 : 0000000000000000 s6 : 0000000200000100 s7 : 0000000000000001 [ 0.000000] s8 : ffffffe07fe04040 s9 : ffffffff81a22c80 s10: 0000000000001000 [ 0.000000] s11: 0000000000000004 t3 : 0000000000000001 t4 : 0000000000000008 [ 0.000000] t5 : ffffffcf04000808 t6 : ffffffe3ffddf188 [ 0.000000] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 0000000000000002 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007240>] riscv_cpuid_to_hartid_mask+0x6/0xae [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80009474>] sbi_remote_fence_i+0x1e/0x26 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8000b8f4>] flush_icache_all+0x12/0x1a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8000666c>] patch_text_nosync+0x26/0x32 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8000884e>] ftrace_init_nop+0x52/0x8c [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff800f051e>] ftrace_process_locs.isra.0+0x29c/0x360 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80a0e3c6>] ftrace_init+0x80/0x130 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80a00f8c>] start_kernel+0x5c4/0x8f6 [ 0.000000] ---[ end trace f67eb9af4d8d492b ]--- [ 0.000000] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill the idle task! [ 0.000000] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill the idle task! ]--- While ftrace is looping over a list of addresses to patch, it always failed when patching the same function: riscv_cpuid_to_hartid_mask. Looking at the backtrace, the illegal instruction is encountered in this same function. However, patch_text_nosync, after patching the instructions, calls flush_icache_range. But looking at what happens in this function: flush_icache_range -> flush_icache_all -> sbi_remote_fence_i -> __sbi_rfence_v02 -> riscv_cpuid_to_hartid_mask The icache and dcache of the current cpu are never synchronized between the patching of riscv_cpuid_to_hartid_mask and calling this same function. So fix this by flushing the current cpu's icache before asking for the other cpus to do the same.
An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 5.2 on the powerpc platform. arch/powerpc/kernel/idle_book3s.S does not have save/restore functionality for PNV_POWERSAVE_AMR, PNV_POWERSAVE_UAMOR, and PNV_POWERSAVE_AMOR, aka CID-53a712bae5dd.