In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbdev: Fix invalid page access after closing deferred I/O devices When a fbdev with deferred I/O is once opened and closed, the dirty pages still remain queued in the pageref list, and eventually later those may be processed in the delayed work. This may lead to a corruption of pages, hitting an Oops. This patch makes sure to cancel the delayed work and clean up the pageref list at closing the device for addressing the bug. A part of the cleanup code is factored out as a new helper function that is called from the common fb_release().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: validate zero num_subauth before sub_auth is accessed Access psid->sub_auth[psid->num_subauth - 1] without checking if num_subauth is non-zero leads to an out-of-bounds read. This patch adds a validation step to ensure num_subauth != 0 before sub_auth is accessed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Fix out-of-bound accesses [WHAT & HOW] hpo_stream_to_link_encoder_mapping has size MAX_HPO_DP2_ENCODERS(=4), but location can have size up to 6. As a result, it is necessary to check location against MAX_HPO_DP2_ENCODERS. Similiarly, disp_cfg_stream_location can be used as an array index which should be 0..5, so the ASSERT's conditions should be less without equal.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: iwlwifi: limit printed string from FW file There's no guarantee here that the file is always with a NUL-termination, so reading the string may read beyond the end of the TLV. If that's the last TLV in the file, it can perhaps even read beyond the end of the file buffer. Fix that by limiting the print format to the size of the buffer we have.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: ucan: fix out of bound read in strscpy() source Commit 7fdaf8966aae ("can: ucan: use strscpy() to instead of strncpy()") unintentionally introduced a one byte out of bound read on strscpy()'s source argument (which is kind of ironic knowing that strscpy() is meant to be a more secure alternative :)). Let's consider below buffers: dest[len + 1]; /* will be NUL terminated */ src[len]; /* may not be NUL terminated */ When doing: strncpy(dest, src, len); dest[len] = '\0'; strncpy() will read up to len bytes from src. On the other hand: strscpy(dest, src, len + 1); will read up to len + 1 bytes from src, that is to say, an out of bound read of one byte will occur on src if it is not NUL terminated. Note that the src[len] byte is never copied, but strscpy() still needs to read it to check whether a truncation occurred or not. This exact pattern happened in ucan. The root cause is that the source is not NUL terminated. Instead of doing a copy in a local buffer, directly NUL terminate it as soon as usb_control_msg() returns. With this, the local firmware_str[] variable can be removed. On top of this do a couple refactors: - ucan_ctl_payload->raw is only used for the firmware string, so rename it to ucan_ctl_payload->fw_str and change its type from u8 to char. - ucan_device_request_in() is only used to retrieve the firmware string, so rename it to ucan_get_fw_str() and refactor it to make it directly handle all the string termination logic.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vlan: enforce underlying device type Currently, VLAN devices can be created on top of non-ethernet devices. Besides the fact that it doesn't make much sense, this also causes a bug which leaks the address of a kernel function to usermode. When creating a VLAN device, we initialize GARP (garp_init_applicant) and MRP (mrp_init_applicant) for the underlying device. As part of the initialization process, we add the multicast address of each applicant to the underlying device, by calling dev_mc_add. __dev_mc_add uses dev->addr_len to determine the length of the new multicast address. This causes an out-of-bounds read if dev->addr_len is greater than 6, since the multicast addresses provided by GARP and MRP are only 6 bytes long. This behaviour can be reproduced using the following commands: ip tunnel add gretest mode ip6gre local ::1 remote ::2 dev lo ip l set up dev gretest ip link add link gretest name vlantest type vlan id 100 Then, the following command will display the address of garp_pdu_rcv: ip maddr show | grep 01:80:c2:00:00:21 Fix the bug by enforcing the type of the underlying device during VLAN device initialization.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: hid-thrustmaster: fix stack-out-of-bounds read in usb_check_int_endpoints() Syzbot[1] has detected a stack-out-of-bounds read of the ep_addr array from hid-thrustmaster driver. This array is passed to usb_check_int_endpoints function from usb.c core driver, which executes a for loop that iterates over the elements of the passed array. Not finding a null element at the end of the array, it tries to read the next, non-existent element, crashing the kernel. To fix this, a 0 element was added at the end of the array to break the for loop. [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=9c9179ac46169c56c1ad

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ibmvnic: Use kernel helpers for hex dumps Previously, when the driver was printing hex dumps, the buffer was cast to an 8 byte long and printed using string formatters. If the buffer size was not a multiple of 8 then a read buffer overflow was possible. Therefore, create a new ibmvnic function that loops over a buffer and calls hex_dump_to_buffer instead. This patch address KASAN reports like the one below: ibmvnic 30000003 env3: Login Buffer: ibmvnic 30000003 env3: 01000000af000000 <...> ibmvnic 30000003 env3: 2e6d62692e736261 ibmvnic 30000003 env3: 65050003006d6f63 ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ibmvnic_login+0xacc/0xffc [ibmvnic] Read of size 8 at addr c0000001331a9aa8 by task ip/17681 <...> Allocated by task 17681: <...> ibmvnic_login+0x2f0/0xffc [ibmvnic] ibmvnic_open+0x148/0x308 [ibmvnic] __dev_open+0x1ac/0x304 <...> The buggy address is located 168 bytes inside of allocated 175-byte region [c0000001331a9a00, c0000001331a9aaf) <...> ================================================================= ibmvnic 30000003 env3: 000000000033766e

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usbnet: ipheth: fix DPE OoB read Fix an out-of-bounds DPE read, limit the number of processed DPEs to the amount that fits into the fixed-size NDP16 header.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vfio/platform: check the bounds of read/write syscalls count and offset are passed from user space and not checked, only offset is capped to 40 bits, which can be used to read/write out of bounds of the device.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: LoongArch: csum: Fix OoB access in IP checksum code for negative lengths Commit 69e3a6aa6be2 ("LoongArch: Add checksum optimization for 64-bit system") would cause an undefined shift and an out-of-bounds read. Commit 8bd795fedb84 ("arm64: csum: Fix OoB access in IP checksum code for negative lengths") fixes the same issue on ARM64.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86/mmu: x86: Don't overflow lpage_info when checking attributes Fix KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES to not overflow lpage_info array and trigger KASAN splat, as seen in the private_mem_conversions_test selftest. When memory attributes are set on a GFN range, that range will have specific properties applied to the TDP. A huge page cannot be used when the attributes are inconsistent, so they are disabled for those the specific huge pages. For internal KVM reasons, huge pages are also not allowed to span adjacent memslots regardless of whether the backing memory could be mapped as huge. What GFNs support which huge page sizes is tracked by an array of arrays 'lpage_info' on the memslot, of ‘kvm_lpage_info’ structs. Each index of lpage_info contains a vmalloc allocated array of these for a specific supported page size. The kvm_lpage_info denotes whether a specific huge page (GFN and page size) on the memslot is supported. These arrays include indices for unaligned head and tail huge pages. Preventing huge pages from spanning adjacent memslot is covered by incrementing the count in head and tail kvm_lpage_info when the memslot is allocated, but disallowing huge pages for memory that has mixed attributes has to be done in a more complicated way. During the KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES ioctl KVM updates lpage_info for each memslot in the range that has mismatched attributes. KVM does this a memslot at a time, and marks a special bit, KVM_LPAGE_MIXED_FLAG, in the kvm_lpage_info for any huge page. This bit is essentially a permanently elevated count. So huge pages will not be mapped for the GFN at that page size if the count is elevated in either case: a huge head or tail page unaligned to the memslot or if KVM_LPAGE_MIXED_FLAG is set because it has mixed attributes. To determine whether a huge page has consistent attributes, the KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES operation checks an xarray to make sure it consistently has the incoming attribute. Since level - 1 huge pages are aligned to level huge pages, it employs an optimization. As long as the level - 1 huge pages are checked first, it can just check these and assume that if each level - 1 huge page contained within the level sized huge page is not mixed, then the level size huge page is not mixed. This optimization happens in the helper hugepage_has_attrs(). Unfortunately, although the kvm_lpage_info array representing page size 'level' will contain an entry for an unaligned tail page of size level, the array for level - 1 will not contain an entry for each GFN at page size level. The level - 1 array will only contain an index for any unaligned region covered by level - 1 huge page size, which can be a smaller region. So this causes the optimization to overflow the level - 1 kvm_lpage_info and perform a vmalloc out of bounds read. In some cases of head and tail pages where an overflow could happen, callers skip the operation completely as KVM_LPAGE_MIXED_FLAG is not required to prevent huge pages as discussed earlier. But for memslots that are smaller than the 1GB page size, it does call hugepage_has_attrs(). In this case the huge page is both the head and tail page. The issue can be observed simply by compiling the kernel with CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC and running the selftest “private_mem_conversions_test”, which produces the output like the following: BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in hugepage_has_attrs+0x7e/0x110 Read of size 4 at addr ffffc900000a3008 by task private_mem_con/169 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl print_report ? __virt_addr_valid ? hugepage_has_attrs ? hugepage_has_attrs kasan_report ? hugepage_has_attrs hugepage_has_attrs kvm_arch_post_set_memory_attributes kvm_vm_ioctl It is a little ambiguous whether the unaligned head page (in the bug case also the tail page) should be expected to have KVM_LPAGE_MIXED_FLAG set. It is not functionally required, as the unal ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usbnet: ipheth: use static NDP16 location in URB Original code allowed for the start of NDP16 to be anywhere within the URB based on the `wNdpIndex` value in NTH16. Only the start position of NDP16 was checked, so it was possible for even the fixed-length part of NDP16 to extend past the end of URB, leading to an out-of-bounds read. On iOS devices, the NDP16 header always directly follows NTH16. Rely on and check for this specific format. This, along with NCM-specific minimal URB length check that already exists, will ensure that the fixed-length part of NDP16 plus a set amount of DPEs fit within the URB. Note that this commit alone does not fully address the OoB read. The limit on the amount of DPEs needs to be enforced separately.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix array bounds error with may_goto may_goto uses an additional 8 bytes on the stack, which causes the interpreters[] array to go out of bounds when calculating index by stack_size. 1. If a BPF program is rewritten, re-evaluate the stack size. For non-JIT cases, reject loading directly. 2. For non-JIT cases, calculating interpreters[idx] may still cause out-of-bounds array access, and just warn about it. 3. For jit_requested cases, the execution of bpf_func also needs to be warned. So move the definition of function __bpf_prog_ret0_warn out of the macro definition CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/compaction: fix UBSAN shift-out-of-bounds warning syzkaller reported a UBSAN shift-out-of-bounds warning of (1UL << order) in isolate_freepages_block(). The bogus compound_order can be any value because it is union with flags. Add back the MAX_PAGE_ORDER check to fix the warning.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix overflow in dacloffset bounds check The dacloffset field was originally typed as int and used in an unchecked addition, which could overflow and bypass the existing bounds check in both smb_check_perm_dacl() and smb_inherit_dacl(). This could result in out-of-bounds memory access and a kernel crash when dereferencing the DACL pointer. This patch converts dacloffset to unsigned int and uses check_add_overflow() to validate access to the DACL.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usbnet: ipheth: fix possible overflow in DPE length check Originally, it was possible for the DPE length check to overflow if wDatagramIndex + wDatagramLength > U16_MAX. This could lead to an OoB read. Move the wDatagramIndex term to the other side of the inequality. An existing condition ensures that wDatagramIndex < urb->actual_length.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: orangefs: fix a oob in orangefs_debug_write I got a syzbot report: slab-out-of-bounds Read in orangefs_debug_write... several people suggested fixes, I tested Al Viro's suggestion and made this patch.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix out-of-bounds in parse_sec_desc() If osidoffset, gsidoffset and dacloffset could be greater than smb_ntsd struct size. If it is smaller, It could cause slab-out-of-bounds. And when validating sid, It need to check it included subauth array size.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iscsi_ibft: Fix UBSAN shift-out-of-bounds warning in ibft_attr_show_nic() When performing an iSCSI boot using IPv6, iscsistart still reads the /sys/firmware/ibft/ethernetX/subnet-mask entry. Since the IPv6 prefix length is 64, this causes the shift exponent to become negative, triggering a UBSAN warning. As the concept of a subnet mask does not apply to IPv6, the value is set to ~0 to suppress the warning message.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Don't use tnum_range on array range checking for poke descriptors Hsin-Wei reported a KASAN splat triggered by their BPF runtime fuzzer which is based on a customized syzkaller: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888004e90b58 by task syz-executor.0/1489 CPU: 1 PID: 1489 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.19.0 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x9c/0xc9 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x1f0 ? bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0 kasan_report.cold+0xeb/0x197 ? kvmalloc_node+0x170/0x200 ? bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0 bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0 ? arch_prepare_bpf_dispatcher+0xd0/0xd0 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x43/0x70 bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x3e8/0x640 ? bpf_obj_name_cpy+0x149/0x1b0 bpf_prog_load+0x102f/0x2220 ? __bpf_prog_put.constprop.0+0x220/0x220 ? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110 ? __might_fault+0xd6/0x180 ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0 ? lock_is_held_type+0xa6/0x120 ? __might_fault+0x147/0x180 __sys_bpf+0x137b/0x6070 ? bpf_perf_link_attach+0x530/0x530 ? new_sync_read+0x600/0x600 ? __fget_files+0x255/0x450 ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0 ? fput+0x30/0x1a0 ? ksys_write+0x1a8/0x260 __x64_sys_bpf+0x7a/0xc0 ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x21/0x70 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f917c4e2c2d The problem here is that a range of tnum_range(0, map->max_entries - 1) has limited ability to represent the concrete tight range with the tnum as the set of resulting states from value + mask can result in a superset of the actual intended range, and as such a tnum_in(range, reg->var_off) check may yield true when it shouldn't, for example tnum_range(0, 2) would result in 00XX -> v = 0000, m = 0011 such that the intended set of {0, 1, 2} is here represented by a less precise superset of {0, 1, 2, 3}. As the register is known const scalar, really just use the concrete reg->var_off.value for the upper index check.

Out-of-Bounds Read in netfilter/ipset in Linux Kernel ChromeOS [6.1, 5.15, 5.10, 5.4, 4.19] allows a local attacker with low privileges to trigger an out-of-bounds read, potentially leading to information disclosure

Certain WithSecure products have a buffer over-read whereby processing certain fuzz file types may cause a denial of service (DoS). This affects WithSecure Client Security 15, WithSecure Server Security 15, WithSecure Email and Server Security 15, WithSecure Elements Endpoint Protection 17 and later, WithSecure Client Security for Mac 15, WithSecure Elements Endpoint Protection for Mac 17 and later, WithSecure Linux Security 64 12.0, WithSecure Linux Protection 12.0, and WithSecure Atlant (formerly F-Secure Atlant) 15 and later.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sch_cake: Fix out of bounds when parsing TCP options and header The TCP option parser in cake qdisc (cake_get_tcpopt and cake_tcph_may_drop) could read one byte out of bounds. When the length is 1, the execution flow gets into the loop, reads one byte of the opcode, and if the opcode is neither TCPOPT_EOL nor TCPOPT_NOP, it reads one more byte, which exceeds the length of 1. This fix is inspired by commit 9609dad263f8 ("ipv4: tcp_input: fix stack out of bounds when parsing TCP options."). v2 changes: Added doff validation in cake_get_tcphdr to avoid parsing garbage as TCP header. Although it wasn't strictly an out-of-bounds access (memory was allocated), garbage values could be read where CAKE expected the TCP header if doff was smaller than 5.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: synproxy: Fix out of bounds when parsing TCP options The TCP option parser in synproxy (synproxy_parse_options) could read one byte out of bounds. When the length is 1, the execution flow gets into the loop, reads one byte of the opcode, and if the opcode is neither TCPOPT_EOL nor TCPOPT_NOP, it reads one more byte, which exceeds the length of 1. This fix is inspired by commit 9609dad263f8 ("ipv4: tcp_input: fix stack out of bounds when parsing TCP options."). v2 changes: Added an early return when length < 0 to avoid calling skb_header_pointer with negative length.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ataflop: potential out of bounds in do_format() The function uses "type" as an array index: q = unit[drive].disk[type]->queue; Unfortunately the bounds check on "type" isn't done until later in the function. Fix this by moving the bounds check to the start.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFS: fs_context: validate UDP retrans to prevent shift out-of-bounds Fix shift out-of-bounds in xprt_calc_majortimeo(). This is caused by a garbage timeout (retrans) mount option being passed to nfs mount, in this case from syzkaller. If the protocol is XPRT_TRANSPORT_UDP, then 'retrans' is a shift value for a 64-bit long integer, so 'retrans' cannot be >= 64. If it is >= 64, fail the mount and return an error.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: fix another slab-out-of-bounds in fib6_nh_flush_exceptions While running the self-tests on a KASAN enabled kernel, I observed a slab-out-of-bounds splat very similar to the one reported in commit 821bbf79fe46 ("ipv6: Fix KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in fib6_nh_flush_exceptions"). We additionally need to take care of fib6_metrics initialization failure when the caller provides an nh. The fix is similar, explicitly free the route instead of calling fib6_info_release on a half-initialized object.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: scsi_debug: Fix out-of-bound read in resp_readcap16() The following warning was observed running syzkaller: [ 3813.830724] sg_write: data in/out 65466/242 bytes for SCSI command 0x9e-- guessing data in; [ 3813.830724] program syz-executor not setting count and/or reply_len properly [ 3813.836956] ================================================================== [ 3813.839465] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in sg_copy_buffer+0x157/0x1e0 [ 3813.841773] Read of size 4096 at addr ffff8883cf80f540 by task syz-executor/1549 [ 3813.846612] Call Trace: [ 3813.846995] dump_stack+0x108/0x15f [ 3813.847524] print_address_description+0xa5/0x372 [ 3813.848243] kasan_report.cold+0x236/0x2a8 [ 3813.849439] check_memory_region+0x240/0x270 [ 3813.850094] memcpy+0x30/0x80 [ 3813.850553] sg_copy_buffer+0x157/0x1e0 [ 3813.853032] sg_copy_from_buffer+0x13/0x20 [ 3813.853660] fill_from_dev_buffer+0x135/0x370 [ 3813.854329] resp_readcap16+0x1ac/0x280 [ 3813.856917] schedule_resp+0x41f/0x1630 [ 3813.858203] scsi_debug_queuecommand+0xb32/0x17e0 [ 3813.862699] scsi_dispatch_cmd+0x330/0x950 [ 3813.863329] scsi_request_fn+0xd8e/0x1710 [ 3813.863946] __blk_run_queue+0x10b/0x230 [ 3813.864544] blk_execute_rq_nowait+0x1d8/0x400 [ 3813.865220] sg_common_write.isra.0+0xe61/0x2420 [ 3813.871637] sg_write+0x6c8/0xef0 [ 3813.878853] __vfs_write+0xe4/0x800 [ 3813.883487] vfs_write+0x17b/0x530 [ 3813.884008] ksys_write+0x103/0x270 [ 3813.886268] __x64_sys_write+0x77/0xc0 [ 3813.886841] do_syscall_64+0x106/0x360 [ 3813.887415] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 This issue can be reproduced with the following syzkaller log: r0 = openat(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f0000000040)='./file0\x00', 0x26e1, 0x0) r1 = syz_open_procfs(0xffffffffffffffff, &(0x7f0000000000)='fd/3\x00') open_by_handle_at(r1, &(0x7f00000003c0)=ANY=[@ANYRESHEX], 0x602000) r2 = syz_open_dev$sg(&(0x7f0000000000), 0x0, 0x40782) write$binfmt_aout(r2, &(0x7f0000000340)=ANY=[@ANYBLOB="00000000deff000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000047f007af9e107a41ec395f1bded7be24277a1501ff6196a83366f4e6362bc0ff2b247f68a972989b094b2da4fb3607fcf611a22dd04310d28c75039d"], 0x126) In resp_readcap16() we get "int alloc_len" value -1104926854, and then pass the huge arr_len to fill_from_dev_buffer(), but arr is only 32 bytes. This leads to OOB in sg_copy_buffer(). To solve this issue, define alloc_len as u32.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Correct the length check which causes memory corruption We've suffered from severe kernel crashes due to memory corruption on our production environment, like, Call Trace: [1640542.554277] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [1640542.554856] CPU: 17 PID: 26996 Comm: python Kdump: loaded Tainted:G [1640542.556629] RIP: 0010:kmem_cache_alloc+0x90/0x190 [1640542.559074] RSP: 0018:ffffb16faa597df8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [1640542.559587] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000400200 RCX: 0000000006e931bf [1640542.560323] RDX: 0000000006e931be RSI: 0000000000400200 RDI: ffff9a45ff004300 [1640542.560996] RBP: 0000000000400200 R08: 0000000000023420 R09: 0000000000000000 [1640542.561670] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff9a20608d [1640542.562366] R13: ffff9a45ff004300 R14: ffff9a45ff004300 R15: 696c662f65636976 [1640542.563128] FS: 00007f45d7c6f740(0000) GS:ffff9a45ff840000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [1640542.563937] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [1640542.564557] CR2: 00007f45d71311a0 CR3: 000000189d63e004 CR4: 00000000003606e0 [1640542.565279] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [1640542.566069] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [1640542.566742] Call Trace: [1640542.567009] anon_vma_clone+0x5d/0x170 [1640542.567417] __split_vma+0x91/0x1a0 [1640542.567777] do_munmap+0x2c6/0x320 [1640542.568128] vm_munmap+0x54/0x70 [1640542.569990] __x64_sys_munmap+0x22/0x30 [1640542.572005] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1b0 [1640542.573724] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [1640542.575642] RIP: 0033:0x7f45d6e61e27 James Wang has reproduced it stably on the latest 4.19 LTS. After some debugging, we finally proved that it's due to ftrace buffer out-of-bound access using a debug tool as follows: [ 86.775200] BUG: Out-of-bounds write at addr 0xffff88aefe8b7000 [ 86.780806] no_context+0xdf/0x3c0 [ 86.784327] __do_page_fault+0x252/0x470 [ 86.788367] do_page_fault+0x32/0x140 [ 86.792145] page_fault+0x1e/0x30 [ 86.795576] strncpy_from_unsafe+0x66/0xb0 [ 86.799789] fetch_memory_string+0x25/0x40 [ 86.804002] fetch_deref_string+0x51/0x60 [ 86.808134] kprobe_trace_func+0x32d/0x3a0 [ 86.812347] kprobe_dispatcher+0x45/0x50 [ 86.816385] kprobe_ftrace_handler+0x90/0xf0 [ 86.820779] ftrace_ops_assist_func+0xa1/0x140 [ 86.825340] 0xffffffffc00750bf [ 86.828603] do_sys_open+0x5/0x1f0 [ 86.832124] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1b0 [ 86.835900] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 commit b220c049d519 ("tracing: Check length before giving out the filter buffer") adds length check to protect trace data overflow introduced in 0fc1b09ff1ff, seems that this fix can't prevent overflow entirely, the length check should also take the sizeof entry->array[0] into account, since this array[0] is filled the length of trace data and occupy addtional space and risk overflow.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: Fix out of bounds when parsing TCP options The TCP option parser in mptcp (mptcp_get_options) could read one byte out of bounds. When the length is 1, the execution flow gets into the loop, reads one byte of the opcode, and if the opcode is neither TCPOPT_EOL nor TCPOPT_NOP, it reads one more byte, which exceeds the length of 1. This fix is inspired by commit 9609dad263f8 ("ipv4: tcp_input: fix stack out of bounds when parsing TCP options.").

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: elantech - fix stack out of bound access in elantech_change_report_id() The array param[] in elantech_change_report_id() must be at least 3 bytes, because elantech_read_reg_params() is calling ps2_command() with PSMOUSE_CMD_GETINFO, that is going to access 3 bytes from param[], but it's defined in the stack as an array of 2 bytes, therefore we have a potential stack out-of-bounds access here, also confirmed by KASAN: [ 6.512374] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ps2_command+0x372/0x7e0 [ 6.512397] Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881024d77c2 by task kworker/2:1/118 [ 6.512416] CPU: 2 PID: 118 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 5.13.0-22-generic #22+arighi20211110 [ 6.512428] Hardware name: LENOVO 20T8000QGE/20T8000QGE, BIOS R1AET32W (1.08 ) 08/14/2020 [ 6.512436] Workqueue: events_long serio_handle_event [ 6.512453] Call Trace: [ 6.512462] show_stack+0x52/0x58 [ 6.512474] dump_stack+0xa1/0xd3 [ 6.512487] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1d/0x140 [ 6.512502] ? __ps2_command+0x372/0x7e0 [ 6.512516] __kasan_report.cold+0x7d/0x112 [ 6.512527] ? _raw_write_lock_irq+0x20/0xd0 [ 6.512539] ? __ps2_command+0x372/0x7e0 [ 6.512552] kasan_report+0x3c/0x50 [ 6.512564] __asan_load1+0x6a/0x70 [ 6.512575] __ps2_command+0x372/0x7e0 [ 6.512589] ? ps2_drain+0x240/0x240 [ 6.512601] ? dev_printk_emit+0xa2/0xd3 [ 6.512612] ? dev_vprintk_emit+0xc5/0xc5 [ 6.512621] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 6.512634] ? mutex_lock+0x8f/0xe0 [ 6.512643] ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x20/0x20 [ 6.512655] ps2_command+0x52/0x90 [ 6.512670] elantech_ps2_command+0x4f/0xc0 [psmouse] [ 6.512734] elantech_change_report_id+0x1e6/0x256 [psmouse] [ 6.512799] ? elantech_report_trackpoint.constprop.0.cold+0xd/0xd [psmouse] [ 6.512863] ? ps2_command+0x7f/0x90 [ 6.512877] elantech_query_info.cold+0x6bd/0x9ed [psmouse] [ 6.512943] ? elantech_setup_ps2+0x460/0x460 [psmouse] [ 6.513005] ? psmouse_reset+0x69/0xb0 [psmouse] [ 6.513064] ? psmouse_attr_set_helper+0x2a0/0x2a0 [psmouse] [ 6.513122] ? phys_pmd_init+0x30e/0x521 [ 6.513137] elantech_init+0x8a/0x200 [psmouse] [ 6.513200] ? elantech_init_ps2+0xf0/0xf0 [psmouse] [ 6.513249] ? elantech_query_info+0x440/0x440 [psmouse] [ 6.513296] ? synaptics_send_cmd+0x60/0x60 [psmouse] [ 6.513342] ? elantech_query_info+0x440/0x440 [psmouse] [ 6.513388] ? psmouse_try_protocol+0x11e/0x170 [psmouse] [ 6.513432] psmouse_extensions+0x65d/0x6e0 [psmouse] [ 6.513476] ? psmouse_try_protocol+0x170/0x170 [psmouse] [ 6.513519] ? mutex_unlock+0x22/0x40 [ 6.513526] ? ps2_command+0x7f/0x90 [ 6.513536] ? psmouse_probe+0xa3/0xf0 [psmouse] [ 6.513580] psmouse_switch_protocol+0x27d/0x2e0 [psmouse] [ 6.513624] psmouse_connect+0x272/0x530 [psmouse] [ 6.513669] serio_driver_probe+0x55/0x70 [ 6.513679] really_probe+0x190/0x720 [ 6.513689] driver_probe_device+0x160/0x1f0 [ 6.513697] device_driver_attach+0x119/0x130 [ 6.513705] ? device_driver_attach+0x130/0x130 [ 6.513713] __driver_attach+0xe7/0x1a0 [ 6.513720] ? device_driver_attach+0x130/0x130 [ 6.513728] bus_for_each_dev+0xfb/0x150 [ 6.513738] ? subsys_dev_iter_exit+0x10/0x10 [ 6.513748] ? _raw_write_unlock_bh+0x30/0x30 [ 6.513757] driver_attach+0x2d/0x40 [ 6.513764] serio_handle_event+0x199/0x3d0 [ 6.513775] process_one_work+0x471/0x740 [ 6.513785] worker_thread+0x2d2/0x790 [ 6.513794] ? process_one_work+0x740/0x740 [ 6.513802] kthread+0x1b4/0x1e0 [ 6.513809] ? set_kthread_struct+0x80/0x80 [ 6.513816] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 6.513832] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 6.513838] page:00000000bc35e189 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1024d7 [ 6.513847] flags: 0x17ffffc0000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) [ 6.513860] raw: 0 ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: ngene: Fix out-of-bounds bug in ngene_command_config_free_buf() Fix an 11-year old bug in ngene_command_config_free_buf() while addressing the following warnings caught with -Warray-bounds: arch/alpha/include/asm/string.h:22:16: warning: '__builtin_memcpy' offset [12, 16] from the object at 'com' is out of the bounds of referenced subobject 'config' with type 'unsigned char' at offset 10 [-Warray-bounds] arch/x86/include/asm/string_32.h:182:25: warning: '__builtin_memcpy' offset [12, 16] from the object at 'com' is out of the bounds of referenced subobject 'config' with type 'unsigned char' at offset 10 [-Warray-bounds] The problem is that the original code is trying to copy 6 bytes of data into a one-byte size member _config_ of the wrong structue FW_CONFIGURE_BUFFERS, in a single call to memcpy(). This causes a legitimate compiler warning because memcpy() overruns the length of &com.cmd.ConfigureBuffers.config. It seems that the right structure is FW_CONFIGURE_FREE_BUFFERS, instead, because it contains 6 more members apart from the header _hdr_. Also, the name of the function ngene_command_config_free_buf() suggests that the actual intention is to ConfigureFreeBuffers, instead of ConfigureBuffers (which takes place in the function ngene_command_config_buf(), above). Fix this by enclosing those 6 members of struct FW_CONFIGURE_FREE_BUFFERS into new struct config, and use &com.cmd.ConfigureFreeBuffers.config as the destination address, instead of &com.cmd.ConfigureBuffers.config, when calling memcpy(). This also helps with the ongoing efforts to globally enable -Warray-bounds and get us closer to being able to tighten the FORTIFY_SOURCE routines on memcpy().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tty: Fix out-of-bound vmalloc access in imageblit This issue happens when a userspace program does an ioctl FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO passing the fb_var_screeninfo struct containing only the fields xres, yres, and bits_per_pixel with values. If this struct is the same as the previous ioctl, the vc_resize() detects it and doesn't call the resize_screen(), leaving the fb_var_screeninfo incomplete. And this leads to the updatescrollmode() calculates a wrong value to fbcon_display->vrows, which makes the real_y() return a wrong value of y, and that value, eventually, causes the imageblit to access an out-of-bound address value. To solve this issue I made the resize_screen() be called even if the screen does not need any resizing, so it will "fix and fill" the fb_var_screeninfo independently.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: comedi: pcl812: Fix bit shift out of bounds When checking for a supported IRQ number, the following test is used: if ((1 << it->options[1]) & board->irq_bits) { However, `it->options[i]` is an unchecked `int` value from userspace, so the shift amount could be negative or out of bounds. Fix the test by requiring `it->options[1]` to be within bounds before proceeding with the original test. Valid `it->options[1]` values that select the IRQ will be in the range [1,15]. The value 0 explicitly disables the use of interrupts.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: Fix UBSAN shift-out-of-bounds warning If get_num_sdma_queues or get_num_xgmi_sdma_queues is 0, we end up doing a shift operation where the number of bits shifted equals number of bits in the operand. This behaviour is undefined. Set num_sdma_queues or num_xgmi_sdma_queues to ULLONG_MAX, if the count is >= number of bits in the operand. Bug: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/1472

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: objtool, nvmet: Fix out-of-bounds stack access in nvmet_ctrl_state_show() The csts_state_names[] array only has six sparse entries, but the iteration code in nvmet_ctrl_state_show() iterates seven, resulting in a potential out-of-bounds stack read. Fix that. Fixes the following warning with an UBSAN kernel: vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: .text.nvmet_ctrl_state_show: unexpected end of section

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath12k: Decrement TID on RX peer frag setup error handling Currently, TID is not decremented before peer cleanup, during error handling path of ath12k_dp_rx_peer_frag_setup(). This could lead to out-of-bounds access in peer->rx_tid[]. Hence, add a decrement operation for TID, before peer cleanup to ensures proper cleanup and prevents out-of-bounds access issues when the RX peer frag setup fails. Found during code review. Compile tested only.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: fix out of bounds punch offset Punching a hole with a start offset that exceeds max_end is not permitted and will result in a negative length in the truncate_inode_partial_folio() function while truncating the page cache, potentially leading to undesirable consequences. A simple reproducer: truncate -s 9895604649994 /mnt/foo xfs_io -c "pwrite 8796093022208 4096" /mnt/foo xfs_io -c "fpunch 8796093022213 25769803777" /mnt/foo kernel BUG at include/linux/highmem.h:275! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 710 Comm: xfs_io Not tainted 6.15.0-rc3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:zero_user_segments.constprop.0+0xd7/0x110 RSP: 0018:ffffc90001cf3b38 EFLAGS: 00010287 RAX: 0000000000000005 RBX: ffffea0001485e40 RCX: 0000000000001000 RDX: 000000000040b000 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: 000000000040b000 RBP: 000000000040affb R08: ffff888000000000 R09: ffffea0000000000 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 00000000fffc7fc5 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: 000000000040affb R14: ffffea0001485e40 R15: ffff888031cd3000 FS: 00007f4f63d0b780(0000) GS:ffff8880d337d000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000001ae0b038 CR3: 00000000536aa000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> truncate_inode_partial_folio+0x3dd/0x620 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x226/0x720 ? bdev_getblk+0x52/0x3e0 ? ext4_get_group_desc+0x78/0x150 ? crc32c_arch+0xfd/0x180 ? __ext4_get_inode_loc+0x18c/0x840 ? ext4_inode_csum+0x117/0x160 ? jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata+0x61/0x390 ? __ext4_handle_dirty_metadata+0xa0/0x2b0 ? kmem_cache_free+0x90/0x5a0 ? jbd2_journal_stop+0x1d5/0x550 ? __ext4_journal_stop+0x49/0x100 truncate_pagecache_range+0x50/0x80 ext4_truncate_page_cache_block_range+0x57/0x3a0 ext4_punch_hole+0x1fe/0x670 ext4_fallocate+0x792/0x17d0 ? __count_memcg_events+0x175/0x2a0 vfs_fallocate+0x121/0x560 ksys_fallocate+0x51/0xc0 __x64_sys_fallocate+0x24/0x40 x64_sys_call+0x18d2/0x4170 do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x220 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Fix this by filtering out cases where the punching start offset exceeds max_end.

A flaw was found in the IPv4 Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP) classifier in the Linux kernel. The xprt pointer may go beyond the linear part of the skb, leading to an out-of-bounds read in the `rsvp_classify` function. This issue may allow a local user to crash the system and cause a denial of service.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath12k: fix possible out-of-bound read in ath12k_htt_pull_ppdu_stats() len is extracted from HTT message and could be an unexpected value in case errors happen, so add validation before using to avoid possible out-of-bound read in the following message iteration and parsing. The same issue also applies to ppdu_info->ppdu_stats.common.num_users, so validate it before using too. These are found during code review. Compile test only.

Out of bounds read and write in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 143.0.7499.147 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: conntrack: dccp: copy entire header to stack buffer, not just basic one Eric Dumazet says: nf_conntrack_dccp_packet() has an unique: dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &_dh); And nothing more is 'pulled' from the packet, depending on the content. dh->dccph_doff, and/or dh->dccph_x ...) So dccp_ack_seq() is happily reading stuff past the _dh buffer. BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in nf_conntrack_dccp_packet+0x1134/0x11c0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff000128f66e0c by task syz-executor.2/29371 [..] Fix this by increasing the stack buffer to also include room for the extra sequence numbers and all the known dccp packet type headers, then pull again after the initial validation of the basic header. While at it, mark packets invalid that lack 48bit sequence bit but where RFC says the type MUST use them. Compile tested only. v2: first skb_header_pointer() now needs to adjust the size to only pull the generic header. (Eric) Heads-up: I intend to remove dccp conntrack support later this year.

Data leak in Canvas in Google Chrome prior to 99.0.4844.51 allowed a remote attacker who convinced a user to engage in screen sharing to potentially leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page.

An out-of-bounds read flaw was found in the Linux kernel’s io_uring module in the way a user triggers the io_read() function with some special parameters. This flaw allows a local user to read some memory out of bounds.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vduse: check that offset is within bounds in get_config() This condition checks "len" but it does not check "offset" and that could result in an out of bounds read if "offset > dev->config_size". The problem is that since both variables are unsigned the "dev->config_size - offset" subtraction would result in a very high unsigned value. I think these checks might not be necessary because "len" and "offset" are supposed to already have been validated using the vhost_vdpa_config_validate() function. But I do not know the code perfectly, and I like to be safe.

An out-of-bounds read vulnerability was discovered in linux kernel in the smc protocol stack, causing remote dos.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: isofs: Fix out of bound access for corrupted isofs image When isofs image is suitably corrupted isofs_read_inode() can read data beyond the end of buffer. Sanity-check the directory entry length before using it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: stmmac: dwmac-rk: fix oob read in rk_gmac_setup KASAN reports an out-of-bounds read in rk_gmac_setup on the line: while (ops->regs[i]) { This happens for most platforms since the regs flexible array member is empty, so the memory after the ops structure is being read here. It seems that mostly this happens to contain zero anyway, so we get lucky and everything still works. To avoid adding redundant data to nearly all the ops structures, add a new flag to indicate whether the regs field is valid and avoid this loop when it is not.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ubifs: Fix read out-of-bounds in ubifs_wbuf_write_nolock() Function ubifs_wbuf_write_nolock() may access buf out of bounds in following process: ubifs_wbuf_write_nolock(): aligned_len = ALIGN(len, 8); // Assume len = 4089, aligned_len = 4096 if (aligned_len <= wbuf->avail) ... // Not satisfy if (wbuf->used) { ubifs_leb_write() // Fill some data in avail wbuf len -= wbuf->avail; // len is still not 8-bytes aligned aligned_len -= wbuf->avail; } n = aligned_len >> c->max_write_shift; if (n) { n <<= c->max_write_shift; err = ubifs_leb_write(c, wbuf->lnum, buf + written, wbuf->offs, n); // n > len, read out of bounds less than 8(n-len) bytes } , which can be catched by KASAN: ========================================================= BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ecc_sw_hamming_calculate+0x1dc/0x7d0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888105594ff8 by task kworker/u8:4/128 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-ubifs_0_0) Call Trace: kasan_report.cold+0x81/0x165 nand_write_page_swecc+0xa9/0x160 ubifs_leb_write+0xf2/0x1b0 [ubifs] ubifs_wbuf_write_nolock+0x421/0x12c0 [ubifs] write_head+0xdc/0x1c0 [ubifs] ubifs_jnl_write_inode+0x627/0x960 [ubifs] wb_workfn+0x8af/0xb80 Function ubifs_wbuf_write_nolock() accepts that parameter 'len' is not 8 bytes aligned, the 'len' represents the true length of buf (which is allocated in 'ubifs_jnl_xxx', eg. ubifs_jnl_write_inode), so ubifs_wbuf_write_nolock() must handle the length read from 'buf' carefully to write leb safely. Fetch a reproducer in [Link].